

**International Journal of Theology,
Philosophy and Science**



Volume 1, Number 1, November 2017
Valahia University Press
Târgoviște 2017



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Preface

The first issue of *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science* (IJTPS) (November 2017) contains a group of articles with various themes, dedicated to the areas of Philosophy, Theology, and Science.

Thus, the section ***Studies and Articles*** opens with the paper: “*Philosophy and Theology. Science and Knowledge, Truth and Life*”, written by Ph.D. Marin BUGIULESCU in which the author undertakes a theological analysis and he mentions the content on philosophical information and presents the Christian Dogmatic Theology teaching as science and knowledge of Truth and Life. The next work is *Language, Truth and Literature: The grammars of truth in the history of philosophy*, and it belongs to Ph.D. Gene FENDT who shows us that in the history of philosophy, the word ‘truth’ is used in many ways. After that, the paper called: *The prayer «God of the spirits»* was written by Ph.D. Nicolae PREDA, who shows that the expression “in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms”, is the only one which emphasizes the real difference between the various written forms of the prayer *The God of the spirit*. The next study, by Ph.D. Cosmin SANTI, entitled *Christian Hymnographic Representation of the State of Souls in Hell* shows a particular interest because the author succeeds in showing that our earthly life, of faith and communion with the Heavenly Father or of faithlessness and non-communion with God, is extended in the eternity.

The following paper belongs to Ph.D. B. Hyun CHOO, M.D.DABPM. and Jay J. CHOI having the title: *Amitābha Buddha Revisited: Into the Twenty-first Century Modern Science*, in which he highlights the Mahāyāna concept of Buddha’s meritorious qualities. Particularly, Amitābha Buddha symbolizes the Buddha of Infinite Light and Infinite Life, representing the transcendence of time and space. Walter GOMIDE Ph.D. signs the subsequent article: *The Divine Logos and possible Worlds*. This paper represents an attempt to translate into mathematics, especially into set theory and infinitary epistemic logic, the notion of “Divine Logos”. The following article: *Religion and Science unification*, by Ph.D. Spyridon KAKOS is an attempt to show that Religion-vs.-Science debate is a pseudo-conflict. Science and religion both complete our knowledge for the world. Speaking about God is part of science as well as of religion. The following article belongs to Ph.D. Georgios KARAKASIS and its title is: *An interpretation of evil’s perception in the Freedom essay of Friedrich Schelling*. The study emphasizes the concept of Schelling on *freedom* in order to understand how evil is to be perceived and what its nature is. Kantian moral altruism is not merely a matter of logical consistence or even a deconstruction of humanity by reason alone; it must be valued in a more specifically non-formalistic sense i.e. moral respect and love. This is the viewpoint of Ph.D. Candidate Yuhang GUO presented in the article *A Kantian Approach to Altruism in Respect and Love*. The volume of our journal ends with MA. Rocco A. ASTORE’s article, entitled: *Against Hegel and Marx: In Favor of Danto’s, Benjamin’s, and Löwith’s Critiques of Universal History*.

The academic and scientific content presented in the first Number of *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science* distinguishes the opportunity to examine the altogether truth-claims found in Theology, Philosophy, and sciences, as well as the methods laid out by every discipline and the meanings derived from them. This is both the aim and the scientific mission of our *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science*.

November 2017

Editor Prof. Ph.D. Marin BUGIULESCU



PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, SCIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH AND LIFE

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ABSTRACT

The present article analyses the content on philosophical information and presents the Christian Theology and Dogmatic teaching as Science and Knowledge of Truth and Life. Orthodox theology in general and the dogmatic in particular, have as primary objective the knowledge and explanation of the revealed truths of faith, which exposes them systematically and symbolically, having the basic inside of their content sent by the Holy Scripture and Tradition, but formulated for Church in dogmas. The specific of the Orthodoxy shows us that theology is the science of the whole knowledge with a direct existential implication of the only truth about life-maker iconically expressed by God the Holy Trinity. The theological background of knowledge is essentially that of ecclesial, as graceful ambience in which the divine revelation represents the power of the truth. That's why Church is the guarantee and the authenticity of the free knowledge and infallible knowledge of the divine truth that it has inside.

Keywords: Christianity; Orthodoxy Theology; Dogma; Philosophy; Truth and Life; Church;

INTRODUCTION

Man is the only being created by God who has the ability to think, speak, and be like his Creator, the God. With the passage of time, the feelings and thoughts of everyday life passed through the thought filter were written on paper, and contained in words, notions and concepts written and left as an inheritance to future generations, but also as a testimony of the passage over time. Two great scientific contents deal with the knowledge of truth, of the human life of everything that exists. Of course, we are talking about philosophy and theology. "What is philosophy?" We asked Jules Lachelier (1832-1918), but here is what he responded to the astonishment of his disciples and ours: "I do not know!" Here's how a teacher teaches a discipline which he does not know, nor what it is and what it does¹. Starting from these considerations in philosophy, there are no universal standards that impose themselves in the face of knowledgeable consciousness, and the operation of delimiting philosophy from the other fields of intellectual exercise, starting from the criterion of definition, is itself philosophical. Man by nature is a philosopher, he thinks, has questions, and seeks answers. In ancient Greek, philosophy designated the love of wisdom, and according to tradition, Pythagoras used this term for the first time (580-500 BC).

¹ Andre Vergez & Denis Huisman, *Curs de filosofie, (Course of philosophy)*, Humanitas, 1995.



“Pythagoras was the first to use the term philosophy and called himself a philosopher ... saying that no man is wise but only the god. Philosophy was formerly called wisdom, and the professor was called wise, to show that he had reached the highest degree of soul perfection; the philosopher was the lover of wisdom”².

Is the philosopher a wise man? The wise man can be a philosopher? If philosophy questions question, theology with a revealed character responds. From a philosophical perspective, “wisdom means to conform to the truth by listening to the nature (*physis*) of things” that “remain hidden”³. It is man who creates wisdom and gives birth to philosophical thinking, which results in the purely anthropocentric character of philosophy.

What is theology? Unlike rationalist philosophical thinking where truth is impersonal, Christianity reveals God as a personal, Tri-Personality of the Holy Trinity, who does not stay away from His creatures but is in touch with them, and especially with man. It is revealed to men so that they can at least know something of His existence and works. If there was no Divine Revelation, or the action by which God is revealed to men, his knowledge would not be possible to men, for He, being a spiritual being, cannot be known by the senses. Revelation is necessary because without it man cannot know the works and plans of God, and thus he cannot fulfill the ultimate purpose for which he was created, namely, the exaltation of the Creator and the acquisition of eternal happiness as the fulfillment of his own being, as the Savior Himself says: “*Now this is eternal life: that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent.*” (John 17: 3). So, Christian theology does not build the idea of God but is based on the revelation of God made to men gradually, so long as man can understand the Truth. Hence the theology, the dogmatic knowledge does not ask what is the essence of divine revelation, but what the Church must say on the basis of the apostles and prophets and the Bible for the salvations of all peoples.

“The theology does not offer a sum of knowledge about God, but the life of God, the Person of Christ, God-Man, the only Complete Truth, the Way, Truth, and Life”⁴.

The Truth is God Himself. In this sense, revelation-based theology analyzes God and His works outside of His Being, but also all His works and beings created by Him as they stand in relation to God the Creator, the Provident and the Savior. So in this aspect as in philosophy, any natural or human phenomenon in this world can be analyzed from the theological perspective. Anything or phenomenon can become the subject of Christian theology: the world, nature, the environment, science, man himself, creation etc. Unanimously, philosophical thinking referring to Christian theology conceptualizes it and sums it up:

“1) the disbelief in the human mind of being able to find the truth through its own means. That is why human thinking in this period seeks support outside of it, in God, in divine revelation, in dogma. 2) The purpose of philosophy is of a hermeneutical nature. She has to interpret holy texts, in which the truth is masked, often exposed in a metaphorical way. 3) The world is not constituted by rational principles, as pagan philosophers understood it. The meaning of the world escapes our ability to know. The world is a mystery, since the

² Diogene Laertios, *Despre viețile și doctrinele filosofilor (About philosophers' lives and doctrines)*, București, Editura Academiei, p.118

³ See, *Filosofia greacă până la Platon, (Greek philosophy up to Plato)*, Vol. I. Second part, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, pp. 321-373

⁴ Pr. Lect. George Remete, *Dogmatica Ortodoxă, (The Orthodox Dogmatics)*, ed. III-a, Editura Reîntregirea, Alba-Iulia, 2000, p. 11.



creator of this world, God, has not presented to people his intentions. 4) Nature research becomes marginal. Interesting are, for the Christian philosopher, the moral deeds and inner life of man”⁵.

Certainly, from a rational point of view, these considerations can be accepted, but they miss out on the very real character, specific to God and especially to man. This definition of theology is made in the strictest way of logical reasoning and logic thinking, but apart from the total divine revelation realized by Jesus Christ, where the antinomy and the parody become real and meaningful. Greek philosophy is centered on the structure of religion, the mythology of history, and the relations of the gods with world-theology, and not a reality of God, which is why Greek philosophers conceive the world in the storyline as something of its own, something of the order logically constraining records and does not seek to see who her author is.

"*Philosophical theology*", in fact, the ancient philosophy rediscovered in the medieval period, represents the power of man's mind directed to the knowledge of divinity, to the relationship with the gods, an anthropocentric discourse - understood as a rational, monologist projection given to imaginary meanings that conceive of a divinity static, existing only apparent and not real. On the opposite pole, based on the divine discovery, theology means conceptually defined life by the systematic assemblies of revealed works of faith as well as the defense and valorization of the Christian faith.

Philosophy is man's desire to love the wisdom of fulfilling man's duty to man. Philosophy starts from the incursions of human thought into the world of the concepts and ideas that it generates, postulates, autonomously without guaranteeing their existence, and so at the origin of all lies a principle, an idea, abstract, unreal, but which becomes real just by the fact that is thought. *An essential remark is the following, namely, theology is specific to the man who seeks him, speaks with and is about God. While Divine Revelation is the revelation of God to men, the action by which God speaks of Himself and His works is theology. It does not mean theology, because it is Revelation. And if God does not exist, it cannot be discerned, it cannot be known, yet logically the philosophical man seeks precisely the existence of his non-existence, which for philosophy, ontologically, it cannot make sense, because the being cannot be thought as coming from non-existence.*

Talking about God, rationalizing the Divine Existence, thinking that there is a Supreme Being is in fact a call to what the Creator put into man's being, the mental and mental part through which man reaches the act of knowledge, understanding, and science. This complex and antinomical process is a revelation and certainty that at least in terms of logical act, gnomic is possible. So man ascends with the mind to perceive the mysteries of God and creation, because this presupposes on one hand his own existence and on the other hand the existence of God. From the perspective of theological thinking, this act is not based on the intellectual processes specific to man, scientifically perfected with the passage of time, because God is not an idea, a man-made conception, but is grounded on God's revelation, the Divine Revelation. God exists and is revealed to men, of course progressively in the Old Testament and fully through Jesus Christ, and man's reception of this revelation not only involves intellectual mechanisms, neither scientific schemes, nor philosophical opinions, but a relationship, a connection of love and communion of man with God specific to the personal beings that is generally attributed to the sacred and holy space of the Church.

⁵ http://www.unarte.org/unarte/pdf/pentru_studenti/cursuri/CA.2.pdf, pp. 76-69



The divine revelation is comprehended and transmitted by Sacred Scripture and Holy Tradition but in close connection with the Church that has authority over its formation, fixation, defense, and explanation under the direct presence, assistance and inspiration of God's Holy Spirit. The process of knowledge generally involves a conceptual coordinate with logical, analogical and symbolic veils, using words, judgments, images, symbols, analogies, according to the human way of thinking and understanding to express and define their realities and existence.

The Orthodox Theology, in general, and Dogmatics in particular, seeks to know and explain the revealed truths of faith, which they systematically and symbolically exhibit, having as their basis their content contained in the Sacred Scripture and transmitted by the Holy Tradition but formulated in time by the Church in dogma.

Theology refers to the totality of the teachings of the Church concerning the Existence of God and His works in the world. That is why theology should not be seen only as a science of religion or religion, because in reality God cannot be defined and encompassed scientifically, but rather, empirically by personal belief based on the revealed truths one can define and express part of the vast theological domain. As a science and religious experience, theology encompasses many forms of manifestation: dogmatic, practical, ritualistic, moral, ascetic, mystical. Through all the action of God's knowledge is made, which represents a way of life that Jesus Christ the Son of God incarnate has revealed, but the Church has regulated it by linking the theandric sacramental ambiance it offers to its members. *So, the man cannot know God without the dates of the Divine Revelation and especially without the harsh and ecclesial life through which he unites with Christ in the Holy Mysteries, but this process is continuous, it is not static, because what is to be known God is Absolute, that is why theological, dogmatic knowledge is accomplished in venice and involves a transformation of man, a sanctification of it, the fulfillment of the divine achypus by the likeness of God.*

1. THE NOTION AND MEANING OF THEOLOGY AND DOGMA

The notion of "theology" first appears in the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, naming the words spoken of a certain god ($\theta\epsilon\omicron\lambda\gamma\acute{\iota}\alpha$)⁶, but being related to mythology and agnostic mysticism embodied in magic, which made the Christian context for differentiation uses the phrase "*true philosophy*," designating the action that deals with studying, knowing, explaining and transmitting the truths of revelation. St. Justin the Martyr and the Philosopher uses the first word "theologian" in the Dialogue with the Triphon the Jude, meaning the word or revelation of God to man, without defining theology as Christian teaching, which he is called "*the only true and useful philosophy*". In the same direction is also Clement the Alexandrine, who says that Christian theology is "true philosophy and theology." The term "dogmatic theology" dates back to the seventh century AD, adding to the historical

⁶ See: Platon, *Republica* (c. II, 379 A); Aristotle, *Metafizica* 2.4; The term theology was first used by Plato in the Republic (II, 379 A) where he speaks of three types of theology: (1) epic, (2) melos, (3) the tragedy, these being the representations of the gods, the citizens of a city, in contrast to the rough representations that circulated in the people. At Aristotle, the term "theologians" is used for old poets and writers: Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus. They are theologians, or those who know the life of the gods. In contrast to these theologians also considered to be a kind of philosopher, Aristotle opposes the ancient physicists or those who study and speak about the principles of the world, such as Empidocle (*Metaphysics*, I075 b, 2; 26).

⁷ Sfântul Iustin Martirul și Filosoful, *Dialogul cu iudeul Trifon (Dialogue with Trypho)*, Partea I, cap, II, trad. Pr. Olimp N. Căciulă, în P.S.B., Nr. 2., edit IBM al BOR, București 1980, pp. 92-94



separation of the Christian church beginning with 1054 but continued until today, and coordinated by comparative theology or "symbolic"⁸.

From etymological perspective, the notion of theology is made up of the words: Θεός -Theos = God and λόγος -logos = word, teaching, reason, knowledge, what only shows the material side that is related to rationality developed and materialized in what man called science of the "Word of God" or "science of God and His works". But this materiality of theology seen only as science is not sufficient, because its object which is the relationship of God with man and vice versa is not expressed, for it is accomplished in a living, integral reality by the interpenetration of natural the supernatural, the divine with humanity, the material with the spiritual, in other words, through mystical living, or life in Christ, defined by being in the "Holy Spirit, in the spirit of the holy Fathers".

Defining theology only as a science based on the etymology of the Greek word "theologia" means in fact a definition of what it contains and truly expresses, namely the co-working of man with God testified in the teaching of God and His works on the basis of revelation, and totally in and by Jesus Christ, but formulated, transmitted and preached exclusively by Church. Christ Himself is permanently and truly present in the Church teaches to the saints and leads to salvation the people who unite with Him and believe in Him. Therefore the Church is the theandrical framework of revelation, in which Christ continuously and continuously exercises until the end of his three-eyed ministry.

Theology dealing with Christian religion, or the free and conscious connection of man with God cannot be defined only as a sign of the teachings of God, God's relationship with man and the world, these being important as regards the epistemological side but not enough for knowledge of divine secrets because knowledge in its deep sense means the discovery of the one expressing a certain reality, in a dogmatic religious sense meaning God's knowledge. But God cannot be known by His being, because man does not have this capacity on the one hand, and on the other through such knowledge and definition we circumscribe Him, we limit Him and therefore we cannot be God. We know God after the works that springs up and holds on to His Being or grace; therefore theology implies the reception of grace that illuminates man's mind (gnosis); enlightenment that transforms him (*metanoia*) and makes him a worker according to the mystical experience he has reached, which he cannot define or conceptualize because it "contains the uncluttered", the apophatic in which human logic encounters antinomy.

Taking into account this mysterious experience, the Orthodox Church has always learned that theology is in the first place a way of life and not a science, and **theologian is not the one who speaks of God but the one who speaks to God**, to whom reveals the "hiding places and secrets" of the transcendent which he then speaks of using the elements of the immanent, but that does not mean a dissection and exhaustion of what he actually knows.

Theology is a reality of man's relationship with God, of prayer and contemplation. That is why Evagrius of Pontus teaches us that: „*he that loveth God hath spoken with him forever, as with a father*”⁹ and in conclusion „*if you are a theologian (you are dealing with the contemplation of God to the true knowledge), pray truly; and if you pray with a devil you are a theologian*”¹⁰. In this sense, the great writer of church, Origen in his epistle to his

⁸ Clement Alexandrinul, *Stromata* I, cap. V, trad. Pr. D. Fecioru, în P.S.B., Nr. 5, Edit IBM, București, 1980, pp. 25-28

⁹ Evagrie Ponticul, *Cuvânt despre rugăciune (The teaching of prayer)*, cap. 54, în Filocalia, vol.I, ed.II, trad. Pr. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Sibiu 1947, p. 81

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, cap 60, p. 81



disciple St. Gregory the Thaumaturgus, advising him to understand the mysteries of Holy Scripture says:

“My distinguished son, be remembered in the reading of holy scriptures, for we who are reading the scriptures must be careful, that we may not learn or believe anything unhealthy about them. Having a lot of attention and remembrance in the reading of the holy ones, but also a belief with pleasing thoughts to God, knocks on the hidden doors of the scripture and opens to you the story about which Jesus taught us. But in order to understand the holy ones it is not enough to beat and to search, but very prayerful is also the prayer”¹¹.

Theology involves the sensual and gradual experience of the God's love for men, love that the ecclesial frame truly shares with those who enter into direct communication with Christ, illuminating their minds and revealing to them the unique system of cognitive knowledge in which divine life transcends the concept of "the word that kills" because it actually means receiving the spirit of life that makes the letter or word itself alive. In order to attain this knowledge, it is necessary to have the *metanoia* and deliverance from the bondage of sin by changing the mind that is heading to Christ, colliding with Him, having the same thoughts that materialize in good deeds as the rows of faith, as St. Athanasius the Great:

“In addition to the true search and knowledge of the Scriptures, it is also necessary for a good life and a pure soul and virtue after Christ, that, walking in its path, the mind reaches the desirable ones and can encompass as far as possible the flesh of men, find out about God-Word. For without pure thought, without the consecration of the saints, one cannot understand the words of the saints. ... He who wishes to understand the thoughts of God to the speakers must cleanse and wash the soul through life, and draw near to the saints by the likeness of his deeds, that by accompanying them together by living with them, discovered by God ...”¹².

St. Maximus the Confessor clearly shows the difference between theology as discourse and theology as knowledge of God, therefore:

“Those who have mysteriously conceived of God's contemplative knowledge (contemplative theology) and have made their minds clean of all material imagination and all, and have made the image of divine beauty by imitating that, to think that they are lovers”¹³.

Revelation in Jesus Christ is the plenary divine Revelation in the sense that it can no longer be improved or perfected, and that no new revelation, i.e., another, for mankind, is to be expected in the future. This plenary Revelation in Christ is not only a sum of teachings or truths, but also a new order of harvest life set in and by Christ, that is, the fullness of Christian truths and salvific hardships present as a continuous permanence of Christ in the Church over all times and spaces. Concretizing the knowledge of divine truth constitutes the Sacred Tradition or the Apostolic Tradition of the Church as the application and deepening of the revealed word of Holy Scripture. When the knowledge of theology teaches the true knowledge of God, the kingdom of heaven. In Christ is the whole content of knowledge that we reach through the Holy Spirit that guides us to all truth (John 16:13) or to Christ Himself "The Way, Truth and Life" (John 14: 6). That is why through the Holy Spirit „*What we have received is not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, so that we may understand what God has freely given us. This is what we speak, not in words taught us by*

¹¹ Origen, *Epistola către Sfântul Grigorie, (The Epistle to St. Gregory)* ; Migne P.G. vol. XI, col. 89-92

¹² Sf. Atanasie cel Mare, *Despre Întruparea Logosului (About the Incarnation of the Logos)*, trad. Pr. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae PSB, vol. 15, Edit. IBM al BOR, București 1987 pp. 153-154

¹³ Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul, *Răspuns către Talasie*, 10, Filocalia 3, ediția electronică, Apologeticum 2005, p.63



human wisdom but in words taught by the Spirit, explaining spiritual realities with Spirit-taught words.” (1 Corinthians 2: 12-13).

From the view point of the stringency that characterizes most of the scientific fields, scholasticism has lately developed, apart from ecclesial authority, the discipline dealing with the study of religions called the Science of Religion (history of relegation). But the Science of Religion differs from theology as far as the subject is concerned, because religion science studies the religious phenomenon in general, and theology studies Christian religion, based on revelation in Christ whose content is contained in dogmas; as well as the methods: the Science of Religion, applying to the rational side, treats religion as a natural phenomenon arising from causes and effects, and evolved through the action of contextual factors, whereas theology, based on divine revelation data, does not aim at the theoretical formulation, the truths of faith, their experience in gaining eternal life.

So *Theology belongs to the Christian religion that it studies and explains, but not only in the vitality of the data provided by human reason, but above all on the divine revelation, through which the grace of the Holy Spirit illuminates reason; it is the true science that has the object of studying God and His works, and especially the relationship of all creation with God the Creator, Savior, Savior, and Judge.* That is why Dogmatics:

“No longer to man, but to human, and therefore to touch each soul's chords, may flourish with glimmers of light in every soul. It does not address the idol, the singular, the lusts, the random associations, or the selfish calculations of one individual or another, but the eternal, general-human, sacred, and abnegating of every human being. It does not address those who deprive man of his human face, but those who make him an authentic man. In a word, Dogmatics begins to use humanity arguments instead of the former Dominic's arguments, and the moment of the psychology of religion is replaced by that of the new testamentary theology”¹⁴.

The Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, if it remains in the scholastic sphere loses its meaning as the living source of the faith that Christ carries in human beings, risking being ideologized and consequently should call upon continuous adaptation of faith to various time-specific thinking systems, which contradicts divine revelation.

Orthodox Theology in general and especially Dogmatic Theology is based on the strong Biblical and patristic hermeneutics assumed and transmitted in the "spirit of the holy Fathers" gathered in synod under the authority and inspiration of the Holy Spirit formulated and transmitted the dogmas of faith absolutely necessary for knowledge, giving salvation. So dogma as a synthesis of the teaching of faith involves prayer and life in and with Christ known in the revelation transmitted by Holy Scripture and the Holy Tradition intensely applied by patristic theology, by the liturgical experience and by the improved life of those who came through ascetic effort to know the depth of divine secrets.

“That is why we are obliged to receive with strong faith and question from those who have tried the dogmas of the Church and the righteous judgments of the teachers about the divine Scriptures and the thoughtful and thoughtful creatures, lest we, by trusting in our understanding, fall short. In all, we owe ourselves to discover our ignorance that seeking someone and not believing in his thoughts, wanting to teach, and in the knowledge of much ignorance, to know his ignorance of the wisdom of God without the edges of God”¹⁵.

¹⁴ Pavel Florenski, *Dogmatică și dogmatism, Studii și eseuri teologice, Dogmatics and Dogmatism, Theological Studies and Theses*, Ed. Anastasia, 1998, p.144

¹⁵ Petru Damaschinul, *Despre a șasea cunoștință, About the Sixth Knowledge*, Filoc. 5, Eit. IBM al BOR, București, 1976, p.106-107



Understanding and knowing the mysteries of both divinity and creation cannot be accomplished without the divine help of grace that illuminates the mind of man and makes him truly faithful.

The central point from which the process of Christian understanding begins is the Person and the Work of Christ the Son of God Incarnate, or the Logos by which God has fulfilled all the purposes of creation. But the process of knowledge in Christ is full of life, graceful, that is why it cannot be attained in a discursive knowledge based solely on the powers of reason, for it remains within the sphere of creation, the need for overcoming by faith, contemplation of the things that are seen, which lead to direct, simple understanding, in which the mind lowered in the heart is enlightened by divine grace. The work of the Holy Spirit-giving life and the light of Christ's knowledge are inherent to the ecclesiastical theandric community, in which grace descends to a fifty-second continuously under the "image of the tongues as fire" as a manifestation and presence of the triumphal love. St. Gregory Palamas in the word of teaching at the descent of the Holy Spirit says:

"But why did the Spirit appear in the tongue? To show his coexistence with the Logos of God, for nothing has a greater approximation than the word with the tongue. At the same time to doctrine, because he who teaches the things about Christ must have gracious tongue. But why are burning tongues like fire? Of course, not only to show the Spirit's devotion to the Father and to the Son, for the fire is our God, and yet the burning of all wickedness, but also because of the folded work of the apostles' sermon. This is because it can also be for charity or for punishment. As the fire has the quality of enlightening and burning, so the word of the teaching of Christ also illuminates those who obey, and those who do not receive them make them worthy of torment and eternal fire. And he spoke tongues, not of fire, but of fire, lest any man think that this fire is material and subject to the senses and that we can understand the manifestation of the Spirit through this embodiment in the form of tongues"¹⁶.

The grasp of knowledge and knowledge (Luke 11: 52) offered by Christ to those who unite with Him leads to the understanding of the spirit of the life of the scripture and not to the speculative appreciation of "the letter that kills" (2 Corinthians 3: 6). Knowing and experiencing the "New Testament" - Jesus Christ puts theology in direct relation to the revelation, in which the initiative belongs to God, and at the same time engages the free answer of faith and love on the part of man. The renowned Professor Dumitru Stăniloae following St. Maxim the Confessor shows that Christ:

"The Word or Reason of God passes through the whole being of man by virtue and knowledge, family them. It's a breakthrough in time, not in a moment. The Word of God, stubborn in man, in his consciousness, passes through his reason, which thus conforms to the purposes of God. From consciousness, she organizes, rationalizes the bodily movements of man, and then enlightens his understanding, eventually penetrating all man. The two reasons are intimately related, but two remain, the human one following the divine, as the word of God binds to Himself, in response, our word, without canceling it, into a dialogue union"¹⁷.

In the union with Christ, the visible power of the mind reaches the understanding and vision of the spiritual ones communicated by God, whose presence it senses, but cannot express it in a material sense, for it exceeds the immanence. In this state, the mind is traversed by the apophatic intimate knowledge of God. Faith and pure prayer accompanied

¹⁶ St. Gregory Palamas, *Omilia 24, Cuvânt la pogorârea Duhului Sfânt*, 7, trad. Diac. Drd. Eugen Moraru, în rev. „S.T.”, Seria II, An XLVII, Nr. 1-3, 1995, p. 79

¹⁷ Sf. Maxim Mărturisitorul, *Ambigua*, trad. Pr. D. Stăniloae, PSB 80, Edit. IBM al BOR, București, 1983, nota 172, p. 144



by purification of passions brings the theologian closer to Christ, and the Incarnate Word Himself directs it to the knowledge of God One in being and in perspectives, seen as love and light above love and light.

2. DOGMA, THEOLOGUM, THEOLOGICAL OPINION

The Orthodox Dogmatic Theology expose systematically and symbolically in an organic form the teaching of revealed faith of the Church contained and transmitted by Sacred Scripture and Holy Tradition, but formulated in time by the Church in the dogmata. So the dogmatic content is dogmas, but especially their explanation.

The notion of "δoγμα doctrine" derives from the verb "dokeo" which means I think. I think in a broad sense, meaning a conception, an unquestionable belief at origins. Also from the verb "dokeo" derives "doxa" which means opinion, magnification, and teaching.

In ancient philosophy, the "dogma" term defines a principle, a philosophical teaching that enjoys a wide recognition as an incontestable truth. Thus the doctrines were called, the teachings of Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, Stoics, and philosophers in general.

In Christian Orthodox Theology, dogma is a truth of faith revealed by God Himself, her author, immutable, formulated, proposed, transmitted, defended, and accepted by the Church on account of her infallibility in the ecumenical and local synods necessary for the salvation of her members.

“The word dogma is used 5 times in the Greek New Testament, but with the one exception of Acts 16:4, in a sense widely different from that which ecclesiastical usage has given to it from the 2nd century downward. "Dogma" is used in the New Testament, (1) of Roman laws: "a decree (Greek dogma) from Caesar Augustus" (Luke 2:1); "the decrees of Caesar" (Acts 17:7) = the whole body of Roman law; (2) of ordinances of religious law: "the law of commandments contained in ordinances" (Ephesians 2:15); "the bond written in ordinances" (Colossians 2:14) = the Mosaic ordinances as expressing the moral law which condemned the sinner, and whose enmity Christ abolished by His death. It is a significant revelation of the spirit of Greek theology that all the Greek commentators understood by ordinances in these two places, the gospel as a body of dogmas which had removed the commandment or bond that was against us (see Lightfoot, Colossians, at the place); (3) of the decrees of the Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15:20), which Paul and his companions delivered to the Gentile churches (Acts 16:4). Here we have one element that entered into the later ecclesiastical meaning of the word. These dogmas were decisions on religious matters, imposed by a more or less authoritative council of the church as a condition of admission to its membership”¹⁸.

So, in the New Testament, the word "dogma" appears in two places (Luke 2, 1 and Acts 14, 7), meaning decrees, laws, imperial order, and (Colossians 2, 14 and Ephesians 2), we do the Mosaic Law prescriptions.

In the Acts of the Apostles, the term dogma defines the "decisions" taken by the apostles and elders of the Church of Jerusalem (in the years 50-52, Acts 16: 4) "*And when passing through the cities, they teach them to observe the teachings (δογματος) ordained by the Apostles and the priests of Jerusalem.*" St. Ignatius Theophorus by dogma defines all the teachings of Christ transmitted by the Holy Apostles when writing to the Magytes: „*Pray to be strong in the dogmas of the Lord and the apostles*”¹⁹. Also, St. Basil the Great says:

¹⁸ <http://biblehub.com/topical/d/dogma.htm>

¹⁹ Sfântul Ignatie Teoforul, *Către magnezieni (To Magnesians)*, cap 13, trad. Pr. D. Fecioru, P.S.B. 1, edit. IBM al BOR, București 1979, p. 168



“Of the dogmas preserved in the Church, we have the written teachings on the instruments, and the allies have received them from the tradition of the apostles. Both (forms of transmission) have the same power for faith”²⁰.

Father Dumitru Stăniloae claims that dogmas “*are the truths of faith necessary for salvation, and these truths are in fact expressions of the Supreme Truth that is Christ-God true and true Man*”²¹.

As a logical projection of one or more metalogical principles dogma is related to paradox or antinomy, which rationally does not mean nonsense. Antimony does not limit knowledge but opens it to the transcendent, to the contemplation of divine purposes, which implies charisma or the only way of understanding dogma.

Dogma in its essence is a truth of faith revealed by God, formulated and transmitted by the Church, for the salvation of man.

From this definition, two characteristics of dogma are easily detached:

Truth revealed / Church truth

These two are essential in defining a dogma. Therefore, a truth discovered in Sacred Scripture or Holy Tradition, but not formulated by the Church, does not constitute a dogma but has its revealed truth of faith. Only through express expression in the synod by the Church these truths become normative and leading to salvation and the heavenly kingdom in Christian life.

“In the first phase, revealed truth is implicitly or explicitly in the Revelation, without the Church activating, formally or officially deciding upon it. In the second phase, the truth is discussed on all faces, researched by theological conception, with all its possibilities for knowledge, possibly disputed by heretics. Finally, in the third phase, at the end of the exhaustion of all the discussions, the Church officially and authoritatively decides as a “pillar and foundation” of the truth”²².

Formal proclamation as a dogma is a non-standardized process that has several stages that involves revealing the truth by God in an indeterminate form, then analyzing under the harsh assistance of those discovered, and then proclaiming it as a dogma by formal, solemn and ultimate Church. In conclusion, the Church is the guarantee and authenticity of the revealed and infallible truth, of the divine truth, which it encompasses, regulated by the biblical canon and the monuments of the Holy Tradition. Outside of the Church according to the atotropicality and universality of the grace, there may be rational theological knowledge, but this is without the essence of integrity and the guarantee of authenticity. In this case, it must be passed under the authority and guarantee of the Holy Spirit that belongs to the ecclesial space, because theology is the revelation and the official voice of the Church, or the synodality of the mysterious Body of Christ.

Retrieving, preserving, preaching and accepting the dogmas is the exclusive preserve of the Church made up of clergy and believers, and once these moments have been accomplished, the dogma becomes a testimony and testimony of faith.

“Because this preservation, preaching, application, or fruition, explanation, and definition is the testimony of the experience of the same pressure of the whole Revelation centered on

²⁰ Sfântul Vasile cel Mare, *Despre Sfântul Duh*, XXVII, trad. Pr. Pof. Dr. Constantin Cornițescu, P.S.B. 12, edit. IBM al BOR, București 1988, p. 79

²¹ Pr. Prof. dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, *Noțiunea dogmei, The notion of dogma*, în “*Studii Teologice*”, Nr. 10, 1964, p. 540.

²² Coord. Liviu Petcu, *Lumina Sfințelor Scripturi, antologie tematică din opera Sfântului Ioan Gură de Aur*, vol. I, Editura Doxologia, Iași, 2010, p. 447



Christ that those who became the first members of the Church at Pentecost had through the descent of the Holy Spirit. Revelation remains effective through the Church; The Church is the environment of persistence of Revelation in its efficiency. The Church keeps alive Revelation, Revelation keeps the Church alive. Revelation thus receives a church aspect; her expressions or dogmas become the expressions or dogmas of the Church”²³.

The Orthodox Church formulates and defines the content of the revealed belief in two ways: 1. through the continued preaching and confession of the saving truths of the Church through the Apostles, hierarchs, local Councils, Confessions of Faith imposed by the consensus of the Church everywhere - *consensum ecclesiae dispersae*. 2. Formally and solemnly, where possible, through the Ecumenical Councils, as organs of expressing the infallibility of the Church.

The main attribute of dogma is the soteriological aspect. In the Orthodox Church dogma is absolutely necessary for salvation. The Church has not formulated doctrines for all the revealed truths of faith, because some are absolutely necessary, but others are not. If they were not necessary for salvation, dogmas would be only a religious philosophy.

Dogmas are immutable, absolute, because the truth itself is immutable and cannot be relativized.

“Thus dogmas are necessary for salvation, as they express Christ in His saving work. But Christ saves us only if we open to Him if we believe in Him. Christian Dogma expresses therefore the powers of Christ in the saving action, but on the condition that we believe in what they express”²⁴.

Speaking about God He is the only one who exists in Himself and through Himself for ever and ever. Having the author of God, the dogma has an immutable character, unchangeable because there is no shadow of change or change in God. That is why we must add to the doctrines of dogma in direct connection with the first two and its inimitableness and character of obligation to salvation. In Orthodoxy the latter, as once defined by the dogma, can no longer be changed, canceled, or replaced being a *sine qua non* for the attainment of salvation.

The criteria for recognizing and defining the dwellings imply in part the traditional historical aspect of the customary bill, as established by Vincent de Lerini: on the other hand, the aspect of synodality generically called and expressed by consensus *Ecclesiae dispersae*. As far as the historical aspect is concerned, it can be argued that not all the definite dogmas fall under its materiality, therefore the aspect of synodality is representative. The consensus of the Church, relative or absolute, of the Holy Fathers among themselves and of the Sacred Scriptures, of the clergy and laity, imposed in the Orthodox Church truths of faith which, by their soteriological value, amount to dogmas such as the number of the sacraments, the nature of the divine grace, and the way of the Eucharistic transformation.

3. THEOLOGUMENON AND THEOLOGICAL OPINIONS

Some Christian teachings, which find their foundation in Divine Revelation, but which do not have the unanimous consensus of the Church, although they can be of great circulation, have been called theologians, that is, what can be the object of Theology, which can form the basis of theological doctrine, such as the creation time of the angels, of the soul

²³ Pr. Prof. Dumitru Stăniloae, *Teologia Dogmatică, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology*, ediția a II-a, București, Editura IBM, 1996, pp. 77-78.

²⁴ Pr. Prof. Dumitru Stăniloae, *Teologia Dogmatică*, p.78.

of their parents etc. Theologoumena are opinions issued by some theologians, having some foundation in the revealed teaching, in order to clarify what the Church did not specify. That is why the theologoumena are not defined or accepted unanimously and officially proclaimed by the Church, for this would become dogmas.

Theologoumena are often found in Theology, usually the subject of the theological spheres, for example: the time of the creation and fall of angels, the origin of the soul of the descendants of Adam (3 theories), the way of transmitting the ancestral sin (7 theories), the salvation of those who are not part from the Church, the unbaptized, etc.

Theologoumena, as well as additions and explanations in some points of faith undeveloped by the Church, even if they are of importance to Theology, cannot alter the content of the dogmas. The traditional, ecclesiastical and spiritual theological experience shows that theologian has a theme in revelation, especially in the writings of the great teachers of the Church. To justify a theologoumenon, it must meet four conditions:

1. Have a theme in Revelation
2. Formulate only in relation to those aspects of doctrine that have not been specified and developed by the Church
3. To have both internal and external authenticity, that is, to fully agree both them and their consequences with all the dogmas formulated by the Church.
4. Be necessary and useful

Besides theologoumena, theologians and the personal opinions of some theologians, often admitted and debated in isolation or only in a restrained creature, are met. Theologians enjoy a certain generality and circulation in the Church, whereas the personal views of the theologians are admitted only to the extent that they do not contradict dogmas and are as close as possible to theologians and are a plausible and supportive theological explanation in Revelation.

CONCLUSIONS

In the Orthodox spirituality, theology is the science of total knowledge with direct existential implication of the only truth of life, expressed as iconomic - God the Holy Trinity. The theological framework of knowledge is exclusively the ecclesial one, as a holy ambience in which divine revelation is the force of truth. That is why the Church is the guarantee and authenticity of the full and infallible knowledge of the divine truth that it encompasses. Outside of the Church according to the atropicity and universality of the grace, there may be rational theological knowledge, but this is without the essence of integrity and the guarantee of authenticity. In this case, it must be passed under the authority and guarantee of the Holy Spirit that belongs to the ecclesial space, because theology is the revelation and the official voice of the Church, or the synodality of the mysterious Body of Christ.

As peculiarities of the Eastern Church Theology, to philosophical writings of truth, to scientific truths or to other religious ideas we will enumerate the most important.

1. Just as the healthy eye needs light to see, so the theology is the source of the uncreated light, namely God, so it is a theological one, springs from God, implies the grace and a specific charisma to the theologian, unlike the other sciences have an exclusively anthropocentric character and scientific content is the result of purely human thinking.

2. The Basis of Theology, the Eastern Churches is the full divine revelation accomplished in and by Jesus Christ, the Son of God Incarnate. *"After God, many times and many times, spoke to our fathers through the prophets, in these last days He spoke to us*



through the Son, whom He has given to all who He has made, and by whom also He has made the Ages"(Hebrews 1:1-2) and also in the divine-human Person of Christ, men know God as far as they relate to ecclesial harvest life.

3. The Church is the guarantor and the owner of the dogmas, that is, it has the merit of faithful, living, and not just leadership or assembled confessional gatherings. The Church is the pillar and the foundation of the truth (Timothy 3:25), therefore theology is a function of it and expresses its teachings.

“Because this preservation, preaching, application, or fruition, explanation, and definition is the testimony of the experience of the same pressure of the whole Revelation centered on Christ that those who became the first members of the Church at Pentecost had through the descent of the Holy Spirit. Revelation remains effective through the Church; The Church is the environment of persistence of Revelation in its efficiency. The Church keeps alive Revelation, Revelation keeps the Church alive. Revelation thus receives a church aspect; her expressions or dogmas become the expressions or dogmas of the Church”²⁵.

4. From the analytical point of view Divine Revelation is transmitted through Holy Scripture and Holy Tradition. This means that Orthodox theology understands Revelation in the light of the teaching of the holy Fathers of the Church, that is, as they explained it, formulated it and lived it. Sacred Scripture does not contain all the teachings that are supremely covered by Christ, but only what is normative; therefore, most of the teachings circulate on the pale of the living-beast: "There are many other things that Jesus did, he would have written in detail, it seems to me that even in this world would not fit the books that were written "(John 21:25). From this we infer that the Sacred Scripture contains the essential part of the Divine Revelation, while the Holy Tradition exposes all the truths that have developed and kept alive but which through the Church have become normative and fixed in writing, forming the Holy Tradition or Church Supper.

5. Orthodox theology involves a kataphatic and apophatic knowledge of God, a knowledge that cannot be separated from the Orthodox spirituality, that is why the theologian is both a man of dogma and especially a practitioner of them.

6. Naturally following the aforementioned Theology on the basis of divine revelation is not oversimplification but a living reality an experience of communion with God, within the theandric, through the grace of the Holy Mysteries in the Church.

7. The relationship between Holy Scripture, Holy Tradition and the Holy Church is interdependent because they cannot be conceived separately. It is the Church that gives its believers the guarantee of truth revealed in its full extent and experience. The Sacred Scripture, which contains the essence of the divine revelation, is complemented by what was preserved by live speech, namely, the Holy Tradition. This truth, and more so than the Incarnate Jesus Christ, the Church offers its members. The consensus of the Church, relative or absolute, of the Holy Fathers among themselves and of the Sacred Scriptures, of the clergy and laity, imposed in the Orthodox Church truths of faith which, by their soteriological value and value, amount to dogmas such as the number the sacraments, the nature of the divine grace, the way of the Eucharistic transformation.

8. Theology is a church ministry through which the contents of the dogmas are incessantly deepened, transmitted to man for the purpose of salvation and sanctification. If theology can only be conceived by constantly reporting to the Church it means that it must be anchored in the Church's Apostolic Tradition which it preserves and continues with

²⁵ Pr. Prof. Dumitru Stăniloae, *Teologia Dogmatică*, pp. 77-78.



fidelity, but at the same time contemporary with each and every time as the permanence of the message of salvation for the man and society of each time, and of course looking to the future with a prophecy-eschatological character. This eschatological perspective is in fact a fulfillment of it as science, as a fundamental truth revealed by God and especially as a way of life involving eternal life.

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LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LITERATURE¹ : THE GRAMMARS OF TRUTH IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

*Examining the history of philosophy, we can see that the word ‘true’ is used in many ways. These ways parallel the modes Northrop Frye saw ordered in literature. Just as his *Anatomy of Criticism* outlines literature’s devolution from myth to romance to the high mimetic, low mimetic and ironic. We see the history of philosophy descends from mythic metaphysics to a selfdeconstructing irony. Between these we can find three asymmetrically related modes of ‘being true’ which exhibit the same functions and interrelations as Frye’s three intermediate modes in literature. Given the work of Gödel and Tarski there is good reason to suspect that the sort of relationships pointed out by Frye and exhibited in Kant are necessary for any linguistic being. Truth is said in many ways; these ways are systematically related and allow no closure on any particular one.*

Keywords: Truth, senses of; Philosophy, history of; Frye, Northrop; Grammar (Wittgenstein); Tarski, Alfred; Literary modes; Empiricism, limits of; myth; invention/discovery; language games;

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, ON GRAMMAR, TRUTH AND THE ANATOMY OF CRITICISM

In the lecture notes Desmond Lee took from Wittgenstein in the early 1930’s, which lectures were at least partly organized as comments on C. D. Broad’s taxonomy of philosophical methods and systems, Lee quotes Wittgenstein as saying that “philosophy is not a choice between different ‘theories’” for example, the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories of truth.

We can say that the word [“truth”] has at least three different meanings; but it is mistaken to assume that any one of these theories can give the whole grammar of how we use the word, or endeavor to fit into a single theory cases which do not seem to agree with it.²

¹ There was once a book, famous in my undergraduate years, whose author rather prided himself on solving all the major problems of philosophy in it; its title was *Language, truth and logic*. I mean to echo that title, if not that intent.

² Quoted from *Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1930-32*, ed. Desmond Lee (London: Basil Blackwell, 1979) in Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Macmillan, 1990): 322.



“What replaces theory,” Ray Monk continues, “is *grammar*,” though what Wittgenstein means by grammar was certainly not clear to G.E. Moore at the time, and has been considerably debated since. It seems that by calling his criticisms grammatical Wittgenstein means to point out a wide variety of ways of putting sentences together using the word at issue (truth), some of which ways make them not have sense (being 'ungrammatical'). If this is the case, then his remark about truth indicates that there are *at least* three sorts of language game using the word truth in the philosophical traditions and while the word looks the same in every game, the distinct rules or grammar of each game in which truth gets used will generate confusion if sentences from one game are interpreted in accord with another game where the word also has a use, but a different one. Imagine using a queen from a chess set as your marker in Monopoly, or the car from your Monopoly game to replace a missing pawn from the chess set, or a missing checker; though the piece is the same, the kinds of moves each set of game rules (or grammar) allows it is quite distinct and to transfer what the piece can do from one game to another will be nonsense in the other game. This will be even more the case if we, say, use the queen as a boundary marker to play a halfboard game of checkers.

Now Wittgenstein would perhaps not like what I am going to suggest next, which is to attempt to elucidate a series of such games or grammars *in a distinct relation*; that relation is taken from the anatomy Northrop Frye discovered? / constructed? for criticism.³ And the question of whether Frye discovered or constructed his anatomy is analogous to the question one may ask about Wittgenstein: is his ‘grammar’ or ‘language game’ a heuristic and useful construction or a discovery about how language works? Wittgenstein for a while was puzzled in a similar manner about the foundations of mathematics: is mathematics a science where we discover or construct? Perhaps this question is ungrammatical itself where should we have to be placed, and how should we have to be in the world and the world of language, in order to (discover or, alternatively, construct) our answer to it? Could we be in any world at all? Any world we could speak about? Wittgenstein seems eventually to have answered the question about mathematics definitively (for himself): mathematics is a construction (of useful tools for physics mostly). Monk puts it somewhat differently, whatever in mathematics is presented as a discovery “should properly be seen as a grammatical (in Wittgenstein’s rather odd sense of the word) innovation.”⁴ If he is right about that, then what follows should probably be regarded as the construction of a story or ‘perspicuous representation’ of the language games in which ‘truth’ can be (and has been) used. The story I will be giving is less grammatical *innovation* than *notice of an ordering* in the grammar of uses of ‘truth’ an order, as it were, among language games in which ‘truth’ is uttered. I am claiming, then, that philosophy's theories about truth are not merely different games, like Monopoly and checkers, but can be set out, at least heuristically, as an ordered relation of games or grammars.

Frye's story about literature that it orders itself as a devolution from myth to romance to the high mimetic, low mimetic and ironic seems most like a discovery in his exhibition of that devolution through history: see, the history is really like that! But that his story itself

³ We should perhaps keep in mind that the Latin word *invenio/invenire* from which we make ‘invention’ meant in the first instance ‘to come upon’, to discover. Inventing implies our own creation: the human being and its powers make the truth of whatever is invented, say, transfinite numbers. Discovery implies the human being and its powers are already within a world not made by its own powers. In the first case the human order is mythic; in the second, the human is a more middling mimetic, as we will see.

⁴ Monk, *Duty*, 468.



bears readings that are at once mythic, romantic, realistic (see!) and ironic with equanimity and poise makes it again seem a (very complex) construction. It bears this plurality of significance because it has a structured openness. By this I mean that Frye's larger story allows all these different readings (from mythic to ironic) entrance and purchase *on itself*. This is perhaps best indicated by his beginning with a "Polemical Introduction" and ending with a "Tentative Conclusion." The mythic divine (or at least magisterial) announcement of the outline of a science of criticism is significantly tempered through the essays until we get to the ironic tentativity of the conclusion.⁵ It is structured in its openness to these readings in that these mythic to ironic readings are mutually implicated and run across each other in ways which deny ownership of Frye's whole story to any one of them and allow some very clear views of their mutual relations. The movement from polemic to tentativity suggests that even the most thematic of works is imbedded in a narrative arc; Frye himself here, enacts a fall from architectus to suppliant almost as if such structures are the *a priori* conditions of making sense in words.⁶ Frye suggests, besides (a) that the history of literature displays a shift in the center of gravity from the first to the last which seems a discovery, that (b) at the depths of irony we approach the mythic again, exhibiting that the *pharmakon* of one person is the godterm of another,⁷ and this circularity further suggests either (1) a dependence of the parasitic type of each mode upon the mode above it (as, perhaps, in Diotima's ladder), or (2) a more Hegelian mutual interdependence, or selfdevelopment and exfoliation of each from or within the whole, which is the body of literature. We might say of these final two options within Frye's story that in the first case everything depends upon (is parasitic on) myth as all loves are dependent upon love for the Beautiful itself, or in the second, that no one mode can be ripped from the body of the whole and taken as all in all without fatally compromising its own viability.

As is the case of the wave/quantum interpretations of the propagation of light, both these conclusions appear to be valid and each interpretation of Frye's story allows us to see some things more clearly than the other. In application to our case the problem of truth that irony approaches myth suggests that Frye's story is itself a construction: like light, one approach taken to its extreme leads to its own dialectical inversion in the form of the appearance of the necessity of the other, opposed, approach. Once we set up the problem one way, it leads determinately and necessarily to the other. The construction we begin with dictates the paradoxes that will eventually appear, and prescribe the dialectically necessary alternatives which escape those paradoxes and lead into their opposed ones. As with light and the foundations of mathematics, in Frye's case, too, it makes sense to ask how would we have to be in the world in order to grammatically phrase the foundational question: is this (story about truth or story about literature) itself a discovery or construction? What story would we already have to be in to ask such a question? In any case, it will turn out that if the story I shall be outlining is true, most of our ways of talking about truth are desiccated

⁵ This movement from polemic to tentativity is a structural or formal sign that what I am saying is what occurs: Frye's book allows a plurality of readings. But Frye's arguments within the book also show how his story of mythic devolution runs across distinctions within the critical theory he presents in numerous places; for example, see pp. 115-117, 123-126 in Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism*, (Princeton: University Press, 1957). Many other lines and short segments seem to be referring obliquely to the project of the book itself and range from romantic to ironic, even sarcastic, in tone; not many authors do this kind of self-referencing.

⁶ Frye himself does not go quite so far...at least not directly: "We have thus answered the question: are there narrative categories of literature broader than, or logically prior to, the ordinary literary genres?" (Frye, *Anatomy*, 162).

⁷ Frye, *Anatomy*, 43.



inadequacies (under 1) or meant analogously or as some kind of synecdochic reduction (under 2). At this point Frye's project would tie into that of Kenneth Burke, who considers 'the truth' according to four master tropes, which he hints are forms of reduction.⁸ To cash this out in the philosophical job market, the story I am outlining is a complaint that the analytic or continental, modern or medieval, postmodern or empiricist, or Platonist or feminist or Marxist idea of truth is in every case either inadequate or reductive and inevitably tied to those it denies function to. The proof follows.

1. THE GRAMMARS OF TRUTH

A) Myth

It is easy for philosophers to see a pattern of devolution in truth talk in our history like that given for literature in the *Anatomy*. Frye's first mode, the world of myth, is "a world of total metaphor, in which everything is potentially identical with everything else, as though it were all inside a single infinite body."⁹ One thinks of Socrates' myth of the Good in *Republic*: that which makes all things be what they are (including the knower) and be known as they are; or his myth of the Beautiful in *Symposium* as that in which all beautiful things bodies, souls, ideas participate and to which they all lead; that which both impregnates the soul and to which it gives birth in its speeches. It is this infinite all-encompassing Eternal Idea which the demiurge in *Timaeus* passingly imitates in constructing the moving world in which we live, and move, and know, and imitate in our own way the Eternal Idea which the demiurge knows, and imitates. Clearly, 'myth' here is not simply a lie, nor that somewhat higher creation Hegelian picture thinking would have it be, but is the presentation of that within which only all questions of truth can be raised and are always already answered, awaiting only our *anamnesis*.

A related version is explicated in detail by any number of early Christian and medieval commentators on the opening sentences of John's Gospel: "In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God. He was in the beginning with God; through him all things were made and without him nothing was made which has been made" (*John* 1:13). It is the religion of real presence, whose time, so the story we are telling goes, is over. In it the truth of the world and of the mind and of the logos (word or thought) which the mind utters is all one: Adam names all the animals correctly, seeing them *as they are* because seeing them in, or through, the mind of God with whom he is intimate, naked and unashamed: "So God brought all the animals before the man and behold what he called each was its name" (*Gen* 2:19). Here no distinction is possible between realism, transcendentalism, objectivism, coherence, a cultural relativism of language games, or the (impossible?) individual relativism of idiolect; and pragmatism, too, is the truth of things, for in all of Eden nothing else works. Less poetically but why would we want to be less poetic? we might describe this grammar as "mythology as framework of thought" through which we can read all of a culture's "knowledge, practices, ... modes of interrelationship..., modes of logical organization..., in a unitary manner" as Zaidman and Pantel describe myth.¹⁰ But Plato's myths (and John's and that of Genesis) are not myths for a culture, but the myth of language and thought encultured everywhere: they are the myths of the relation of speaker, speech and world, and of all their possible relations.

If we were to tell this story in Kantian terms, we would have to tell a story here of a

⁸ Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969): 503-517

⁹ Frye, *Anatomy*, 136.

¹⁰ See Louise Bruit Zaidman and Pauline Schmitt Pantel, *Religion in the Ancient Greek City*, translated by Paul Cartledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 149.



form of intuition which we do not have and so of which we can have "no proper knowledge."¹¹ we find that it is impossible to describe such a thing without driving into selfcontradiction since the ordinary language of substantives and tenses *in which we tell* the story seems permanently tied up with spatiotemporal intuition beyond which we are here trying to reach.¹² Despite these insuperable difficulties, Kant goes on to imagine the equivalent of Frye's mythic unity of truth and being thus: "An understanding which through its selfconsciousness could supply to itself the manifold of intuition an understanding, that is to say, through whose representation the objects of the representation should at the same time exist" (B139). For this being all other being and being known are utterly, because metaphysically, coextensive: *Cogito ergo est*.

In more recent times, we might consider that Tolkien, Chesterton and C.S. Lewis would all probably agree with Lewis' statement that "the story of Christ is simply a true myth... One must be content to accept it in the same way, remember that it is God's myth where the others are men's myths, i.e. the Pagan stories are God expressing Himself through the minds of poets, using such images as he found there."¹³ In this case it is just true, that "Chesterton's 'natural religion'... is not a *deus absconditus* at the end of a chain of being, but revealed and active in every phenomenon and experience."¹⁴ The whole world and all experience of it is deeply sacramental, though most of the time we live in it like dwarves searching for porridge.

B) 'Realism': the high and low mimetic

Such a great beginning. For philosophers I think it will be easier not to follow quite exactly the narrative design of Frye's critical emplotment. The next step should be romance, but let me speak first of what Frye calls 'realism,' which includes what he calls the high and low mimetic. If "myth is an art of metaphorical identity..., realism is an art of implicit simile."¹⁵ Here we can put all philosophical empiricism Locke, Berkeley, Hume and all correspondence theories of truth. According to these an idea is true insofar as it corresponds to is like the thing. So, Locke's ideas are denominated true or false "*whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to anything extraneous to them*" insofar as the mind's "*tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing... happens to be true or false.*"¹⁶ And "the truth of these appearances or perceptions in our minds" consists "*only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects to produce ... such appearances.*"¹⁷ That is to say, the ideas

¹¹ Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 1933): B149.

¹² Augustine usually comes at this issue from the angle of posing a problem of the bounds of language rather than as a bound of epistemology; he regularly presses language to the point where it breaks down and must fall silent (e.g., *Confessions* 1.4.4, 9.10.23-26). Nonetheless, he continues to speak. Undoubtedly these two angles are complementary, for whereof we cannot speak, thereof we seem not to be able to remain silent, or as Kant puts it the "extension of concepts beyond *our* sensible intuition is of no advantage to us. For as concepts of objects they are empty, and do not even enable us to judge of their objects whether or not they are possible" (B148). Here Kant must mean of no advantage to our *knowledge of things*, for he has, nonetheless, already used one such concept (the creative intuition), precisely to exhibit the bounds of our knowledge.

¹³ Bradley J. Birzer, *J.R.R. Tolkien's Sanctifying Myth: Understanding Middle Earth* (Washington: ISI Books, 2003): p. 26.

¹⁴ Alison Milbank, *Chesterton and Tolkien as Theologians: The Fantasy of the Real* (London: T and T Clark: 2007), p. 11.

¹⁵ Frye, *Anatomy*, 136.

¹⁶ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book 2, chapter 23, paragraph 4. I have used the edition of Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover, 1959).

¹⁷ Locke, *Essay*, Book 2, chapter 32, paragraph 16.



imply nothing about the substance of the thing *being*, for example, actually blue or bitter, just that it looks or tastes *like* that. In fact, Locke goes so far as to say of our ideas of substances that “they are all false, when looked upon as representations of the unknown essences of things:”¹⁸ we do not grasp the essence, but something relative. Similarly for Hume, impressions are our more lively perceptions; ideas the less lively perceptions of which we are conscious when we reflect on the first. “Every idea is copied from a similar impression.”¹⁹

One can translate this theory of psychological simile into one about truthfunctional propositions and avoid the direct psychologicistic problems brought to bear upon the early empiricists. This is, in fact, how presentday empiricism is related to those earlier versions. In this case, ‘truth’ indicates the degree of *likeness* between the proposition and the world; e.g., ‘snow is white’ is true, if and only if snow is white. In the former case, that of empiricist psychology, we have degrees of likeness between the more or less rapidly fading idea and the more vivacious impression. In the latter case we have: “The world is everything that is the case” and “the world is the totality of facts not things” and “a proposition is a picture of reality” and “the totality of propositions is a language” as a fairly good summary of the logic of the position.²⁰ If all of your propositions are *like* the world, you’re in good shape. Somewhat more formally we might say, “If it is true that *p*, then, in so far as it can be known that *p*, someone can believe that *p* precisely because *p*.” Thus runs the helpful patter of present day empiricists.²¹ Under such empiricism and positivism, moral and aesthetic truth must (just as everything else) correspond to *something=p*, and so we have to go about looking for what it is. Hobbes and Hume as well as many more modern thinkers judge it to be certain sentiments, which they are (variously) willing to call socially influenced/shaped/created. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein says morality and aesthetics lie outside the world, whatever that means if the world is everything that is the case. What it means, I am given to understand, is that the shape of the world is moral or aesthetic. But this wordshape seems as a simile without a correlate, unless that correlate is feeling, sentiment, passion. According to Hume and his children these feelings are clearly *things in the world*, so if Wittgenstein is not agreeing with Hume we must begin to think that this simile without a correlate is a sign of the deracination of the early Wittgenstein’s story about language and truth from a more complete and perfect world in which it can grow and have its place.²² We should not be surprised to discover that the plant quickly desiccates, and Wittgenstein himself moves back to a more rooted story of how language achieves truth. Perhaps, in fact, that was his aim all along in the *Tractatus* to show the inadequacy of such empiricist and positivist views by strict entailment all the way out to the point where they can be seen to have no possibility of saying anything. Yet we speak of such things: Michelangelo’s *David* is sublime.

So, in fact, we do not have to think that Wittgenstein believed his *Tractatus* story about language, truth and logic to be true *tout court*. He could have been making a sort of

¹⁸Locke, *Essay*, Book 2, chapter 32, paragraph 18, cf. paragraph 5.

¹⁹David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Section 2, paragraph 14; see also paragraph 12. I have used the edition of P. H. Nidditch and L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975).

²⁰See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), sentences 1, 1.1, 4.01, 4.001.

²¹See, for this example, David Wiggins, “Objective and Subjective in Ethics, with Two Postscripts about Truth” in *Needs, Values, Truth: essays in the philosophy of value* (New York: Blackwell, 1987): p. 35

²²See David Rozema, “*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: A ‘poem’ by Ludwig Wittgenstein,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* Vol. 23 No. 2 (April 2002): 345-363.



poem to illustrate, or perhaps imitate, the deracination and essential moral vapidness of that contemporary empiricist and positivist view of the world. It is true and accurate about that (about which it *says* nothing as required). This would mean that the so-called turn in Wittgenstein's thought would not be a real turn, but that his first book was a tract exhibiting what the reduction of philosophy to logic would really amount to, leaving it to the reader to throw away the ladder that gets one into such an inhuman and unlivable position. The later works would then be different attempts at curing similar sorts of problems, exhibiting their ungrammaticality if not their unliveability. On either reading of Wittgenstein, we could understand the idea that mathematics needs a foundation as of a piece with the *Tractatus* view of language, and Wittgenstein moves away from both that idea of mathematics and the *Tractatus* view of language toward the idea of grammars, rules, and language games making sense in ways of life all at once.

G. E. Moore, around the same time, attempts to answer the empiricist problem about moral and aesthetic truth. He thinks he has found what our terms correspond to (at least for ethics, though not aesthetics)—a simple nonnatural indefinable and nonanalyzable quality²³ which requires a special capacity of mind he calls intuition. We should note how Moore's view approaches here the mythic version of truth we saw in Plato, who would have called intuition *nous*, but who has a much richer story to tell about it than Prof. Moore who really has only the word. We should now be drawn to remember that, according to Plato's myths, we were said to have *seen* or *experienced* the Good, the Beautiful, and those other eternal things beyond the rim of heaven in our previous lives, as we drove our human and imperfect chariots behind those of our chosen god.²⁴ In *that* world was everything that *is* the case; now we are in the world of resemblances and moving images; the world of likeness. So the truth of empiricism is *one aspect* of the original mythic truth, empiricism is both held up by and holds up (could we but recollect the experience) that mythic world which (and in which) it hides; *nous* gets us back there through recollection.

Heidegger restates this point when he emphasizes that the correctness sought in *epistemê* hides, or is forgetful of, the truth of Being, in its concentration on beings. Poetry is *aletheic*, it brings that openness to Being back before us, perhaps even through the thing the poet concentrates on: old shoes, for instance. Heidegger is closer to Plato than Moore in that he seems aware that the pressure for epistemic exactness about a thing or relation *requires a forgetfulness* of that *in which* it appears. Moore rather aims to identify yet another form of epistemic exactness, and thinks thereby to bring both *truth and completeness* to our thinking. At least Moore recognizes something is *amiss* in empiricism as it stands, that he needs something more. Empiricism needs a supplement; Moore calls that supplement intuition, Heidegger calls it poetry, Frye suggests that both need a myth in which to hang. As in Frye's 'world of total metaphor,' so also in Plato's *Timeaeus* vision of the all-encompassing Eternity, or *Republic's* untold story of the Good itself: in the mythic world empiricism is *also* true, and only within such a mythic world can such realism be understood as truth.

A short parable: In the *Future of an Illusion* Sigmund Freud tells a story of his young son hearing a fairy tale from his governess and, upon asking "but is it true?" and being told it was not, walking away in disgust.²⁵ Freud considers this an exhibition of admirable sentiment on the boy's part. Just so, we might expect Freud's contemporary sons will ask of

²³G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), chapter 1.

²⁴See *Phaedrus* 245c-257b and *Meno* 81.

²⁵Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, translated by W.D. Robson-Scott, revised by James Strachey (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1964): chapter 5.



Whitman's answer about the grass that same deracinate question: "but is it true?" and when they find out that it is not "the case" they will, like other positivists, turn their back on literature *in toto*. Given the limiting strictures put on truth by empiricism, this response is entirely proper, but (dare we ask?) are those strictures true? Freud himself was not quite so dismissive of literature as he appears in this story, or as the Vienna Circle was in reality, but that is only because the good doctor believed that much of literature was true in the historical sense of referring to events either in the deep past of the original totemic clan, or in the mists of infantile ego formation: "the Lord's handkerchief?" no; "the uncut hair of graves?" if we understand it as the blooming of the death principle, yes.²⁶ Faith in that myth being lost, literature can carry no truth value whatsoever: "commit it, then, to the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."²⁷

Returning to our overarching story, we might be able to distinguish Frye's high mimetic from low mimetic realism in philosophy of mind by paying attention to the status of the mind in each case. So, for example, Aristotle and the medieval realists (e.g., Aquinas) who followed his lead, thinking that the mind abstracts the knowable essence from the thing, gave the mind thereby "a power of action somewhat higher than the environment"²⁸ of things in which the mind dwells and which things act upon the mind and which the mind thereby knows. The empiricists who come later are low mimetic (Locke, Hume, et al.); the mind is like a piece of wax; things leave their impression on it, these impressions are ideas. Things happen; the mind accepts them. The things that happen are connected by contiguity or constant conjunction; we are in the habit of calling such repeated conjunctions 'causality'. The patterns repeated more frequently delve deeper furrows into the waxy tablature of the mind than singularities. Gradgrind does this to Bitzer (who at the end of the novel is capable only of these little bits of empirical truth) quite successfully. Reality is gradgrind: it gradually grinds our mind into agreement with itself.²⁹ Occasionally, damage (for example, after leaving by the window rather than the door once too often) or disease (fever) causes a meltdown of the wax. The mind is "not a significantly different kind of thing from the environment," nor does it have any more significant powers than the usual wax. This is precisely Frye's description of the low mimetic; one wonders if such a thing can be any kind of hero.³⁰

Wittgenstein's comment about A.J. Ayer after the radio debate with Fr. Copleston can be well understood from the contextualization we are giving here: Wittgenstein said that Ayer "has something to say, but is incredibly shallow."³¹ Ayer is demanding that the rules for words like true, objective, exists, etc. stay within the well known game of low mimetic empirical science; he has something to say in pointing out when Copleston is speaking ungrammatically according to the low mimetic game Ayer considers these words belong to. So Copleston contributes "nothing at all to the discussion" because he does not notice that he himself is using these words in accord with a different language game, but takes them over

²⁶ The quotes here are from Walt Whitman's "Song of Myself," part six; this part begins with the child's question "What is the grass?" Available online at <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/45477/song-of-myself-1892-version>.

²⁷ This is David Hume's suggestion for the improvement of libraries; see his *Inquiry*, section 12 part 3; this is the last sentence of his *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

²⁸ Cf. Frye, *Anatomy*, 33-34.

²⁹ See Charles Dickens, *Hard Times*.

³⁰ Cf. Frye, *Anatomy*, 34.

³¹ Monk, *Genius*, 543; quoting Rush Rhees, ed., *Recollections of Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).



from the low mimetic game of Ayer as if there were no important differences between speaking of the truth of God's existence and the truth of the existence of a bowling ball, or the truth that grass is green and snow white.

The grammar of low mimetic morals is similarly reductive: judgment becomes the mobile expressionistic result of a congeries of variously graven inputs pleasure, pain, survival, parental or social dissatisfaction, etc.: were our empirical science perfect, morals would be as predictable as a machine: ouch. That is the point of Bitzer's transformation by Gradgrind; in the end Gradgrind feels the pinch of his own exact machining. Perhaps the mythic command against graven images can yet be understood even at this low mimetic level? The point of the Dickensian work of art is to make us feel not only the pain, but more the injustice and reductive partiality of such a world. This is precisely what makes it comic. The novel makes a world in which empiricism is the whole truth; but that world is *seen* (by us in the audience) not to be true: people aren't all the way like that, really. At least Dickens seemed to think there were other possibilities. We can, however, only feel this world as reductive, partial, unjust and so painful or mocking because we feelingly know that world of total and complete empiricism not to be the world though it is like the world.

This exact reductivism is exhibited by some contemporary thinkers. Take, for example, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, whose "alternative view of [the] matter" regarding both moral and aesthetic value (and, it turns out, much else) is explained thus:³² She sets out a view of the individual human being (if I may use the phrase) as an algorithm for particular evaluations. The algorithm is built up by the usual inputs, which, because they can vary through life, make the algorithm vary. Each evaluation comes as the solution to a multivariable equation of innumerable variables; she gives a list of the *kinds* of variables, but could never list all of them. The list of evaluative outcomes is a similarly variable range of more and less articulate grunts (or clicks or swipes) of approval and disapprobation, "most of which", she says, "*are performed intuitively and inarticulately, and many of them so recurrent that the habitual arithmetic becomes part of our personality and comprises the very style of our behavior.*"³³ She thinks that the great advantage of this alternative view is its reductivism; as she says, "in accord with such an account, evaluative divergences and the exhibition of so-called bad taste would be seen as the product of the *same* dynamics the playing out of the same *kinds* of variables, but with different specific values that produce evaluative convergences and the exhibition of so-called good taste." And this alternative view can be played out with regard to all human preferences, from art to food, from sex to religion, "*or even [to] types of logic.*"³⁴ Of course, in this view good and bad taste are just algorithmic outputs of approval or disapprobation of each other algorithm's outputs of disapprobation and approval; there is no correcting of algorithms. Some algorithms complete their circuits positively due to a shaken box of glass punctuated unrhythmically by gunshots, some turn on for Bach; "good taste" is a phrase for communal agreement in algorithmic output.

We recognize this merely the return of low mimetic morals in a more modern dress, designed to fit with the sharp modern sensibilities of mathematics and computer programming. Of our last few centuries' history, then, Moore should be considered the high mimetic version of the generally low mimetic British Moral Theorist. His requirement of a

³² Barbara Herrnstein Smith, *Contingencies of Value: alternative perspectives for critical theory* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988): 38.

³³ *Ibid.*, 43.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 39 and 43.



higher power of the mind was of a piece with this; venturing into personal psychology I should guess that he was raised as a High Church Anglican almost as High Church as Aquinas. Hume, if my memory serves correctly, was Presbyterian, and he abandoned it. Smith indubitably joins him in the low mimetic if she is not already speaking from the ironic world, for her protagonist self seems already a mere "scene of bondage."³⁵

C) Romance

"Myth, then, is one extreme...; naturalism is the other, and in between lies the whole area of romance, using that term to mean...the tendency...to displace myth in a human direction and yet, in contrast to 'realism,' to conventionalize content in an idealized direction."³⁶ The best example of this kind of story about truth is Kant, whose introduction to the *Prolegomena* and preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* read like romances: in which the knight of honor goes forth to redeem the name of that slandered queen, *Metaphysica*.

Time was when metaphysics was entitled the Queen of all the sciences; and if the will be taken for the deed, the preeminent importance of her accepted tasks gives her every right to this honour. Now, however, the changed fashion of the time brings her only scorn; a matron outcast and forsaken, she mourns like Hecuba.³⁷

Kant goes on to argue that the science which the empiricists think gets at all the truth that there is (empirical realism) depends essentially on a truth it never achieves or can achieve what Kant calls the regulative ideals of pure reason. These ideals are at work in each and every effort of empirical science; exhibiting their necessity and becoming perspicuous about their nature is the effort of the first *Critique*, and that book shows how all of our ordinary truths about snow are part of an idealized and *ever incomplete* project of reason: the complete *Naturwissenschaft* of the never wholly intuited cosmos of Nature. Kant hints early and argues later that this project (science) is essentially moral,³⁸ for the empirical realist science which gets at nature's truth depends upon the same autonomy of reason which produces the categorical imperative, and the moral law which is the engine of the whole (to bring things down to a low mimetic machinist's analogue) has the purity and autonomy of the true queen, whom we all love and have loved always. Reason in this moral sense extends further than intuition, which in Kant is already a higher power than mere empiricist sense perception, and reason has freedom autonomy from the causal rules of sense; and it must have this or we could not unify our experience or form hypotheses and "constrain nature to answer" as empirical science does.

The selfgrounding and selfrevealing God of the mythic world is thereby displaced in Kant to practical reason (displacing myth in a human direction, as Frye says), which proves both its existence and its right by deducing its law *a priori*, refusing any aid from empirical anthropology. Nor does this mind merely abstract from its experience (as the high mimetic mind), rather *reason directs* the investigation of, and action in, the empirical world *in accord with its own* regulative ideals in a language whose syntax is underwritten by the *a priori* synthetic truths we lay out in mathematics, and the metaphysics of nature and of morals. Far from being a piece of wax, this mind is one with nearly demiurgic powers. Perhaps this

³⁵ Frye, *Anatomy*, 34.

³⁶ Frye, *Anatomy*, 137.

³⁷ Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 1933): p. Aviii.

³⁸ Cf. Gene Fendt, "De Reductione Scientiae ad Bonos Mores" in *For What May I Hope: Thinking with Kant and Kierkegaard* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990): pp. 45-71.



mind *is* Plato's demiurge; to say so would be to (speaking as a literary critic) demythologize Plato into what Frye would recognize as the romance of Kant.

We must be particularly clear that the truths of morals are not, according to this romance, discoverable in the way that truths about snow and the rest of the physical world are, for they *cannot* appear in intuition, not even intuition of one's own moral action. Nonetheless, the truths about snow and the world depend upon (what Kant himself calls) the *fact* (not just the possibility) of moral truth, in particular, that moral truth called freedom.³⁹ The word 'fact' here also participates in the romantic phase of language rather than low mimetic grammar of empiricism. The truth here is not discovered through an intuition of a thing, still less is it an idea decaying from such an intuition, rather this truth is itself an unmittable *active power*: we could not discover any (low mimetic empirical) truths were reason not *truly* the (romantic) power of making laws for itself. Kant is, then, a moral realist, but what counts as real is not objective in the way that what counts as real in empirical science is objective: 'objective' too has distinctive uses in the romantic grammar. Further, we see that these senses of truth in Kant's philosophy *are a mimesis* of the hierarchical organization of the types of hero we find in low mimetic, high mimetic and romantic literature.

Kant is very clear that these two kinds of truth (which we are calling romantic and realist) are not merely different; they are related in an asymmetrical way: the objectivity or realism of the moral realm is the condition for the possibility of the discovery of any real truths about nature; but the reverse is not true. Further, the fact of freedom presupposes the coherence of reason's unmittable autonomy with the discovery of truths about nature, but that *coherence* does not prove the fact of freedom either. You can't get from nature to freedom; you must already be free to come to know nature at all. Aesthetic judgments are a third kind of truth, but they, too, would not be possible without the fact of morality; their 'objectivity' takes yet another form, one which not only coheres with the other two, but in addition is the ground or *condition for any actual community* among human beings *in the world of experience*, for only if feeling, intuition and intellect are connected in the same way in all of us can we even speak to each other, much less come to agreement about any political or aesthetic or even empirical issue.

Kant's transcendental arguments about the work of reason both *perform and defend* that 'romantic' (in Frye's sense) "power exceeding that of ordinary sense and the environment" which belongs to such high heroes, and we have seen does not belong to an empiricist mind. Kant's Reason, like the hero of romance, has a power of operation "superior in degree" to both the mere empirical understanding and to its environment. This power, unnatural to empirical understanding and intuition but natural to practical reason, and coherent with low mimetic truths about snow places the human being *at once* in the world of experience *and* in the supersensible world of morality. Freedom is a "magic mirror," an "enchanted weapon" if ever there was one.⁴⁰ In fact, it is the source of all such stories. The truth of romantic fairy tales is their *aletheic* revelation of the moral power and the higherthantheenvironment status of all moral soul.

D) The ironic

Descending below the high and low mimetic with which we have already dealt, we

³⁹See "On the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its Association with Speculative Reason" in *The Critique of Practical Reason*, translated by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: LLA, 1956).

⁴⁰Cf. Frye, *Anatomy*, 33 for all of the phrases in quotes in this paragraph; they are signs that we are in a romantic phase.



find the ironic mode, which “begins with realism and tends toward myth, its mythical patterns as a rule being more suggestive of the demonic than of the apocalyptic.”⁴¹ Here the division of the original mythic body of truth becomes absolute: each element is a windowless monad whose vision of what is is entirely its own. Each vision may be coherent in itself—each has its algorithm, we might say but thoroughly different from each other vision. Without a God to guarantee their preestablished harmony, each will be constructing, or showing, its own selfmade film: each is its own private theatre of “true to me.” One may, at this point of anomic despair, be tempted to invoke an argument against private language (Wittgenstein), or voice a prayer for solidarity amidst all these contingent ironies (Rorty), or attempt to demonstrate that the grinding gears of natural selection delete those running peculiar (let us not call them queer or avantgarde) films (Spencer, and his more well-dressed grandchild, Sociobiology). But can such invocations be thought to go somewhere? I ask myself. Each of these later figures thereby exhibit what they would have taken the place of Leibniz’s more romantic version of God: language (high mimetic), groundless solidarity (low mimetic), natural selection (ironic). But to ask which is true, or whether any of them are so, is to take us immediately out of irony, for *asking the question* pretends that other monads hear and they (might) care. I say to myself.

No ironic form will close the option that it may well be that no other monad is sharing my film or that in any case one is merely applauding a universality that appears only in one’s own private theatre. And it can’t; I am tempted to ask for the condition of this impossibility, but that is (according to it) to be tempted by Metaphysics, which is impossible. In this story any agreement among monads (how would we notice it?) is purely contingent; there is no queen, and certainly no God preestablishing our harmony. This space is where the purely coherentist notion of truth operates and in its smallest space. Further, what counts as coherent may vary widely (how could we tell?) if, as some literary theorists in this mode hold “even [our] types of logic” are merely a convergence of our own particular preferences.⁴² Barring the pragmatism of the boxcutter and the bomb, it will only be by some totally mystifying supervenient grace (mythic explanation), some invisible hand (a high mimetic explanation), that these monads will come to agreement about the truth of either things or of values: without such (variably interpretable) grace the divisions between individuals are infinite and unbridgeable each is a differend to the other.⁴³ Lyotard’s position seems to me to be the French (or continental philosophical) version of one espoused by (the more analytic) Gilbert Harmon; he allows that there “is even the limiting case ... [of] a oneperson group” determining the ethical good.⁴⁴ But such a differend is undiscoverable; such a one has no common language or way to share his experience with us thus Lyotard *must* begin his book in the passive voice. How such a thing (as the differend) can become known to us is precisely the mystery that can’t be answered under this view. There can be no subject speaking to another subject; the death of the subject is the bottomless end of this phase.⁴⁵ We do not find ourselves to be quite in this position yet. (How could *we. find. it. to be?*) There is a similar solipsism implicit in pragmatism that is exactly its problem with

⁴¹Frye, *Anatomy*, 140.

⁴²Smith, *Contingencies*, p. 39.

⁴³Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The differend: Phrases in Dispute* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988): p. xi.

⁴⁴ Gilbert Harmon, *Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996): p. 7

⁴⁵ Achieved by Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in *Image, Music, Text*, translated by Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977): pp. 142-148.



regard to truth. As the always witty and inevitably trenchant Santayana once said, pragmatism seems “to express an acute critical conscience, a sort of will not to believe; not to believe, I mean, more than is absolutely necessary for solipsistic practice.”⁴⁶

We cannot find this situation out; and, to speak as mere empiricists, we don't. Irony, even to be understood, requires a lighting it cannot supply itself. So, supervenient grace is operative: QED. This grace is present everywhere; it is that by which we see the ironic smile to be ironic and a smile or, not a smile perhaps. The term grace is, however, completely blank to irony, its emptiness repeating a movement seen in (Moore's) empiricism under the term intuition. We have now returned to myth, as Frye said we would, though coming to it this way and from this direction makes grace and sacrament seem Absolutely Other (*totaliter aliter*, as some later Medievals would put it) to each and all of us: totally transcendent to our profane world(s), yet we are somehow open to it.

So far then, we can see that Frye's claims about the five modes, as well as his claim that irony approaches myth, do play out in the *anatomy* of truthgrammars in philosophy as well as they did in literature.

2. LOGIC AS TROPE

There is a formal analogy to this story about truth. It is, I think, more than an analogy; more like the keystone of the arch which joins philosophy (and its history) to literature (and its history), stone across from like stone, in these devolutionary histories. In 1931 Kurt Gödel published an important paper on undecidability in formal systems, which proved that in any formal system adequate to number theory there is a formula that is not provable and whose negation is not provable. In other words, the consistency of a formal system can not be proved within that system. Alternatively, if consistency can be proven, completeness cannot be. What we have seen in our examination of truth is the playing out of that claim about formal systems in the very informal and unaxiomatized system of ordinary language. Gödel's proof showed that mathematics could not be proven both complete and consistent within the bounds of one formal system, that the consistency of a system can only be proven by taking a step outside that system into another and if that second can be proven to be consistent we will not be able to prove its completeness.

Almost as a proof of this, Alfred Tarski, in the course of his argument in “The Semantic Conception of Truth,” notes that while his reasoning is very closely related to that used by Gödel, it “may be added that Gödel was clearly guided in his proof by certain intuitive considerations regarding the notion of truth, although this does not occur in the proof explicitly.”⁴⁷ In other words, Tarski holds that Gödel's reasoning about formal systems (which inspiration Tarski is following) can itself be seen to depend upon and be involved in Tarski's larger and more general theory about truth in semantic systems: Gödel's truths about the formal system of mathematics are imbedded in the metalanguage of language and his proof mimics Tarski's thought, as Tarski proves it must (even though Gödel's work was published first). Tarski's claim in this footnote is for the structural necessity of a certain nesting of languages in our ways of using the word 'true'; Gödel was merely playing that out (ahead of time) in the limited area of number theory. There is, perhaps, an analogue of these semantic and mathematical problems in physics, if the cosmos does not support a physics without a singularity precisely a point which extends beyond the limit of physics: a point

⁴⁶ See George Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion* (New York: Scribner's, 1913): p. 130.

⁴⁷ Alfred Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics” in *The Nature of Truth*, edited by Michael P. Lynch (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001): p. 360 n18.



where the physics breaks down. For my part, I would like to say that Frye was clearly guided in his *Anatomy* by certain intuitive considerations regarding the notion of truth, although this does not occur in his anatomy explicitly. In other words, Frye's analysis allows us to produce a perspicuous representation of the variety of grammars in which words like 'true,' 'objective' and 'fact' are used, and this clearly guided his intuitions about literature, though a discussion of the grammars of truth does not appear explicitly in his anatomy. We have now explicated that fact.

We should further point out that Tarski himself restricted his notion of truth to semantically open *artificial* languages whose semantic predicates (predicates like 'true') apply only to sentences of languages other than itself. This requires the nesting of an object language within a metalanguage in which those predicates may apply (and which in turn must also be semantically open to a metalanguage in which *its* truth may be expressed...). Our story is clearly related to this kind of logical vision of one complete system depending, for proof of its consistency, on something not provable within it, and that next system depending, for proof of its completeness, on something outside that, and so on. To start at the bottom, any ironist's view is perfectly consistent in itself, but he wishes to talk to someone about it and even convince them to be in solidarity with him; the accomplishment of that task requires a step outside his 'object' language, and his language game. A pragmatist ironist (Rorty, to name names) wishes to make all such accomplishment nonlinguistic and so avoid this logical problem. With the right tools (including boxcutters and bombs) I suppose that it is possible to accomplish this in the pragmatic sort of way which reduces those who disagree to dusty silence. Kant once suggested that this might be the only sense to "perpetual peace." He was, I think, being ironic, since he clearly argues that there are "facts," "truths," even "objective truths" that reason can grasp which are beyond pragmatist and empiricist uses of such words, but not beyond such a rational being's ken. Even a pragmatist can see the outside of the grammar he has been organizing: "a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule."⁴⁸

Kant perspicuously unites the next three higher versions of truth, for he shows that while Hume's low mimetic empiricism is perfectly consistent, it is incomplete: it cannot explain the condition for its own possibility (much less that of mathematics). For that a transcendental argument is needed. That first transcendental argument shows how the waxmind must be structured in order to do the things it does (i.e., that it must be something more than mere wax) and so involves us in a system that includes freedom, a fact the proof of which lies outside the system of empirical science as well as beyond that first deduction, though it can be shown to be wholly consistent with the low mimetic empirical science. A second (and second kind of) transcendental argument is needed to prove the fact of freedom, and that argument has implications which take us beyond the high mimetic story of a mind which asks questions of nature into the romantic truth of freedom's relation to sensibility. That Romanticism followed Kant's third *Critique* is simply a fact of cultural history, which might prove something to an empiricist, if she thought history was a science and could prove something.

But however neatly this story and analogy work, natural language is not a formal system (as Tarski admitted), and so I conclude that all of these modes of truth are always

⁴⁸ William James, "The Will to Believe," in *The Will to Believe, Human Immortality, and Other Essays on Popular Philosophy*, (Mineola, NY: Dover Books, 1956): 28.



operative in it, and variously deployed by its users, in one great glass bead game. Though we might be able to see distinct plausible ways of using the word 'true', what we might have wished to believe were separate language games cannot really be separated *in vivo*. And as to the question of whether this entire game is dependent upon some extramythic origin (In the beginning, when God made...) or is the exfoliation of language itself (There is nothing outside of the text), I propose that that question is undecidable from within that informal system we have and in which we move, *and therefore* we have stories which go each way. This, then, has been a logical proof. Frye suggests, in numerous places, that the devolution from myth to irony which provides his anatomical outline is echoed in various societies, and at least in various communities of readers; thus in an ironic age a mythic all-encompassing work will be hooted at like an old tale; a low mimetic age, on the other hand, would have to accept such a prediction of reception theory to be a *proof of truth*, if, in fact, such a reception occurred. A more mythic community of readers would accept it, as day brings the news to day and night to night imparts wisdom, or as one Overman on his mountaintop shouts to the next, over the clouds and the all-too-human valley.

But perhaps we should return to what Kant said beginning his first *Critique*: "Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also unable to answer."⁴⁹ As mathematics proves to be essentially tied up with our language and way of understanding, this undecidability will remain a permanent issue in the question of its foundations as well. There will be mythic mathematical Platonists, like Cantor, who will say they are discovering new worlds of intellectables; there will be low mimetic engineers, like Wittgenstein, who say the mathematician is just shaping a useful tool though he may not know what it is useful for yet. I do not mean to be heard as saying that such questions (about mathematics or the senses of truth) are *essentially* undecidable, only that they are so *for us*. I mean to recall two technical notions in this last sentence. First, according to Tarski, a theory is essentially undecidable if all consistent extensions of it are undecidable.⁵⁰ Second, according to Aquinas, recall that what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be so to a particular intellect-i.e., for us.⁵¹ For the sake of completeness, let me add the testimony of science fiction. In *Imaginary Magnitude*, the higher artificial intelligence of GOLEM (originally a defense department project) concludes its final lecture to lower human intellects by confessing to a limit to its own knowledge, and then adds, "one ought to set limits, not only to the subject being examined, but to one's own speculation as well, so as not to become totally arbitrary."⁵²

3. SOME CONCLUSIONS FOR TEACHERS

I have therefore found it necessary to practice irony, in order to make room for faith.
attributed to Louis Mackey

Does it matter whether Louis Mackey ever said this? Given the ordered partiality of all of our ways of talking about truth, what does it mean not to have an ironic tinge to one's teaching or writing? For the human being who pretends to mythic wholeness (or even completeness and consistency) is delusional. God might be able to teach so; or Adam speak so before the Fall; but mustn't the rest be megalomaniac self-speaking myths? Such

⁴⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. Avii.

⁵⁰ *Undecidable Theories*, (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1953), Preface.

⁵¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947). 1. q. 12, art. 1; cf. 1.2.1.

⁵² Stanislaw Lem, *Imaginary Magnitude*, translated by Marc E. Heine (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981): p. 243.



apocalyptic tones, such presumptions of completeness and coherence what else can be made of them? Kant's way of writing *seems* to lack irony until one considers...how ironic is it for a *philosopher* to “find it *necessary* to deny knowledge?”⁵³

So let us, finally, follow Kant to a more medieval conclusion. Kant shows that the truth of empiricism depends upon something beyond it: a principle not provable within its system the freedom of reason. We might say that the language of empirical science is (necessarily) semantically open to that of morality. So, too, it will turn out that morality depends for its completion, and the coherence of our moral actions in a *complete* system, upon a *principle* outside itself: the existence of God (and ourselves) in the realm of ends: a kingdom of ends, a community of justice. And that we can consider these options and their beauty (or lack thereof) together depends on a *fact* that even the fact of freedom does not guarantee or prove: that sensibility and reason work harmoniously and alike in all of us. But this fact can't be proven either empirically or as the categorical imperative (which proves the fact of freedom). Take the first: the existence of God cannot be *proven* within morality, but God and immortality are implicated in every moral act; we might say that the language of morality is (necessarily) semantically open to faith. To Kant this necessary openness seems to require faith, as his discussion of Spinoza makes clear.⁵⁴ In making his moral argument for the existence of God, Kant is merely proleptically affirming the same thing that Gödel stated: that the undecidable formula, *s*, of a formal system is presumed true. In any case, it is logically and naturally impossible to close the language of the moral world upon itself; and this is true of every other lower grammar employing the word truth as well: it is not closed any presumptions of completeness and coherence are false.

I suppose, however, the semantic openness of morality to faith really means something further: that it is necessarily possible that God could 'speak' to man, and that if He chose to do so he could make himself understood, through some analogy available to us: There could be a Word outside our words with which all our natural language is coherent and from which all our language's truth functionality can be judged. So, *we* could be found to be true or false. One thing further; having heard and understood, to know that Word as true would require that we have a further openness, but I think that that further openness must be something other than a mere *semantic* openness of language to God's word, and more plausibly called a *metaphysical* openness of our being to some kind of unity with the God through that Word, some kind of what Aquinas calls "being made deiform."⁵⁵ Quite naturally, and quite in keeping with the logic of truth in natural language, I cannot argue in proof of this principle, but I may consistently pray that this Word be done unto me. Pragmatically speaking, it is the one true thing to do. Perhaps then, irony isn't a sin, as Mackey used to point out was Aquinas' position; perhaps, *sed contra*, it is a practice of prayer. And prayer is the real solidarity of the human race in its true city, where lesser ironists (or more megalomaniacal ones) attempt a solidarity which is merely a response to a force they dislike.⁵⁶

⁵³ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. Bxxx.

⁵⁴ See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, KU 452f.

⁵⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1, q. 12, art. 5, 6.

⁵⁶ Earlier versions of this paper were given as part of an NEH seminar on Literature and Values at The University of North Carolina in the summer of 2001, and at a conference in honor of Louis Mackey at the University of Texas, Austin in the fall of 2005.



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THE PRAYER “THE GOD OF THE SPIRITS...” (an expression that disappeared from liturgical structures: “in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms”)

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ABSTRACT

Although it seems to be a “common prayer” without any characteristic, given her repeated presence in the Funeral ordinances, the prayer “The God of the spirits...” still has a special value, being considered one of the prayers that is representative for the dead. That is why we would like to linger in this short article on some textual forms, including on the expression “in the bosom of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob”, able, in our opinion, to reveal the real difference of the various writings of the prayer “The God of the spirits...”.

Keywords: hymnography; liturgical structures; liturgical manuscripts; prayers for the departed; funeral practices;

1. THE PRAYER “THE GOD OF THE SPIRITS...” – TEXT

Before analysing¹ the expression “in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms”, I consider necessary and useful to present the entire text of the prayer, as it is shown in the (Romanian) *Psalter* from 1818:

“The God of the spirits (Revelation 22, 6)² and of every flesh (Numbers 16, 22; 27, 16), who didst trample down death and didst overcome the devil (acc. to Hebrews 2, 14)³, bestowing life to this world (acc. to 2 Maccabees 3, 35; John 6, 33⁴); do Thou, O Lord, give rest (acc. to Matthew 11, 28)⁵ to the soul of Thy departed servant [name] in a place of light, in a place of green pasture, in a place of refreshment (Genesis 8, 9; Numbers 10, 33 etc.), from whence pain, sorrow and mourning have fled away (acc. to Isaiah 35, 10; 51, 11). Every sin committed by him in thought, word or deed, do Thou as our good and man-befriending God (acc. to Exodus 34, 6; Luke 18, 19⁶) forgive: for there is no man that shall live and not sin (2 Paralipomena 6, 36)⁷, Thou alone art without sin. Thy righteousness is an everlasting righteousness, and Thy law is truth (Psalm 118, 142; John 17, 17)⁸”.

¹ See also I. Stoicu, “Rugăciunea: Dumnezeuul duhurilor și a tot trupul” [“The prayer: The God of the spirits and of every flesh”], in *Mitropolia Banatului (Mitropolity of Banat)* 14/1-3 (1964), pp. 77-82; unfortunately, this article is lacking essential data regarding the origin and age of the prayer.

² The biblical references do not appear in the original text, but they are intended to facilitate the analysis of the textual forms.

³ According to S. Parenti and E. Velkovska, *L’ Eucologio Barberini gr. 336*. Seconda edizione riveduta con traduzione in lingua italiana, BELS 80, Roma: CLV-Edizioni Liturgiche, 2000, p. 235 and Δ. Β. Τζέρπος, *Η Ακολουθία τοῦ Νεκρωσίου Εὐχέλαιον κατὰ τὰ χειρόγραφα Εὐχολόγια τοῦ ιδ’-ις’ αἰ.*, Ἀθήνα, Ἴδρυμα Βυζαντινῆς Μουσικολογίας. “Λατρευσιολογία 1”, 2000, p. 244.

⁴ Ἀθηναγόρας (Μητροπολίτης), “Ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων”, Ἐκκλησιαστικὸς Φάρος 36 (1937), p. 189.

⁵ Ἀθηναγόρας (Μητροπολίτης), “Ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων”, p. 189.

⁶ Ἀθηναγόρας (Μητροπολίτης), “Ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων”, p. 190.

⁷ Ἀθηναγόρας (Μητροπολίτης), “Ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων”, p. 189.

⁸ According to *Psaltirea (The Psalter)*, Chișinău: În Exarhiceasca Tipografie a Basarabiei, 1818, p. 305r; see



2. THE PRAYER “THE GOD OF THE SPIRITS...” – THE EXPRESSION “IN ABRAHAM’S, ISAAC’S AND JACOB’S BOSOMS” – GENERAL REMARKS

A fundamental addition in the prayer “*The God of the spirits and of all flesh...*” is the expression: “*in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms*”⁹, which, unfortunately, is missing from the current form of the prayer and which has direct and indirect grounds in the Scripture (Luke¹⁰ 16, 22-23¹¹; acc. to Matthew 8, 11¹²; Luke 13, 28¹³; 4 Maccabees 13, 17¹⁴).

Specialists have written a lot about this expression, given the fact that, on the one hand, it is the only one which emphasizes the real difference¹⁵ between various written texts

also N. Preda, *Rânduiala rugăciunii ce se face după ieșirea sufletului din trup, conform Psaltirii de la 1818 (Chișinău): noțiuni de liturgică [The Order of Prayer read after the Soul Has Left the Body, according to the Psalter from 1818 (Chișinău): Notions of Liturgics]*, Bucharest: Basilica Publishing House, 2015, pp. 208-209.

⁹ “*ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ*”, A. Dumont, “Fragment de l’office funèbre de l’Église grecque sur une inscription d’Égypte”, in Th. Homolle, *Mélanges d’archéologie et d’épigraphie*, Paris, Ernest Thorin, 1892, p. 584.

¹⁰ “*εἰς τὸν κόλπον Ἀβραάμ (...)* ὁρᾷ Ἀβραάμ ἀπὸ μακρόθεν καὶ Λάζαρον ἐν τοῖς κόλποις αὐτοῦ”, *Greek-English New Testament*. Greek text Novum Testamentum Graece, in the tradition of Eberhard Nestle and Erwin Nestle, edited by Barbara and Kurt Aland [et al.]. Eleventh corrected edition, Stuttgart, Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2008, p. 215; see also S. Parenti and E. Velkovska, *L’Eucologio...*, p. 236, note e etc., B. Botte, “Les plus anciennes formules de prière pour les morts”, in *La maladie et la mort du chrétien dans la Liturgie*, Conférences Saint-Serge XXI^e semaine d’études liturgiques, Paris, 1^{er}-4 juillet 1974, BELS 1, Roma, Edizioni Liturgiche, 1975, p. 93 and Δ. Β. Τζέρπος, *Ἡ Ἀκολουθία τοῦ Νεκρωσίμου...*, p. 243, note 3 etc.; “*“Κόλποις Ἀβραάμ” Λουκ. 15Τ, 23*”, Αθηνάγορας (Μητροπολίτης), “Ο Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων”, p. 189; “Saint Luc, *Ἐν.*, XVI, 22”, A. Dumont, “Fragment de l’office funèbre de l’Église grecque...”, p. 588, note 2.

¹¹ “LE SEIN D’ABRAHAM.– L’image du sein d’Abraham, comme celle du rafraîchissement, vient de la parabole de Lazare et du mauvais riche: après sa mort, Lazare est transporté dans le sein d’Abraham (*Lc* 16, 22-23). L’expression est iconnue de l’Ancien Testament”, B. Botte, “Les plus anciennes formules...”, p. 93.

¹² “*ὅτι πολλοὶ ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν ἤζουσιν καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται μετὰ Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν*”, *Greek-English New Testament...*, p. 18; see also B. Botte, “Les plus anciennes formules...”, p. 93, S. Parenti and E. Velkovska, *L’ Eucologio...*, p. 236, note f etc. and Δ. Β. Τζέρπος, *Ἡ Ἀκολουθία τοῦ Νεκρωσίμου...*, p. 243, note 3 etc.

¹³ “*ὅταν ὀνηθεῖ Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ καὶ πάντα τοὺς προφήτας ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ*”, *Greek-English New Testament...*, p. 207; see also S. Parenti and E. Velkovska, *L’ Eucologio...*, p. 236, note f etc.

¹⁴ “*οὕτω γὰρ θανάτῳ ἡμᾶς Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ ὑποδέχονται καὶ πάντες οἱ πατέρες ἐπαινεσοῦσιν*”, LXX [*Ἡ Παλαιὰ Διαθήκη κατὰ τοὺς Ο’ (Septuaginta)*, Ἀθήνα, Ἑλληνικὴ Βιβλικὴ Ἐταιρία, (s. a.): 1176; see also B. Botte, “Les plus anciennes formules...”, p. 93.

¹⁵ “*Il lettore avrà notato che la differenza fondamentale – l’unica d’altronde – di questi quattro testi consiste nella formula Ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ, καὶ Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Ἰακώβ, contenuta nella lapide di Daninos e che è presente in quasi tutte le stele, di cui si è fatta menzione sopra*”, V. Bruni, *I funerali di un sacerdote nel rito bizantino, secondo gli Eucologi manoscritti di lingua greca*. Pubblicazioni dello Studium Biblicum Franciscanum. Collectio Minor n. 14, Jerusalem, Franciscan Printing Press, 1972, p. 156; “O. V. Bruni καταλήγει στὰ ἐξῆς συμπεράσματα: 1 ον) Στὴν εὐχή ἡ μόνη διαφορά ποὺ παρατηρεῖται εἶναι ἡ φράση: “*Ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ, καὶ Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Ἰακώβ*” ποὺ παραδίδει ἡ δίγλωσση ἐπιγραφή Daninos τοῦ 913 καὶ ποὺ δὲν ὑπάρχει στὰ ἄλλα κείμενα”, Θ. Στ. Χριστοδοῦλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία κατὰ τοὺς χειρογράφους κώδικες 10ου-12ου αἰῶνος*. Τόμος Α’. Γενικὴ Εἰσαγωγή, Κατάλογοι, Πίνακες, Ἱερὰ Μονὴ Προφήτου Ἡλίου Θήρας, Ἐκδόσεις Θεοσβίτης, 2005, p. 186; “*La rédaction moderne a, plusieurs fois, altéré le texte tel qu’il était fixé à l’époque de notre épitaphe; la rédaction ancienne est plus pure, plus grecque que celle de la prière actuelle. Il n’y a vraiment qu’une différence importante entre les deux textes; la partie de phrase ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ, Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ ne figure pas à cette place dans l’office funèbre de l’Église orientale, bien qu’on la trouve souvent, ailleurs, dans le cours de la cérémonie. Il est fort probable que cette adjonction dans la prière ὁ θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων était propre à un pays particulier et qu’il faut la supprimer, si on veut retrouver, non une rédaction locale, mais le texte qui était reçu, à cette époque, dans la plus grande partie de l’Orient chrétien*”, A. Dumont, “Fragment de l’office funèbre de l’Église grecque...”, p. 588.



(funerary inscriptions, manuscripts, printed texts), and, on the other hand, because it could offer us information related to the origin of the prayer¹⁶.

Although the additional expression “in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms” appears in the prayer “The God of the spirits and of all flesh...” only in the texts of the funerary inscriptions¹⁷, it will not completely disappear from the subsequent liturgical structures of funeral practices. Furthermore, this expression is to be found even today in the content of certain prayers from “Rânduiala înmormântării preoților și a diaconilor de mir” (“Ceremonial regarding the funerals of the departed secular priests and deacons”)¹⁸:

“On retrouve encore cette mention dans l’ἀκολουθία νεκρώσιμος εἰς ἱερεα(ι) τελευτήσαντα; à l’oraison qui suit l’Évangile”¹⁹.

Noticeable in the aforementioned statement is the consistency of H. Leclercq’s reasoning, which specifies a fact subsequently pointed out in a note²⁰ in a diversified manner, according to which the prayer mentioned by J. Goar at page 465²¹ is an unusual one (an isolated case), and does not follow the reading of the *Gospel*.

¹⁶ “On sait que M. Edmond Le Blant a démontré que les types de l’épigraphie funéraire des premiers chrétiens étaient différents selon les pays et qu’il en a proposé un classement géographique. Dans le tableau qu’il a donné deux des invocations que nous trouvons ici sont attribuées à la Nubie et à l’Égypte méridionale, parce qu’on les a constatées principalement à Kalabscheh et à Colasucia: ἀνάπαυσον ὁ Θεὸς τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ - ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ πάσης σαρκός. La nouvelle découverte confirme la doctrine de M. Le Blant sur l’attribution de ces formules à la vallée du Nil...”, A. Dumont, “Fragment de l’office funèbre de l’Église grecque...”, p. 585; “E’ perciò da supporre che la preghiera in questione non sia nata nella regione, ma che vi sia stata importata. Passata a far parte dell’epigrafia funeraria ha probabilmente accolto, integrandola, la formula già comune: Ἀνάπαυσον, ὁ Θεός, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ, καὶ Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Ἰακώβ. Come principio dobbiamo escludere una eventuale provenienza dal vicino Egitto, perché i rapporti fra “l’epigrafia sepolcrale nubiana e l’egiziana diventano abbastanza intimi solo più tardi, quando l’uso generale del greco si affievolisce e comincia una più ampia penetrazione del copto: ma ciò ci conduce a parecchi secoli dopo la conversione”“, V. Bruni, *I funerali di un sacerdote...*, p. 156; “Cependant nous trouvons dans d’autres provinces l’expression biblique: in sinu, in gremio Abraham”, A. Dumont, “Fragment de l’office funèbre de l’Église grecque...”, p. 588, note 3.

¹⁷ “Pour le rite byzantin, les témoins manuscrits (papyrus et euclologes) de la prière “Dieu des esprits” omettent le thème d’Abraham, mais la plupart des stèles de Nubie, qui reprennent cette prière, insèrent, avant la mention du lieu de lumière et de rafraîchissement: ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ”, B. Botte, “Les plus anciennes formules...”, p. 94.

¹⁸ *MOLITFELNIC cuprinzând Slujbe, Rânduiali și Rugăciuni săvârșite de preot la diferite trebuințe din viața creștinilor (EUCHOLOGION including Services, Ceremonials and Prayers performed by the priest at various moments in the life of Christians, Bucarest, Printing House of the Biblical and Missionary Institute of Romanian Orthodox Church, 2006), București, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, 2006, pp. 259, 264 and 268; “Et, dans la liturgie byzantine actuelle, si la mention d’Abraham manque dans la prière “Dieu des esprits”, elle se retrouve dans les trois autres oraisons prévues pour les funérailles d’un prêtre”, B. Botte, “Les plus anciennes formules...”, p. 94; mention shall be made of the fact that one of the three prayers that B. Botte points out contains the short form of the expression mentioning solely the patriarch Abraham, as it also appears in the prayer “Rânduiala înmormântării pruncilor” (“The ceremonial of infants’ funerals”) [according to *MOLITFELNIC (EUCHOLOGION)*, București, 2006), p. 253; “Εὐχὴ ἐπὶ τελευτήσαντος νηπίου. Ὁ Φυλάσσων τὰ νήπια (...) καὶ ἀνεύθυνον τοὺς Ἀβραμαίους κόλπους...”, J. Goar, *Εὐχολόγιον sive Rituale Graecorum complectens ritus et ordines Divinae Liturgiae, officiorum, sacramentorum, consecrationum, benedictionum, funerum, orationum etc.*, Venetiis: Ex Typographia Bartholomaei Javarina, 1730², p. 478].*

¹⁹ H. Leclercq, “Ame”, in *Dictionnaire d’Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, t. I, première partie: A-Amende, pp. 1470-1554, Paris VI, Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1924, p. 1527; see also H. Leclercq, “Ame”, p. 1527, note 7 and J. Goar, *Εὐχολόγιον sive Rituale Graecorum...*, pp. 452, 453, 465.

²⁰ ^{c7} *Ibid.*, p. 452, 453, 465”, “Ame”, p. 1527, note 7.

²¹ “Εὐχὴ ἐπὶ τελευτήσαντος Ἱερέως (...) ΚΥριε Κύριε ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν (...), καὶ ἀνάπαυσον αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ...”, *Εὐχολόγιον sive Rituale Graecorum...*, p. 465.



On the other hand, this prayer which is recorded, actually, in a codex from the Grottaferrata Abbey (*Grottaferrata gr. G. b. 1*)²² contains only the short form of the above quoted expression, mentioning solely patriarch Abraham²³.

3. THE EXPRESSION “IN ABRAHAM’S, ISAAC’S AND JACOB’S BOSOMS” – IN THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION

As far as the manuscript tradition is concerned, I have to mention that it will not preserve the additional expression “*in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms*” in the structure of the prayer “*The God of the spirits...*”; nevertheless, it will not completely disappear, being found in many prayers pertaining to various funeral customs, but not only there. One of the most quoted prayers which records the above-mentioned expression is the one from the *Barberini Codex gr. 336* (8th century)²⁴, which was mentioned for the first time by J. Goar²⁵: “*Εὐχή ἐπὶ τελευτήσαντος. Ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ σώζειν (...), ἀνάπαυσον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δούλων σου (...), εἰς κόλπους Ἀβραάμ, Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Ἰακώβ*”²⁶.

For a better understanding of this phenomenon in the manuscript tradition, I consider necessary to enumerate below those prayers which truly render this addition:

a) *Barberini gr. 336*: 251r-251v: *Εὐχή εἰς κοιμηθέντα μοναχόν*²⁷ (...). *Δέσποτα κύριε*

²² *Grottaferrata gr. G. b. 1* [*Euchologium*, sec. XI (9th century)]: [116a]: *Εὐχή(ῆ) ἐπὶ τελευτήσαντος Ἱερέως...*, cf. Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία κατὰ τοὺς χειρογράφους κώδικες 10ου-12ου αἰώνος*. Τόμος Β'. Εἰσαγωγικά, Κωδικολογικά καὶ Παλαιογραφικά Κείμενα, Ἱερά Μονὴ Προφήτου Ἡλίου Θήρας, Ἐκδόσεις Θεσβίτης, 2005, p. 484 and M. Arranz, *L'Eucologio Costantinopolitano agli inizi del secolo XI. Hagiasmatarion & Archieratikon (Rituale & Pontificale) con l'aggiunta del Leiturgikon (Messale)*, Roma, Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1996, p. 311; “*oratio capitis inclinationis pro sacerdote (BES)...*”, M. Arranz, *L'Eucologio Costantinopolitano...*, p. 312.

²³ *E.B.E. 662* [*Εὐχολόγιον τὸ μέγα*, sec. XII (12th century)]: [194a]: *Εὐχή ἐπὶ τελευτῆ μοναχοῦ*.] Κύριε, ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν (...), καὶ ἀνάπαυσον] αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ, according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 491; *Coisl. 213* [*Euchologium Strategii presbyteri*, (a. 1027)]: [91a]: *Εὐχή ἐπὶ τελευτῆ μοναχοῦ*. Κύριε, ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν (...), καὶ ἀνάπαυσον αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ..., according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 506; see also M. Arranz, *L'Eucologio Costantinopolitano...*, p. 312 and 312, note 1.

²⁴ *Barberini gr. 336* [*L' Eucologio*, 8th century]: 249r-249v: *Εὐχή ἄλλη ἐπὶ τελευτήσαντος (...). Ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ θεὸς τοῦ σώζειν, ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ σωτὴρ καὶ κριτὴς ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν (...), ἀνάπαυσον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δούλων σου (...), εἰς κόλπους Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ || καὶ Ἰακώβ...*, according to S. Parenti and E. Velkovska, *L' Eucologio...*, p. 236; *Crypt. gr. Γ.β. IV* [*EUCHOLOGION*, saec. XI]: [124a-124β]: Ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ σώζειν, ὁ δημιουργ] γὸς καὶ Σωτὴρ καὶ κριτὴς ζώντων καὶ νε] κρῶν, ὁ κατάγων (...), ἀνάπαυ] στον τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ δούλου σου (...), εἰς κόλπους Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰα] κώβ..., according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 482.

²⁵ “*La liturgie dite de saint Marc ne possède pas cette formule dans sa forme la plus ancienne; elle apparaît dans une des additions à cette liturgie que contient le manuscrit Barberini cité par Goar...*”, *Dictionnaire d' Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, t. I, première partie, pp. 1153-1154; see also *Dictionnaire d' Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, t. I, première partie, p. 1153, note 3; “*Une oraison donnée en variante par Goar est ainsi conçue: Ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν... ἀνάπαυσον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δούλων σου (...), εἰς κόλπους Ἀβραάμ, Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Ἰακώβ*”, H. Leclercq, “*Ame*”, p. 1527; see also H. Leclercq, “*Ame*”, p. 1527, note 5; “*Εὐχή ἐπὶ τελευτήσαντος: Ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ σώζειν (...), ἀνάπαυσον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δούλων σου (...), εἰς κόλπους Ἀβραάμ, Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ*”, Ἀθηναγόρας (Μητροπολίτης), “*Ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων*”, p. 187; see also Ἀθηναγόρας (Μητροπολίτης), “*Ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων*”, p. 188, note 11.

²⁶ *Εὐχολόγιον sive Rituale Graecorum...*, p. 434.

²⁷ *Vat. Barber. 443* [*Eucologio*, 13th century]: [116β-117α]: *Εὐχή ἐν κοιμήσει μοναχοῦ*. Δέσποτα Κύριε ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν, according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 494; *Messin. Bibl. Univ. S. Salvat. gr. 153* [*Ἐπιτομολόγιον*] τῆς Νοτίου Ἰταλίας, (XI αἰ.): *Εὐχή· Δέσποτα Κύριε, ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ μόνος ἔχων] ἀθανασίαν...*[69a], according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη*

ὁ θεός, ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν (...) καὶ ἀνάπαυσον αὐτὸν εἰς κόλπους Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ²⁸;

b) *Coisl. 213: 89r*: *Εὐχή ἐπὶ τελευτήσαντος ἑτέρα*²⁹. Ὁ Θεός, ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ Σωτὴρ τῶν ἀπάντων, καὶ κριτὴς ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν, ὁ κατάγων (...), ἀνάπαυσον τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ δούλου σου (...), ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ³⁰;

c1) *Grottaferrata G. β. X [Eucologio, 10th century]: 78v*: *Εὐχή· Δέσποτα Κύριε ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ πλάσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα σὴν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν (...), αὐτὸς ἀνάπαυσον τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ δούλου σου ὁ δεῖνα ἐν τόπῳ φωτεινῷ (...), ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ [79r] καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ*³¹;

c2) *Grottaferrata G. β. X: [83β-84β]: Εὐχ(ή) ἐπὶ μ(ονα)χ(οῦ) κοιμηθ(έντος) πρεσβυτέρου καὶ διακόνου. Εὐχαριστοῦμέν σοι Κύριε ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν,] ὅτι σοῦ μόνου τοῦ ζῆν ἀθάνα] τον (...), ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ³²] καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ ἀνάπαυσον*³³;

d1) *Messin. Bibl. Univ. S. Salvat. gr. 153: [75β]: Καὶ ὁ Ἰερ(εὺ)ς τὴν εὐχὴν*³⁴ Δέσποτα Κύριε ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ πολὺς ἐν] εὐσπλαγχνία (...), καὶ συναρίθμησον αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις] [76α] Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ³⁵;

d2) *Messin. Bibl. Univ. S. Salvat. gr. 153: [144α]: Ὁ Ἰερ(εὺ)ς λέγ(ει) τὴν εὐχ(ή)ν:] Ὁ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ παντὶ τῇ θλίψει ἡ] μῶν ὁ Θεός (...), ἀνάπαυσον τὴν ψυχὴν] τοῦ δούλου σου τοῦδ(ε), ἐν φωτὶ καὶ χώρῃ] ζώντων, εἰς κόλπον Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσα] ἀκ καὶ Ἰακώβ*³⁶;

e) *Barb. gr. 431 [Εὐχολόγιον, (XI-XII αἰ.): [132β]: Ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ*

ἀκολουθία (volume II)..., p. 279; *Messin. Bibl. Univ. S. Salvat. gr. 172* [“Σχηματολόγιον”, (ἔτ. 1179)]: *Ἐπει(α) ὁ Ἰερ(εὺ)ς (...), εὔχε(ται) τὴν ῥηθειῖσαν εὐχ(ή)ν·] Δέσποτα Κ(ύρι)ε ὁ Θ(εὸ)ς ἡμῶν ὁ μόνος ἔ] χων ἀθανασίαν...[111α], according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 360; *Vat. gr. 1836* [Σχηματολόγιον, (XI-XII αἰ.): (*Εὐχ(ή) Δέσποτα Κύριε ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν ὁ μόνος] [103α] ἔχων ἀθανασίαν, according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 417.*

²⁸ According to S. Parenti and E. Velkovska, *L' Eucologio...*, p. 238; *Crypt. gr. Γ.β.V – Γ.α.XXV* [Εὐχολόγιον - Σχηματολόγιον, saec. XI]: *Εὐχὴ εἰς μο(να)χ(όν), ὁ Ἰερ(εὺ)ς·] Δέσποτα Χ(ριστ)ὲ ὁ Θ(εὸ)ς ὁ μόνος ἔχων] ἀθανασίας (...), καὶ ἀνά] παυσον αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις Ἀβρα] ἄμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., pp. 85-86; for features see the notes of Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., pp. 85-86.*

²⁹ *E.B.E. 662: [192β]: Εὐχὴ ἄλλη. Ὁ Θεός, ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ Κύριος] τῶν ἀπάντων (...), ἀνάπαυ] στον τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ δούλου σου (...), ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσα] ἀκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 490; see also M. Arranz, *L' Eucologio Costantinopolitano...*, p. 314, note 1 above.*

³⁰ According to J. Duncan, *Coisl. 213. Euchologe de la Grande Eglise*. Dissertatio ad Lauream, Romae, Pontificium Institutum Orientale, 1983, p. 137; see also M. Arranz, *L' Eucologio Costantinopolitano...*, p. 314 and Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 504.

³¹ According to E. Velkovska, “Funeral Rites according to the Byzantine Liturgical Sources”, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 55 (2001), p. 47; see also Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 44.

³² According to Father Themistoclis Hristodoulou's observations, the manuscripts *Grottaferrata gr. G. b. 1, E.B.E. 662* and *Coisl. 213* render the short form of the expression mentioning solely the patriarch Abraham (according to *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 61, note 435); see also M. Arranz, *L' Eucologio Costantinopolitano...*, p. 311.

³³ According to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., pp. 60-61.

³⁴ *Vat. gr. 1836: (Εὐχ(ή) Δέσποτα Κύριε ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν ὁ πο] λὺς ἐν εὐσπλαγχνία...[92α], according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 411.

³⁵ Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., pp. 282-283.

³⁶ Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 305.

σώζειν· ὁ δημιουργὸς] ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν· ὁ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων (...), ἀνάπαυσον] τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ δούλου σου ὁ δεῖνα) (...), ἐν κόλποις Ἀ] [133α] βραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ³⁷;

f) *Leningr. gr.* 226 [*Eucologio*, 10th century]: [127β-128β]: *Εὐχὴ ἑτέρα ἐπὶ τελευτησάντων.*] Ὁ Θεὸς ὁ δυνατὸς, ὁ τῆ σοφία σου κατασκευάσας τὸν] ἄνθρωπον (...) καὶ ἀνάπαυσον τὸ πνεῦμα Αὐτοῦ εἰς] κόλπους Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ³⁸;

g) *Vat. gr.* 1970 [*Eucologio*, (12th century)]: 38v: *Εὐχὴ ὀπισθάμβωνος· εἰς κοιμηθέντας.* Ὁ θεὸς τῶν πνευματων καὶ πάσης σαρκὸς· ὁ μεταφέρων (...) καὶ τάξον [39r] αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ τῶν δικαίων σου³⁹;

h) *Sinai* 973 [*Euchologium*, a. 1153]: 90v: *Εὐχὴ ἐπὶ κολύβων εἰς κοιμηθέντας.* Δέσποτα Κύριε ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ κατοικῶν (...), αὐτὸς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ δούλου σου τοῦδε ἀνάπαυσον ἐν τόπῳ φωτεινῷ, ἐν χώρᾳ ἀγίων, ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ⁴⁰;

i) *Grottaf. Gb43* [*Riti della vestizione e della sepoltura*, 11th century]: [112α]: *Καὶ πάλιν εὐχὴ·*] Ἀχραντε Κύριε ὁ ἐν φωτὶ τὴν] [112β] κατοικίαν ἔχων (...) τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ] δούλου σου τοῦδε(ε), ἀνάπαυ] στον χορῶ φωτεινῷ καὶ δικαί] ω, ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ καὶ] Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ⁴¹.

4. THE EXPRESSION “IN ABRAHAM’S, ISAAC’S AND JACOB’S BOSOMS” – IN THE TEXTS OF EKTENES FOR THE DEPARTED

Among the texts including the expression “*in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms*” there are also the ektenes for the departed:

a1) *Grottaferrata G. β. X:* 77v: *Υπὲρ τοῦ κατατάξαι αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, τοῦ Κυρίου δεηθῶμεν*⁴²;

a2) *Grottaferrata G. β. X:* 81r: *Υπὲρ τοῦ κατατάξαι αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, ἔνθα οἱ δίκαιοι*⁴³;

b) *Grottaf. Gb43:* [157α]: *Υπὲρ τοῦ ἐνωθῆναι αὐτὸν ἐν] τῇ τρυφῇ τοῦ παραδείσου,*

³⁷ Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 475.

³⁸ Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 477.

³⁹ According to H. W. Codrington, *The Liturgy of Saint Peter*, Liturgiegeschichtliche Quellen und Forschungen, Heft 30, Münster in Westfalen, Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936, pp. 144-145; “Ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ πάσης σαρκὸς, ὁ μεταφέρων (...) καὶ τάξον αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ, Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ τῶν δικαίων σου”, Ἀθηναγόρας (Μητροπολίτης), “Ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων”, pp. 182-183.

⁴⁰ According to A. Дмитриевский, *Описание литургических рукописей, хранящихся в библиотекахъ Православнаго Востока. Томъ II. Еὐχολόγια*, Киевъ, Типографія Императорскаго Университета Св. Владиміра, 1901, p. 110.

⁴¹ According to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 169.

⁴² According to E. Velkovska, “Funeral Rites...”, p. 46; *Grottaferrata G. β. X:* [77β]: *Υπὲρ τοῦ κατατάξαι αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις Ἀ] βραὰμ, καὶ Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Ἰακώβ, τοῦ Κυρίου δεηθῶμεν.*, cf. Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 40; see also Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume I)..., p. 654.

⁴³ According to E. Velkovska, “Funeral Rites...”, p. 49; *Grottaferrata G. β. X:* [81α]: *Υπὲρ τοῦ κατατάξαι αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις Ἀβρα] ἄμ, καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, ἔνθα οἱ δίκαιοι.*, according to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 51; see also Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume I)..., p. 660.



έν] κόλποις Ἀβραάμ μετὰ πάντων] τῶν Δικαίων τοῦ Κυρίου δεηθῶμεν.]⁴⁴;

c) *Messin. Bibl. Univ. S. Salvat. gr. 153*: [68β]: Ὑπὲρ τοῦ καταταγῆναι αὐτὸν ἐν κόλποις] Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, τοῦ Κυρίου (δεηθῶμεν).]⁴⁵;

d) *Sinai 963 [Euchologium, saec. XII]*: [3α]: Ὑπὲρ τοῦ εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν μερίδα καὶ κλῆρον ἐν τῇ μελλούσῃ ζωῇ, με] τὰ Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰα] κῶβ τοῦ Κ(υρίου)υ δεηθ(ῶμεν).]⁴⁶;

e) *Sinai 973*: [90α]: Ὑπὲρ τοῦ καταξιοθῆναι αὐτὸν ἐν τρυφῇ πα] ραδείσου, ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσα] ἀκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, μετὰ πάντων τῶν δικαί(ων).]⁴⁷;

f) *Messin. Bibl. Univ. S. Salvat. gr. 172*: [183β]: Κ(ύρι)ε ὁ Θε(ὸ)ς ἡμῶν· τὸν προλαβόντα] δοῦλόν σου ἀνάπαυσον· ἐν κόλ] ποις Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰα] κῶβ, καὶ τοὺς πενθοῦντας,] καὶ ἐν λύπῃ ὄντας παραμύ] θησον· καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐλέησον· νῦν] καὶ ἀεὶ, καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας.]⁴⁸;

g) *Halki 126 [Εὐχολόγιον, (IC' αἰῶνος)]⁴⁹*: Ἀκολουθία τοῦ Τρισαγίου παραλλάσσουσα τῆς ἐν χρήσει, ὡς ἀκολουθῶς: Ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς ὁ Θεὸς (...). Ὡπως Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν κατατάξῃ τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ (Τὸ Κύριε ἐλέησον τρίς)⁵⁰.

Noticeable is the fact that the expression “in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms” is encountered even today in some ektenes for the departed, as for instance the “ectenia răposatilor” (“the ectene for the departed”)⁵¹, as part of the service “Parastasului”⁵²

⁴⁴ According to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 218; see also Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume I)..., p. 656; Unfortunately, this text includes only the short form of the expression mentioning solely the patriarch Abraham.

⁴⁵ According to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 278; see also Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume I)..., pp. 656-657.

⁴⁶ According to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 324; see also Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume I)..., pp. 656-657; *Sinai 963*: Ὑπὲρ τοῦ εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν μερίδα καὶ κλῆρον ἐν τῇ μελλούσῃ ζωῇ μετὰ Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, according to A. Дмитриевский, *Описание литургических рукописей...*, p. 136; Unfortunately, this text does not include the words “in bosoms”.

⁴⁷ According to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 352; see also Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume I)..., pp. 656-657; *Sinai 973*: Ὑπὲρ τοῦ καταξιοθῆναι αὐτὸν ἐν τρυφῇ παραδείσου, ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ μετὰ πάντων τῶν δικαίων, according to A. Дмитриевский, *Описание литургических рукописей...*, p. 110.

⁴⁸ According to Θ. Στ. Χριστοδούλου, *Ἡ νεκρώσιμη ἀκολουθία* (volume II)..., p. 398.

⁴⁹ Ἀθηναγόρας (Μητροπολίτης), “Κατάλογος τῶν χειρογράφων τῆς ἐν Χάλκῃ Μονῆς τῆς Παναγίας”, in Ἐπετηρὶς Ἐταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν 12 (1936), p. 302.

⁵⁰ “Τὴν δέησιν ταύτην ἀπηντήσαμεν ἐν τῷ 126 χειρογράφῳ εὐχολογίῳ τῆς ἐν Χάλκῃ Ἱερᾶς Μονῆς τῆς Παναγίας, ἐν τισὶ παραλλάσσουσιν πρὸς τὴν τετυπωμένην, ὡς ἐξῆς: “Ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς ὁ Θεὸς (...) ὅπως Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν κατατάξῃ τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ. (Κύριε ἐλέησον τρίς.)””, Ἀθηναγόρας (Μητροπολίτης), “Ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων”, pp. 197-198.

⁵¹ “*Apoi ectenia răposatilor*” (“Then the ectene of the departed”), *Octoih Mare care cuprinde in sine Slujba Invierei pe opt glasuri*, București, Tipografia „Cărților Bisericesci”, 1890 (*Great Octoechos that includes the Service of the Resurrection in 8 voices*, Bucarest, Printing House of „Ecclesiastic Books”, 1890), p. 764.

⁵² “PARASTAS (REQUIEM) (παράστασις, ἢ – *parastasis* = appearance in front of someone, mediation) – as the people call the commemorative service performed for the deceased after their funerals and which in the service books is called *Panihida* (Panahida) *mare* (*Great panahida*), corresponding to the *Requiem* in the Roman-Catholic cult...”, Fr. Prof. PhD. E. Braniște and Prof. Ecaterina Braniște, *Dicționar enciclopedic de cunoștințe religioase (Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Religious Knowledge)*, Caransebeș: Diocesan Publishing, 2001, p. 345.



pentru morți, și mai ales pentru ctitori” (“*Requiem for the departed and especially for the founders*”)⁵³: “*For them to be counted in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms, let us pray to the Lord*”⁵⁴.

5. THE LINK BETWEEN THE PRAYER “THE GOD OF THE SPIRITS...” AND THE EXPRESSION “IN ABRAHAM’S, ISAAC’S AND JACOB’S BOSOMS”

In conclusion, I would like to remind the statement of metropolitan bishop Athenagoras concerning the close link between the prayer “*The God of the spirits...*” and the expression “*The God of the spirits...*”, which seems more than meaningful:

“Αναμφιβόλως ἡ Δέησις αὕτη εἶναι ἀρχαιοπρεπεστέρα τῆς ἐν χρήσει ὡς περιέχουσα μάλιστα τό: “ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραάμ, Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ” ὅπερ, ὡς εἶδομεν, δὲν λείπει ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς εὐχῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν κεκοιμημένων ἐν ταῖς θείαις Λειτουργίαις, ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς καὶ ἐν ὄλαις ταῖς νεκρικαῖς δεήσεσιν”⁵⁵.

CONCLUSIONS

Among the hymnography compositions and prayers from the *Funeral Practices* we also find the prayer “*The God of the spirits...*” on which it has been previously written, and, even if it seems to be a “common prayer”, voided of any feature, given its repeated presence among the *Funeral Practices*, it has, nevertheless, a special value, being considered one of the most significant prayers for the departed.

In terms of the expression “in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms”, the specialists wrote a lot because, on the one hand, it is the only one which emphasizes the real difference between the various written forms of the prayer “*The God of the spirits...*” (such as funeral inscriptions, manuscripts, printed texts) and, on the other hand, because it could even offer us data related to its origin.

Even if the expression (more precisely the addition) “*in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms*” appears in the prayer “*The God of the spirits and of the whole body...*” only in the texts of the funeral inscriptions, it will not disappear completely from the subsequent liturgical structures of the *Funeral Practices*.

Furthermore, this expression can still be found today in the content of some prayers from the “Funeral service of the departed secular priests and deacons”; unfortunately, the manuscript tradition will not keep the addition “*in Abraham’s, Isaac’s and Jacob’s bosoms*”, in the structure of the prayer “*The God of the spirits...*”.

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⁵⁴ *Octoih Mare (Great Octoechos)*... (București, 1890), p. 764.

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CHRISTIAN HYMNOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE STATE OF THE SOULS IN HELL

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ABSTRACT

Of an irreducible antagonism, both states, heaven and hell, are eternal. Our earthly life, of faith and communion with the Heavenly Father or of faithlessness and non-communion with God, is extended in the eternity. Our reaching the heaven or the hell is the natural and logical consequence of our actions and not the result of an arbitrary judgment of God. If our paradisiacal life means walking towards perfection and then a continuous progress, a continuous enlightenment of rational creatures as theomorphs, once you reach the end, the lives existing in hell go the completely opposite direction. For demons coexisting with God is impossible; they do not match Him, in other words, they cannot see His uncreated glory. The hell is the stillness in a state of separation and hatred of God, due to sin, which is the disunion. The eternal damnation resembles an endless nightmare and consists in: taking distance from God, feeling remorseful, weeping and gnashing of teeth, tortures which will last day and night to all eternity.

Keywords: hell; judgment; God; devils; sin;

1. INTRODUCTION

“In Orthodoxy, religious books constitute a full treasure, alive, present and eternal of Christian religious experience, the answer given by the believer of his word to God’s call. Books of ritual were overwhelmingly important for the Church and for its believers. All theory of the Church, all dogmas are explained and translated for the ordinary believers, accessible to them through text books of cult. They have as main purpose the catechetical teaching; they aim to introduce the believer into a mysterious atmosphere, become closer to God, thus having a charismatic purpose; a third goal is that we can highlight these liturgical embodiments having lateritic role; and not least the aesthetic purpose, beauty cult, along with the church music have led to a unique art and rare beauty”¹.

If our paradisiacal life means walking towards perfection and then a continuous progress, a continuous enlightenment of rational creatures as theomorphs, once you reach the end, the lives existing in hell go the completely opposite direction. For demons, coexisting with God is impossible; they do not match Him, in other words, they cannot see His uncreated glory. They believe, but they do not communicate with Him. If paradisiacal life is friendship, hell is unfriendship and non-communion, both in relation to God and in relation

¹ Assist. Phd. Rev. Cosmin Santi, „*Christian Cult And Liturgical Books After The Edict Of Liberty (313)*”, in *Teologie și Viață*, 2015, nr. 5-8, pp. 133,136



to others. *“The frightening darkness of death unsettles my soul and the demon inquiring always makes me puzzle and wince me”*².

Saint Maximus the Confessor shows that God also loves and cherishes the one from hell, however the latter’s unhappiness lies in his being apart from Him and spending time with those who hate Him and whom he hates himself: *“And more agonizing and horrifying than any anguish is being forever around those who hate you and are hated...and being separated from the one who loves you and is loved”*³.

“Always being in torment..., would there be anything harder, a greater woe than this? Never-ending eternity! This is an endless sea of which limits cannot be encompassed by the human eye; this is darkness, a precipice where the human eye cannot penetrate. When the sky grows old, like a coat; when the sun gets dark, like a fuming charcoal; when the stars fall from the sky, like the autumn leaves; when all tribes and peoples are defeated by time, like grass under the reaper’s scythe stick; when the world disappears; when time gets tired of flying and stops flowing before the throne of the One Who created it, then eternity will come and all these will not even resemble a drop in its limitless ocean. Eternity is an endless beginning, a limitless space, timeless time. One thousand years resemble a day there and a day resembles one thousand years; a split second is eternity there and eternity is a split second; centuries will seep there, thousands of years over thousands of years and then any time calculation will be wasted and eternity will however set in and eternity years will be more and more numerous”⁴

The Judaic religion does not know the resurrection doctrine. Any man goes down in the seol, an underground place, dark and shadowed, where there is no memory, no praise of God. The hell is where the dead, especially the sinful ones, will be thrown, as this is the home of the dead, Jesus Christ descended to hell to preach before the spirits held in prison (Luca 16, 23), or the state of the doomed, the sufferings and the eternal fire designated to the devil and his angles (Matthew 25, 41). Christ descended to hell deified to show that His light covers the darkness and the shadow of death and to set the slaves free. Jesus Christ, Who voluntarily accepts His death on the Cross, assumes the human reality all the way through the end, in all its most negative aspects, and the confrontation itself with the devil where the latter dwells and is the master, namely the kingdom of death. In fact, redemption means taking man out of hell. He descends like a king and announces His eternal victory over death and Satan, not only for the righteous, but for all, for the Christians and the ungodly⁵. The texts of our religious books are extremely beautiful and depict this shining and incomprehensible event as follows: *“Your burying, Lord, opened the heaven to mankind; and from lewdness we were delivered and we pray to You, Our resurrecting God; have mercy on us”*⁶.

“We worship to Your Cross, Lover of Mankind, as you were nailed down on the cross, life of all; Savior, you opened the heaven to the thief who came to You in faith and who had loved

² ***, *Octoiul Mare*, care cuprinde slujba Învierii pe opt glasuri, Tipografia cărților bisericești, București, 1952, Glasul al IV-lea, Marți seară, la Doamne strigat-am, Stihirile Crucii, Stihira a VI-a, p. 321.

³ Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul apud Pr. Dr. Ioan Tulcan, *Rai și iad - realități veșnice*, în „Mitropolia Banatului”, XXXIX (1989), nr. 4, p. 47

⁴ S.A.Arhanghelov, *Tainele vieții viitoare*, traducere de Climent I. Bontea, Editura Bunavestire, Bacău, 2007, p. 165.

⁵ Pr. Prof. Dr. Ion Bria, *Dicționar de Teologia Ortodoxă A-Z*, ediția a II-a, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1994, p. 194.

⁶ ***, *Penticostarul*, adică sfintele slujbe de la Duminica Paștilor până la Duminica Tuturor Sfinților, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1999, Vineri în Săptămâna Luminată, la Utrenie, la Laude, glasul al VI-lea, Stihira I, p. 51.



the pleasures of life and yet confessed to You: Jesus, remember me! Take us just you took him, for we say: We all sinned, and do not forget us for You are merciful!”⁷. “Your crucifixion opened the paradise to men and You raised men from the dead, You are our Life; and You rose and defeated death with Your power, and You truly unified the earthly and the heavenly; and You filled with unspoken joy the Apostles, Words of God, and You gave them peace”⁸

In addition to its soteriological meaning, this event has both a christological and an eschatological meaning, as Jesus Christ descended to hell with His soul while His body was in the grave, as one can see in the troparion above, which means that, upon death, the rational soul or the human personality is not destroyed, but awaits resurrection of the body⁹, which will take place upon the eschatological time of the rise from the dead at the end times, just as we say in the Creed at each Liturgy. “*If the Savior came down to those tied like a dead, the dead of all times rose along with Him and said: Glory to Your power, God*”¹⁰. “Christ has risen, by untying the ties of Adam the first human creation and crashing the power of hell. Dare. All dead, for death was murdered, and hell was ravaged with it and Christ took His kingdom, the One who was crucified and rose. He offered us the harmlessness of the body; He will raise and resurrect us and will make us worthy of His glory, in joy, all who truthfully and dearly believed in Him”¹¹.

“You let Yourself nailed down on the cross, You capable of great endurance, you let yourself lie down in the grave like a dead man, You life giver, Your death crushed the mastery of death with Your own death, You strong, the hell guards winced; You raised the dead of all times, like a Lover of mankind”¹²

2. THE HELL OR DISTANCE FROM GOD

The hell is the stillness in a state of separation and hatred of God, due to sin, which is the disunion. The hell lies in the dark, infernal aspect of human condition¹³, in all characteristics of man’s life and disobedience to God and His commandments.

The word hell or underworld (Gr. Γέεννα, Lat. inferna) designates the expiation place following death, the place where all unredeemed souls go; in the Orthodox iconography (Icon of the Doomsday), the hell is depicted like a river of fire, somewhere in the depth of the earth, where the sinful souls are thrown and subjected to all sorts of tortures (tormenting fire)¹⁴. At the end of the Parable of the Bags of Gold spoken on the Mount of Olives, the hell is also described as a place of punishment and great torture in the afterworld. This is the parable where Jesus tries to prepare His listeners for the afterlife, until today, when the sinners will be thrown “in the farthest darkness”, where “there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth” (Matthew 25, 30; 24, 51). “*Let me not come to the weeping land and see*

⁷ *Penticostarul*, Vineri în săptămâna a doua după Paști, la Utrenie, după întâia Catismă, Sedealna Crucii, glasul I, pp. 79-80.

⁸ *Penticostarul*, la Stihovă, Stihirile Praznicului, Stihira I, glasul al IV-lea, p. 81

⁹ Pr. Prof. Dr. Ion Bria, *Dicționar de Teologia Ortodoxă A-Z*, ediția a II-a, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1994, p. 194

¹⁰ ***, *Octoiul Mare*, Glasul al V-lea, Duminică dimineață, alt Canon al Prea Sfintei Născătoarei de Dumnezeu, Peasna a 4-a, Stihira a VI-a, p. 380

¹¹ ***, *Triodul*, care cuprinde slujbele bisericești de la Duminică Vameșului și Fariseului până la Sfânta Înviere, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 2000, Sămbăta Lăsatului sec de carne, la Utrenie, la Laude, Stihira a IV-a, glas VIII, p. 37

¹² ***, *Octoiul Mare*, Duminică la Utrenie, Glasul I, Sedealna a II-a, p. 16

¹³ Pr. Prof. Dr. Ion Bria, *Dicționar de Teologia Ortodoxă A-Z*, ediția a II-a, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1994, p. 195

¹⁴ Pr. Prof. Dr. Ene Braniște și Prof. Ecaterina Braniște, *Dicționar enciclopedic de cunoștințe religioase*, Editura Diecezană, Caransebeș, 2001, p. 246



*the place of darkness, My Lord, Words, or be thrown out of Your world, bound hand and foot, with my harmless garments filthy, I the unworthy*¹⁵. *“The river of fire torments me, softens me, the gnashing of teeth and the depth darkness torture me”*¹⁶.

The Divine Gospel shows us that the hell is a place of torture and torment (Matthew 13, 35; Luke 16, 23). As for the sorts of different works assigned to people in hell, the same testimonies of the Holy Gospel tell us that the hell hosts the burning fire and the undying worms: *“Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched...”* (Mark 9, 44, 46). Both body and soul suffer in hell: *“If your right eye causes you to sin, gouge it and throw it away. It is better for you to lose one part of your body than for your whole body to be thrown into hell.”* (Matthew 5, 29). In hell there is punishment and eternal fire: *“If your hand or your foot causes you to stumble, cut it off and throw it away. It is better for you to enter life maimed or crippled than to have two hands or two feet and be thrown into eternal fire”* (Matthew 18, 8). In hell there is a furnace of fire and brimstone (Apocalypse 20, 10), the eternal oven and the gnashing of teeth (Matthew 13, 50), the fire of hell (Matthew 5, 22); the hell is tartarus, where it is abominably cold and freezing (2 Peter 2, 41), it is dark (Judas 6, Romans 13, 12), it stinks unbearably (John 11, 39, Isaiah 34, 3), weeping, excruciating famine etc.; there will be huge despair in hell, and there will no longer be time for redemption, for the door of God’s mercy has closed for those who are not prepared and penitent.

*“I weep and I gripe when I start feeling the eternal fire, the farthestmost darkness and the tartarus, the abominable worm and the never-ending gnashing of teeth, and the pains which are to go through the ones did all the wrongs, and who deceivingly infuriated You, the Very Kind, of which I am one and the first, the wretch. You Judge, have mercy on my soul and redeem me”*¹⁷

In hell there is eternity, endless torture, and it is to these endless works that Jesus the Savior refers when He says: *“Then He will say to those on his left, ‘Depart from me, you who are cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels. Then they will go away to eternal punishment, but the righteous to eternal life’* (Matthew 25, 41, 46). Then let us work incessantly on our reformation and pray to God by saying: *“Forgive me, Father, Your Slave, so that You do not abandon me to the most bitter tortures, to the atrocious angles, among whom one may not find peace”*¹⁸. Save me, Lord from the gates of hell; save me from the abyss and the deepest darkness, from what lies under the earth and from the burning fire and from any other eternal punishment¹⁹.

We can escape the devil’s influence and his conspiracies only if “we participate to God’s love, if we unify with the others in Church, which truly represents the sharing of godly life; it may be weakened and destroyed if man ignores Satan’s conspiracies. The Church has two aspects: one positive, i.e. love, union and immortality shared with one another and saints into Christ, and one negative, defeated in the body of Christ by those who live into Christ, beyond death. Christology represents the positive aspect of the Church, which is however influenced by the biblical demonology – the negative key factor, which

¹⁵ ***, *Triodul*, Duminica Lăsatului sec de carne, La Utrenie, Canonul-alcătuire a lui Teodor Studitul, Cântarea a 4-a, Stihira a IV-a, glas al VI-lea, p. 43.

¹⁶ *Triodul*, Cântarea a 5-a, Stihira a II-a, glas al VI-lea, p. 44

¹⁷ *Triodul*, Duminica Lăsatului sec de carne, la Vecernie-Sâmbătă Seara, la Doamne strigat-am..., Stihira a IV-a, glas al VI-lea, p. 40

¹⁸ *Triodul*, la Utrenie, Canonul-alcătuire a lui Teodor Studitul, Cântarea a 5-a, Stihira a III-a, glas al VI-lea, p. 44.

¹⁹ *Triodul*, Cântarea a 6-a, Stihira a VI-a, glas al VI-lea, p. 45



determines both Christology and ecclesiology, which are both impossible to comprehend without a proper understanding of Satan's work and methods²⁰. Nevertheless, the Incarnation of our Lord, Jesus Christ, His miracles, His Passions, His Crucifixion, His Death, His Descent into Hell, and more importantly His Rise from the dead, destroyed the gates of hell, broke the chains of demons, the power, the yoke, the slavery of the devil, and re-established the harmony between man and God, once and for all, and this is praised and commended in most texts of religious hymns of the Pentecostarion books, which are extremely beautiful:

“Let the creature be joyful and flourish like a lily for Christ has risen, Where is your courage, death? Let us scream. Where is your victory, hell, You were made to fall by the one who raised us like a Gracious”²¹. “Christ, with Your chosen life-creating death, you shattered the gates of hell like a God, You opened the old heaven for us, and raising from the dead, You saved our lives from rottenness”²². “God, you smashed the gates of hell and destroyed death with Your great power and together You raised the dead sleeping in the dark for centuries, with Your godly and gracious Resurrection, like the King of all and God, Almighty”²³.

The godly providence is a work which encompasses the whole creation. According to the patristic theology, if God takes back His breath of Life, everything will turn into nothing. The creation is not self-sufficient since it has no existence in itself. God makes creatures and things be, live, reason. God deifies creatures and things in line with their receptivity, depending on their nature or volition. It is due to this care of God for creation in general, and for man in particular, that He makes some people have feelings and experiences of hell ever since this lifetime, so that they may be awakened to reality and to a more virtuous life. “*Hell is dead; dare, human beings! For, being crucified on the cross, Christ threw the sword against it and it lies dead, for it was deprived and emptied of all those it kept inside*”²⁴.

Saint Mark of Ephesus believes that what is seen in the hell experiences is “*often a face of future tortures, and not a literal embodiment of the present state of those who await the Doomsday in hell*”²⁵. Nevertheless, the hostility towards God, which is also hell, is unforgivable. Not because God's mercy has some limits or boundaries, but because the man, who constantly looks away from God, reaches the extreme limit of enmity from which there is no turning back. If man stands against the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit may no longer bring him back to penitence. The soul of an understanding creature may soften only through the godly grace of the Holy Spirit, without which it will surrender to pride and darkness²⁶.

“I will pour my prayer to God and I will share all my misfortunes with Him; for my soul is full of mischief and my life is closer to hell now; and like Jonah I pray: God, take me out of rottenness”²⁷

²⁰ Arhiepiscopul Hrisostom de Etna, *Elemente de psihologie pastorală ortodoxă*, ediția a II-a, traducere de Daniela Constantin, Editura Bunavestire, Galați, 2003, p. 65

²¹ ***, *Octoiul Mare*, Glasul al VI-lea, Duminică dimineață, alt Canon, al Crucii, Stihira a II-a, p. 476.

²² *Octoiul Mare*, Duminică dimineață, Al doilea rând de Sedelne ale Învierii, Slavă..., p. 467

²³ *Octoiul Mare*, Glasul al VII-lea, Duminică dimineață, la Laude, Stihira a V-a, pp. 563-564

²⁴ ***, *Penticostarul*, Duminica a treia după Paști, a Sfintelor femei mironosițe și a Dreptului Iosif, la Utrenie, Canoanele, Canonul Mironosițelor-alcătuire a lui Andrei Criteanul, Cântarea a 6-a, Stihira a II-a, glasul al IV-lea, p. 99.

²⁵ Sfântul Marcu al Efesului, *Cuvântări împotriva purgatoriului* apud Ierom. Serafim Rose, *Sufletul după moarte*, traducere de Dana Cocargeanu, Editura Sofia, 2007, p. 169.

²⁶ *Apostazia și antihristul după învățăturile Sfinților Părinți*, Editura Sfinții Martiri Brâncoveni, Constanța, 2008, pp. 37-38

²⁷ ***, *Mineul pe Februarie*, Editura Reîntregirea, Alba-Iulia, 2002, Ziua a opta, la Utrenie, Canoanele, Cântarea a 6-a, Imnosul, glasul al VIII-lea, p. 85



3. THE LAST JUDGMENT, ETERNAL LIFE OR ETERNAL DAMNATION

After man's judgment some people will start enjoying eternal happiness, while others eternal punishment, meaning eternal tortures in hell, the place where dwell all hatred, distress and disaster, where there is only horror, torment and chaos, where one may find no joy, hope or relief (Mark 9, 44, 46, 48). The eternal separation from God and the deprivation of His gifts, the horrible remorse, the dishonesty and eternal shame, the blemishes, the insults and the curses of those who were attracted to sin by the punished, the oppressions of the demons who live with the punished²⁸, all this will compose the picture called the hell, the Hades, the farthest darkness, the tartarus where "there is gnashing of teeth" (Matthew 22, 13) and "the fright of harassment" (Mark 13, 14).

"Alas, my miserable soul, you will be weeping much there in remembrance of your actions, when the righteous are invited to the eternal Kingdom while you are punished for your actions in the eternal fire! Sob your heart out, weep while still here, run after Christ the Savior and cleanse your sins."²⁹

It is absolutely true that the ones who rejected communion with God are in hell. But those who did not lose all faith in God are also in hell, where they dwell due to their insignificant sins which took them out of the communion with God. With this faith in their souls, the hell dwellers may discover the communion with Christ and go to heaven, before the doomsday, with the help of the saints' prayers and the prayers of the ones living on earth. Prayers make the act of communion of the people on earth sprout the root of the communion tree in the soul of the hell dwellers³⁰.

The mystery of the fact that some will be taken out of the hell before the universal judgment and others will live in hell forever and will, moreover, go to the eternal hell along with those who die and go to hell, at the end of times, is a mystery of man's freedom and of his power to strengthen himself in a negative freedom difficult to overcome. Berdiaeff admits that there is a hell resulting from the refusal of the communion with God; yet he believes that this is a subjective hell, not an ontological one, and states that it may not last forever³¹.

Saint Joan of Damascus says: "God also offers the devil what is forever good. But the devil refuses to receive it. And in the century to come God offers everyone the good things. However, each participates to what is good as each made himself worthy of it"³² [32]. This is why God is not the source of all devil's eternal tortures, the devil actually tortures itself.

All those who will not be able to get out of hell until the universal judgment, will never be able to leave it. The hell punishments are different from person to person, as their sins are different. The reward will be in line with everybody's actions, depending on how conscious and free they were in performing such actions. Therefore, hell continues to be a possibility for each individual; yet it depends on us, people, whether this possibility becomes a reality or not.

²⁸ ***, *Apostazia și antihristul ...*, pp. 80-81.

²⁹***, *Octoiuhul Mare*, Glasul al VIII-lea, Duminică seara, La Doamne strigat-am, Stihirile de umilință, Stihira a II-a, p. 651.

³⁰ Pr. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Popescu, *Iisus Hristos – Pantocrator*, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 2005, p. 397

³¹ Pr. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, *Teologia Dogmatică Ortodoxă*, ediția a II-a, vol. III, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1997, p. 177.

³² Sfântul Ioan Damaschin apud Pr. Dr. Ioan Tulcan, art.cit., p. 47



“God, when you judge them all, which of the people on earth, who live in the middle of their passions, will suffer? Because then, the burning fire and the undying worm will soar above the forever punished”³³

There are opinions according to which the eternity of hell would bring sadness into God’s life, which is heaven. This apocatastasis argument relies on the fact that God, saints and eternal life are essentially love and memory of love. Love is also memory, memory of love mainly. The redeemed are eternally linked to sinners by mere memory. When in need, the apocatastasis followers were calling Saint Isaac the Syrian who was also praying and shedding tears for demons. He says that love may dwell in hell and not destroy it, since this is exactly what hell is: the flames of remorse, the flames of love denied³⁴. On the contrary, Saint Catherine of Siena says: “*Love may not remain in hell, it would crush it; it would be easier to destroy hell than let love stay in it forever*”³⁵. The idea that hell introduces sadness into God’s life lies in a certain conception regarding love and God’s feeling which starts from the axioms that God is so kind that He may not help forgiving, that His love is an irrepressible miracle by itself, and there is no greater miracle than loving the falling sinners, and the fact that Christian teachings and mystic experience unanimously show that the Spirit of God teaches us to love everything. God’s love certainly goes beyond the justice that people can understand. Without being in contradiction or affecting justice, love may be imagined as an addition to it, a redundancy beyond justice and yet never able to destroy such justice. We may be right in asserting that, in a super-human sublime meaning, God’s justice is in fact love. God’s love for those living in hell is not sheer sentimentality or compassion, but always control and conscious precise action. His love does not even exclude a certain abandonment on God’s side. God’s real and definitive love to us all does not automatically mean sadness in a human sense. Sadness seems to be a sort of love weakening. The action of the love shown to those in heaven is extremely real, yet the response to it is different³⁶. “Blessed Virgin Mary, who gave birth to the One Righteous Forgiving Judge, Jesus Christ our Lord, save me from the judgment and the fire and the torture which were inflicted on me by my delight for sins”³⁷. Hell exists and persists because there is persistence in not confessing our sins and this means eternity of hell. Hell persists and settles down because the obstinate refusal of Life and Truth means final stillness; because there is also a total separation from the being and the truth, from the others. The eternity of hell appears possible because we have both the experience of refusing God and the stillness of such refusal, which refusal eventually turns out to be a frailty. Hell is the refusal of God’s eternal love or the refusal to love. The refusal to love becomes at a certain point in time the inability to love. Saint Maximus the Confessor says:

“For we contorted the right feeling of love and we embedded a twisted movement in our hearts, and so we corrupted its lack of suffering and we perverted it. And therefore, we unawares caused on us the hatred of choice, like a worm, the damage, and we dug within

³³***, Triodul, Duminica Lăsatului sec de carne, la Utrenie, Canonul-alcătuire a lui Teodor Studitul, Cântarea a 8-a, Stihira a II-a, glas al VI-lea, p. 48

³⁴ Pr. Conf. Dr. George Remete, *Suferința omului și iubirea lui Dumnezeu*, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 2005, pp 101, 102.

³⁵ Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Mic discurs despre iad*, traducere de Alexandru Sahighian, Editura Anastasia, 1994, p. 67

³⁶ Pr. Conf. Dr. George Remete, *Suferința omului și iubirea lui Dumnezeu*, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 2005, pp. 103, 104, 105, 106

³⁷***, Triodul, Miercuri dimineața în întâia săptămână a Sfântului și Marelui Post, Tricântarea, Cântarea a 9-a, Stihira a IV-a, a Născătoarei de Dumnezeu, glasul al II-lea, p. 154



ourselves, through lies, a much more unfair feeling, which made it impossible for us to unify with the Honest Righteous God”³⁸.

4. CONCLUSIONS

We can conclude with the words of the Russian theologian Paul Evdokimov whose opinion on hell is: Therefore the eternity of heaven and the eternity of hell have to be seen from the perspective of God’s supreme justice. God Who rewards actions of the righteous and punishes the sins of the non-righteous with eternal tortures.

“The hell of the divine love is the celestial dimension of the hell, the divine vision of the man who sank in the darkness of his loneliness”³⁹. “How will hell endure Your entrance, God, and how will it not crush and darken at the sight of Your blinding light?”⁴⁰. Oh, Savior, voice of spoken God and godly power of Your mastery through which you pulled down the gates of hell and of the all-eating death! Take me away from my passions, just like You did with Lazarus, your four-day-long dead friend”⁴¹ “Your Resurrection lightened everything up, God, and the heaven itself opened; and all creation praises and worships You forever”⁴²; “And so leaving this life with the hope of the eternal life, let me reach the never-ending rest, where lies the undying voice of the worshippers and the endless sweetness of those who can see the unspoken beauty of Your face”⁴³.

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³⁸ Sfantul Maxim Mărturisitorul, *Scrieri*, vol. II, în P.S.B., nr. 81 apud Pr. Conf. Dr. George Remete, op.cit., p. 122.

³⁹ Paul Evdokimov, *Iubirea nebună a lui Dumnezeu*, traducere de T. Baconsky, Editura Anastasia, București, 1993, p. 10

⁴⁰ ***, *Triodul*, Slujba Sfințelor și Mântuitoarelor Patimi ale Domnului Iisus Hristos, În Sfânta și Marea Zi Sâmbătă, Denia de Vineri seara când se cântă și Prohodul Domnului, Starea I, Troparul 10, glasul al V-lea, p. 649

⁴¹ *Triodul*, Sâmbătă în săptămâna Floriilor, la Utrenie, Canonul-alcătuire al lui Teofan, Cântarea a 5-a, altă Tricântare, Stihira a II-a, glasul al II-lea, p. 522

⁴² ***, *Penticostarul*, Marți în Săptămâna Luminată, în Sfânta și Marea Duminică a Paștilor, la Vecernie, la Doamne strigat-am..., Stihirile Învierii, glasul al III-lea, Stihira a II-a, p. 36

⁴³ *Penticostarul*, Rugăciunile de mulțumire după dumnezeiasca Împărtașire, Rugăciunea întâia a Sfantului Vasile cel Mare, p. 320



- [11] Pr. Conf. Dr. George Remete, *Suferința omului și iubirea lui Dumnezeu*, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 2005,
- [12] Pr. Dr. Ioan Tulcan, *Rai și iad - realități veșnice*, în „Mitropolia Banatului”, XXXIX (1989), nr. 4
- [13] Pr. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Popescu, *Iisus Hristos – Pantocrator*, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 2005
- [14] Pr. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, *Teologia Dogmatică Ortodoxă*, ediția a II-a, vol. III, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1997
- [15] Pr. Prof. Dr. Ene Braniște și Prof. Ecaterina Braniște, *Dicționar enciclopedic de cunoștințe religioase*, Editura Diecezană, Caransebeș, 2001
- [16] Pr. Prof. Dr. Ion Bria, *Dicționar de Teologia Ortodoxă A-Z*, ediția a II-a, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, București, 1994, p. 194.
- [17] S.A.Arhanghelov, *Tainele vieții viitoare*, traducere de Climent I. Bontea, Editura Bunavestire, Bacău, 2007,



AMITĀBHA BUDDHA REVISITED: INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MODERN SCIENCE

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ABSTRACT

Buddhism and quantum physics share many points of contact. New scientific evidence regarding nonlocality has made possible an insightful understanding of nonduality and wholeness. In light of this discovery, modern intellectuals may become comfortable with the Mahāyāna concept of Buddha's meritorious qualities. Particularly, Amitābha Buddha symbolizes the Buddha of Infinite Light and Infinite Life, representing the transcendence of time and space. Specifically Amitābha signifies both wisdom and compassion, while the field of quantum mechanics reflects sufficiently the wisdom aspect of Amitābha. However, compassion has not been incorporated in science due to its non-objective nature. Can modern intellectuals understand the wisdom comfortably to encompass compassion? This article develops and employs a novel conceptual approach to address a broader understanding and acceptance of modern science for scholars of religion. We argue that the concept of nonlocality, with its extension into a sequence of nonlocality–nonduality–wholeness, enables Amitābha's wisdom and compassion to fit reasonably within the framework of modern science. Thus, Amitābha Buddha can be said to re-appear with a scientific face in the 21st century.

Keywords: Amitābha Buddha; Buddhism; Quantum Physics; Nonlocality nonduality wholeness;

INTRODUCTION

In 1936 when Phyllis Wright, a six-grade student in the Sunday school of the Riverside Church in New York, asked Einstein whether scientists pray, and if they do, what they pray for, Einstein replied:

“Scientific research is based on the assumption that all events, including the actions of mankind, are determined by the laws of nature. Therefore, a research scientist will hardly be inclined to believe that events could be influenced by a prayer, that is, by a wish addressed to a supernatural Being. However, we have to admit that our actual knowledge of these laws is only an incomplete piece of work, so that ultimately the belief in the existence of fundamental all-embracing laws also rests on a sort of faith.... The pursuit of science leads therefore to a religious feeling of a special kind, which differs essentially from the religiosity of more naïve people”¹

¹ Max Jammer, *Einstein and Religion: Physics and Theology*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ., 1944, pp. 92–93.



This ingenuous question is still valid today and retains its original strength. However, how can we reconcile the scientific assumption or belief with a religious faith? Amitābha Buddha, for example, venerated by Mahāyāna Buddhists, is the common name of the Buddha of Infinite Light and Infinite Life, thus transcending the classical sense of time and space. Although this concept of transcendence is often spoken about and sounds so simple due to its familiarity, it is a difficult concept to grasp, especially the idea of “eternal present” and the “here and now.” It has traditionally been more readily understood from a philosophical, rather than a scientific, perspective. However, a number of concepts from quantum mechanics have helped it emerge from its elusive nature to a more accessible one.

At the *noumenon* or intuitive level, Amitābha Buddha is said to represent the True Mind/One Mind, that is, the Self-nature of Buddhas and all sentient beings. At the scriptural level, Amitābha Buddha is trans-historical, that is, the Buddha of the Western Paradise and venerated particularly in Pure Land Buddhism. Pure Land Buddhism propounds a variety of practices including meditation on images and awareness, the use of mantras and prayer, and rhythmic chanting the name of Amitābha. The recitation of Amitābha Buddha’s name, that is, *Namu Amitabul* or *Namo Amitābha Buddha*, is an important practice performed by Pure Land Buddhists who wish to seek rebirth in *Sukhāvatī*, the Western Bliss Land where Amitābha Buddha is said to reside. A recitation of such simple repetitive words may seem an uneducated, perhaps illiterate practice, yet it is often performed among common lay Buddhists. They believe that the practice of this mantra may help them tolerate a multitude of personal harsh conditions and also prevent them from succumbing to worldly desires. It appears that this unsophisticated, recitative ritual may insinuate a lack of intelligence. For this very reason, and as a consequence, the tendency to focus on one’s own subjective and personal religious experience has generally been disparaged in the classical scientific arena, specifically the Cartesian and Newtonian dualistic space and time world-view. Such world-view has been heretofore powerfully influential in today’s society within the frame of positivistic–reductionistic–objective (PRO) formalism. Thus, discussion of subjective issues has often been classified as non-scientific within the realm of so-called mainstream scholars of philosophy and religion; the concept of religiosity has been not only discredited but also often discarded from the academic arena. However, we aim to discuss how this approach, that is, the use of recitation, can be interpreted in a positive sense using modern scientific principles and rational insights. Interestingly, the advent of the new modern physics, which is more organic and holistic, has opened a new window to allow for a radically different scientific interpretation of the phenomena of mind and religiosity, facilitating an opportunity for meaningful dialogue. It has been demonstrated that the classical world-view has been essentially overturned by the new modern physics – a useful tool for reinterpreting reality and the phenomena of mind. However, it appears that students of humanity have been persistent in their efforts to depict the truth in the classical methodology, which narrows itself to explaining phenomenon solely through reference to physical and objective causes of the PRO kind. Specifically, Newtonian physics is described as uncompromised dichotomy and stresses an *either/or* vision of truth. In contrast, quantum reality and human nature are situational or context-dependent, utilizing the concept of *both/and* and embodying the realm of quantum holism.² This is to be elaborated further in this article. For Mahāyāna Buddhists, enlightenment may be elucidated as the full awareness of an inexpressible *śūnyatā*, or

² Ian Marshall and Zohar Danah, *Who’s Afraid of Schrödinger’s Cat?* William Morrow & Co., NY., 1997, pp. 299–300.



emptiness of essence, which transcends dualistic reality. This distinctive awareness reflects a fully enlightened state, which is said to be completely devoid of delusion. Curiously, quantum reality and *śūnyatā* may be addressed as sharing similar reality principles, in that the quantum vacuum is not merely empty but replete with the potentiality of encompassing everything in the universe, while the Buddhist concept of *śūnyatā* denotes a similar view, as expressed in the phrase “wondrous existence of true emptiness.” This state is attained when all forms of existence and phenomena are observed in their real nature.

Quantum reality, as explained in the wave/particle dualism of micro-entities, appears to be a paradox based on everyday experience, as particles and waves presume to be fundamentally different types of entities. The classical Newtonian perspective indicates that no particle can be a wave, any more than a single object can be both a bullet and a ripple. Yet, in the view of quantum physics, electrons are demonstrated to display both particle and wave characteristics; the waves and particles themselves can transmute into each other. This is familiarly understood in Buddhism as “neither one, nor two” or “neither the same nor different.” This expression signifies a distinct Buddhist way of characterizing the relationship between various kinds of phenomena. It is often introduced as a Mādhyamika view, but is found in almost every branch of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Quantum Field Theory (QFT), an extension of quantum theory into the realm of high-energy physics, goes further denoting in which no atoms or particles are regarded as primary or permanent, but rather as patterns of dynamic energy, that is, the quanta or excitations of some underlying vibrating field. There is general agreement among modern scientists that QFT is the most accurate physical theory to date, being accurate to about one part in about 10^{11} , that is, one hundred billion, while general relativity has been tested to be correct to one part in 10^{14} , or one hundred trillion.³

Experiments in particle physics show that existing particles are coming and going from “nowhere,” as though something were acting on them. Concerning this issue, particle physicists may puzzle over the riddle of a fundamental quest: As particles can appear and disappear at random, what do they emerge from and where do they go?⁴ Scientists are often reluctant to step further into a non-scientific arena, which may raise religious or philosophical issues. Marshall & Zohar write, “The greatly expanded mathematical framework of QFT attributes such effects to an all-pervasive, underlying field of potential – the vacuum.” Unseen and not directly measurable, the vacuum exerts a subtle push on the surface of existence, like water pushing against things immersed in it. This is known as the “Casimir effect” in QFT.⁵ The Casimir effect refers to the understanding that the universe is not filled with the vacuum, but rather it is *written on* or emerges out of it. The quantum vacuum, then, is said to be the background of evanescent reality, which is the ground state of energy in the universe and called as such because it cannot be perceived or measured directly. Another line of thought attributed to QFT suggests that all existence may be described as an excitation of the underlying quantum vacuum, that is, all existing things are like ripples on a universal pond, rather than being seen as solid, individual lumps. The universe is thus described as consisting of so many patterns of dynamic energy.⁶ Interestingly, this is intuitively evocative of the transcendent nature of Amitābha Buddha.

³ Roger Penrose, “Quantum Theory and Spacetime”, in *The Nature of Space and Time*, (ed.), by Stephen Hawking, and Roger Penrose, Princeton University Press, Princeton & Oxford, 1996, p. 61.

⁴ Ian Marshall and Zohar Danah, *Who’s Afraid of Schrödinger’s Cat?* p. 304.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.185.



The notion of transcending time and space can therefore reasonably be understood from a scientific perspective as propounding “eternal present, and the here and now.” In the noted Buddhist work entitled “*The Awakening of Faith*” a more specific analogy is illustrated in which ripples are explained as an inseparable product of the activity of the wind on the water in a pond, the wet nature remaining undisturbed.⁷ Likewise, mind is stirred by the wind of ignorance. Aśvaghosha, the author attributed to this work, expounds:

“All modes (*lakshana*) of mind and consciousness are ignorance. Ignorance does not exist apart from enlightenment; therefore, it cannot be destroyed, and yet it cannot not be destroyed. This is like the relationship that exists between the water of the ocean [namely, enlightenment] and its waves [modes of mind] stirred by the wind [ignorance]. Water and wind are inseparable; but water is not mobile by nature, and if the wind stops, the movement ceases. But the wet nature remains undestroyed. Likewise, man’s mind, pure in its own nature, is stirred by the wind of ignorance. Both Mind and ignorance have no particular forms of their own, and they are inseparable. Yet Mind is not movable by nature, and if ignorance ceases, then the continuity [of deluded activities] ceases. But the essential nature of wisdom [namely, the essence of Mind, or the wet nature of the water] remains undestroyed. This logos-principle, though hidden and accessible only to intelligence, is still material, as it results from the identification of the heraclitian logos with cosmic fire”.⁸

Building from these ideas, the transpersonal nature of Amitābha Buddha’s Infinite Light and Infinite Life may reasonably be perceived as a resonance between qualities of the quantum vacuum and human reality, that is, the underlying ground-energy state of the universe as demonstrated by QFT and related qualities of human reality. In this regard, quantum mechanics, which advocates the quantum model of reality, may be inductive in allusion to Amitābha’s Western Paradise for today’s modern scientific-minded individuals. However, it should be acknowledged that the element of compassion has yet to enter the debate in the quantum mechanics. On this premise, we seek to examine a series of critical issues and suggest some insights drawn from modern scientific perspectives:

1. Can one understand the transcendent nature of Amitābha Buddha within a framework of modern scientific interpretation?
2. Can the recitation of Amitābha Buddha be practiced comfortably by scientifically minded intellectuals toward Einstein’s “religious feeling of a special kind” or an enlightenment of the Buddhist kind?

This article develops and employs a novel conceptual approach to this question. We argue that the concept of nonlocality, with its extension into a sequence of nonlocality-nonduality- wholeness, enables Amitābha’s wisdom and compassion to fit reasonably within the framework of modern science. In order to understand the role of interpenetration regarding both disciplines, we will first explore how the nature of reality can be understood in both Buddhism and modern science, particularly in quantum physics. Secondly, a relevance will be posited between Buddhism and quantum physics with regard to ultimate reality, illuminating the nature of Amitābha Buddha and how the practice of recitation of his name can possibly lead one to an enlightenment of the Buddhist kind. Thirdly, we will elaborate on how this approach can contribute toward introducing the issue of personal religious experience and/or the phenomena of religiosity into the Buddhist studies academia.

⁷ Robert E. Buswell, Jr., and Donald S. Lopez, *The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ., 2014, p. 76.

⁸ Yoshito S. Hakeda, (trans.), *The Awakening of Faith; Attributed to Aśvaghosha*, Columbia University Press, New York & London, 1967, p.41.



1. WHO IS AMITĀBHA BUDDHA?

Amitābha Buddha is described as the Buddha of Infinite Light and Infinite Life, and is also known as one of the Five Wisdom *Tathāgatas*.⁹ The Wisdom Buddhas are all aspects of the *Dharmakaya* or “Dharma-body,” which embodies the principle of enlightenment. As a trans-historical Buddha venerated by all Mahāyāna schools and particularly the Pure Land School, Amitābha in peaceful meditation is said to preside over the *Sukhāvātī*, or Western Pure Land, where anyone can be said to be reborn through sincere recitation of his name, “*Namo Amitābha Buddha*,” particularly at the time of death. The basic doctrines concerning Amitābha and his vows are found in the Three Pure Land *Sūtras* consisting of three canonical Mahāyāna texts: *the Larger Sukhāvātīvyūha Sūtra*, *the Sūtra of Immeasurable Life*; *the Sūtra of the Meditation on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life*; and *the Smaller Sukhāvātīvyūha Sūtra*, *the Smaller Sūtra on Amitāyus*. According to the *Larger Sūtra*, Amitābha was, in very ancient times and possibly in another realm, a monk named Dharmakāra. In some versions of the *sūtra*, Dharmakāra is described as a former king who, having come into contact with the Buddhist teachings, renounced his throne. He resolved to become a Buddha and so to come into possession of a Buddha-field (*Buddha-kṣetra*; a world produced by the Buddha’s merit) and possessed of many perfections through firm resolutions. These resolutions are expressed in his Forty-eight vows, which reflect the type of Buddha-field that he aspired to create (the conditions under which beings might be born into that world). Among his Forty-eight vows, the eighteenth vow is that any being in any universe desiring to be born into Amitābha’s Pure Land and calling upon his name even as few as ten times would be guaranteed rebirth there. His nineteenth vow promises that he, together with his bodhisattvas and other blessed Buddhists, would appear before those who calls upon him at the moment of death.¹⁰ Through his efforts, Dharmakāra, known as Amitābha, is said to have created the Pure Land, called *Sukhāvātī* in Sanskrit, which means “possessing happiness.” *Sukhāvātī* is said to be situated in the uttermost west, beyond the bounds of our conventional world. By the power of his vows, Amitābha has made it possible for all who call upon him to be reborn in this land, there to undergo instruction by him in the Dharma and ultimately to become bodhisattvas and Buddhas. This openness and acceptance of all kinds of people have made the Pure Land school one of the major influences in *Mahāyāna* Buddhism. It has become popular in northwest India/Pakistan and Afghanistan, and has further spread to Central Asia, China, Korea and Japan.

The *sutra* goes on to explain that Amitābha, after accumulating great merit over countless lives, finally achieved Buddhahood and is still alive in his land of *Sukhāvātī*, whose many virtues and joys are described. The name Amitābha is a compound of the Sanskrit words *amita* (“without bound” or “infinite”) and *ābhā* (“light” or “splendor”). Consequently, the name is to be interpreted as “one who possesses infinite light without bound.” The name Amitāyus is also used; this is a compound of *amita* and *āyus* (“life”), and so means “one whose life is boundless.” Therefore, he is seen as the supreme power and energy of nature, cast on an earthly plain, and accessible to all sentient beings. In Tibetan Buddhism, Amitābha is red in color, being the color of love, compassion, and emotional energy. His direction is to the west and so he is envisioned as the (red) setting sun. During sunset, the sun is gentle and one can look directly into its fierce power, without coming to

⁹ Five *Dhyani* Buddhas. In *Vajrayana* Buddhism, the Five *Dhyani* Buddhas, the Five Great Buddhas and the Five *Jinas* (S. for “conqueror” or “victor”), are representations of the five qualities of the Buddha.

¹⁰ F. Max Müller, “The Larger Sukhāvātī-vyūha, Buddhist Mahāyāna Texts”, in *The Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. xlix, (trans.) by F. Max Müller, Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, NY, 1969, pp. 12–22.



any harm. When represented on a stupa, he always faces the west. Amitābha Buddha, similar to Shakyamuni Buddha, often appears as part of a triad: Avalokiteśvara on the left represents Amitābha's great compassion; and *Mahāsthāmaprāpta* on the right represents Amitābha's wisdom. Avalokiteśvara refers to the Lord who gazes and hears the Sounds of the World, also known as the Great Bodhisattva of "A Thousand Eyes and A Thousand Hands," who is said to see and help thousands everywhere and instantaneously. *Mahāsthāmaprāpta* refers to the Lord who is possessed of great power and believed to open people's eyes to the need to strive for awakening. Avalokiteśvara's unique emblem is the lotus, and is thus associated with its attributes: gentleness, openness, and purity. Amitābha's mount is the peacock, which is said to be capable of swallowing poisonous snakes without being harmed. In fact, the peacock is believed to derive its rich plumage from the poison of the snakes on which it feeds. This symbolism, of being immune even to poison and transmuting it into beauty, imparts a sense of the purifying and transforming power of Amitābha. Here, one may wonder if this nature of Amitābha, conveyed from a fictional story, can possess any meaningful realistic value in modern terms. For a religious person, the answer may easily be affirmative due to his/her personal belief, but how can scientifically minded intellectuals understand the Amitābha of "Infinite Light and Infinite Life" within the framework of a logical mind-set and consequently learn to act with a compassionate heart? This article endeavors to elaborate and employ a novel conceptual approach to this question.

2. REALITY AS AN ILLUSION

In formulating an answer to this question, one of the fundamental questions to be asked would be "What is true reality?" from both a religious and a scientific perspective. While comprehensive critical evaluation of this subject remains beyond the scope of this article, a brief explanation of the main theme may suffice here. Doctrine of emptiness or voidness, stressed in many Mahāyāna scriptures, is first propounded with the Perfection of Wisdom (*Prajñāpāramitā*) sūtras and the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna philosophy.¹¹ Emptiness signifies the lack or absence of intrinsic nature in all phenomena, the final nature of all things. It goes beyond the early Buddhist position of *anatta* (non-Self) and refers to the understanding that all existence is based solely on dependent origination, that is, our perception of reality is an illusion; a falsely imagined type of existence dependent upon other conditions. To argue that all dharmas are empty does not mean that they do not exist, but rather identifies them as appearances, which should not be perceived as objects of grasping, expressed as *sūnyatā* or emptiness. This is considered as the single most important Mahāyāna innovation.

None the more, modern quantum physicists, equipped with an accuracy of one part in 100 billions, have begun to corroborate this Buddhist notion of reality in which the objective existence of the world is seen as an *illusion*. In recent years, Buddhism has been at the center of inner science of mind, and much discussed in an ongoing working of the mind among both Buddhists and scientists. In particular, His Holiness the Dalai Lama has actively engaged in mind and life dialogues, which explore the wealth of scientific research in collaboration with Buddhism.¹² Our ordinary experiences operate from the assumption that the objective world is real; we instinctively feel no hesitancy in asserting this undeniable

¹¹ Charles S. Prebish, *Historical Dictionary of Buddhism; Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophes, and Movements*, The Scarecrow Press, Inc., Metuchen, N.J., & London, 1993, p. 249.

¹² The Dalai Lama, Herbert Benson, Robert A.F. Thurman, Howard E Gardner, and Daniel, Goleman, *MindScience: An East-West Dialogue*, Wisdom Publications, Boston, MA., 1991.



belief. Specifically, classical Newtonian science has emphasized a third-person examination of a so-called “positive, reductionistic and objective” world-view, which is claimed to be scientifically true. From the perspective of classical science, one can empirically comprehend reality based on the five senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching. This becomes the basis for a dualistic world-view, reflected in such terms as subject/object, mind/matter, wave/particle, life/death, long/short, clean/dirty, good/evil, and so on. However, the explanation of reality from this empirical view is obviously limited because the five senses have their own limitations. For instance, since visible light is known to comprise less than about 10% of the spectrum, it can be reasonably said that humans may see approximately 10% of the totality of reality. What is lurking around in the other 90% of the non-visible light world that we cannot see? While visual sense-based perception makes up merely 10% of the total reality, other senses may possess a similarly limited scope. Undeniably, humans sense only a small portion of the entirety of any given object. However, the issue of illusion in Buddhism surpasses beyond this 10% limitation. From the Buddhist perspective of *sūnyatā*, even the 10 % of the total sensible reality itself is said to be an *illusion*. What would be the quantum physicist’s view on this?

According to quantum physicists, the reality which is based upon the five sense perceptions alone may not be a true reality, not only because of its limitation, but also because personal beliefs act as a filter and human perception creates nothing more than an illusion micro-macroscopically. Quantum physics describes physical reality on the most fundamental level in terms of exchange of quanta. In the development of quantum physics, Niels Bohr’s realization of the fact that a quantum exists as *both* wave *and* particle was revolutionary. He stated that the wave aspect of a quantum is continuous and spread out over space and time, whereas the particle aspect is localized at one point in space and time.¹³ More precisely, it has been demonstrated that the wave is not actually spread out as a wave, but rather only a *probability* of the particle’s existence is said to spread out as a wave; thus it is called the “probability wave.”¹⁴

According to Bohr, when a measurement or observation occurs, the wave function “collapses”, a possibility gives way to an actuality, and the wave becomes instantly realized as a particle. Marshall & Zohar assert the fact, that the measurement or observation can so radically change the character of physical reality in a so-called *superposition* of possibilities, is the single most outstanding discovery of modern physics.¹⁵ Humans experience the world as “either/or”, which Newton’s classical mechanics describes as one’s orientation in the physical world. However, quantum reality describes a bizarre world of “both/and”: waves and particles; both here and there; now and then, and so forth. For these reasons, some physicists, who have not (?) yet penetrated a “scientific” insight from nonlocality encompassing into nonduality, believe that quantum theory may be incomplete. Nadeau and Kafatos¹⁶ commend Niels Bohr for the complementarity principle as the “logic of nature” that best describes the new relationship between parts and wholes in both physics and biology. This principle was originally developed by Bohr in an effort to explain wave-particle dualism in quantum physics. His Principle of Complementarity shows that the

¹³ Robert Nadeau, and Menas Kafatos, *The Non-Local Universe: The New Physics and Matters of the Mind*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 13.

¹⁴ Sung K. Kim, and Y.G. Cho, *Modern Physics explains Ban Ya Sim Gyung*, Bulgwang Publishing Co., Seoul, Korea, 2006, p.78.

¹⁵ Ian Marshall and Zohar Danah, *Who’s Afraid of Schrödinger’s Cat?* p. 222.

¹⁶ Robert Nadeau, and Menas Kafatos, *The Non-Local Universe*, p. 13.



materialistic common sense notion of reality is an illusion; the objective existence of the world is a mere projection as only one aspect of the particle. Bohr argued that many things are mutually exclusive, yet complementary: thought and action, subjectivity and objectivity, feeling and reasoning, and so forth. Nadeau and Kafatos assert that Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg recognized quite well that quantum theory would have a profound impact on our understanding of reality. Both physicists are considered the creators of quantum mechanics, the most precise and far reaching physical theory ever devised, which is viewed as the cornerstone of modern physics. Bohr says in his *Philosophical Writings*:

“As our knowledge becomes wider, we must always be prepared. . . to expect alterations in the point of view best suited for the ordering of our experience”.¹⁷

Heisenberg clarifies in his *Physics and Philosophy*: The existing scientific concepts cover always only a very limited part of reality, and the other part that has not yet been understood is infinite. Whenever we proceed from the known into the unknown... we may have to learn at the same time a new meaning of the word ‘understanding’.¹⁸

Interestingly, the second century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna described a similar idea: “The ultimate reality is unmade; it will never be other than what it always is”.¹⁹ Both Buddhists and quantum physicists make a strikingly similar claim; that the objective world is an illusion. However, one must note that physicists assert “neither existence” while Nagarjuna emphasizes “nor non-existence” as well. Thus, the Middle Way in Buddhism declares a state of “wondrous existence of true emptiness.” However, in quantum mechanics, the element of compassion, which is so vital to Buddhist thought, is not yet an agenda which is agreed upon as part of science. Can modern intellectuals understand the wisdom comfortably to encompass compassion? This article investigates and employs a novel conceptual approach to this question.

From primeval times up to the present, human beings have had an innate obsession for fixated beliefs, one of which is “seeing is believing.” This obstinacy regarding the foundational value of seeing reflects an inborn ignorance, which is the fundamental basis of the three poisons of sentient beings as pointed out by the Buddha. In order to transcend the level of ordinary experience from a world of the Newtonian “either/or” to a realm of the quantum “both/and”, one must make a quantum leap from distinction knowledge to the wisdom of *prajna*. It may be far-fetched to connect any Buddhist principle too closely with any particular understanding of physics, but when meaningful comparisons and connections are made at a logical and philosophical level, an insightful dialogue between Buddhism and science can occur. Quantum mechanics may serve as a pivoting reference point for that purpose. In this regard, Niels Bohr may well be referred to as a Zen master of modern physics!

3. AN UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE: A CONCEPT OF NONLOCALITY

A quintessential discovery in quantum mechanics supports the view that physical reality may be arguably *nonlocal*. Classical physics since Descartes portrays the opposing view that physical reality is local, which means that a measurement at one point in space cannot influence what occurs at another beyond a fairly short distance. Descartes was known

¹⁷ Niels Bohr, *The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr*, Ox Bow Press, Woodbridge, CT.,1987, p. 1.

¹⁸ Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science*, Harper & Row, Publishers, NY, 1958, p. 201.

¹⁹ K. Venkata Ramanan, *Nagarjuna's Philosophy: As Presented in the Maha-Prajnaparamita-Sastra*, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, India, 1966, p. 268.



to be among the first to assert that mind or consciousness appears to exist in a realm separate from matter, formalizing a duality between mind and nature. Until recently this has been perceived as an immutable truth. However, the amazing new aspect of nature known as nonlocality has posed an unprecedented challenge to the usual understanding of reality.

This new fact of nature was revealed in a series of experiments which tested predictions as follows. The predictions were proposed in a theorem developed by the Irish theoretical physicist John S. Bell in response to a number of questions raised by Albert Einstein and others in 1936.²⁰ In later years a series of landmark experiments was conducted by the physicists Alain Aspect, et al. in 1982 and later Nicolaus Gisin, et al. in 1997.²¹ These revolutionary discoveries were derived directly from the quantum mechanics, of which veracity has been vindicated experimentally. In the Aspect experiments conducted at the University of Paris, correlations of linear polarizations of pairs of photons were measured at a distance between the two filters of thirteen meters. The results demonstrated that the photons “interacted” or “communicated” with one another *instantaneously and simultaneously*. This experiment led to the revelation that physical reality is indeed not local, but rather *nonlocal*. Nadeau and Kafatos concluded that this result provided unequivocal evidence that the “single” wave hypothesis may be false and that Einstein’s view of “locality” realism does not hold in a quantum mechanical universe.²² Fifteen years later, Nicholas Gisin and colleagues at the University of Geneva extended the earlier landmark experiment of Aspect, using entangled photons (light particles) originated under certain conditions. They traveled in opposite directions to detectors located about seven miles apart in order to enable simple but instantaneous communication. These experiments conclusively demonstrated the nonlocality to a photon that might as well be halfway across the universe. No signal traveling at the speed of light could be presumed to carry information between the analyzers. Nadeau and Kafatos view that this discovery is said to be “the most momentous in the history of science”.²³

The implications of this unveiling of nonlocality may extend beyond the domain of the physical sciences and have the potential to transform current conceptions of reality beyond any known previous theories or ideas documented in the history of humanist-social sciences. The results of these experiments suggest that all of physical reality consists of a single quantum system that responds *en masse* to further interactions. The quanta that make up our bodies could be as much a part of this unified system as the photons in the Aspect and Gisin experiments. Thus, nonlocality or non-separability in these experiments as the factual condition in the entire universe can translate such single quantum system into one of nonduality. A revolutionary look at the implications of this fact of nature, nonlocality to nonduality, presents a new scientific epistemology and reaches deep into one of the most intimate aspects of humanistic studies, that is, religiosity.

It is intriguing to note that this new revelation and subsequent understanding of the fundamental relationship between the part and the whole as has been disclosed in quantum mechanics conforms precisely to the concept of “one is all and all is one” and “unhindered mutual interpenetration of phenomena to phenomena” in Buddhism. The former indicates an

²⁰ John S. Bell, “On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Paradox”, *Physics* 1, (1964), pp. 195–200.

²¹ Wolfgang Tittel, Juergen Brendel, Thomas J. Herzog, Hugo Zbinden, and Nicolas Gisin, “Experimental demonstration of quantum-correlations over more than 10 Kilometers”, in *Physical Review A* 57/5 (1998), pp. 3229–3232.

²² Robert Nadeau, and Menas Kafatos, *The Non-Local Universe*, pp. 77–80.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 3.



expression of the essential unity of all things; a tenet of the Huayan and Tiantai schools and the latter characterizes a non-obstruction among individual phenomena, an important concept in Huayan philosophy.

Virtually everything in the immediate physical environment is said to be made up of quanta that have been interacting with other quanta in a single quantum state. All particles in the history of the cosmos may have interacted with other particles in the manner revealed by the Aspect experiments. “Quantum entanglement” is the term used to describe the manner in which particles of energy/matter can become correlated predictably to interact with each other regardless of how far apart they are. It implies that particles, separated by incredible distances, are able to interact with each other immediately in a communication that is not limited to the speed of light. It further suggests that no matter how far the distance between the correlated particles, they remain entangled as long as they are isolated. Entanglement is presumed to be a real phenomenon, that is, it is the nonlocal interaction of objects that are separated in space. Although Einstein called it “spooky action at a distance,” a number of physicists demonstrated and verified it repeatedly through experimentation.²⁴ They observed that entanglement could not be an illusion created by any speed-of-light communication between particles, or certain photons.²⁵

Earlier Anton Zeilinger pointed at the quantum entanglement as nonlocal connectedness of two particles, in which under certain circumstances two particles remain one system even if separated by a very large distance.²⁶ This implies that in a fundamental sense, they are not really separated at all. In the latest effort to explore this phenomenon, physicists led by Zeilinger at the University of Vienna along with nineteen other colleagues in China, Germany and USA developed a new version of the Bell test in February 2017. They have used light, emitted from two stars in the Milky Way around 600 years ago, to bolster the case for Einstein’s “quantum spookiness.” Their results have verified a level of correlation that supports “action at a distance”.²⁷ According to physicist N. David Mermin quantum entanglement grows exponentially with the number of particles involved in the original quantum state; indeed, there is no theoretical limit on the number of these entangled particles.²⁸ If this is true, objects in the universe on a very basic level remain in contact with one another over any distance in *no time* in the absence of the transfer of energy or information: metaphorically a vast web of particles. However, the mechanism, which maintains such a connectedness, cannot as yet be fully explained by any theory.

Strikingly, this fact of nature points intuitively to Amitābha Buddha’s image of “Infinite Light and Infinite Life.” The term “*Indra’s net*” which is said to adorn the palace of the god *Indra* is appropriate here as it refers to the idea that each intersection of the net holds

²⁴ George Musser, *Spooky Action at a Distance*, Scientific American, New York, 2015, p. 9. See also Max Born, and Albert Einstein, *Born-Einstein Letters, 1916–1955: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times*, (trans.), by Irene Born, Palgrave Macmillan. New York, 2005, p. 155.

²⁵ Lynden K. Shalm et al., “Strong Loophole-Free Test of Local Realism”, in *Phys. Rev. Lett.* 115 (2015), 250402. B. Hensen et al., “Loophole-free Bell inequality violation using electron spins separated by 1.3 kilometres”, *Nature* 526 (2015), pp. 682–686. Marissa Giustina et al., “Significant-Loophole-Free Test of Bell’s Theorem with Entangled Photons”, in *Phys. Rev. Lett.* 115 (2015), 250401.

²⁶ Anton Zeilinger, “Experiment and Paradox in Quantum Physics”, in Arthur Zajonc, (ed.), *The New Physics and Cosmology: Dialogues with the Dalai Lama*, Oxford University Press, NY., 2004, p. 24.

²⁷ Johannes Handsteiner et al., “Cosmic Bell Test: Measurement Settings from Milky Way Stars”, in *Phys. Rev. Lett.* 118 (2017), 060401.

²⁸ N. David Mermin, “Extreme Quantum Entanglement is a Superposition of Macroscopically Distant States”, in *Physical Review Letters* 65–15, (1990), pp. 1838–1840.



a reflecting jewel which mirrors all the other countless jewels in the net. This term is frequently employed as a metaphor for the interrelation or mutual inclusiveness of all phenomena. The discovery that nonlocality is indeed a fact of nature may not produce immediately a drastic change in human daily life, but it may, at the least, warrant significant revisions to the current scientific world-view. The impact on humanist-social studies may indeed be revolutionary in the years to come. As Henry P. Staff stated, nonlocality could be the “most profound discovery in all of science.”²⁹

As nonlocality emerges as a property of the entire universe, Nadeau and Kafatos have concluded, “An undivided wholeness may exist on the most primary and basic level in all aspects of physical reality.”³⁰ The reality that exists between the space-like separated regions appears to be an indivisible whole. Interestingly, before the results of the Aspect and Gisin experiments were known, most physicists were convinced that they would completely restore a certain faith in the classical or Einsteinian epistemology and in the doctrines of positivism, reductionism and objectivism. Now these new understandings of nonlocality and the new epistemology of science need to be incorporated into humanity studies.

4. FROM NONLOCALITY TO NONDUALITY AND WHOLENESS

Intuitively, the concept of nonlocality in quantum physics forms a link to that of nonduality, which implies non-separation and fundamental oneness in the philosophical and religious perspectives. Specifically, Buddhists claim that all distinctions are the imaginary products of thought and language superimposed on a fundamentally nondual reality. Using powerful contemplative methods of first-person investigation, Buddhists have focused on the direct experience of the observing mind itself. Strangely enough, this has been known and accepted by quantum physics in the form of its “observer effect,” a measurement problem, which is encapsulated lucidly by the quantum physicist Goswami: “An observation converts the objects from waves of quantum possibilities into particles of actualities (‘collapse’) in the observer’s consciousness.”³¹ Physicalist-reductionist thinking about consciousness cannot adequately explain the observer effect, as it is a logical paradox. The solution of the measurement problem is to conceive of the “collapse” as the outcome of choice by a nonlocal consciousness. One of the key paradoxes of quantum physics is that when light travels through space, it seems to travel as a wave, but when it is detected, it appears as a particle. Building on the idea of the observer effect, Goswami proposes a new paradigm shift in that the observer effect forces a movement from the primacy-of-matter to a new paradigm: the primacy-of-consciousness. In his “*The Scientist, The Buddha and God*,”³² Goswami sets forth his theory of Quantum Activism, which posits the idea of changing ourselves and societies in accordance with the transformative and revolutionary message of quantum physics. This is a new paradigm within science, one of a consciousness-based reality. Goswami suggests that quantum physics relays three transformative messages. First, consciousness is the ground of all being, and all objects of experience are quantum possibilities for consciousness to choose from. Second, if one chooses from what is known, that is, what is conditioned from prior experiences, one is choosing from the ego-

²⁹ Henry P. Staff, “Are superluminal connections necessary?” in *Nuovo Cimento* 40B (1977), p. 191.

³⁰ Robert Nadeau, and Menas Kafatos, *The Non-Local Universe*, p. 4.

³¹ Amit Goswami, *How Quantum Activism Can Save Civilization*, Hampton Roads Publishing Company, Inc., Charlottesville, VA., 2011, pp. 14, 38–39, 49.

³² Amit Goswami, “The Scientist, the Buddha and God”, An Invitation to Quantum Activism Science and Nonduality Conference, San Rafael CA., 2009.



consciousness. But if one chooses what is unknown, or what is unmanifested from prior experiences, one is choosing from what spiritual traditions call “God-consciousness,” or “quantum consciousness” in scientific language. Choosing from God-consciousness requires quantum leaps (movement from point A to point B without going through intermediate steps), nonlocality (signal-less communication), and tangled hierarchy (causal relationships of circularity). The third message of quantum physics refers to the evolution of consciousness, noting the movement from the current preoccupation with the rational mind to an intuitive mind that values the archetypes, such as good, beauty, truth, justice, and love. This gives one the ability to process the meaning of his/her lives through these archetypes. In the wake of the findings of quantum mechanics, Goswami adopts the phrase “*Opto, ergo sum*” (I choose, therefore I am) instead of Descartes’ “*Cogito, ergo sum*” (I think, therefore I am).³³ However, the concept of illusion in Buddhism moves beyond even Goswami’s “God-consciousness” or “quantum consciousness.” Doctrine of emptiness or voidness in Buddhism refers to the understanding that all existence is based solely on dependent origination, that is, our perception of reality is simply an illusion; all phenomena in the universe are mere projections, having no-Self and impermanence, and thus this world has no separate or independent core of essence. As mentioned earlier, Quantum physicists describe “neither existence” while Nagarjuna emphasizes “nor non-existence” simultaneously. From the Buddhist’s perspective of *neither existence nor no-existence, also existence and non-existence in situ*, we venture to redefine Goswami’s “*Opto, ergo sum*” more precisely as “*Subiungo, ergo sum*” (I attach, therefore I am). This is to highlight a significance of attachment in Buddhism.

Although both disciplines indicate the distinctive characteristics of the observer effect in the investigation of the nature of the mind, Buddhism emphasizes the idea of nonduality in the context of “neither one, nor two.” This can be intuitively understood if one perceives that in external reality two elements of dichotomy appear separated and mutually exclusive, but in actuality represent two, perhaps multiple, facets of a single underlying whole. Regarding this, a thirteenth century Chan master, Zuigan, practiced Chan Buddhism in a unique way:

“Every day Zuigan used to call to himself, ‘Master!’ and would answer, ‘Yes!’ Again, he would call, ‘Thoroughly awake! Thoroughly awake!’ and he would answer, ‘Yes! Yes!’ ‘Don’t be deceived by others, and any day or any time.’ ‘No! No!’”³⁴

The reason why those who are searching for the truth cannot realize it is because they perceive relative consciousness only and take it entirely for a fixed entity. Perhaps modern intellectuals need to find a real master within themselves, just as Zuigan used to call himself in order to evoke a religious insight, which can transcend ordinary time and space. Buddhists claim that beyond the ordinary perception, memory, and thought there is a pure awareness, the inner experience of consciousness, namely “awareness of awareness” or the “self-witnessing aspect” which implies the self-authenticating aspect of cognition. It refers to the witnessing of the functioning of the subjective aspect. Buddhism has described this undifferentiated consciousness as being the ultimate state of bliss or *nirvana*. However, such an ultimate state of bliss is said to be ineffable; if any seeker wants to explain it, a Chan master would say that the seeker inevitably goes wrong even before one opens his/her mouth. The essence of teaching is construed as utterly indescribable. However, the central

³³ Amit Goswami, *The Self-Aware Universe*, Putnam Book NY., 1993, p. 107.

³⁴ Kōun Yamada, (trans.), “Zuigan Calls Himself ‘Master’”, in *Gateless Gate, Mumonkan*, Center Publications, Los Angeles, CA., 1979, pp. 67–71.



challenge to understanding such indescribable nonduality may be that once it has been named or defined, then paradoxically another duality can be created. It is just like that at the very moment one observes the wave state, quantum reality does *collapse* and the wave becomes a particle. Even the statement “all things resolve into one” creates a distinction between “one” and “not-one”! As the famous Chan master Chao Chou claims, “Ten thousand dharmas converge to One, where would One return to?” Chao Chou is like sparks struck from stone, like the brilliance of a flash of lightning. If one goes to the words to discriminate, s/he is mistakenly abiding by the zero point of a scale.³⁵ In Buddhism, the truth is often classified as both ultimate and relative; ultimate truth is the reality when perceived from the viewpoint of the Buddha, as opposed to conventional or relative truth of the phenomenal world, which is perceived from a worldly standpoint. Thus, nonduality is pertinently situated in the Middle Way of Buddhism, which is expressed as neither different nor the same, just as Bohm described “The two truths are one entity, but different isolates”.³⁶ Similarly, quantum reality consists of an inaccessible wave-particle dualism; the waves and particles themselves can transmute into each other [neither one nor two]. With this understanding, it may be sufficient to say that the essential feature of quantum mechanics corresponds figuratively to the wisdom aspect (*Mahāsthāmaprāpta*) of Amitābha Buddha. In this regard, *śūnyatā* and quantum reality agree on one of the basic concepts of reality principle.

However, once a religious insight is attained in Buddhism, the wisdom obtained should naturally be able to incorporate *in situ* the compassion aspect (*Avalokiteśvara*) of Amitābha Buddha as well. Wisdom and compassion are just like two sides of a coin. It can be said that as wisdom can be understandable, it is therefore learnable. When wisdom is thoroughly understood and experienced, can compassion surface naturally, just as the moon can be revealed itself in a clear, still lake. True Suchness, or *Bhūtatathatā* in Buddhism, which is the ultimate truth as the state of things as they really are, is manifested sufficiently in both wisdom and compassion, which are complementary like the particle and the wave, as stated by Bohr. However, the element of compassion has not heretofore been incorporated in science, probably due to its being considered as non-objective and therefore non-scientific from the Cartesian-Newtonian perspective. Further, it is highly unlikely that compassion may be seen as complementary to wisdom any time soon by the scientific world. The missing link here is religious insight, which is a natural byproduct of an experienced wisdom, to be acquired not necessarily by knowledge, but rather consequent to a rigorous practice. In the current trend, however, a fundamental limitation exists in that a rigorous practice is considered to stay outside of the classical, scientific intellectual domain. How can modern intellectuals with a scientific mind-set regard it, then?

5. MEDITATION AS PRESCRIBED FOR MODERN INTELLECTUALS

There is a general consensus that modern intellectuals are often inundated by a flood of information, which at times threatens their capacity to maintain a healthy level of sanity. Humans, more than any other beings on Earth, have an innate ability to process an enormous amount of information, and to consequently create all kinds of conceptions within a given space-time dimension. Unfortunately, however, we are often motivated and driven by limitless greed, anger, and ignorance, whether explicitly or implicitly. This fatefully

³⁵ Thomas and JC. Cleary, (trans.), *The Blue Cliff Record*, Vol 2, Shambhala, Boulder, CO., 1977, pp. 318–322.

³⁶ Guy Newland, *The Two Truths*. Ithaca, Snow Lion Publications, New York, 1992, pp. 59–75.



compelling process may tend to make a certain susceptible people vulnerable to a host of afflictions, such as attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD), obsessive and compulsive reaction, depression, aggressive behaviors and so forth. Unfortunately, a number of publications reveal that this trend is worsening. The number of children diagnosed with ADHD continues to climb, according to new data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.³⁷ In 2011, 11% of children/adolescents aged 4 to 17 years received an ADHD diagnosis (6.4 million children). There has been a 42% increase in the number of reported cases since 2003. More than two-thirds of those were taking medication. According to the IMS Health report in 2013, the antipsychotic drug Abilify (aripiprazole) racked up the highest number of sales among the top 100 selling drugs in the U.S., with profits of nearly \$6.4 billion. Abilify is known to be prescribed to treat schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder, and other maladies.³⁸ This reflects the increasing burden being placed on the U.S. health care system. Efforts to further understand diagnostic and treatment patterns are certainly warranted. What are the alternatives?

Among noted quantum physicists, David Bohm of Princeton University uniquely indicated that insight is required to end the illusion originating in our thought; the self and the world are broken into fragments.³⁹ Bohm defines our everyday world of space, time and causality as the explicate order, whereas underlying this everyday world is an interconnected, or the implicate order. Given the unbroken wholeness of the implicate order, Bohm asks why our thought is so dominated by fragmentation. He states as follows:

“... fragmentation is continually being brought about by the almost universal habit of taking the content of our thought for ‘a description of the world as it is’ (Ibid, p. 4). Our fragmentary way of thinking, looking, and acting, evidently has implications in every aspect of human life (Ibid., p. 20). So fragmentation is in essence a confusion around the question of difference and sameness (or Oneness), but the clear perception of these categories is necessary in every phase of life (Ibid., p. 21)”.

Bohm views this illusion as somewhat locality-duality-nonwholeness based, which in Buddhist terms is remarkably similar to the concept of *moha* (ignorance, delusion), one of the three poisons: *lobha*, greed; *dosa*, hatred; *moha*, ignorance, as posited by the Buddha. He argues that meditation may be necessary in order to produce an insight that can break the illusion. He writes:

“[Meditation] is particularly important because, as has been seen, the illusion that the self and the world are broken into fragments originates in the kind of thought that goes beyond its proper measure and confuses its own product with the same independent reality. To end this illusion requires insight, not only into the world as a whole, but also into how the instrument of thought is working (Ibid., p. 32)”.

How can one obtain such insight? Among the various ways of inducing it, Amitābha recitation, for example, has been highly recommended and practiced in the Pure Land Buddhist tradition. According to that tradition, by the power of his vows Amitābha has made it possible for all who call upon him to be reborn into the Pure Land. Depending on how one interprets this, the Pure Land may not necessarily be located *out there* objectively, but rather can be revealed *here and now* from the quantum perspective. Incessantly calling the name Amitābha will help concentrating one’s wandering attention to this one point, and creating a

³⁷ Susanna N. Visser et al. “Trends in the Parent-Report of Health Care Provider-Diagnosed and Medicated Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: United States, 2003–2011”, in *Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry* 53–1, (2014), pp. 34–46.

³⁸ <http://www.webmd.com/cholesterol-management/news/20131101/crestor-is-top-selling-drug?printing=true>

³⁹ David Bohm, *Wholeness and the Implicate Order*, Routledge & Kegan, London, 1980, pp. 186–190.



continuous stream of consciousness. Thus, the recitation can be evocative of both wisdom, which is based on nonlocality-nonduality-wholeness, and its complementary counterpart, compassion. When these two elements are amalgamated into Oneness, it will lead to the unique experience at the root of religiosity of the “wondrous existence of true emptiness” and “neither one, nor two.”

In this regard, we prudently propose a breakthrough invitation to Amitābha Buddha. By utilizing a similar vein of repetitive pattern and concentrating one’s wandering attention to one point, Amitābha recitation can be a beneficial and effective practice for today’s intellectuals. This can be accomplished either through direct chanting or by listening to chanting.⁴⁰ One may argue that this may sound apologetic, however, it can become an intense reminder of the “Infinite Light and Infinite Life,” symbolizing wisdom and compassion, respectively, which exist within all of us. It is not necessarily of apologetic nature at least from a rational perspective. With devoted practice, the repercussion of the name Amitābha can be heard while awake or asleep, creating a continuous stream of consciousness, which the fourteenth century Korean Seon master Naong considered essential to the attainment of enlightenment.⁴¹ This means that the practitioner must persist in his/her process of inward attention without interruption and with full one-pointed concentration throughout the three states of wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep. At this stage, it can be said that Amitābha Buddha and possibly modern science can meet at the very core of religiosity, an enlightenment.

CONCLUSION

The dialogue between religion and science is ongoing. Discussion between Buddhism and science has been actively intensifying in a small group of Buddhologists and scientists, notably quantum physicists. The intellectual search for ultimate truth reveals a complementary synergy between Buddhism and modern science. We have presented the subject of Amitābha Buddha as it relates to quantum physics -- an approach which may seem rather bold, as Amitābha Buddha represents the religious practice of meditation, particularly the use of a mantra stemming from a faith-based sect, whereas quantum physics is an exceptionally precise science with an accuracy of one part in 100 billion. This article develops and employs a novel conceptual approach to address a broader understanding and acceptance of modern science for scholars of religion. We investigate the concept of nonlocality to introduce the non-scientific subject of Amitābha Buddha to present-day intellectuals. As this attempt is unprecedented within the scope of academia, it may raise more questions than answers, requiring deeper study and revealing the necessity for more penetrating insights, both scientifically and religiously. To facilitate this goal, we have discussed a branch of Buddhism, the Pure Land sect, pointing out its links with modern science in terms that may be easier for modern intellectuals to accept, assimilate and integrate into their understanding. We argue that the concept of nonlocality, with its extension into a sequence of nonlocality-nonduality-wholeness, enables Amitābha’s wisdom and compassion to fit reasonably within the framework of modern science.

⁴⁰ Amitābha Buddha Name Recitation, <http://www.amtb-usa.org/index.htm>, Amitābha Buddhist Society of USA.

⁴¹ Naong was the founder of the Lin-chi tradition of *Hwadu Seon* in Korea, and introduced the criteria of Three Gates, in order for a Buddhist practitioner of meditation to have one’s experience of enlightenment. This had been brought up recently and strongly emphasized by the late Supreme Patriarch, Seong Cheol of the Korean Buddhist Jogye Order.



Further, it bridges the chasm between the elements of wisdom and compassion, which involves an issue of religiosity. Amitābha Buddha can now reappear based on a reasonably tested scientific principle, specifically, the quantum model of the mind. Perhaps this approach can help reconcile the scientific assumption or belief with a religious faith and open a new theoretical window into Einstein's "religious feeling of a special kind" or an enlightenment of the Buddhist kind.

After all among various ways of inducing religious insight, a mantra practice – Amitābha recitation – may be a reasonable option for intellectually oriented modern readers as well as religious practitioners. In this regard, it is to be remembered that although the Buddhologist need not necessarily be a Buddhist practitioner, there is certainly nothing scientifically invalid with him/her choosing to be one. As Einstein (1941) states in his essay, *Science and Religion*:

"I cannot conceive of a genuine scientist without that profound faith. The situation may be expressed by an image: science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind".⁴²

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THE DIVINE LOGOS AND POSSIBLE WORLDS

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ABSTRACT

In this paper I intend to show an attempt to translated into mathematics, especially into set theory and infinitary epistemic logic, the notion of "Divine Logos". From this translation, what is intended is to present the notion of metaphysical causality as strictly analogous to the epistemic implication and, with this, it attempts to provide a logical (and metaphysics) path that begins with Divine logos and terminates in the notion of the possible world. In this percourse, I am always pressuposing that God, by means of His "Divine Logos", knows every step of His creation, and this fact is explicitly express by means of the last formula of this paper, namely, the expression. nr. 17. The inspiration for this construction comes from Leibniz's metaphysics and the theory of transfinite numbers of Georg Cantor, a german mathematician who is the founder of Theory of Sets.

Keywords: Divine Logos; Cantor; Leibniz;

INTRODUCTION

According to Leibniz, the world was created by God from a "choice of the best of possible worlds¹." In fact, in God's mind all the worlds are present, that is, all the worlds reside in the thought of God in his completeness, in its fullness of actuality. Given this situation only comprehensible for divine intellection, God opts for one of these worlds and makes it real, in the sense that this world is the fruit of the divine option that becomes accessible to human experience: man, in his condition of epistemic agente, interacts with a reality that has come from the mind of God, and God chooses the physical world that surrounds us as the real world from unfathomable purposes to human reason. The only clue we have of this choice, according to Leibniz, is that such an option for this world over others has occurred because the world we live in is the best of the possible worlds.

But why is the surrounding physical world the best of all possible worlds? Perhaps for a reason of information economy, it is the world that God keeps active with the minimum energy necessary for its operation. Or, one might consider the physical world as one with the simplest structuring laws possible, and in this sense it would be the world with the least conceivable complexity² Finally, the reasons that led God to choose this world and not another can be found through explanations that, to a certain extent, would appeal to the idea of a God operating in his creation with the greatest possible parsimony: God chooses a world in that His performance does not have to occur at any moment; God chooses a world with

¹ See Leibniz, *La Monadologie*, §§ 53-55, [1714]. English version: <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/leibniz1714b.pdf>.

² See Chaitin, G: *Complexity and Leibniz*, IN: <https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~chaitin/tenerife.html>.



the greatest possible autonomy, a world in which the need for miraculous interventions is minimal. In any case, God "chooses" the world that is the real, observable physical world, and this world is the "best" of them.

Perhaps in the opposite sense to the previous argument based on a God of parsimony and discreteness, the fact that this world is the best of all resides in the fact that it is the world that God loves the most and that is why God himself wants to intervene at all times, in an absurd and inexplicable way; perhaps this world is the place where epiphanies and more miracles happen and for this reason, based on the love of God, be the best possible.

But can we understand, schematically and narrowly, how the choice of the real world comes from an infinity of present worlds that reside in the mind of God? One point to be emphasized in this question is this: whatever the reasons that lead God to choose this world over others, God "chooses", that is, his action is free and as such is not determined by a process beyond his control. In other words, it is not possible to conceive of conditions of the will of God other than His purposes: God acts freely with unfathomable "strategies" to the human intellect. Therefore, whatever form we sketch the creation of the world, this form or way has to take into account the Divine freedom.

Let us consider, then, a scheme for the creation of the world inspired by the philosophy of the monads of Leibniz. Monads, in the leibnizian conception, are well-defined atoms of a spiritual nature which constitute the nature of things (LEIBNIZ, *Monadology*, § 1, [1714]).

One of the consequences of the simplicity inherent in the monads is their inexhaustible character. Since monads are simple points or the atoms of nature, then they have no extension, since extension is a characteristic of what is composed of parts, not of what is absolutely indivisible (LEIBNIZ, *ibid.*). In this way, the monads are the simple elements of nature and have no extension. Therefore, the differentiation between one and the other is not then given by external factors such as the figure or the geometric form, but by an internal principle of activity. Each monad has an inner dynamism that is its own, and this dynamism generates an inner life that is characterized by perceptions and modifications; and it is this inner life, the appetite, which is different in each monad, the principle which imprints the monadic identity (*ibid.*, §§ 7-11). In addition, monads organize themselves in such a way that some of them have more apperception or awareness of their perceptions, and others have less. However, it is good to be frize: every monad has an inner activity, its appetite, of which some are more or less conscious. In this sense, we can affirm that Leibniz endowed the constitutive atoms with the nature of activity, of dynamism, which is something in strict opposition to mechanism that presupposed the physical world as a pure material extension obeying geometrical laws that do not take into account any kind of dynamism.

God creates an infinity of monads, and these come from God by fulgurations. In this way, the monads arise by God, and God is the primitive cause of all monads. Each monad owes its being to God, and God is the first monad from which all others arise by emanation or spreading (*ibid.*, §47). Leibniz proposes a metaphysical configuration in which God creates the monads by continuous fulgurations. What seems to be suggested by Leibniz in using the expression "continuous" is the fact that God creates the world at every moment: at every instant of time, a "spurt" of monads is spread from God to the world, and such scattering guarantees, so to speak, that a continuum of monads, with their internal activities, the functioning of the world with pre-established harmony.

From the creation and sustenance of the real world, composed of simple and derived monads (compound monads), the question arises as to whether there could be a



logical possibility of other worlds being distinct from this, which one is our observable world. In fact, it is perfectly conceivable to God that He emanates or creates successively different monads of these that constitute the simple units of nature. It is also perfectly plausible that composite monads are other if God had conceived the world as different. But God conceived the world as it is because this world is the best of the possible worlds: the real world is the best world of possible worlds, and the other worlds doze in the thoughts of God, such as words that will never be said. It is to be noted that God has opted for this world, and not for another, endowed with the full exercise of his infinite Freedom, since it stems from the fact that God's Will is not determined by anything other than the full and infinite self- that God enjoys.

1. A PROPOSAL FOR THE "CREATION" OF THE WORLD FROM LEIBNIZ AND CANTOR

What follows in this section is a proposal for the metaphysical creation of the real world from the monadological scheme of Leibniz, as well as some elements of the Cantorian theory of sets³. Let us begin with the hypothesis that God creates an infinite and enumerable quantity of monads. As it is known from Cantor's theory on transfinite numbers, under this hypothesis, the cardinality of the created monads are \aleph_0 (CANTOR, [1895], § 6).

This infinite quantity of monads would not emanate at any moment from God as Leibniz says, but in an instant, an instant or a purely metaphysical situation, an absolute beginning which occurs in the mind of God and whose phenomenological functioning is completely inaccessible to us to whom knowing the nature of this phenomenological context would imply in knowing the conscience of God, which in theory is impossible to man.

Given this initial and infinite quantity of monads, a "metaphysical configuration" is established in which all monads relate to God as Their creatures. What is being said here is that each monad, in some way, knows or feels in its inner activity that it, the monad in question, was created by God. In other words, God imprinted his mark on every monad, and they, the monads, tend to turn to God in their inner activity; and it is through this reminiscence or remembrance of God that the purposes of each monad are felt in the monadic internal activities. Metaphorically or allegorically speaking, all monads "reverence" God as their creator, and this reverence occurs consciously or merely with a feeling in which some teleology is perceived. In turn, God, the creator, sees Himself as the author of the monads, and out of love (an infinite Love which would be the superior activity which only God has), He relates Himself to all monads. It may even be said that God sees or perceives all monads as "creatures" that depend on Him, and thus establishes the bond of absolute Creator of all that exists. In this way, while the monads see themselves as creatures of God, God perceives himself as Creator, and it is His infinite and omnipotent Love - the guarantee of His absolute free and creative Will - that pervades each created monad. In this way, the logical relations "x is created by y" and its inverse "y is the creator of x" are on the metaphysical basis of the creation of the world.

³ Georg Cantor (1845-1918), a German mathematician, is considered the author of theory of sets. He introduces systematically the study of infinite sets by means of his transfinite numbers, and the Works that will be used here as references are: CANTOR, G [1883]. *Cantor's Grundlagen*. IN: EWALD, W., ed. *From Kant to Hilbert. A Source Book in the Foundations of Mathematics*. Volume 1. Clarendon Press, Oxford, [1999], and CANTOR, G [1895-1897]. "Beiträge zur Begründung der Transfiniten Mengenlehre". *Contributions to the Founding of the Transfinite Numbers*. Dover Publications, New York, [1941].

From this configuration that establishes itself with the relations mentioned above, the question arises of how God creates the real world. What is proposed here differs from the Leibnizian proposal, although it shares the conceptual basis of Leibniz. Since there are an infinite number of monads, God can group them in their totality a continuous number of times, and each unit of this arrangement is a possible world. It should be noted that each sequence of monads constitutes a possible world of null measure, since it consists of an infinite and enumerable quantity of monads⁴. Thus the possible worlds, just like the monads, are non-extensive beings who are situated in the mind of God as ready and actual thoughts. But how do the monadic arrangements that God performs in the unfathomable silences of His thoughts operate? Is there any rule by which God assembles monads to form worlds?

2. A MATHEMATICAL SCHEME FOR THE "CREATION" OF THE WORLD

Let's start by considering that the Almighty God knows that He is the creator of everything. We can introduce here the hypothesis (Cantor-Leibniz hypothesis) that God created the world from which comes from. The divine logos is the conscience that God has of this fact: He knows He is the creator of an infinite number of monads. Within an epistemic infinitary logic⁵, we can express this by means of the following expression (besides epistemic infinitary logic, we use also Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers in a very intuitive way):

1) $K_{m_{\aleph}} (\bigwedge_{i \in \omega_1} C(m_{\aleph}, m_i))$, where " m_{\aleph} " is a name of God⁶, and \aleph is a very high cardinal number, such that $\aleph > \omega_1$.

This formula above (the "Divine Logos") says that God knows He is the creator of an infinite and denumerable number of monads m_i , such that $i \in \omega_1$.

From infinitary epistemic logic, we can derive the following conditional:

$$2) K_{m_{\aleph}} (\bigwedge_{i \in \omega_1} C(m_{\aleph}, m_i)) \rightarrow \bigwedge_{i \in \omega_1} C(m_{\aleph}, m_i)$$

2) expresses the fact that one can go from God's Mind to reality: If God believes in something, then this something is. In some sense, the material implication in 2) has a metaphysical sense according as it represents that God's mind causes the infinitude of monads. In other words, the truth of the infinitary conjunction is caused by the fact that this conjunction lies in the God's Mind as a "Starting Divine Belief". This "Starting Divine Belief" causes in a relevant way the truth of the conjunction; if the antecedent was false, then the truth of the conditional could not be affirmed. Then, we are authorized to substitute the material implication by one that represents metaphysical or ontological causation. Let's call this one by " \succcurlyeq ", and so 2) becomes the following metaphysical statement:

$$2') K_{m_{\aleph}} (\bigwedge_{i \in \omega_1} C(m_{\aleph}, m_i)) \succcurlyeq \bigwedge_{i \in \omega_1} C(m_{\aleph}, m_i)$$

⁴ In Measure Theory, an infinite and denumerable set has measure equals with null. On Measure Theory, see HALMOS, P.R [1950]: *Measure Theory*, Van Nostrand Company, Inc., New York.

⁵ On Infinitary Epistemic Logic, see HEIFETZ, A, [1993], IN:

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⁶ Here one assumes that m_{\aleph} is "a name of God", but not "the name of God". If one admits we are dealing with a translation of the name of God into set theory, then one could face the problem of attributing an end to the series of ordinal numbers, what is interdicted by Cantor's theory (see CANTOR, [1883], § 3 on).

In the expression. 1), ω_1 is the first ordinal number of the third class of numbers, a number that can be counted the continuous sets (see CANTOR, [1897], § 16). In the typical language of infinitary logic, this number is treated as a cardinal, not as an ordinal.



We call “ \succcurlyeq ” *metaphysical implication*, and this notion will be very important from now on in this article.

From $\bigwedge_i \in \omega_1 C(m_\pi, m_i)$ we can reach the set M of all monads. It is easy to see that:

$$3) \bigwedge_i \in \omega_1 C(m_\pi, m_i) \rightarrow \exists X (X = \{y / C(m_\pi, y)\}).$$

The expression above can be replaced by its metaphysical version, namely:

$$4) \bigwedge_i \in \omega_1 C(m_\pi, m_i) \succcurlyeq \exists X (X = \{y / C(m_\pi, y)\})$$

We can now give a name to this set X , and this name will be M , in such way that $M = \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k, \dots\}$. Of course, since the set M comes from the fact that God created all monads, we can express this metaphysically as:

$$5) \bigwedge_i \in \omega_1 C(m_\pi, m_i) \succcurlyeq M = \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k, \dots\}.$$

The only formal property that we associated to *metaphysical implication* is transitivity, and this association is very obvious in so far as we are considering this kind of implication as a translation into infinitary epistemic logic of the concept of causality. So we have:

$$6) K_{m_\pi} (\bigwedge_i \in \omega_1 C(m_\pi, m_i)) \succcurlyeq M = \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k, \dots\}.$$

The conscience of God, His “Divine Logos”, can choose any monad, and this choice can occur for building possible worlds that lie in God’s Mind. One way to translate into logical language this God’s choice could be by means of the following “Divine choice function”:

$$7) \diamond(x) = \epsilon x.C^{-1}(m_\pi, x).$$

The relation $C^{-1}(m_\pi, x)$ is the inverse of $C(m_\pi, x)$. Since the former says that God created all monads, the latter tells us all monads was created by God: the first one express God as the creator of all monads (active voice), and the second one stress all monads as created by God (passive voice). The “epsilon operator”⁷ acting over x means that the function $\diamond(x)$ picks out *randomly* any monad that satisfies $C^{-1}(m_\pi, x)$. In some sense, this function tries to put into logical language the inextricable and mysterious choices of God.

With the aim of correlating this function to *metaphysical implication*, we can express the function $\diamond(x)$ by means of an *arrow* that explicitly shows what is the *effect* of applying $\diamond(x)$ on M , namely:

$$8) M = \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k, \dots\} \rightarrow_{\diamond(x)} m_j \in \omega$$

After ω -times of applying $\diamond(x)$ (in other words, after an infinite and denumerable numbers of God’s choice), we have the set:

$$9) W = \langle m_j, \dots \rangle$$

W is an ordered, infinite and a denumerable set: W is a sequence, and we can identify it with a possible world.

Since one can consider the applying of the $\diamond(x)$ successively (more precisely, we can consider that God applies such function ω -times on M), it is easy to see that W is metaphysically caused by M , namely:

$$10) M = \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k, \dots\} \succcurlyeq W,$$

⁷ On “epsilon” operator, see WIRTH, C.P [2008]. “Hilbert's epsilon as an Operator of Indefinite Committed Choice”. IN: Journal of Applied Logic. Vol. 6, Issue 3, pp. 287-317

And by virtue of 6) and the transitivity of metaphysical causation, we have:

$$11) K_{m_{\pi}} (\wedge_{i \in \omega_1} C (m_{\pi}, m_i)) \supseteq W.$$

It is interesting to notice that, from the set M , a continuous number of possible worlds could be built in a strict and analogous way by which the set W is acquired: God chooses successively, from M , \aleph_0 monads and these monads are ordered by means their position in the set of choices of God. So, we have a continuous number of sequences of monads that are possible worlds⁸. Let us call the set of all possible worlds by Π , and this set can be presented as:

$$12) \Pi = \{W_1, W_2, \dots, W_{\beta}, \dots\},$$

where β is an adequate ordinal number that belongs to some Cantor's class of numbers⁹, and $W_m \neq W_n$ for $m \neq n$.

Since each W_j comes from M by means of successive applications of the function $\diamond(x)$, we can stress that:

$$13) M \supseteq \Pi,$$

And we'll have:

$$14) K_{m_{\pi}} (\wedge_{i \in \omega_1} C (m_{\pi}, m_i)) \supseteq \Pi$$

The set Π is the space in God's Mind in which every possible world is located as a point: every possible world is a set whose measure is null, and they form some kind of *Transcendent Space in God's Mind*; and this transcendent space is caused by the Divine Logos.

One more thing must be added here: we are using the infinitary epistemic operator in a distributive way, that is, if one assumes that Kp and $p \rightarrow q$, then we can assert that $K(p \rightarrow q)$ and Kq . Since we are admitting a strict analogy between epistemic operator and metaphysical causation, in such way that we can translate every infinitary epistemic statement into a new proposition in which metaphysical causation appears, then we can also affirm that:

$$15) K\alpha \text{ and } \alpha \supseteq \beta, \text{ then } K(\alpha \supseteq \beta) \text{ and } K\beta.$$

In this way, every step from 1) up to 14) is presented in the "Divine logos", and more precisely this later must be identified with the following statement ("a more powerful expression. of the "Divine Logos"):

16) : $K_{m_{\pi}} (\wedge_{i \in \omega_1} C (m_{\pi}, m_i) \wedge_{j \in \omega} \Phi_j)$, where ω is the first cardinal number, and each Φ_n is a metaphysical consequence of

$$K_{m_{\pi}} (\wedge_{i \in \omega_1} C (m_{\pi}, m_i)).$$

So, by means of 16), we can assert that:

$$17) K_{m_{\pi}} (\wedge_{i \in \omega_1} C (m_{\pi}, m_i) \wedge \Pi = \{W_1, W_2, \dots, W_{\beta}, \dots\}).$$

From Π , God, in His Absolute Freedom, chooses one world (the best possible world, according to Leibniz) and, from this point in the transcendent space, built the real

⁸ If we consider each monad labelled with a natural number, then the quantity of possible worlds that God can create becomes the question concerning how many functions are whose domain is the natural numbers; and the answer to this question is $2^{\aleph_0} = c$, where c is the cardinal of continuous (see CANTOR, *ibid*, § 4, [488]).

⁹ Here we are admitting, as Cantor did, that every set can be counted or well-ordered, and this counting or well-order is expressed by attributing an ordinal number to this set; and every number that is an expression. of some counting belongs to some class of ordinal numbers. (CANTOR, *ibid*, § 12 on).



world, with its physical laws and space-time structure. But this passage from the best possible world to the real world will not be considered here, and it shall be a theme for another opportunity.

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RELIGION AND SCIENCE UNIFICATION

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ABSTRACT

Speaking for God has been part of religion for many years. However, science has come in the past few years to question that role or even our very ability to speak about God in general. My goal is to show that dogmatism, under any form, is wrong. And even though dogmatism had for a long time been associated with ill-intentioned religion, nowadays science has replaced religion in the throne of doctrinaire thinking. The point of the paper is to illustrate that one-way thinking is never correct – most of the times a combination of science and religion, measurements and theoretical thinking, logic and intuition, is required to draw a conclusion about the most important philosophical questions. The paper establishes that exact sciences can be very useful, but they also have limits. The Religion-vs-Science problem is a pseudo-problem; logic and evidence can easily be used to defend theistic views. Both science and religion use common tools and methods and can be unified in a new way of thinking. This paper sets the foundations on how this can be achieved. The conclusion is that science and religion both complete our knowledge for the world, our understanding of humans and our purpose in life. Speaking about God is part of science as well as of religion. Only when we think of God as theologians and as scientists at the same time can we fully reach Him...

Keywords: religion; science; science-religion controversy; science philosophy; religion philosophy; God; theism; logic; dogmatism; materialism; axioms

INTRODUCTION

Figure 1: God the geometer¹



Science and Religion are treated by some people as contradictory ways of thinking. This cannot be further from the truth. Without claiming that I hold the key to the "ultimate truth" (if such thing even exists in philosophy), I will analyze the philosophy underlying both and show that these two ways of thinking are not in conflict, but two sides of the same coin. You can never know life fully, unless you see the cosmos from both perspectives.

The existence of God can be proved by both the tools of logic and faith, or to be more exact: the one cannot fully exist without the other. Religious people are some of the greatest scientists of all times. Science and religion do not solely rely on logic and faith respectively. In an era when the new advances of science surprise us every day, religion stays powerful and current. That is not without a reason. No matter how much science advances, there will always be metaphysical questions

¹ Source: Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:God_the_Geometer.jpg



that their answer can only be found in other ways; not because of current gaps in our knowledge but because of deeply inherent limitations. Science cannot tell us anything about how and why we feel sad from hearing a song or sense joy from seeing an old friend, let alone about other more profound metaphysical issues – like what “I am” means. Modern science does not have human as part of the picture it tries to create and that makes it even more demanding for all of scientists to change their way of thinking. The meaning of life cannot be found inside a lab. Logic is a scientific tool as much as experimenting is. And there are a lot of interesting conclusions about our life and our purpose in life that logic has led to. It is important to understand that for science and religion to coexist harmonically, it is not only religion that has to be careful not to interfere with the things science investigates (i.e. physical phenomena). Science must also be very careful not to have philosophical (most of the time anti-religious) assumptions undermining its work.

Despite the (illusionary) science-religion “war” that some people like Dawkins are trying to make us believe that exists, the truth is much more different, simpler and friendlier. Few people realize that the ancient Greeks, who are regarded as the genuine first free thinkers (free from what? – that is the important question) of all time, actually had a religion. Because at the end one realizes that any thought must be based on something. And we should not forget that Christianity was first willingly adopted by those founders of Logic and true Science, the Greeks.

All the Greek manuscripts of Aristotle and Plato, were saved from the passage of time by the Greek Orthodox Christians in the Byzantine Empire and the Islamists Arabs of the medieval times. If you read about ancient Greek philosophy today it is because of a monk devoting his whole life into studying that philosophy in a monastery. It is characteristic that the “priest” of modern atheism, Richard Dawkins, is a professor at the College of St. Mary! So much “war” is going on between religion and science, that religion has created a college for its greatest enemy to teach.

So perhaps there is not only white and black, but other colours as well. The main points of a Religion and Science unity that exists but still eludes most people today, are depicted below.

1. SCIENCE FOR THE "HOW", RELIGION FOR THE "WHY"

The realm of exact sciences² is the physical phenomena world. On the other hand, questions like “what is our purpose in life”, “why do we exist” or “what is reality” are out of science's scope (see Conclusions for more on that).

Science deals with the ‘How’, while religion deals with the ‘Why’. These are two interdependent and supplementary elements. Even if science finds out how every cell of the human brain functions, it will still haven’t discovered why it works that way. The “first cause”, the beginning of existence is outside of science’s scope. One could say that science deals with the natural world and the natural phenomena while religion with the supernatural phenomena^[1, 2]. That is why both science and religion are needed for the quest of truth. Religion deals with questions science can never answer as the famous *ignoramus et ignorabimus*³ of the German physiologist Emil du Bois-Reymond states^[3]. And although

² I refer to the physical/ exact sciences with the term "science" in this article from hereon - except when stated differently - for simplicity purposes.

³ "We do not know, and we will never know", like the "I only know that I don't know" (Gr. *ἔν οἶδα, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδα*) of Socrates.



Hilbert attempted to deny that there are things we will never know, Gödel with his incompleteness theorem proved that Emil du Bois-Reymond was finally right.

It is also very important to understand that science and religion are both based on some kind of faith. Science on the faith that an ultimate truth exists and that logic can reveal that ultimate truth and religion on the faith that an ultimate purpose (and, thus, God) exists (what is interesting to note here is that even though Logic has been proved by Gödel that it cannot prove the truth people still believe in it with no questions asked). Throughout science's history, science had God as its starting point. The notion of us, humans, being made in the image of God gave scientists like Newton the power and will to try to understand the universe; if we are made in His image, then we have the ability to understand His creation people thought from the time of Saint Thomas Aquinas. On the other hand, religion has God as its ending point. It tells us how to behave and act in this world so as to earn a place in the "other" world. Science does not deal with problems of ethics at all. It may tell you how a nuclear bomb explodes, but it has nothing to say about whether you should use it and when. Science deals with measurable things, while religion with things that cannot be measured. And the latter (things for which we cannot speak scientifically) are the ones which distinguish us from animals.

Blaise Pascal tried to make us see the cosmos with our heart. Wittgenstein warned us that the things which matter lie not in this world. And as Albert Einstein eloquently said, "Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind".

2. LOGIC ARGUMENTS FOR THEISM

Many people are empiricists or materialists and deny the validity of theism or the very existence of metaphysics as a valid sector of knowledge. But what we must not forget is that every opinion or philosophical system (both the theistic and the atheistic ones) are based on unproven assumptions and axioms. There is no such thing as 'free' thinking, if by 'free' we mean 'absolutely objective and without any assumption'. Everyone should at least try to know these axioms and once they do, they will understand that the assumptions and axioms required for the belief in the existence of a God are much less in numbers and much less difficult to justify than the assumptions and axioms required to believe in "randomly generated life in a universe which just happened to exist for no particular reason". Some of the arguments in favor of a more theistic view of the cosmos are summarized below. In the process, some of the limitations of science will be revealed.

2.1 Definitions

"*Αρχή σοφίας, ονομάτων επίσκεψις*" said the Greeks ("The beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms"). Thus, an attempt to define the terms for which we talk about is absolutely necessary before we begin the analysis of arguments in favor of theism.

Metaphysics

Metaphysics (Gr. *μετά τα φυσικά* - meta ta Physika) is an arbitrary title given by Andronicus of Rhodes, circa 70 B.C. to a certain collection of Aristotelean writings. Traditionally given by the oracular phrase: The science of being as such. To be distinguished from the study of being under some particular aspect; hence opposed to such sciences as are concerned with ens mobile, ens quantum, etc. The term "science" is here used in its classic sense of "knowledge by causes", where "knowledge" is contrasted with "opinion" and the term cause has the full signification of the Greek cause (Gr. *αἰτία* - aitia). The causes which are the objects of metaphysical cognition are said to be "first" in the natural order (first principles), as being founded in no higher or more complete generalizations available to the

human intellect by means of its own natural powers. Secondary and "derivative meanings: (a) Anything concerned with the supra-physical, like "metaphysical healing", "metaphysical poetry", et cetera. (b) Any scheme of explanation which transcends the inadequacies or inaccuracies of ordinary thought^[4]. From that perspective, metaphysical issues are closely related to things existing without any prior cause - look at the "First Cause" argument below for more details and analysis on that.

I can believe anything, provided that it is quite incredible.

Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, 1891

"Believe"

Because the word "believe" has been misunderstood many times, I would like to make a clarification on the way I use it in this article. From my point of view, "believe" does not mean either "know" or "I am certain that this is it". When I say, "I believe" I use the word with what seems to be the dictionary definition of the word: I have some data to point me towards one conclusion, but which are not enough to make me certain (in that case I would say "I know"), so I say, "I believe this is it" based on that data and on some logical arguments. I do not use the word "believe" in the version of "this is how it is, and I censor all other opinions". For example, when someone says, "I see clouds, so I believe it will rain", he is not promoting any religious ideas. He is just making some (probably) valid conclusions (that may even be called scientific), but he uses the word "believe" instead of "I know" because he is not absolutely (100%) certain. And this is also a good point to clarify that the only thing science has proved is that it cannot prove anything (see Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem). Our conviction that we can prove something is one of the most fundamental beliefs that persists in the minds of humans.

"Being"

The hardest questions are the simpler ones. Most philosophy is built on top of the that great question that troubled Heidegger so much: what "Being" actually is, what does it mean? We use it all the time and yet we find it impossible to define. That question about what reality is, is what triggered the creation of the world of the Ideas of Plato, the "Unmovable Mover" (Gr. *Ακίνητο Κινούν*) of Aristotle or the ego of Freud. All philosophy is based on that question. And Heidegger was right in saying that we have forgotten how important it is^[5]. All fields of science are failed attempts to get away from the difficulty of that question by breaking it and transforming it to many others. However, the fact that we have broken down the question of "Being" into many smaller ones, does not mean that we have made any real progress. Instead, we have even forgotten the importance of the question. "Being" is something we cannot define. Heidegger tried but failed, but he did show some of its properties⁴. And this failure could be the basis of all the great philosophical problems we currently face. The word here is used in the way we all understand – but cannot actually define in detail – of what being is: I exist, I am, I feel, breath and love, I hate, and I cry. It is me. I exist. I am me⁵.

⁴ See George Steiner, Martin Heidegger, Fontana Press, 1978, for a description of the main conclusions of the work of Martin Heidegger.

⁵ That notion of 'being' shares seems similar to the tautological phrase of God "Εγώ ειμι ὁ ὄν" (I am that I am). This is the only thing we can be certain of and it stems out not from any logical explanation of the world but from an irrational belief that we "are". In that sense our logic seems more irrational since it cannot account for that fundamental knowledge we all share. (Spyridon Kakos, *Harmonia Philosophica: The philosophy of the irrational*, Philosophy journal «Φιλοσοφείν», issue 11, January 2015, Athens)



Faith

Faith is a belief in the trustworthiness of an idea that has not been proven beyond the shadow of a doubt. However, this does not mean that faith in something is based on completely nothing else than imagination. Faith in the truth of a syllogism (e.g. that there is a First Cause) can be based on both evidence and logic. And let's not forget that all axioms (on which any scientific theories are based upon) are taken for granted based on faith. Faith that they will help build a solid scientific model. Faith that they will provide the basis for a theory which explains what we observe. Faith that they are somehow close to the objective truth (which we believe it exists out of faith again).

2.1 A higher purpose exists

I believe (i.e. "my logic dictates that to me after I have examined many facts about the universe" and not "I think so with no supporting logic or evidence whatsoever") that there is a higher purpose in life. And this purpose - existing way above the level of matter - could have only been set by a perfect and transcendent being like God. Since everything we do in life we do it with a purpose in mind ^[6], I find it illogical and highly improbable that our life has no purpose. This is known as the teleology argument.

I don't know what that purpose is and I may never find out. But many things we know and experience indicate that something of "higher essence" is part of our existence - that we are partly made of something more than dust. We are luminous beings, not crude matter. Science may never understand why we come to tears when we listen to an old favorite song (even though it may explain thoroughly the chemistry and the mechanism of tears), why we laugh, why we may love someone so much that we may give our life for (and I am not talking about the love a mother has for her child - which may be explained by the theory of evolution since the mother has that love to protect her child -but to all other kinds of love a human may exhibit, like the love a human has for his friend et cetera), why we are good, why we exhibit altruistic behavior by helping people unknown to us while at the same time risking our own lives (and without ever wanting that to be known so as to get a reward of some kind), why human strives for creation, writing, poetry, why we may give our lives for higher ideas like freedom, why people kill themselves (if surviving was the ultimate thing we had in mind like the theory of evolution implies, then we would never even consider killing ourselves) and so on.

It is logical to think that these phenomena are derived from something more than simple matter, something beyond what we see and feel. Unless someone finds it logical to believe that a set of lifeless electrons and protons can "decide" to be destroyed for a separate set of electrons and protons. As Pascal reminded us "Jesus says: Console yourself, you would not seek me, if you had not found me".

2.2 The First Cause argument

The Universe is intelligible and that logically means (at least that is what this meant to Aristotle) that a First Cause [Gr. *Πρώτη Αιτία* – *Proti Aitia*] must exist. Or in other words, an Unmovable Mover must have set the world in motion in the first place ^[7]. Science from the beginning of time tries to find the causes of all phenomena, so it is rather ironic that some scientists completely reject the idea of an initial cause – even as a possibility. It is not logical to say that every event has a cause, but that the universe itself has none. After all, when examining an event, e.g. a glass of water that falls on the ground, you try to find the initial cause. If you say that "the glass fell because of the law of gravity" you would have "cheated". You did not find THE cause, you just stated the first-most immediate cause. For your analysis to be complete, you must find the cause of the law of gravity, the cause of that



cause etc. If no initial cause exists (God? – the name plays no role), then actually the simple phenomenon of the glass falling has no cause at all. The world would stop from being intelligible.

As the “sufficient cause” argument of Leibnitz states, there must be sufficient reason for something to “be”. So, there must be some reason for all the universe to exist, instead of nothing.

In summary the "First Cause" argument is as follows:

1. The cause of existence for something can lie outside of (so we talk for “possible” things) it or inside it (so we talk for “necessary” things). A child is a “possible” thing: it requires an “outside” cause to exist (i.e. its parents). God (as defined by religions) or the ever-existing universe (as described by Heraclitus) are “necessary things (i.e. the cause for their existence lies inside them).
2. Something can exist or not-exist. Something exists only if there is “sufficient reason” for it to exist. This is the only way that existence can be justified against the possibility of non-existence. A child can exist or not-exist. If it exists, it does so because of a sufficient cause: its parents and their decision to make children.
3. $1 + 2 \Rightarrow$ Universe requires a cause of existence.
4. Nothing can be created from nothing. If at some moment (i.e. before the Big Bang) there was nothing, then nothing should exist now either. So, the universe either exists for ever or was created at some point.
5. If the universe existed for ever, it does not need an “outside” cause for existence – it is “necessary”. Otherwise it requires an “outside” cause for justification of its existence.
6. All the things we observe are “possible” (i.e. they require an “outside” cause to exist). For example, I exist because of my parents. This text exists because I write it.
7. The universe exists and is the sum of all things that exist in it.
8. $6 + 7 \Rightarrow$ Universe is “possible”, so it needs an “outside” cause to exist. This cause, we call the “First Cause”.
9. Everything has a cause. So the First Cause must also have a cause.
10. If the First Cause has an outside cause, then we end up with an infinite series of causes \Rightarrow No First Cause exists.
11. The conclusion 10 is not correct, since it does not agree with 8.
12. $8 + 11 \Rightarrow$ The first cause does not need an outside cause for existence. The first cause is “necessary”.

No arrogant claim of scientists that “we know what caused that phenomenon” can escape dealing with the First Cause. What we seem to know is usually only the first or second most immediate cause of a physical phenomenon and nothing more. However, that means that we do not actually “know” the true initial cause of the phenomenon. Science is an excellent tool to examine reality but unfortunately is has its limits. And these limits seem to pose an impenetrable wall at where the explanation of the essence of our existence lies. If we are to accept that we can understand the universe, then we cannot ignore the implications of that understanding that we everyday "feel"...

The First Cause argument is one of the most well-known and well formulated arguments in favor of a God. Atheists (with Hume being one of the examples) in their attempts to discredit it or deny it have reached to the point of denying the very existence of “causality” in the Universe. Some claim that “we are not sure that causality exists, why not have an infinite series of causes?”, while probably forgetting that the whole structure of science is based on the very existence of causality. Some others claim that no causality exists in



quantum mechanics, so in the beginning of the universe no causality existed, and an infinite series of cause is a valid theory. These people forget that even for the complicated and still-in-debate field of quantum mechanics where more than ten interpretations exist, most known scientists believe a deterministic (i.e. including the notion of causality) interpretation^[3, 8, 9, 10]. It is important to remember that the point here is not if causality exists or if the argument can persuade everyone or not. The point is that there is a logical background in the arguments for the metaphysical realm of God, that the metaphysical can be part of human intellectual. In any case what is “logical” is a matter of choice: People doubt that there can be a First Cause which needs no cause of its own, only to “prove” that the whole cosmos itself can exist without a cause. Opening the door to a cosmos without causality more problems for science than for religion. In a world without causality the existence of a First Cause is no longer a problem, however all scientific theories must be rewritten to account for that new “reality”.

2.3 “A priori” and “a posteriori” knowledge

Empiricists deny the existence of knowledge that does not come from experience (“a posteriori” knowledge is the knowledge based on experience). In other words, they deny the existence of any “a priori” knowledge. However, Kant postulated that there can be human “a priori” knowledge. For example, the ‘ $1 = 1$ ’ syllogism is an a priori knowledge - it is independent of any present, past or future experience. The argument “if A is true and $A \Rightarrow B$, then B is true” is also an a priori knowledge. We seem to have it without someone teaching us so. We understand it is true (even though it may not be, never trust what you already “know”). Another example comes from our experience in science of counting: when we count or measure we use the underlying notion of quantity. That notion should be somehow “embedded” in us before we start counting. It is an a priori knowledge on which we base all other knowledge we acquire^[2, 11].

The sum of a priori knowledge is knowledge that exists without prior cause - something like the First Cause stated in the above sub-chapter. That a priori knowledge (e.g. of the notion of quantity or the notion of quality, according to Kant) is the basis of our own understanding of the universe. And the very existence of such a kind of knowledge states that “something” gave us that knowledge. That “knowledge with no causes” is what the area of “metaphysics” is all about.

The attempt of some empiricists to explain our a priori knowledge with terms of evolution fails. Some people claim that what we seem to know before any experience of ours, is actually the encoded knowledge of our ancestors in our genome. Again, finding a possible immediate cause does not mean that we know the true (initial) cause of a phenomenon (see above sub-chapter for more on that). So, the question in this case is simply transferred one “level” backwards: How did the first humans know how to count if they did not have an a priori sense of the notion of quantity?

2.4 Ontological arguments

Many thinkers have attempted to prove the existence of an all-powerful being (like the one religions call God). These attempts are interesting not because they prove something beyond the shadow of a doubt (there are indeed logicians who think they are correct, but there are also others who think otherwise⁶), but because they show that logic can be a tool that

⁶ In any case let’s not forget that Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem states and proves that nothing can be proved beyond the shadow of a doubt. There will always be ‘truths’ which cannot be explained based on a given set of axioms.



leads to God. One of the greatest logicians of all times, Gödel, has documented such an ontological argument ^[12].

The argument initially uses the following axiom.

Axiom 1: It is possible to single out positive properties from among all properties. Gödel defines a positive property rather vaguely: “Positive means positive in the moral aesthetic sense (independently of the accidental structure of the world). It may also mean pure attribution as opposed to privation (or containing privation)”

We then assume that the following three conditions hold for all positive properties (which can be summarized by saying “the positive properties form an ultrafilter”):

Axiom 2: If P is positive and P entails Q, then Q is positive.

Axiom 3: If P₁, P₂, P₃, ..., P_n are positive properties, then the property (P₁ AND P₂ AND P₃ ... AND P_n) is positive as well.

Axiom 4: If P is a property, then either P or its negation is positive, but not both.

Finally, we assume the following axiom:

Axiom 5: Necessary existence is a positive property (Pos(NE)). This mirrors the key assumption in the respective Anselm’s ontological argument.

Now we define a new property G: if x is an object in some possible world, then G(x) is true if and only if P(x) is true in that same world for all positive properties P. G is called the “God-like” property. An object x that has the God-like property is called God.

From axioms 1 through 4, Gödel argued that in some possible world there exists God. He used a sort of modal plenitude principle to argue this from the logical consistency of ‘Godlikeness’: in a possible world it is certain that an object with all positive properties does exist. Note that Godlikeness is itself positive, since it is the conjunction of the (infinitely many) positive properties.

Then, Gödel defined essences: if x is an object in some world, then the property P is said to be an essence of x if P(x) is true in that world and if P entails all other properties that x has in that world. We also say that x necessarily exists if for every essence P the following is true: in every possible world, there is an element y with P(y).

Since necessary existence is positive, it must follow from Godlikeness. Moreover, Godlikeness is an essence of God, since it entails all positive properties, and any nonpositive property is the negation of some positive property, so God cannot have any nonpositive properties. Since any Godlike object is necessarily existent, it follows that any Godlike object in one world is a Godlike object in all worlds, by the definition of necessary existence. Given the existence of a Godlike object in one world, proven above, we may conclude that there is a Godlike object in every possible world, as required. In simpler words: Since a Godlike object exists in one possible world, then it necessarily exists in all other possible world (since “necessary existence” is one of its positive properties).

From these hypotheses, it is also possible to prove that there is only one God in each world: by identity of indiscernibles, no two distinct objects can have precisely the same properties, and so there can only be one object in each world that possesses property G. Gödel did not attempt to do so however, as he purposely limited his proof to the issue of existence, rather than uniqueness. This was more to preserve the logical precision of the argument than due to a penchant for polytheism. This uniqueness proof will only work if one supposes that the positiveness of a property is independent of the object to which it is applied, a claim which some have considered to be suspect.



Again, the same thing which applies to all other arguments applies here as well: one might surely disagree with it. But this is not of importance. The critical point here is that some other logicians agree⁷. So even though this argument has not solved the great mystery of them all, it has given us a great lesson: Logic is not a tool for atheism only, it is a tool for theism as well.

Some people argue that Gödel had defined “positive” too vaguely. “Why should existence be a positive property?”, they ask. My answer to that counter-argument is rather simple: Let us imagine that, for the sake of the argument, “existence” is a “negative” property. Then all people should stop worrying about dying, since “not existing” is something good! In that way all great philosophical problems of humans will be solved in a strange but clearly decisive way.

2.5 The argument from Design

The Universe seems to be designed. Modern cosmology has discovered that as many as ten parameters are set to exactly the necessary values so as to have a universe that sustains life^[13]. This seems to be indication of a “Design” by many. Others of course do not reach to the same conclusion: such a set of fine-tuned parameters could be (according to a very extreme position) a result of pure luck. A coincidence of cosmic proportions. Modern cosmology is the modern theology.

The point to note again is not the fact that this is a final argument proving God beyond the shadow of a doubt. Every phenomenon can be interpreted in different ways. Most of times the underlying philosophical stance of the observer is what dictates him what to conclude. However, what one should understand from that argument of “Design” is the fact that observations and logical analysis can provide the basis for faith in God's existence. Whether you agree or not with this logical analysis does not destroy the value of that argument per se.

2.6 Other arguments

The existence of “free will” can also show the existence of God. Few people have thought about the implications of the existence of free will. In a fully materialistic⁸ world governed by universal absolute physical laws that define everything there is no room for free will. The only way to justify the existence of free will is to base that existence on “something” that does not follow the physical laws (which are the ones which make everything predictable in the universe). The foundations of free will must be set on that “something” that does not follow the logic “initial conditions” and the “physical rules” (thus leading to predictable behavior). In that way free will opens the path for the only being that could deviate from the path of the physical laws - God (as a “first cause” - see above respective argument).

3. LOGIC AND NOT ONLY FAITH

Before someone counter-argues that all these are indications and not scientific proof, I will argue that saying that is completely wrong since it is based on numerous assumptions – the greatest of which is that this claim takes for granted that we know what is objectively true even though we do not. It is a great mistake of the atheists and the agnostics to claim that every argument in favor of the existence of God is “not-logical” or simply false. The job of every scientist and open-minded person is to question everything. It is not thus logical to say that “we can and must question everything and we must not be dogmatic”, but have

⁷ What is logic, but the view held by the majorities? asked William James.

⁸ Materialism is a philosophical dogma believed by many scientists today, who forget that no one has proved or shown that only matter exists in the cosmos – let alone define what matter is. [14]



exceptions to that rule. If we are to question everything, then the dogmas of the modern materialistic age must be questioned too.

We must bear in mind that for things that relate to all these metaphysical questions (like what is our purpose in life), there is little hard (i.e. not like “I watch the universe and calculate the law of gravity”) evidence to rely on. Metaphysics is the realm of “non-measurable” things which are outside the scope of science by definition. Although one could have some hard data about the universe's structure and way of working, we have to rely on “soft” evidence and common (i.e. not strictly defined mathematical) logic to make the “leap” required in order to explain things in the metaphysical world. The abovementioned indications are all we've got.

And we must note that at least the ones that argue that there is a purpose in life have some indications to base their arguments on - while the ones that claim there is absolutely no purpose in life do not even have indications, they just have speculations. The theory of evolution is based on some fossil. And it really explains well some things: e.g. how some species evolve and change over time. However, explaining how fish evolved and went to the land, doesn't mean that we have explained there is no purpose in life or that God doesn't exist. This is a huge logical leap that is not supported by any evidence or logic.

Humans have more than one tools to reach truth. We have our feelings and our intuition. We don't know whether our logic or our feeling/ intuition are better guides for the truth. Many mathematicians have used their intuition to formulate theorems that every mathematician believes as true today but are still unproved. Science and religion, religion and science should work together to fill in the pieces of the puzzle of human existence. Until we have some better clues, we must rely on the indications we have and not to “believe” we have the correct answer to everything.

3.1 Faith in science

Scientists use logic to reach conclusions, based on observations data. These conclusions are based on a series of very subtle underlying beliefs – beliefs based on faith to a lesser or greater extent. Some of the beliefs scientists rely upon in order to reach to conclusions and formulate scientific models, are depicted in the following list:

1. Belief that all that exists in Universe is matter and the physical laws. We must not forget that materialism is an underlying dogma of most of today's scientists and not a truth that has been proved ^[6].
2. Belief that Logic as a tool works correctly: This belief is used mainly in physics, since in mathematics it has been proved that logic has flaws and inconsistencies (see Russell's paradox and Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem).
3. Belief that all physical laws apply to the whole universe: For example, we can see that gravity applies to our solar system and we believe that the same gravity applies also to galaxies we have not yet even observed. Modern observations have started hinting at a law of gravity which is not universally homogeneous⁹.
4. Belief that logic induction leads to correct conclusions: This is a subset of the belief in logic and the basis of most modern physics. When we observe a physical phenomenon and then verify that the same phenomenon takes place in a second and a third experiment, we conclude that the same phenomenon will occur also in the next experiment. But we cannot be sure about that. It is highly possible that we have

⁹ See for example the modified Newtonian dynamics (MOND) proposed by Mordehai Milgrom in 1983.



observed the three exceptions to the rule and that all the other experiments we will conduct will result in something different.

5. Belief that our senses work correctly: This is of the uttermost importance, but we insist on forgetting it. Our whole perception for the world is based on our senses. We do not know how close is the world we feel via our senses with the “real” world. Take for example the colour red. We see “red”, so we conclude that it exists. However, we forget that most animals do not see red. So, what is the “real” thing after all? Does red exist or not? According to the myth, Democritus chose to pull out his own eyes so that he was not deceived by his senses. We chose to blindly trust what we see.
6. Belief in the fellow human: This may sound weird, but it is the basis of our scientific society. When a scientist publishes a conclusion all other scientists believe him just by trusting his word. If a paper is published on a scientific journal with prestige, then it “must” be true. However, we have seen many times scientists tampering with their data and posting fake “groundbreaking” conclusions. When the historians listen to an eye-witness who says to them what has happened at a given period, they just trust him. If you do not test the conclusion yourself, then your belief in what the other scientists says is mostly based on the grid of human trust and only that.
7. Belief that all things are measurable and that all phenomena can be reproduced in a laboratory. I can easily think of a very important case of a phenomenon which could have occurred only once and which is thus unable to be reproduced: the creation of the universe with the Big Bang.
8. Belief that the axioms on which we base our theories are “true”. This is the most important faith of them all. We must never forget that all theories are based on axioms (like the ones mentioned above) and that no axiom is proved. Change the axioms at will and you will end up with a different theory! Having axioms is not a bad thing per se (to be exact, there would be no science without axioms). What is bad is forgetting that your axioms are unproven and arbitrarily selected.

The abovementioned beliefs tend to transform to dogmas when we forget that we are using them. When we forget that our conclusions are based on such beliefs that we cannot be sure if they are true or not, then we become dogmatic and stop being true scientists. We must acknowledge our limitations and move on by embracing them, not by ignoring them.

4. MISUSE OF SCIENCE

Many modern-day atheists use science to serve their own purposes. No better example of that can be found but in the case of the Theory of Evolution. Those people (with Richard Dawkins in the first line) try to establish the idea of a “war” going on between science and religion, something which is simply not true. After showing the limitation of science and how there can be logical arguments to support the existence of God, this part focuses on how some arguments against God may actually be derived from a misguided use of science.

4.1 New scientific findings

Mainstream scientists tend to rely on a simplified view of science philosophy for various concepts. For example, they take it for granted that the cause must exist before the event that it causes. However new findings in science point towards a fresh look to our world. Teleology (existence of a purpose – Gr. *τέλος*) seems to find its way through physics – not always in a straightforward way. No scientific theory indicates that the cause must always exist before the result. Quantum mechanics experiments – e.g. the experiment of the



two holes¹⁰ – show that an electron may “decide” whether it behaves like a particle or like a wave during its course only after a human has observed it (a.k.a. the ‘Observer problem’). And it “decides” for its nature for the entire length of its existence - not only after it has been recorded in a particle detector but even before that. The world laws of physics are not so platonic - perfect as once we thought they were. That, along with the fact that the human watching the experiment of the two wholes help the electron determine its existence, creates more room for teleology: if the human decides for the electron, maybe he decides for the universe laws as an observer of these as well (or, in other words, the planets move the way they move so as to obey their “purpose” of behaving in the way the human observer wants them to)? Like the electron that its whole existence is determined by its goal (purpose) to look like a particle or wave at a certain point of time, the human life may be the way it is because of a higher purpose we have in the universe, or because of a higher purpose the universe has for us. Evidence from recent research hint that our mind could be the one shaping reality^[15]. Maybe the universe has the higher purpose to be set by us and we have the higher purpose to reach the higher mental level and connect to the “universe” itself (Gr. *θέωσις* - theosis). We still do not know, but the window for the truth is open. And it does not seem like a “logical” window at all.

These findings are not the only ones which may support a different view on things. As science progresses and as scientists analyze the cosmos, new questions come forward. For example, the laws of physics seem to have limits. The universe has a specific amount of processing power (if you look at every particle as a bit of information, then the universe is like a giant computer - according the theory of information nowadays) and this means that it (the universe) can calculate for example the position of planets up to a specific decimal point. Higher accuracy has its limits even for the cosmos itself. And yet, we have the belief that we can eventually understand and discover everything. Is that a religious belief or inherent arrogance of modern science?

4.2 Evolution as an accident

The best example of science misuse is the attempt to apply the theory of evolution to philosophy, to show that there is no purpose or First Cause. For some people, if we accept the sayings of the theory of evolution then there is not purpose in life, since we are an accident of nature. We exist because we just happened to exist. And why do we exist? For no reason. This is in every way deeply illogical: by saying that we exist with no purpose in life, you nullify the value of human life itself, you tell everyone that being a human or a banana is more or less the same (we share 50% of our genome with the banana and 60% with flies). And you choose to blatantly ignore all the indications I mentioned above regarding our nature: if there is no purpose in life and if man is so completely stripped off anything of “higher value”, then why do we everyday strive to get out of our body and grow spiritually? In general, this is just a categorical error: these people use a biological theory to explain things which are not related to biology, thus arriving at erroneous conclusions.

Furthermore, some things for the theory of evolution are yet unanswered: How does a system evolve in something more functional over time? We know from physics that every system's entropy¹¹ increases over time (law of thermodynamics). How species then evolve by pure chance? Scientific experiments with flies and other insects have shown random

¹⁰ Also known as the ‘double slit’ experiment. The original experiment was performed by Davisson and Germer in 1927.

¹¹ Quantitative measure of the disorder of a system.



mutations over time, but none of these mutations has led to a new species¹². All in all, the theory is a very good biological theory but with limitations – even in the field it is related to (i.e. biology). In summary, the theory of evolution has showed that it can be used as a tool to analyze biodiversity, but not as a tool to find the ultimate truth about everything concerning life or as a tool to answer philosophical questions.

4.3 Medicine as “inhumane mechanics”

The best argument many people find for science is medicine. However, the truth is exactly the opposite: medicine has become so inhumane today that it offers the perfect argument against science¹³.

First of all, medicine is not a science with the proper definition of the term. Science is about creating models for the prediction of systems’ behavior in the future via theories. Medicine does not formulate theories in the same way physics do. Medicine is based on observations alone. But making observations and deducing conclusions is not Science. If it was, then baboons watching coconuts falling on each other and breaking apart would also be making “science” as well. Secondly, medicine must not be confused with technology. Seeing something in the ultrasound equipment is not “science” as such. And surely seeing something in the ultrasound equipment is not medicine. Medicine is many things and an indication on the iU22 xMATRIX screen is at the bottom of that list.

Medicine is all about love, it’s all about care and compassion, it’s about faith and love. Faith in other humans, faith in the value of life as something more than a set of organs working together like a machine, love towards other people, love of existence instead of nothingness. Things which are now longtime forgotten by our modern “scientific” medicine, which mostly adheres to a mechanistic inhumane view of the cosmos. And when we try to analyze the connection of medicine with these notions we may be startled to discover that medicine can be more “unscientific” and more “irrational” than its believers would like to admit.

Empirical observations do help, but again what do they help us about anyway? If we see ourselves as machines then it is surely good that we will live 10, 20, 30 years more. But why would we want to live more? Why should we even care about that? Philosophy has not found any reason why health is better than sickness and we surely do not know if life is better than death in the first place. Sticking into the materialistic mechanistic view of humans will help us treat patients up to a point. Patients need other things though. We are all going to die anyway. Does it matter if we live more or less? Or is it that other things matter more? When examining the foundations of our attachment to life we will discover many assumptions which we cannot answer.

If we are machines, I do not know why we should even care.

Dogmas turn us dead long before we die...

¹² In that case it must be noted that the problem of the definition of what constitutes a ‘species’ is very important. Also known as “The species problem”. Is a fruit fly with different shape of wings a new species? It is notable that Darwin's book triggered a crisis of uncertainty for some biologists over the objectivity of species, and some came to wonder whether individual species could be objectively real — i.e. have an existence that is independent of the human observer. (see Johnson, DS April 1908, "Introduction". The American Naturalist. 42 (496): 217)

¹³ With “science” in this case I refer to modern science, which choses to be distinct from any other field of human knowledge. In the days before Galileo however, religion and science were not separated as such.



4.4 Consciousness, the last frontier

The most important thing man ever wanted to know was “who am I?”. And in this quest, he started asking questions about nature, about being, about time, about anything. Modern science has started to analyze the great mystery of consciousness but with little success. Although the analysis of the details of related research falls outside the scope of this article, it is important to note the obvious: Someone cannot find what he does not look for. Modern science has “created” a cold universe with particles and lifeless matter – no wonder it cannot “find” human consciousness anywhere. We have defined a place which just exists, and we observe it standing outside of it. There is no place for human spirit inside such a cosmos and that is why all scientific theories researching the subject are in fact chasing their own tails. Many evidence from observations or experiments already point out towards a human mind which is not located or limited in what we call “brain” [16, 17]. That, along with the problems of neurology to substantiate it’s claims on clear philosophical grounds (reading brain readings does not mean anything with regards to what is actually happening towards the realization of a thought, who makes that thought and so on), lead me to the conclusion that the problem of consciousness will be the cause of a grand paradigm shift towards less materialistic ways of conducting scientific research.

4.5 Lessons learned

All of the above teach us an important lesson: We should not let our dogmas (e.g. “materialism”, “theism”, “atheism” et cetera) lead our thought. We should acknowledge that we use axioms and at least speak freely about the underlying dogmas of our theories so that other people can judge them properly. The ultimate goal is to try to think without any axioms in mind at all, although this is very difficult to achieve¹⁴.

5. SCIENCE DRIVEN AWAY FROM HUMANS

The most important thing to say about today’s science is that science has stopped having human life as its primary focus for a long time now. In its effort to explain everything, it has forgotten that its main purpose is to serve human and improve our lives. By telling people that we are nothing more than dust certainly doesn’t help in that direction (although it will certainly grant some people a good funding to go on researching why people are so similar to bananas). If you axiomatically think the world is consisted only of particles and physical laws that govern their behavior, then no wonder you cannot find any evidence of spirituality in the universe. If you axiomatically think that there is no purpose in our existence, then it is more than logical that you cannot find any proof for the existence of purpose in the cosmos.

Let us not fall into the trap of some atheists who wish to have a “war” between science and other ways of reaching the truth, like philosophy or religion. Logic is as much a useful tool as intuition and instinct are. Many atheists today have tried to make a hero out of Galileo Galilei by distorting the facts around his trial and his general behavior. As philosopher Paul K. Feyerabend says, the case of Galileo was a minor and not-at-all important episode of the life at that time. Galileo had made a promise and he had attempted to hide behind lies. He wanted to reach a compromise and he finally did. Proponents of scientism, in a look for a “hero”, managed to change the story of a frightened “con” to the story of the clash between “giants” [18, 19, 20, 21, 22].

¹⁴ This “thinking without thinking” is what various mystics over the ages hinted about. Letting go of any thought and just accepting the cosmos as it is, seem to be the keys to various methods of meditation. Some Christian seemingly monotonous prayers bear many resemblances to such methods.



Science must re-unite with philosophy and - as in the times of Aristotle and Plato - try to reach truth with a more holistic way of thinking. Science must understand that the dogmas on which it relies could be wrong. Science must understand that not all things are measurable (like moral, emotions, love) and that there are things we will never know via science. Trying to use other paths to the truth seems unscientific but it is actually the most scientific thing scientists can do today.

6. THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN PROGRESS

Humankind progresses. We learn new things, we generate new ideas, we read history and try to make the future better. Our society progresses in all sectors. Some Darwinists claim that human progress does not actually exist, that it is a mere illusion. They say that the only real progress is the one conducted via random mutations and natural selection. I disagree. We progress in all sectors, even if this progress is sometimes very slow. Even if someone denies progress' existence in one sector, he will not be able to deny the fact that humans progress in a way in some fields. This progress indicates that we are not only influenced by our environment, but we also influence it back. We are not evolving only by adaptation to our environment (as the theory of evolution claims), but we also evolve via our own free will and make the environment adapt to us.

The fact that we design new life forms or improve our own genome via molecular biology, clearly shows that the notion of "design" is something that is not just a theological idea but rather a part of reality. We progress because we have free will and because we are conscious of our ability to formulate our very own optimized designed future. This provides evidence that we are not the same as the other species. Maybe the structure of society dictates how some of our human traits of 'higher essence' - like free will - are expressed, but one cannot deny that humans inherently have some traits of such nature.

And it is important to note that for the last 50 years, the progress that was promised by the materialistic science at the end of the 21st century was not delivered. In contrast to the recent past when scientists' thought was more holistic, we cannot claim that today we have made substantial progress on many sectors^[9]. Science today only collects vast amount of data, without suggesting any essentially new theories for the cosmos. Having CD-ROMs and DVDs is not progress. Analyzing terabytes of data is not science, in the sense of the science produced by Newton – it is just analysis.

I certainly hope that will lead science to go back to more holistic ways of thinking, as it used to think back in the good "old" days of Aristotle or at least Albert Einstein. Science needs to become more humane, now more than ever.

7. POST-MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Wittgenstein – a pioneer post-modern philosopher – thought that all philosophical problems are misunderstandings caused by the limitations of our language. For example, the phrase "the pig hereres" is neither true nor false. That phrase is nonsense: the words used have no meaning. Thus, we cannot claim anything about its truthfulness. In the same way, the phrase "God exists" cannot be true or false either. In that phrase we use the word "God" without knowing what "God" exactly is and the word "exists" without having defined exactly what "existing" means. So, that phrase is nonsense too.

The teachings of Wittgenstein were wrongly used by many atheists to claim that no God exists. The Vienna Circle attempted to make such a misuse and that is why Wittgenstein did not go to their meetings.



The reality is quite different. Wittgenstein in his work *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was clear on one thing: the things that are of real importance in life are the ones for which we cannot speak about! We may not be able to answer the question “does God exist?”, but that does not mean anything about God’s actual existence. And that question - in spite of what many agnostics “believe” - is indeed one of the most important ones: knowing who we are and how we came to be is knowledge we must all have. As Heidegger^[23] said, we may not know what “Is” is, but the search for its meaning is what makes us humans.

CONCLUSION

As the Interacademy Panel (IAP - Global network of Science Academies) stated on an announcement it made for the theory of evolution on 21 June 2006: “Human understanding of value and purpose are outside of natural science’s scope. However, a number of components – scientific, social, philosophical, religious, cultural and political – contribute to it. These different fields owe each other mutual consideration, while being fully aware of their own areas of action and their limitations. While acknowledging current limitations, science is open ended, and subject to correction and expansion as new theoretical and empirical understanding emerges”^[24].

It is also very important to note that when Edward J. Larson of the University of Georgia in USA attempted in 1997 to repeat an older study conducted in 1916 (by the noted psychologist James Leuba) concerning the percentage of scientists believing in God, he was surprised to find out that the percentage remained the same despite the great advances of science. A very stable 40% of the scientists surveyed (biologists, mathematicians, physicists and astronomers included) answered that they believed in the existence of a God, despite all the astounding scientific breakthroughs in the years that have elapsed^[11].

What is more, a 2005 survey of scientists at top research universities found that 38% had a religious affiliation and more than 73% believe that religions convey important truths. The same study showed that religiosity in the home as a child is the most important predictor of present religiosity among scientists^[12]. What is more, in the Global Values Survey (that is conducted since 1981) it is shown that the higher the educational level of a person the more possible it is that this person will be religious^[25]. So being religious is not at all incompatible with being a good scientist as some people are trying to make us think.

People are tired of dogma (religious or scientific) and of cold science as well. As a conclusion one could say that we must stay humble in front of the wisdom of nature, search like a scientist, believe in human and its higher value like a theologian and work all together to discover the truth! Asking the right questions is sometimes more important than knowing the answers...



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AN INTERPRETATION OF EVIL'S PERCEPTION IN THE FREEDOM ESSAY OF FRIEDRICH SCHELLING

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to bring into light the significance of Schelling's Freedom Essay for our understanding of how evil is to be perceived and which its nature is. More specifically, in the first part we will start by presenting the distinction made by the German philosopher between the ground and the existence of God so as to show the way human being rises as pure potentiality from the ground of God. In the second part we will examine how what was a pure potentiality and blind will, namely the human being in the ground, enlightened by the rays of the understanding, of the Word as universal will, gets to know itself and become aware of its own willing as such. Once what was a blind will in the ground gets touched by the light of understanding, it is shone forth by the latter's spirit. Hence, we witness the becoming of the human being from a mere selfhood to a personality; a radical change accompanied by the self-aware human being's will to will either his subordination to what has made his self-awareness feasible or his decision to make himself the centre of all existence. Thus, the - firstly ground - grounded blind will becomes a powerful will able to freely will something, even though this something is evil. In the last part we will examine the challenges the evil sets in modern society and we will highlight the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach towards our understanding of what evil and its relation with modern society's human being is.

Keywords: Schelling; Ground; Existence; Evil; Freedom; Modern world;

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is, firstly, to present - via an extended reference to passages - how the concept of evil is interpreted in Friedrich Schelling's *Freedom Essay*¹, as well as why it is perceived as purely spiritual, and, secondly, to highlight the work's diachronic significance for our better grasping both in philosophy and religious studies of the emergence of evil in modern society.

In the first part we will set out and probe into the famous distinction between the *ground* and the *existence*² of God, seeking to understand how the human being's ascend springs from as pure potentiality from the former. The aforementioned distinction, due to its

¹ The *Freedom Essay*, being written in a very particular theological/cryptic vocabulary has also provoked great interest due to its potential influence from the thought of the mystic and philosopher Jacob Böhme. For a very detailed and well based analysis of this subject see: S.J McGrath, *The Dark Ground of Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious*, London: Routledge, 2012

² For very insightful and clarifying interpretations of these two concepts in the *Freedom Essay* see the following: Martin Heidegger, *Schelling's treatise on the essence of human freedom*, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985 and Jason Wirth, *The conspiracy of life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.



multiple aspects - such as dark and light principle, gravity and light, blind will and understanding, among others - is of crucial importance when it comes to see the way the human being is related to God in the thought of the German philosopher.

In the second part we will show the process of human being's becoming a personality through his merging into the spirit. The latter - being dark ground's passage to(wards) its self-enlightenment when brought into light by the light principle of understanding - becomes, too, the only way through which evil's apparition to the human being is manifested in the latter's free will to make of himself the centre of the universe.

In the last part, we will ponder over the turbulent and bloody situations the world has been living since the beginning of the 20th century and we will set forth our proposal for the necessity of an interdisciplinary reinterpretation of the human being and of the way evil is emerging in modern society. More specifically, our intention is to highlight the importance of perceiving and treating the human being as a pure living will; not as an abstract concept of Spirit's unfolding in the world, but as a corporeal entity extremely capable of suffering and provoking suffering as well.

1. THE DARK GROUND OF GOD: GROUND AND EXISTENCE IN THE FREEDOM ESSAY

In this first part we will see one of the most important elements appearing in the *Freedom Essay*, the distinction between the *ground* and the *existence* - first in God, then in the human being - which, when being fully actualized, opens the overwhelming infinity of possibilities of action for the human subject. This distinction - described in a variety of ways - aims at helping us realize why this division is crucial for our understanding of freedom and evil's essence. Some of the abovementioned distinctions are: dark and light principle, yearning and understanding, contraction and expansion etc. The reason of our emphatic insistence on the distinction made is that it paves the way for our becoming conscious of the unity's critical role as interplay in the thought of Schelling. Evil is not to be seen as mere deficiency or a tool for the final victory of good. Evil is rooted much deeper into our yearning for *becoming* and it is chosen freely, as we will later see. Coming now back to the distinction between *ground* and *existence*, Schelling's comment is:

"This ground of his existence, which God has in himself, is not God considered absolutely, that is, in so far as he exists; for it is only the ground of his existence. It [the ground] is nature—in God, a being indeed inseparable, yet still distinct, from him. This relation can be explained analogically through that of gravity and light in nature. Gravity precedes light as its ever dark ground, which itself is not *actu* [actual], and flees into the night as the light (that which exists) dawns. Even light does not fully remove the seal under which gravity lies Contained. Precisely for this reason gravity is neither the pure essence nor the actual Being of absolute identity but rather follows only from its own nature or is absolute identity, namely considered as a particular potency"³.

What we can derive from the examination of this difficult, and rather cryptic passage, is that God's existence is not nullifying His ground of existence. The ground of God - nature - even though inseparable from God is not something actual. It is of a particular potency; a potency that gets actualized in the appearance and the actions of beings - most importantly, human beings.

³ Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations Into the Essence of Human Freedom* (translated by J. Love and J. Schmidt), Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, p. 28



This distinction between the existence of God and the ground of His existence is quintessential in the *Freedom Essay* since it succours us in discerning how things come to be(come). Namely,

“ We recognize rather that the concept of becoming is the only one appropriate to the nature of things. But they cannot become in God, considered in an absolute manner, since they are different from him *toto genere* or infinitely, to speak more correctly. In order to be divided from God, they must become in a ground different from God. Since, however, nothing indeed can be outside of God, this contradiction can only be resolved by things having their ground in that which in God himself is not *He Himself*, that is, in that which is the ground of his existence”⁴.

In this passage a key claim is made: no thing can exist outside of God, but all of the things are different *essentially* from God. How can we manage to understand what things are and how the process of their becoming operates? Only through their coming from, their emergence from the ground of God’s existence. This is the way Schelling tries to explain how things come to be, and their relation with(in) God. In an effort to make this point a bit clearer for our perception says:

“ If we want to bring this way of being closer to us in human terms, we can say: it is the yearning the eternal One feels to give birth to itself. The yearning is not the One itself but is after all co-eternal with it. The yearning wants to give birth to God, that is, unfathomable unity, but in this respect there is not yet unity in the yearning itself. Hence, it is, considered for itself, also will; but will in which there is no understanding and, for that reason, also not independent and complete will, since the understanding is really the will in will”⁵.

The distinction between *ground* and *existence* wears another really important aspect here: yearning and understanding. The yearning of the One is not God as existence since there is no understanding and without understanding there can be no unity. The understanding appears only in its brilliance with the pronouncing of the Word, the personal self-revelation of God, where the light of the understanding is lights up(on) the darkness of the ground of God’s existence. But the yearning of the ground, this blind will which blindly wills only itself is not unity; only through the understanding comes unity, only through the Word as accounted for in the following passage:

“ But, corresponding to the yearning, which as the still dark ground is the first stirring of divine existence, an inner, reflexive representation is generated in God himself through which, since it can have no other object but God, God sees himself in an exact image of himself. This representation is the first in which God, considered as absolute, is realized [*verwirklicht*], although only in himself; this representation is with God in the beginning and is the God who was begotten *in* God himself. This representation is at the same time the understanding—the *Word*—of this yearning and the eternal spirit which, perceiving the word within itself and at the same time the infinite yearning, and impelled by the love that it itself is, proclaims the word so that the understanding and yearning together now become a freely creating and all-powerful will and build in the initial anarchy of nature as in its own element or instrument”⁶.

This is how God, and only God, exists in the perfect unity between the yearning of the ground of His existence and the understanding which radiantly shines forth from the Word. What is perfect in God, though, is very different if compared with what is perfect in the human being; far from being perfect, the human being, unable for ever to reach the perfect unity occurring in God, can only strive between his own yearning and his will to be shed in light in the radiance of the understanding of the Word. Nevertheless, it is in thus struggle that

⁴ Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations...*, p.28

⁵ Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations...*,p.30

⁶ Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations...*, p.30



freedom appears carrying with it the possibility of acting evil- but the possibility of freely overcoming what evil is as well. In the following passage we will see how Schelling comprehends the emergence of the beings and the interplay of the yearning and understanding in them.

“ Each being having emerged in nature according to the manner indicated has a dual principle in itself which, however, is basically but one and the same considered from both possible sides. The first principle is that through which things are separated from God or through which they exist in the mere ground; since, however, an original unity indeed occurs between what is in the ground and what is prefigured in the understanding, and the process of creation involves only an inner transmutation or transfiguration of the initial principle of darkness into the light (because the understanding or the light placed in nature genuinely seeks in the ground only the light that is related to it and turned inward), the—by its nature—dark principle is exactly what is transfigured in the light, and both are, though only to a certain point, one in each natural being. The principle, to the extent that it comes from the ground and is dark, is the self-will of creatures which, however, to the extent that it has not yet been raised to (does not grasp) complete unity with the light (as principle of understanding), is pure craving or desire, that is, blind will. The understanding as universal will stands against this self-will of creatures, using and subordinating the latter to itself as a mere instrument”⁷.

In the above passage we observe the appearance of the human being as a magnificent being indeed; one which yearns, wills blindly but also in an enlightened manner when he wills the Word - the universal will- and his subordination to it. This struggle between the ground - the blind self-will- and the understanding is the whole history of human life on the world. Our life is a twofold strife: a) the revelation of the light to the blind will, so that the latter be up in knowing what it wills, and b) the decision - which is the proof of how tragedy and brilliance coexist in our lives - to choose what we *want* to will after the light of the Word has sent its rays on the ground. In other words, whether we will choose to will good or evil. Quoting Schelling, “*the real and vital concept is that freedom is the capacity for good and evil*”⁸.

Hence freedom in human life is the capacity to do good or evil. Evil takes the place it deserves in our understanding of what freedom is since without it the concept and the living experience of freedom could never be grasped nor understood. But what is that makes evil so significant for Schelling? Probably, the fact that evil’s weightiest element lies in its being a purely spiritual phenomenon which we will consider in the next part.

2. THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF EVIL

One of the ground-breaking characteristics of Schelling’s analysis on freedom is the importance he attaches to the profound understanding of what evil is, and of how it should be interpreted. He does not treat evil as a deficiency of the intellect principle, i.e. an incapacity of the reason to choose correctly, or as a passive attitude of the human being towards the “earthly”, thus, bad, sensual instincts, nor, finally, as a lower degree of perfection, but perfection, in any case. Evil is much more complex and would not become transparent in front of the correct judgment of the reason’s capacity. Evil is not to be understood in the above presented ways since it, like the human being, rises from the interplay of the two principles inside the human being, the dark and the light one, the yearning and the understanding. Finally, it is pre-eminently hard, if not impossible for evil to become transparent since it is spirit, just like us. But why is evil spiritual in its essence?

⁷ Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations...*, p. 32

⁸ Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations...*,p. 23



The reason is that the human being himself, being merged into both the light and the dark principles, and having emerged from the ground of God's existence could not but be spirit. Schelling presents the spiritual coming to be of the human being in the following passage:

“Because he emerges from the Ground (is creaturely), man has in relation to God a relatively independent principle in himself; but because precisely this principle—without it ceasing for that reason to be dark in accordance with its ground—is transfigured in light, there arises in him something higher, *spirit*. For the eternal spirit proclaims unity or the word into nature. The proclaimed (real) word, however, is only in the unity of light and darkness (vowel and consonant)”⁹.

What we can deduce from this passage is that the spirit arises in the human being as an outcome of the interplay of the two principles inside the human being, especially if we take into account the fact that he is the only being in the universe wherein both of the principles may be in a state of interplay and of a striving to dominate one the other. In this interplay we see the emerging the human being's selfhood and the personality. How these elements appear in the interplay and which the role of each one is, are depicted in a thoughtful way in the following passage:

“The principle raised up from the ground of nature whereby man is separated from God is the selfhood in him which, however, through its unity with the ideal principle, becomes *spirit*. Selfhood as such is spirit; or man is spirit as a selfish [*selbstisch*], particular being (separated from God)—precisely this connection constitutes personality. Since selfhood is spirit, however, it is at the same time raised from the creaturely into what is above the creaturely; it is will that beholds itself in complete freedom, being no longer an instrument of the productive [*schaffenden*] universal will in nature, but rather above and outside of all nature”¹⁰.

What we see in this enlightening extract is that the dark principle, the ground, is the place where the selfhood of the human being crops up. The selfhood, however - arising in a context where the light principle as well has already emerged - has been touched by the rays of the light of the understanding, of the Word. This constant interplay is the bringing forth of the spirit and the human being's becoming a spirit. We are rising from the ground of God's existence in a world where the Word has been uttered in the most personal way; this is the matrix for our struggling to become who we really want to be. At the same time, the human being, as a particular being, as a pure selfhood, when it merges into the spirit it becomes a personality, an indissoluble merging of the selfhood with the spirit. His becoming a personality is an outstanding moment for the human being since he has become a will that is above creatures and outside of all nature. From now on human being freely decides on which his stance towards the nature the creatures and the rest of the human beings is going to be. Slavoj Žižek analysing this distinguished moment for our understanding of evil, and the human being in general, notes:

“In man as a living, actual spirit, his selfhood - which, in an animal, is merely a blind egotistic striving - comes to light. By means of this self-illumination, I become aware of myself, I 'posit' my Self in the radical exclusion of all otherness. That which, in me, resists the blissful submergence in the Good is therefore not my inert biological nature but the very kernel of my spiritual selfhood, the awareness that, beyond all particular physical and psychical features, I am 'me', a unique person, an absolutely singular point of spiritual self-reference”¹¹.

⁹ Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations...*, p. 32

¹⁰ Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations...*, p. 33

¹¹ Slavoj Žižek, *The indivisible remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters*, London: Verso, 2007, p. 59



The uniqueness of each person, and particularly, our awareness of the fact that we are unique is what hoists the human being above every creature and outside the nature. The human being, due to this profound interplay of the two principles inside him, manages to bring what was dark, the ground, into light; What was a blind will is no longer blind and from now on it can see the light of the understanding as it also sees the darkness from which it has arisen. At this moment the human being understands that he has a choice of will: willing to become one with Word and the light of the understanding, or, having seen his origin, wills to make himself the centre of the whole world's existence. The centre, which could be no other than the Word of God and the freely decided merging of the human being into it, is distorted and dislocated in the will of the human being to become the centre of the universe. This distorted will to become the centre is a purely spiritual will, since it originates from the personality of the human being, which derives from the merging of the selfhood into the spirit. Nothing could happen if there were no spirit, no light to be brought upon the depths of the ground. Schelling depicts in a radical way the birth of the sin in this free decision of the human being in the passage hereafter:

“Thus is the beginning of sin, that man transgresses from authentic Being into non- Being, from truth into lies, from the light into darkness, in order to become a self-creating ground and, with the power of the *centrum* which he has within himself, to rule over all things. For the feeling still remains in the one having strayed [*gewichen*] from the *centrum* that he was all things, namely, in and with God; for that reason he strives once again to return there, but for himself, and not where he might be all things, namely, in God. From this arises the hunger of selfishness which, to the degree that it renounces the whole and unity, becomes ever more desolate, poorer, but precisely for that reason greedier, hungrier, and more venomous. In evil there is the self-consuming and always annihilating | contradiction that it strives to become creaturely just by annihilating the bond of creaturely existence and, out of overweening pride [*Übermut*] to be all things”¹².

Human being is rightly understood, thus, as the “being of the Centre”, since it is the only being that considers itself worthy to be placed in the centre of the existence. The human being is putting himself above all the creatures, outside the law of nature, and even aspires to become the new God of the world. Evil could not be but a spiritual and human element, since only the human being can freely take the decision to put himself in the centre of the universe. No animal could ever defy the laws of nature in such an arrogant and overwhelming way the human being does. That's why evil is both free - having been freely decided as the will for the centre of the human being - and spiritual - as the event of the self-illuminating ground and its will for itself.

To reflect on what we have seen so far, the following question is to be answered: what does the human being do when he commits an evil act? A convenient response could be that he tries to become/impose his self-will on the centre of his existence taking the place of the universal will. Human being, endowed with the power of the centre he has acquired(?) over all beings, when acting evil wants to become the creative ground for everything and rule the whole existence. The latter could be described as a self-aware selfhood in the will of glorifying itself. Through his becoming aware of his own selfhood, human being can demand to become the centre of the whole creation. As long as the human being understands himself as an image of God's self-revelation, would never dare to demand the centre for himself and he would continue lurking as a potentiality in the darkness of the ground. Nevertheless, human being, having come to know himself after the illumination of his blind will by the light principle of the understanding may decide to become the centre, a purely

¹² Friedrich Schelling, *Investigations*, p. 55



free and spiritual decision made feasible by human being's becoming aware of himself. After this act of awareness, what was a mere selfhood now sees itself as a spiritually gifted personality, since the darkness, which before the bringing of the light was a pure potentiality, through the light principle gets to actualize itself. Evil, thus, is perceived as something real, concrete and free. Evil is the human being recognizing his selfhood as a personality and willing the centre. According to Schelling:

“ evil does not follow from the principle of finitude for itself but rather from the selfish or dark principle having been brought into intimacy with the *centrum*; and, just as there is an enthusiasm for the good, there is a spiritedness [*Begeisterung*] of evil ”¹³.

This ceaseless interplay is what the human being is, and the only way in which he could ever be. In human life there can be no “happy ending”, no last decision which will stabilize our moral standpoint once and for all. Our life can only be a constant struggle, an exhausting obligation to freely decide to will the Word as the centre instead of our purely egotistic will for ourselves.

Concluding this part, we deem important to clarify that the dark principle, just because it is dark should never be considered as such in moral terms. The dark principle is dark because what exists in it as potentiality is awaiting the light so as to come to know itself as a will and deed for actuality. If there were no dark, then there could be no enlightenment. What is dark is potentially what is brought into pure light and this is something that Schelling always bore in his mind as we can easily deduce from the beauty of the following relevant passage:

“ All birth is birth from darkness into light; the seed kernel must be sunk into the earth and die in darkness so that the more beautiful shape of light may lift and unfold itself in the radiance of the sun. Man is formed in the maternal body; and only from the obscurity of that which is without understanding (from feeling, yearning, the sovereign [*herrlich*] mother of knowledge) grow luminous thoughts”¹⁴.

3. FACING EVIL'S UPROAR IN THE MODERN WORLD

So far, in the first two parts, we have seen the distinction between the ground of the existence of God and His existence and the way how this distinction is crucial for our understanding of how the human being, emerging from the ground, comes in touch with the understanding of the Word, making his blind will of ground a will for his own self. This distinction, then, has led us to our understanding of how freedom is to be understood in the philosophy of Schelling, at least in his *Freedom Essay*, and of how the choice between willing good and evil constitute the core of freedom. Finally, we have seen the importance of the spirit in the emergence of the personality of the human being which was interpreted as the possibility of choice between merging into the centre of the universal will, the Word, or human being's decision to become the new centre of the universe once the dark principle of the ground has been brought into light by the radiant light principle of understanding. In this last part we will endeavour to show the reason why Schelling's thought, and especially his *Freedom Essay*, not only have they not lost their philosophical power, but, on the contrary, they could offer us an invaluable aid in our coming to understand the human being as a pure will, as a being in contrast oscillating struggle between his opposite wills of freely merging himself with the universal will or trying to replace it with making it of his own will the new centre.

¹³ Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations...*, p. 40

¹⁴ Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations...*, p. 29



There is no doubt that modern philosophy has long ago chosen a path towards a radically different vocabulary where the perception of the understanding as the self-revelation of the Word, could, possibly, not be given its due importance because of its theological element. Nevertheless, we still do believe that both scholars of religious studies and philosophers can understand the depth of the thought of Schelling and trace its ontological importance in our better understanding what the human being is and the way the latter understands evil in his life.

In our opinion, when Schelling identifies evil with the will of the human being to bring the universal will to its knees by becoming its new centre/master, he is highlighting a really human characteristic, which is no other than the latter's way of understanding/changing the world actualized in a violent way. The 20th century has been the century of the "titanic" or better said *centrum* ideas set forth into reality, no matter the cost of the human lives. The rising of the totalitarian regimes was based on their perception of a new kind of human being that would bring an end to the decadence of the western society.

The Word, especially after the Enlightenment, may have lost its space as the centre of the world, as the universal will, but this, nevertheless, has not erased humanity's necessity to believe in a universal will and try to find it in every path of its modern history. The aforementioned totalitarian regimes managed to do the same thing, and intended to legitimize in the eyes of their supporters the sacrifice of the individuals for the sake of a greater cause. Of course, no one could ever doubt that in life there are values worth fighting and worth dying for. Nonetheless, one of them should also be the realization of the uniqueness of each individual and of the unsurpassed importance of his being. When we start "sacrificing" individuals in the name of an abstract greater good the only thing we achieve is the abstraction of the individual's life where the latter becomes fuel for the machine of the greater vision's accomplishments. The (in)famous thinker Carl Schmitt uttered one harsh truth that was surely timely in his epoch, but still rings a lot of bells when examining the way modern warfare is executed:

*"Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression of Proudhon's: whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat. To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity"*¹⁵.

Schelling in his analysis of the way evil appears in human condition made a philosophical and ontological breakthrough right into the core of what the human being is. The will of the centre could never be proclaimed in this way; it will get transformed into an abstract powerful ideal, a universal value which no one would dare to criticize since its intentions could never be bad - and in many cases, probably they weren't. Schelling, though, when speaking about the universal will he had in mind the self-revelation of God and our subordination to It. Now that the situation, and the validity of that claim, has radically changed, what should we expect to happen? The will for the centre still remains, but what the centre should be - a problem solved thanks to the Word for Schelling - this is indeed a question that has no easy answer, if there is one.

Having a look at the modern world we see that the *indivisible remainder* mentioned in the first part is extremely close to being a very realistic criterion to analyse and interpret the

¹⁵ Carl Schmitt, *The concept of the Political*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008, p. 54



world. Every day, thousands of people die. Wars are raging all around us. The last, bloody example was the *Arab Spring* when the effort of introducing some fundamental for the western society values did not work that well; Libya is in crisis, Egypt faced terrible skirmishes in its interior which ended(?) when the control was taken by the army, whilst in Syria the Assad regime is still in war and trying to recuperate its territorial losses as a consequence of the struggle against the ISIS and the other parties/powers involved. If we had to explain the situation in one word, we would surely not choose order, nor balance. Bernard Freydberg, when analysing the *Freedom Essay*, insightfully mentions that:

“The whole, and humanity, must come to be understood and justified as works of art . . . without artists. The laws of art are alone without consequences. This factor might make them the most terrifying laws of all, more so than any moral commandment could ever be”¹⁶.

Finally, Schelling in his *Freedom Essay* managed to make both claims, a philosophical and theological one, namely that evil is not an external opposition, a trap set by the outside which will trick the rational agent while the latter is in a phase of passivity. Evil is within us, as a no longer blind will, but as a will willing everything for itself. Evil in the *Freedom Essay* is understood as a dissonance, a reversal of the role of the parts in an organic, not mechanistic whole. When evil arises then it cannot be just thrown away as if getting rid of the infected part could right all wrong. Evil is not an alien factor inside the whole of the human being; it is the disharmony, the *ataxia* occurring when the parts are no longer in order, no longer in unity. Evil is not an enemy at the gates trying to break through inside the human being; it is already there, as the reversal of his order:

“The positive is always the whole or unity; that which opposes unity is severing of the whole, disharmony, ataxia of forces. The same elements are in the severed whole that were in the cohesive whole; that which is material in both is the same (from this perspective, evil is not more limited or worse than the good), but the formal aspect of the two is totally different, though this formal aspect still comes precisely from the essence or the positive itself. To recognize this kind of being is impossible for dogmatic philosophy because it has no concept of personality, that is, of selfhood raised to spirit, but rather only the abstract concepts of finite end”¹⁷.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, taking all the above mentioned into account, what we have tried to do in this paper, is to bring the issue of evil, freedom and human personality into the field of both philosophy and religion; of human being not as an abstract idea getting developed throughout the history as Spirit, but as a living being that wills strong and suffers stronger and deeper. Both religion and philosophy could play a crucial role in our understanding the way the world is, if there is an order in this world and how the human being is to behave when being afraid/conscious of the apparent lack of this order. Unfortunately, if we take a look at the globe the question we could easily ask is not whether evil is a tool for the final victory of good, but if good is the small “breaktime” in a world dominated by evil and by more and more people willing to become the centre of the former.

¹⁶ Bernard Freydberg, *Schelling's dialogical Freedom Essay*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008, p. 95

¹⁷ Friedrich Schelling, *Investigations*, p. 38



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A KANTIAN APPROACH TO ALTRUISM IN RESPECT AND LOVE

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ABSTRACT

The requirement of altruism is a defining feature of morality. This apparently makes acting partially, e.g. regarding loved ones, morally wrong and forbidden. The question arises how do we apply or use effective altruism in practice. This paper will seek to answer that question with Kant's categorical imperative, by defending an interpretation of altruism in terms of two subsidiary principles: moral love and moral respect. I will argue that Kantian moral altruism is not merely a matter of logical consistence or even a deconstruction of humanity by reason alone; it must be valued in a more specifically non-formalistic sense that is, moral respect and love. I will also argue that as independent values implied in humanity formulation. Moral respect and love are compatible and can be illustrated the effective altruism.

Keywords: Altruism; Respect; Love; Categorical Imperative;

INTRODUCTION

Kant's ethics is, essentially about altruism. Altruistic rational persons care if the maxim of their action satisfies the categorical imperative, i.e. Kant's Formula of Universal Law (C1) 'act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.' Moreover, treating all persons equally, namely as ends in themselves. Kant's Formula of Humanity (C2) 'so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means.' Many consider especially the latter, Kant included, being the most intuitively appealing formulation of the categorical imperative. However, this apparently makes acting partially egoism, e.g. regarding loved ones, morally wrong and forbidden. If it is true that Kantian moral theory requires that we give special consideration to intimates, one might wonder whether we could say that Kantian moral theory is an altruism theory. That is, if Kantian moral theory requires us to give some kind of preferential consideration to one group, how can we still call the altruism? If we think altruism, in contrary to egoism, requires equal consideration or equal treatment at the level of deliberation about moral actions so that our reasons for acting are altruistic, then the proposed understanding of Kantian moral theory would not be an egoism. This view as I understand is merely formalistic view of altruism. By examining the place of relationships in Kantian moral theory, I argue that thinking about the Categorical Imperative in the form of Formula of Humanity (C2) means respect and love for others showing Kantian theory not only allows but also requires that we give special consideration to intimates, which might provide a way of understanding effective altruism.

In this paper, I begin in section 1, with an overview of difference between a Kant's account of the altruism of morality and the purely formalistic altruism. In section 2, I outline the current debates on concept of moral altruism. In section 3, I respond to this critique by



elucidating altruism in terms of two subsidiary principles, moral love and moral respect. In section 4, I will show how moral respect and love are compatible and applied to a number of examples (duty of beneficence) to illustrate how an effective altruism is possible.

1. THE TENSION BETWEEN FORMALISTIC AND NON-FORMALISTIC ALTRUISM

There are different ways to understand altruism, truthfully or not truthfully. The misunderstanding, from both critics and interpreters imply that altruism requires either equal treatment or equal consideration for everyone. This view of altruism links with absolute equality. In the practical scenario and circumstances, this means that our friends, family, and significant others deserve either the same treatment or at least the same consideration in our decisions as strangers, in my view neither Kant nor many scholars agree that Kantian altruism is essentially formalistic. If, indeed, Kantian altruism is merely formalistic we would, of necessity, regard him personally as a cold, unfeeling person, and his moral philosophy as unenlightening with regard to human sensibilities and rationality.

This view of purely formalistic altruism as the overriding factor in all moral decisions does not present the best way to think about the kind of impartiality required by Kantian moral theory, rather than being caught in the formalistic quagmire. By exploring Kant's altruism more deeply and by turning to a non-formalistic, i.e. the moral respect and love, understanding of his work, we may discover philosophical rigor, intellectual value and practical application. While purely formalistic impartiality is essentially a negative way to understand Kantian altruism, moral respect and love as two fundamental moral feelings offers a fresh approach, albeit often ignored by Kantians that is positive and productive.

Logical Consistency: The Narrow Emptiness Account of Altruism

It has been generally considered that Kant's moral philosophy is essentially about his categorical imperative. There are numbers of categorical imperatives¹, the first formulation: Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction. C1 describes the procedure moral decision, it has its formal outweigh in action, Kant says moral law must be universalized because it is not only empirically valid, but also objectively valid. Then the question comes out: how the individual will can be the universal will.²This question is not only for the first formulation,

¹ Many Kantians offer this distinction. For instance, non-formalists read Kant as departing from formalism due to C2, given Kant's expression that there must be "something the existence of which in itself has an absolute worth." By a process of elimination that something must be persons by virtue of their capacity for rational agency. The absolute worth of persons or rational agents comprises an independent order of value which precedes and grounds the moral law. On the other hand, Kant is read as a moral formalist due to C1 and C3. In the first case, Kant is understood as saying that there is a procedure for testing maxims to that allows us to test them for universality thereby constructing rational maxims. Alternatively, according to C3, Kant is understood as saying that the stance of the members of an ideal kingdom of ends defines what is right. This view holds that "morality consists, then, in the reference of all action to the lawgiving by which alone a kingdom of ends is possible.", however, such a kingdom is "admittedly only an ideal." The members of such a merely ideal realm would construct the laws for themselves as the ones to bind all of us. For example, ideal legislators pass ideal laws that impose moral behavior. However, the content of the moral law itself is not implicitly self-legislated. That is, the moral law by which we are bound is a universally valid maxim. However, in an ideal realm of ends the law will not be the outcome in accordance with what we do. See Paul Formosa 'Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?'

² For helpful discussion of other generalization and universality principles, see Marcus Singer's 'Universalizability and the Generation Principle' in *Morality and Universality*, ed. Potter and M. Timmons, (Dordrecht: 1985).



but also for the altruism. Understanding altruism can be the way of our understanding Kant's first formulation. Kant's first formulation itself is formal (not formalistic), but the reconstructions and interpretations by Kantians are different. In understanding Kant's first formulation, the narrow formalistic notion of impartiality, as a procedural constraint on the process by which particular moral principles are determined without recommending the substantive principle of altruism; it directs agents to assume the stance of a disinterested judge and treat all persons equally. This seemingly simple principle reminds us the ancient Greek democracy that had no commitment to the equality of persons. The principle of social justice proposed by Plato and Aristotle 'treats the unequal unequally and the equal equally.' An example of formalistic altruism can be found in discussion of the grain-stealing problem:

A farmer who wants to steal his neighbor's grain wonders why this is not permissible. From an external point of view, stealing grain is morally impossible because of common human will which subsequently creates a self-contradiction. In this case, the farmer's private will contradicts the universal will which harks back to the democratic version that complies with universal progression. Therefore, there is nothing morally impermissible about stealing another's grain until the majority of framers who disallow stealing grain create specific rules or laws prohibiting theft. However, such a universal progression reveals the pitfalls of legal positivism which states that we receive rights as a result of laws legislated and enforced by a governing authority. Further, then ideal of a democratic universal will does not go far enough since, returning to our example, the farmer's theft will be morally indifferent. In the end, therefore, a farmer who steals his neighbor's grain is only considered immoral after some positive law is established to prevent stealing grain. Before this decision is made, the democratic universal will results in a war of conflicting interests.

While this purely formalistic notion of altruism in Kantian formality highlights the importance of the universal will, what occurs when my personal will conflicts with the universal will? This question cannot be solved by depending upon the democratic version, which makes moral decisions by relying upon the non-inter-subjective views of the majority. Again, referring back to our example originated by Kant, I may pursue at least two options in order to arrive at a majority opinion with regards to stealing grain. First, perhaps I can ask my neighbor's and others' attitudes about stealing gain. Or, second, perhaps, as members of the agricultural community we could vote on this issue.

While this example may be illustrative, we must note that Kant's notion of altruism is obviously more complicated since his view may be characterized as closer to the impersonal totalitarian view, which is abstract, impersonal and non-inter-subjective. In this case, stealing grain is not only incompatible with the will of a neighbor, but with the will of any owner who has monetary wealth or property; therefore 'no one in particular' is identified. Nevertheless, when individual will conflicts with universal will, individual will is morally forbidden. In other words, there is no need to balance individual and universal will.

This view, according to Kant, holds that 'in a conflict, the universal will is more powerful than the private will.'³ Still, such a view creates new questions: How do I absorb an obscure and impersonal point of view? As an agent living in the real world, the universal will does not come automatically as an epiphany if one strays from the universal will. How, then, can one recognize the universal will? Kant encountered while reading Rousseau's *The Social Contract*. In assuming this position, Kant seeks to mediate between universal and

³M.29:621



individual will.⁴ The Rousseauian Universal Will explanation which stresses everyone's best interests or the common good is also invalid. In Kant's view, ostensibly, the idea of a general will which results in what is ultimately best for everyone is likely naive given modern political perspective. However, this does not appear to be the case.

A purely formalistic notion of altruism does not answer such questions satisfactorily. I hold that a Kantian approach of altruism offers a better alternative to the narrow impersonal stance elucidated here. Because Kant seeks to grasp human understanding and believes humans are capable of both engaging and implementing speculative actions in accordance with the common good, humans are therefore able to pursue a non-formalistic, public conception of the good. I propose that such a view constitutes the archetype of Kantian non-formalistic altruism.

According to formalistic altruism, neglecting others in need might be permissible, provided that one does not desire to receive help in the future; such a stance would at least be coherent. However, Kant may well have held that the formalistic requirement of altruism is not enough. He adds the positive duty of beneficence in the illustration of C1 to forbid negative formalistic duty, i.e. making promises that serve self-interest. Given this aim, altruism must describe the ideal conditions under which impartial principles can be selected and justified.

In order to extend my discussion further, I now turn to an examination of Kantian non-formalistic altruism.

Before we make this move, I will first look at a Kantian principle of beneficence. Kant affirms that our personal relationships can affect which beneficent action we choose to do: 'in acting [beneficently] I can, without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love (one of whom concerns me more closely than another).'⁵ Because many people sense a conflict between their obligation to help others and their desire to benefit intimates, is there the proper place for non-formalistic Altruism?

2. THE VALUE OF NON-FORMALISTIC ALTRUISM

In the *Groundwork*, Kant divides duties into two types: perfect duties and imperfect duties. We have each kind of duty both to self and to others.⁶ Perfect duties are duties we have to others and ourselves that require us to act or refrain from acting every time a situation involving that duty arises. Examples of perfect duties for Kant are the duties to keep promises, not to lie, and also duties of justice. The duty of beneficence is an imperfect duty to others. Perfect duties are the obligations in the sense that we must follow the moral law; we must not lie and kill ourselves. While the imperfect duty constrain the obligation as choiceable, in this paper, I do not seem to overlook the formal requirement of perfect duty, the formal obligation or necessity is indeed the basis of Kant's moral philosophy. The reason I take the turn to explain the example of imperfect duty is, the duty of beneficence is closer with what I term the non-formalistic altruism. In the sense that as the phenomenal being, we overcome our desire or empirical constraints to follow the moral law. Both the perfect duty and imperfect duty will point to the value of altruism, that is, our humanity; the formal aspect (in contrast to the mere formalistic) in perfect duty is within us, I will show how the imperfect duty is equivalent with the value of non-formalistic altruism.

⁴Jean-Jacques Rousseau. *The Social Contract and other later political writings*, translated by V.Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) chapter 3.

⁵MM 6:452

⁶Gr.421-423



In the case of the duty of beneficence, we are required to act beneficently on some occasions. The actions we choose to do as part of our duty of beneficence are up to us. We may volunteer for a charity or we may donate money. Both would count as acting on our duty of beneficence.

However, In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant says that the commands of morality apply to everyone, “without taking account of his inclinations, merely because and insofar as he is free and has practical reason.”⁷ Because morality is supposed to apply to everyone “without taking account of his inclinations,” one might think that we are not allowed to take our personal relationships with others into account when we are deliberating about moral action because of our inclination towards intimates and our desire to act in ways that benefit them. If this view is right, then it looks as though we are not allowed to act for reasons which would express partiality for someone—we are not allowed to act on relationship obligations. Such actions would be excluded by Kantian moral theory. The following question will help direct our examination of non-formalistic impartiality: How exactly is the Kantian duty of beneficence determined by non-formalistic impartiality rather than formalistic altruism?

To provide an answer, consider this scenario: I have an over-abundance of resources and my neighbor is about to die from starvation due to his poverty. I am fully aware of my neighbor’s suffering and of the steady decline of my food resources. According to the narrow formalistic altruism stance, which considers moral law as equivalent to logical coherency, I am not required to act to meet my neighbor’s need especially if I do not intend to accept charity in the future; this position appears completely rational. What reason could I have for not feeding my neighbor? My reason cannot be a mere logical consistency, for if I am, indeed, indifferent about everything I would also be indifferent about relinquishing some of my wealth to feed my neighbor. Let us assume, then, that I am specifically indifferent about my neighbor’s suffering. In reality, even though I know that I could prevent my neighbor’s suffering by giving him some of my surplus, my real attitude is that I prefer holding on to my surplus rather than acting to save my neighbor from starvation. It is irrelevant whether his life has no value or is of minimal value to me. In neglecting to feed my neighbor, I show that I am partial to sustaining my over-abundance when compared with his life.

Now, assume that my neighbor’s life negatively effects my happiness because he regularly disturbs the peace with his cries of hunger that keep me awake at night, even though his behavior has no substantive impact on my conscience. By allowing him to starve, not only would I get to keep my surplus, I would also get rid of a disturbance that makes me unhappy. However, if I act from a duty born of beneficence, I clearly choose to benefit my neighbor in preference to retaining my surplus and ensuring my happiness.

Nevertheless, such seeming self-sacrifice will still not be morally good if it can be affected. That is, no matter whether the ultimate effect is positive or negative, humans may well hold to the supreme moral value which motivates us to regard others as ends in themselves not merely means. Therefore, C2 is not merely a negative assertion, as the narrow formalistic account of altruism. The supreme value espoused in C2, is, then, not too formalistic to guide our action; it possesses concreteness or substantive matter that informs an altruistic approach to others.

⁷ MM 6:217



Furthermore, when Kant considers a situation similar to the one previously described, he says that the character of the dutiful benefactor has incomparable moral worth.⁸ Such moral worth, I argue is the non- formalistic value of altruism for Kant.

Another case worthy of consideration emerges when Korsgaard objects to Dietrichson's example of a woman who has decided to consider a maxim that states, ⁹'If I give birth to a baby weighing less than six pounds, I shall do everything in my power to kill it.' While Dietrichson opposes this maxim given that it fails to mention the mother's reason for killing the child, Korsgaard correctly points out that we can pose a maxim stating that 'killing children that tend to cry at night more than average in order to get enough sleep' is not a logical contradiction with the mother's maxim in Dietrichson's example. While these examples of allowing a neighbor to starve or murdering children in accord with some rule of action may appear extreme, they can and, indeed, have occurred in our world. Therefore, if we choose to impartially consider the interests of all concerned parties in a given situation, such a course goes well beyond the requirements of a merely formalistic notion.

These cases, therefore, demonstrate that the narrow emptiness notion of altruism that relies on logical coherency is fallacious, whereas the non-formalistic notion of altruism is not subject to such errors. As we now turn to consider the broad emptiness charges as well as the nature of humanity, we will also see that the non-formalistic notion of altruism remains plausible.

Broad emptiness account of altruism

As we have seen the narrow formalistic account of altruism implies that one must be maintain nothing more than logical consistency. This characteristically views impartiality as a requirement of morality, which, in turn, leads to the nature of humanity. While such a position might be well accepted as a purely metaphysical consideration, in my view, Kant's theory is provoking not because of its attractive form, but rather because of its practical benefit which enables us to comprehend humans, including ourselves, while also serving as a guide for moral action.

With regard to these controversies, Kant seems to advocate that the members of the moral community are to set aside their personal interests in consideration of the principles that should govern the moral community. For example, suppose that our community decides to ban the right to own and hold private food supplies in order to achieve the common good of eliminating hunger. As a result, everyone would be allowed to enter any household and eat whatever they need. This and other like moral quandaries raise the issue of how to morally balance the ultimate needs of humanity or community ends with private ends. Paul Guyer explains the possible systematic connection of these two seemingly competing ends:

There is no guarantee that in any given circumstances that there will be any maxim of action that could be adopted by any single agent that will also be compatible with all those ends.¹⁰ A genuine moral community, therefore, requires that we rise above our private interests and ends so that we can arrive at a decision that ensures harmony in our community by achieving community ends. In this sense, non-formalistic impartiality ensures that no particular person's or group's ends receive special consideration.

⁸ Gr.398-399

⁹ For details about the example See Christine M. Korsgaard's *Kant's Formula of Universal Law and see When Is a Maxim Fully Universalizable?*. Dietrichson

¹⁰ Guyer (P.) (1995). the possibility of the categorical imperative. *The Philosophical Review*, 104 (3), pp. 353-385.



Given this interpretation of C3 (the kingdom of ends formula), Kant holds that the moral community as a kingdom of ends will not be possible if we justify a particular action or maxim solely on the basis of satisfying personal ends. However by balancing our legitimate personal considerations with the interests of other particular individuals as well as the 'common or social interests' we achieve a moral resolution. For Kant, then, altruism determines the will and harmonizes with his theory of value. Therefore, this position withstands the broad emptiness account.

However, this view of the good which prefers the concerns of our neighbors does not fit with the abstraction Williams proffers, noted above. In fact, Williams complains that Kant's view of humans essentially divorces our will from our individuality. However, according to C3 (the formula of the kingdom of ends), this charge would be dismissed because Kant defines the kingdom of ends in the following way:

I understand by a 'kingdom' the systematic union of different rational beings through common laws. Now, since laws determine ends as regards their universal validity, we shall be able-if we abstract from personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends to conceive a whole of all ends in systematic conjunction (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and also of the personal ends, which each may set before himself); what is we shall be able to conceive a kingdom of ends, which is possible in accordance with the above principles.¹¹ Kant's ultimate assertion is that even if rational agents abstract away all of their personal ends, they can still conceive of themselves as agents. One can always act by relying upon the reason provided by the end of humanity as an end in itself. Respect for humanity or rational nature is an end for all rational beings and, as such, it provides a rational agent with a reason for an action that is distinct from any contingent end the agent may have. Hence, Kantian altruism is not impersonal and indifferent to others, and it is not of course, merely formalistic.

3. MORAL RESPECT AND LOVE IN HUMANITY FORMULATION

In section 1, we have seen that personal relationships are not in some fundamental way incompatible with Kantian altruism, I have given the response that Kantian moral altruism is not merely a matter of logical consistence or even a deconstruction of humanity by reason alone; it must be valued in a more specifically non-formalistic sense. My task, in section 2, has shown that the non-formalistic altruism has the mandate effect on our moral decision, but how the element of altruism could effect as necessity for moral decision, it needs to say more. In this sense, the function of respect and love as the moral incentive allows me to rebut a further charge moved against the purely formalistic altruism. Formalistic altruism conceals change and difference in character, Kant's conception of impartiality is exactly helpful because it links the role of respect and love as a moral incentive. Then the general disputes arise on how can the impartiality derive moral respect and love in reading categorical imperative, in another sentence, how moral respect and love could apply altruism in Kant's genuine usage.

In this section, I would argue moral respect and love are at the core of Kant's theory of altruism. Many formalists would agree that Kant's ethic give some attention to these notions, but none of them have recognized that they are independent values in Kant's system. The broad emptiness charge urges that impartiality is products of formalistic willing. I would suggest, however, that the broad emptiness charge dismisses the non-formalistic aspects of values. Kant's ethic needs and indeed possesses a non-formalistic component in

¹¹ Gr.74



order to ‘complete’ judgments about obligation and goodness. In the rest of the paper, I consider whether the concept of respect and love appropriately and fully expresses the value of humanity, i.e. the non-formalistic component of altruism. In order to explore these ideas further, we will now consider moral respect and love in greater detail.

Moral respect as value of humanity

In *Groundwork I*, Kant clarifies respect marks morally worthy actions. The presence of respect is a warrant that the agent acts out of duty, that is, independently of inclinations.¹² And given the second formulation [A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only This certainly sounds like we ought to ‘respect persons’, and in a sense we should. But in what sense? Some interpretations of the phrase require that we ‘value’ each person’s individuality, his distinctiveness as a human being, and that everyone be given effective rights (subject of course to non-injury to others) to develop that distinctiveness. It is supposed that you must treat me in accord with my own purposes – determined by my hopes, dreams, fears, desires – and not your own. Within some reasonable limits, determined by your own and others’ needs, you should ‘respect what I want’ and be supportive, both of my right to pursue it, and of its actual pursuit. This attitude is usually considered to entail respect for my autonomy as an individual: I am to be my own judge of what is good for me and of how I should develop as a person.

Kant's account of respect as a mark of moral agency and as the evaluative attitude due to persons expressed in C2 has been the target of severe criticisms. The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within C2; we would be in a better position to do so once we appreciate C2. As Rawls tells us that those who think of Kant’s moral doctrine as one of law and guilt badly misunderstand him. Kant’s main aim is to deepen and to justify Rousseau’s idea that liberty is acting in accordance with a law that we give to ourselves. And this leads not to a morality of austere altruist command but to an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem.¹³

Kant says little about what respect is, either as a feeling or as a feature of moral consciousness, and what he does say reveals what I think is a blind spot in his argument. For example, he adds in a footnote that ‘it could be objected that I only seek refuge, behind the word respect, in an obscure feeling, instead of distinctly resolving the question by means of a concept of reason.’¹⁴ Respect has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction.

One might also have supposed that Kant had something more abstract in mind, and I shall argue that this is indeed the case. However, on Kant’s view, the concept of respect is neither ancillary nor subordinate to rational agency: as subjective experience of rational agency, it is the independent value of humanity.

On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, Respect is a feeling that is generated by the agent's reflection on the nature of her own agency. It is not directed to anybody in particular, but to the very idea of rational agency, which is characterized by self-mastery and self-legislation. We are capable of setting ends of our own, by exercising practical reason, that is, by engaging in the activity of law making. It is on this ground, Kant argues, that respect qualifies as the appropriate evaluative attitude toward

¹² Ibid,27-29

¹³ Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, op. cit. P.256. Rawlsian self-esteem includes “a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out”. We should be able to “pursue [these plans] with pleasure” and “take delight in their execution”.

¹⁴ Gr.402/56, footnote



persons, that is, beings capable of making laws and, therefore, setting ends. We value persons insofar as they are endowed with reason, hence capable of lawful activity and thus susceptible to morality. Respect for persons is held equivalent to the reverence for this capacity, in which resides our humanity, as the independent value in ourselves.

Moral love as value of humanity

I have established that respect is perception of boundaries between different units of agency, and to this extent, it is essential to express the value of altruism or humanity. The question remains whether respect is indeed the only moral attitude appropriate toward persons. My suggestion is that we can regain a richer moral vocabulary for valuing others by a Kantian approach to altruism.¹⁵ Kant pairs respect for persons with love of mankind, as attitudes that have humanity as their object. They are both moral feelings and to this extent, they govern the configuration of the will and are reflective or deliberate.

Love as a moral feeling appears as one of the four sensitive basic concepts in the *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*. Like the other sensitive basic concepts, love is cardinal to moral agency; without these concepts, we would be "morally dead", that is, unsusceptible to morality.¹⁶ As Kant explains love, it seems that a pathological sensibility is necessary to have moral sensibility.¹⁷ Our natural susceptibility to rejoice with others or to feel pity for them is a sort of contagious inclination, whose basis is sensitive, thus not free (*communio illiberalis, servilis*). However, to make use of such susceptibility for furthering active and rational benevolence is dutiful.¹⁸ This genuine compassion is grounded on our natural inclination to sympathize with others, but it is deliberate, and thus counts as a moral activity (*communio sentiendi liberalis*). No form of moral feelings is conative in the sense in which pathological feelings can be, that is, as compelling drives.

Acting on a motive of love not only makes an action morally wrong, but also, the moral love is in essence, can be our motive for acting. If the motive of duty is also present as a secondary motive, then the action can be morally right for a Kantian. As a secondary motive, duty serves only to limit those actions which would otherwise be morally wrong. If an action is morally correct or permissible, we can perform that action. This response shows that personal relationships can be part of a Kantian moral theory because we are still allowed to do actions for intimates and the love that grounds that relationship can be our motive for acting.

To be sure, it would object that this kind of love has little to do with people, but (like respect) it has to do "with rationality in their breasts"¹⁹. Not surprisingly, my rejoinder is that this objection fails against Kant's account of love for the same reasons why it fails against Kant's account of respect. The difference between love and respect is reflected in the nature of duties that they respectively ground. The duty of respect is merely negative; it amounts to a duty to have one's self-esteem constrained by the acknowledgment of the dignity of others. It is thus to be regarded as a strict duty, contrary to duties of love, which are broad. Despite the difference in their phenomenology, Kant remarks that love and respect are generally

¹⁵ Murdoch claims that because of a generalized endorsement of Kant's conception of agency, contemporary philosophy has lost (or disposed of) the moral vocabulary for expressing the complexity of moral life and mutual recognition. Contrary to Murdoch, I have argued that to repossess the conceptual ability to appreciate and value mutual recognition in all its forms, we are better off reclaiming Kant's conception of moral sensibility, agency and deliberation.

¹⁶ Kant, 1797, *Metaphysics of Morals*, trans, Lewis White Beck P. 400

¹⁷ Ibid 453, 457

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ See Murdoch, Ibid. P.215



present together. In the second part of the *Elements of Ethics*, dedicated to duties of love to others, we read: Love and respect are the feelings which accompany the exercise of these duties toward others. These feelings can be considered separately (each on itself), and they can also exist separately, (love for one's neighbor, though he deserve little respect: also necessary respect for any man although he be judged hardly worthy of love). But they are basically, according to the law, always combined in one duty, although in such a way that sometimes one duty is joined as accessory. Although love and respect differ in the way they ground the duties, and each of them suffices as a motive for duty, they generally occur together. They work as concurrent attitudes, present together in the mind of the moral agent, who is therefore loving and attentive to others, respectful and caring. If the motive of action is respect, and love is an accessory, we may say that the agent acts out of a loving attention. If the motive of action is love and respect is an accessory, the compound attitude is a kind of reverential love. Although respect and love may concur in the practice of morality and concurrently inform our interactions, they are distinct functions of our moral sensibility and govern our relations in different manners, they both express the value of the humanity.

4. MORAL RESPECT AND LOVE: APPLY ALTRUISM IN C2

In section 3, I show that Kant's respect and love has the concrete value and exhibit a similar phenomenology and work likewise. Respect and love for humanity or rational nature is an end for all rational beings. I argue that both these concepts signal the awareness of agential boundaries. Insistence on the similarity between respect and love does not impoverish the vocabulary of value humanity; rather, it allows us to restore both of them as distinct concepts.

C2 points out non-formal and concrete value of moral law, formalistic understanding C1 has given the altruism the formalistic manner, as in Kant's expression that the form of categorical imperative is various, but there is only one categorical imperative. If we understand C2 correctly, how C2 could link with C1? How we apply the meaning of impartiality in C1, through moral respect and love in C2? We are morally required always to treat others with respect. How to understand the difference Kant expressed here? To confound them, or to opt for one of them at the exclusion of the other, is to deplete the basis of our personal relations. Is Kant's respect egoistic? Or, is Kant's love egoistic?

Altruism is not always required of us at the level of our direct actions. We can show partiality in our actions as long as our general principles approve partiality in those situations. For example, we can show partiality for our parents by acting in ways that honor them because we can see good reasons for the principle, "Honor thy mother and father." It may be misunderstood that the Kantian would require of the man contemplating the reasons he has for saving his wife over the stranger. In Kantian moral theory, personal relationships affect our conception of the Good. Rather than thinking of the motives that arise out of personal relationships as in direct conflict with the motives of altruism. Moreover, it is morally appropriate (not in any way inappropriate) in these circumstances to act on these reasons. The reason that I save my wife is, "that I love her or that she's my wife." These are the reasons on which one acts, and the actions they support express the relationships they refer to. It would be one thing if the husband paused to weigh the claims of his wife against those of others he might save; that would speak against his having the kind of attachment that might be hoped for by his wife. What the Kantian requires is only that he not view his desire to save his wife as an unconditionally valid reason. This does not stand in the way of the direct expression of attachments in action.



Kantian moral theory does not require that we always act from altruistic reasons. What it does require, is that we understand that sometimes, the circumstances of particular situations will be such that the reasons we have that come from particular relationships will be not enough to justify our acting on that reason in other circumstances. We must be aware of the context in which our action takes place and what additional considerations have to be taken into account because of the context. Making the ends of a human individual my own, like the duty of respect itself, is a “wide” obligation and an “imperfect” duty,²⁰ there is no telling how much sacrifice it is appropriate for me to make: I have to decide that for myself. Finally, I do not have to take your word on what is good for you. On the contrary, you must make your own decisions, but I do not have to support them if they seem to me wrong-headed or immoral. To ‘respect’ you is not to support your amoral desire, Instead I respect you by making your moral end as a person, which is to go into law, my own. This is Kantian respect. It subordinates the pursuit of even the most innocently self-regarding desires to the dictates of an austere conclave of noumenal selves, in whose deliberations ordinary people, empirical selves, have no role.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have presented a resolution of the problems arising from the versions of altruism mostly by reconsidering them in a non-formalistic sense in Kant’s categorical imperative. As we have seen, the broad emptiness account of altruism is an adaptation of the traditional emptiness account. This charge claims that the most distinctive and important feature in Kant’s altruism is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature of value. In other words, moral action wholly exists deep inside of me rather than elsewhere. However, I argue that the possibilities for a formal theory of willing or the nature of value are based on Kantian universalization whereas the broad emptiness doctrine supports a theory rooted in the nature of value and employs different ways that in the end misunderstand the content of moral law.

In contrast, I pose a non-formalistic altruism constitutes a rival Kantian theory of altruism. I further claim here that the core character of Kant’s value theory rests on two primary values within Kantian ethics: respect and love. I have argued that each single value is an independent value, which many formalists would probably have not recognized given their stance and given that their formalist interpretation. This interpretation holds that moral respect and love, which arise from formalistic impartiality, are unable to determine the will while at the same time claims that these values cannot be derived. Therefore, I have proposed that Kant’s ethics possesses a non-formalistic component to provide ‘complete’ judgment that speaks of and informs actions. Friends share the same projects, and depend on each other for the fulfillment of their ends, which pertains both to love and respect. More generally, as a moral maxim, love grounds actions of benevolence. Recognizing the dignity of others requires that we appreciate their rationality, and the rationality of their ends. On some occasions, this requires that we help them in the pursuit of their ends: This is a form of love humanity. This is also my initial concern that how to apply altruism in terms of moral respect and love in C2.

²⁰ The best way to begin seeing how FH is supposed to be applied is to look at Kant’s four examples in the *Groundwork*. Kant’s examples are of suicide (perfect duty to oneself), lying (perfect duty to others), developing one’s talents (imperfect duty to oneself), and contributing to the happiness of others (imperfect duty to others).



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AGAINST HEGEL AND MARX: IN FAVOR OF DANTO'S, BENJAMIN'S, AND LÖWITH'S CRITIQUES OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY

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ABSTRACT

A commonality shared by Hegel and Marx is their belief in the existence of a collective destiny or universal history of humankind. Though compelling, it persists that there are major challenges to interpreting history as such. First, this piece will surmise each authors' understanding of the common historical theme, and goal, they believe unites all people. Next, this essay will draw from philosophers Walter Benjamin and Danto, to challenge each theorists' version of universal history. Lastly, this work will draw from Spinoza and Löwith, to further argue that the possibility of a common human history is almost nil, because of the conflicting influences unavoidably tainting the attempts of philosophers such as Hegel and Marx at universalizing history.

Keywords: Philosophy of History; Anti-Historicism; Hegel; Marx; Danto; Benjamin; Löwith;

INTRODUCTION

Per early 19th-century philosopher G.W.F Hegel, history is the unraveling of Spirit on Earth, or the flourishing of the realization of Freedom in human affairs, which will result in humanity's perfection, when people collectively develop or grow to realize that constitutional monarchy is the most mature, or freeing form of coexistence.¹ To mid-late 19th-century economist Karl Marx, history is the common tale of opposition between sociopolitical and socioeconomic classes, which will only end when those most alienated and oppressed arise to rearrange society based on communist principles.² Despite Hegel and Marx's differing views of history and its final aim, their shared belief in a common human destiny is far from being unchallengeable. First, this piece will outline Hegel and Marx's take on history as that journey which all individuals contribute to, and compose. Afterward, this piece will critique Hegel and Marx's universalization of history through the lens of philosophers, Walter Benjamin and Danto. Finally, by drawing from Spinoza and Löwith, this piece will continue to assert that universal histories are unsound due the inevitable collision of incompatible elements, when theorists, including Hegel and Marx, approach history in this way.

¹ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 25, 57, & 97-99.

² Marx, K. & Friedrich Engels. Samuel Moore trans., *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Simon and Schuster, INC., 1964), 80-84.



1. HISTORY AS THE REALIZATION OF FREEDOM ON EARTH

According to Hegel, the major theme found in the trajectory of human affairs is the evolution of Spirit's essence or Freedom in the terrestrial realm through people as those intelligent agents who can make it concrete.³ By Spirit, Hegel understands the totality of reality as being a relation between objective selfhood and subjective identity.⁴ As such, Hegel believes Spirit's material or objective existence is the entire natural order, and as infinite and ever-evolving its self-understanding must also mature, to match its existence as a boundless entity.⁵ This ever-increasing self-awareness, Hegel believes is the nature of Spirit's essence, and when understood by people, it appears as history, or more precisely the record of Spirit coming to terms with its Freedom on Earth.⁶

Now, Hegel believed that Freedom, as an ideal, first appeared on the world stage in the East, where the political structures of the Orient recognized just one person, the absolute leader, or emperor as free.⁷ Antithetically, all others were subservient to that imperial figure, since they did not understand themselves as having liberties, much in the same way as Spirit understood itself in its infancy.⁸ That is, Hegel believes Spirit, in its immaturity, recognized that it only existed for-itself, and the manifold of life in it, it was unaware of, much how the emperors of Imperial China who existed closed-off from all others in the Forbidden City understood themselves.⁹ At the same time, the plethora of people recognizing that one being must stand above them, as a ward, to maintain their shared cultural bonds, and safety, is akin to the manifold of life in Spirit, acknowledging its free essence and revering it as that which makes all freedoms possible.¹⁰ To verify this view, Hegel points his readers to Confucius's moral philosophy, as an example of how people in Eastern societies understood their abilities in relation to the family, nation, and ruler.¹¹ Finally, this understanding, which ultimately led to all historical peoples of the East embracing some form of filial devotion for their national chiefs, Hegel would claim is a prime instance of how Eastern peoples understood and manifested Freedom in their cultural realms.¹²

After Freedom's commencement in the East, Hegel draws his readers' attention to the next major epoch in its development.¹³ To Hegel, Greek *democracy* and Roman *aristocracy* displayed Freedom's advancement, since unlike the Orient, Greco-Roman sociopolitical life recognized more than one to be free, but not all.¹⁴ That is, Greece and Rome both shared in the fact that those states recognized more than just one individual to possess liberties, and those people, as citizens, were distinct from non-citizens and slaves who could not enjoy the

³ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 77-78.

⁴ Hegel, G.W.F. A.V. Miller trans., *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1977), 355-360.

⁵ Ibidem

⁶ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 57 & Hegel, G.W.F. A.V. Miller trans., *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1977), 355-360.

⁷ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 92-95.

⁸ Ibidem

⁹ Ibidem

¹⁰ Ibidem

¹¹ Ibidem, 70-71, 74, & 92-95.

¹² Ibidem

¹³ Ibidem, 95-97.

¹⁴ Ibidem, 93.



same.¹⁵ An example of Greco-Roman culture providing evidence for Hegel's view of Freedom as maturing, but not completely developed in the West, is findable in the religious beliefs of these ancient societies.¹⁶ To Hegel, the religious authors of Greco-Roman antiquity conveyed Freedom's expansive nature, though skewedly since they were only minutely aware of Freedom and its developmental nature.¹⁷ Hegel focuses his readers on the Greco-Roman myth of the titan *Cronos*, which, though the product of a limitedly aware writer, unmindful of history as Spirit's continuous unraveling on Earth, still provided reason to believe that Greco-Roman religion held that Time was at least something real.¹⁸ Consequently, he argues that despite the people of Greece and Rome only unclearly acknowledging a universal progressiveness called Time, it nevertheless enabled them to understand life as temporal.¹⁹ This recognition of the reality of Time, Hegel would claim was a major intellectual discovery of Greco-Roman religion for it put into the motion the idea that history was underway.²⁰

Though a monumental achievement in the West, one should remember that Hegel adhered to the view that because Greco-Roman authors did not write their mythologies with a full awareness of Freedom's progress throughout the world, they could not fully materialize it.²¹ From a Hegelian perspective, this explains why not everyone in Greece and Rome comprehended themselves as free, which played out in their political structures as some possessing liberties, but not all.²² However, another aspect of this is that Spirit's unfolding in human life was not yet at the point where it was possible for Greeks and Romans to know that all were inherently free.²³ Finally, Hegel believed that the Germanic nations displayed the most mature recognition of Freedom, because their constitutional monarchies, rooted in the acknowledgement of freedom for one ruler and all subjects, mimics Spirit's structure most precisely.²⁴

Following Hegel's analysis of Freedom's youth, he comes to address its most mature expression which he believes exists in German sociopolitical life.²⁵ To Hegel, the Germanic political arrangement of one ruler being only as free as the collective liberty of all other people maintains both the individual nature of Freedom as well as its universal aspect.²⁶ In other words, Hegel believes like Spirit's objective existence, the sovereigns of the Germanic World enjoy their liberty for themselves.²⁷ Simultaneously, the people in German principalities, as the manifold of existence Spirit houses, when united, stand as equals to their monarch, for it is from them who he/she derives his/her legitimacy.²⁸ Hence, people, in solidarity, match the freedom of their sovereign, since by deriving his/her freedom to rule from them, while both independently understanding themselves as free, shows that each

¹⁵ Ibidem, 93-94, 95-97.

¹⁶ Ibidem

¹⁷ Ibidem, 14-18, 20-22, & 36.

¹⁸ Ibidem, 79-81.

¹⁹ Ibidem

²⁰ Ibidem

²¹ Ibidem, 23-24, 31-35.

²² Ibidem, 23-24, 31-35, & 93.

²³ Ibidem

²⁴ Ibidem, 93, 97-99, & 105-106.

²⁵ Ibidem

²⁶ Ibidem

²⁷ Ibidem

²⁸ Ibidem



stood in a relationship in which one regarded the other as needed for the confirmation of either's autonomy.²⁹ Lastly, this German political structure, which neither taints nor overextends freedom, maintains both individual and collective liberties, leaving Hegel to use it as evidence to assert that it is Freedom's ripest moment on Earth so far.³⁰

2. HEGEL'S END OF HISTORY

As argued by Hegel, the end of history is that time in which all people live ethically perfect or coexists as totally recognized and respected individuals based on their shared ability to will freely.³¹ To arrive at this historical event, Freedom must first reach the last point of its earthly development, which Hegel believed would play out on the world stage as that moment in which all people of all nations will come to unite around a universal value system.³² To him, this common value system would equally maximize duties and rights for all, while at the same time preserve each nation's cultural identity.³³ To secure each state's culture, Hegel would claim that no country should interfere with another's way of understanding Freedom's terrestrial pinnacle.³⁴ However, one should recall that because this would be the end of history, Hegel would also assert that no nation would interfere with another's interpretation of Freedom's worldly perfection.³⁵ That is because all nations would honor and acknowledge that though they are not identical, all equally capture and embody Freedom at its highest or most refined moment on Earth as fitting to each's national *ethos*.³⁶ Finally, Freedom's most evolved appearance on Earth, or that time in which all people of all nations come to understand and live dutifully free, is also that time in which the need for history will wane.³⁷

To Hegel, the need for history will eventually disappear, once humanity perfects itself, or comes to realize that Freedom unites all individuals.³⁸ To him, this can only come about once the ethical values of the international order and the lifestyles of the world's citizens perfectly cohere.³⁹ In other words, that time when people perfect themselves and move past the need for history, Hegel would claim begins once every member of the human community voluntarily accepts one another's individuality and together work for the good of all.⁴⁰ In this time of Freedom's global completion, history, or that recorded story of humanity's collective

²⁹ Ibidem

³⁰ Ibidem

³¹ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 105-106 & Hegel, G.W.F. A.V. Miller trans., *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1977), 266-296, 364-374, 410-418, & 453-495.

³² Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 105-106 & Fukuyama, F. *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press., 2006), 46-51, 63-65.

³³ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 80-83.

³⁴ Ibidem

³⁵ Ibidem

³⁶ Ibidem

³⁷ Ibidem, 80-83, 105-106.

³⁸ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 95-106, Hegel, G.W.F. A.V. Miller trans., *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1977), 266-296, 364-374, 410-418, & 453-495, & Fukuyama, F. *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press., 2006), 46-51, 63-65.

³⁹ Ibidem

⁴⁰ Ibidem



move toward the emergence out of self-estrangement, will no longer be requisite, since all people would be total embodiments of Spirit's awareness of its essential Freedom.⁴¹

Though tempting to believe that the washing away of history would be identical to the time in which people would return to living in pre-societal arrangements, Hegel would disagree.⁴² First, Hegel believes history's final point would come through an organic process of irreversible progress, resulting in all people reaching the amplest self-awareness and most mature use of their freedom as displayed by their ethical behavior.⁴³ Consequently, it would be more accurate to assert that Hegel adhered to an outlook which envisioned the end of history as being the most civilized time, when all nations recognize their perfection through the flawlessness of their subjects' conduct.⁴⁴

3. MARX'S WORLD HISTORY

The opening page of Marx's *Communist Manifesto* famously reads "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle."⁴⁵ That is, as understood by Marx, the overarching *motif*, found throughout all written history is the struggle between those who oppress and those oppressed.⁴⁶ Marx provides evidence for his claim by drawing his readers to the fact that in all recorded history, antagonisms between groups composing various social hierarchies, in which those who controlled the lion's share of political, social, or economic power subjugated those who possessed less, appears continuously.⁴⁷ One may look to the political division between Ancient Rome's emperors, patricians, and plebeians, the Feudal era's difference between lords, merchants, and landed peasants, and in Marx's age of industrial growth, the economic distinction between bourgeoisie and proletariat, as historical examples of class antagonism.⁴⁸

Furthermore, one must note that this last era of the bourgeoisie and proletariat, Marx believed exists uniquely due to it being an opposition between just two classes.⁴⁹ One reason why Marx believed this to be so is that the aristocracy or bourgeoisie of the *ancien regimes* of Medieval Europe eclipsed that epoch's world order, mainly through the exercise of economic power, which opened the way for them to gain political rights and higher social status.⁵⁰ From these various liberties and heightened social positions, the bourgeoisie, in crises such as the American and French Revolutions, came to topple the yoke of old European crowns, and by doing so, eliminated those who oppressed them.⁵¹ However, this left only the bourgeoisies to have the power to take control of the social, economic, and political aspects of these former feudal nations.⁵² Consequently, those at the lowest strata of power remained alienated from enjoying life the way in which their new overlords, the bourgeoisie, did, and this distinction Marx believed was that which both bourgeoisie and

⁴¹ Ibidem

⁴² Ibidem

⁴³ Ibidem

⁴⁴ Ibidem

⁴⁵ Marx, K. & Friedrich Engels. Samuel Moore trans., *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Simon and Schuster, INC., 1964), 57.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, 57-59.

⁴⁷ Ibidem

⁴⁸ Ibidem, 59-61.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, 58-59.

⁵⁰ Ibidem, 61-63.

⁵¹ Ibidem, 61-62.

⁵² Ibidem



proletariat will continue to find central to their frictional coexistence.⁵³ To Marx, the way in which the bourgeoisie oppresses the proletariat is by molding cultural, political, and especially economic reality to secure the exclusive leisure and privileges they seek to enjoy prolongedly.⁵⁴ Concerning cultural oppression, Marx points to the cosmopolitan character of free trade, capitalist economies, and the ways of life that the bourgeoisie bring with them to new markets around the globe to methodically shape world societies to mimic ways that are conducive to their existence.⁵⁵ By political domination, Marx points to the constitutional trends spread throughout the globe as being products of the bourgeoisie's desire to see liberal democracies flourish everywhere for it is those modes of government which satisfy, protect, and favor their economic schemes.⁵⁶

Economically, Marx believed that with the advent of capitalism, or that economic mode of production central to continuing the bourgeoisie's hold over power, came the most apparent and intense subjugation of the proletariat.⁵⁷ First, Marx adhered to the view that new technologies, used to manipulate Nature, hurt the proletariat by making their labor, in certain fields, obsolete.⁵⁸ Moreover, the occupations which remained available to the proletariat were alienating, or it is the case that jobs which machines and other forms of innovation did not render outdated left workers divorced from others, including themselves.⁵⁹ To Marx, this is not proper labor, but instead a modern form of slavery in which people do not have the freedom to sell their work on their terms, but rather only their labor power, which is all the bourgeoisie demands.⁶⁰ As such, the bourgeoisie, unconcerned with the needs, wants, and well-being of the proletariat, do not wish to see working people succeed or enjoy life as they do because it would spell the end of their exclusive hold over society.⁶¹ Instead, workers receive wages that reflect the bare minimum needed to survive, which is perfect for the bourgeoisie since it guarantees that no proletariat will ever have the means to challenge their rule.⁶² Also, the bourgeoisie can place the proletariat in this unfortunate economic reality for it is they who own the means, or raw materials, factories, and machines used to actualize their capitalist agenda.⁶³ Accordingly, Marx believed that this imbalance of power can be the foundation for the proletariat to become class-conscious, or band together to combat their common plight against forms of bourgeoisie political, social, and economic domination.⁶⁴ Once united Marx believes that the inevitable downfall of the bourgeoisie, by the hands of the proletariat, as that revolutionary class which has nothing to lose but its chains, will occur, and thus move history forward.⁶⁵ Lastly, this new age will be that time in which humanity lives communally due to the abolition of private property, and when embraced by all the world's people, will culminate as the end of human history.⁶⁶

⁵³ Ibidem, 58-61, 63.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, 63-66.

⁵⁵ Ibidem

⁵⁶ Ibidem

⁵⁷ Ibidem, 69-72.

⁵⁸ Ibidem

⁵⁹ Ibidem

⁶⁰ Ibidem

⁶¹ Ibidem

⁶² Ibidem, 70-71.

⁶³ Ibidem

⁶⁴ Ibidem, 80-84.

⁶⁵ Ibidem

⁶⁶ Ibidem



4. MARX ON THE END OF HISTORY

To Marx, the end of history is that time in which the abolition of private property or the foundation of bourgeoisie political, social, and economic power spread across the globe through the embrace of communism.⁶⁷ By communism, Marx understands that political outlook which supports the emancipation of the proletariat from living under the conditions set by the oppressive bourgeoisie, along with the intention to end all forms of unfairness.⁶⁸ Unsurprisingly, Marx envisioned history's end as that move toward a new world order in which the proletariat strips away all aspects of bourgeoisie life, and honestly redefines existence by reshaping national economies.⁶⁹ The character of these economic transformations after the critical moment of the proletarian revolution, which Marx believed will inevitably destroy the bourgeoisie's mantle of power, will move away from *laissez-faire* style practices to communally controlled property.⁷⁰ Thus, Marx's end of history depends on all nations embracing communist economics for if private property were to subsist anywhere, it would invite class divisions, which the proletariat seeks to eviscerate.⁷¹

To show that human history is moving toward this universal embrace of communism, Marx points to that fact that capitalist economies can only thrive off opening new markets.⁷² Marx believed that once new avenues for capitalism no longer existed, there could only be infighting between the bourgeoisie, which would ultimately spell their demise.⁷³ That is because as the bourgeoisie scramble for resources to continue to maintain their quality of life, the proletariat will have more incentive to rebel since this hoarding of materials could only impart a greater burden on them than before.⁷⁴ As such, Marx adhered to the view that communism, which washes away class distinctions by eradicating privatization of property, best suits the proletariat's interest for it illuminates a way for them to understand their unique existence as those who best comprehend unfairness, as well as those who know how to best not repeat it.⁷⁵

Furthermore, it is important to note that this historical end to class antagonism can only arise once the marginalized proletariat becomes genuinely self-aware.⁷⁶ That is, when the destitute grow utterly mindful of the deleterious conditions decimating their quality of life, it will not only result in the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, it will also end all injustice since those once oppressed would never reproduce the harsh circumstances they once suffered.⁷⁷ To make sure that this takes place, Marx asserted that all the impoverished must adopt the principles of communism, since, as that supportive doctrine of the proletariat, only it aims to achieve the historical goal of putting a stop to class warfare entirely.⁷⁸

DANTO'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S SUBSTANTIVE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

⁶⁷ Ibidem, 89-92.

⁶⁸ Ibidem

⁶⁹ Ibidem, 78-81.

⁷⁰ Ibidem, 80-82.

⁷¹ Ibidem

⁷² Ibidem, 82-86.

⁷³ Ibidem

⁷⁴ Ibidem, 77-81.

⁷⁵ Ibidem

⁷⁶ Ibidem, 76-79.

⁷⁷ Ibidem

⁷⁸ Ibidem



To philosopher Arthur C. Danto, attempts at universalizing history, including Hegel's and those who follow in his tradition, are ultimately futile.⁷⁹ First, Danto focuses his readers' attention on the fact that there are two types of historicizing, which he calls the substantive and the analytic.⁸⁰ By the analytic philosophy of history, Danto understands the exposition of significant events throughout time, such as the French Revolution, done in a way that critiques the ideas which contributed to those events, to find their true philosophical causes.⁸¹ Furthermore, the substantive philosophy of history is that which tries to find a chief underlying meaning in events of the past, to predict the course of the future.⁸² To Danto, Hegel and philosophers who try to theorize history in his way, are classic examples of substantive philosophers of history, and there is no shortage of challenges Danto raises to treating history as such.⁸³

First, Danto claims that substantive philosophers of history, such as Hegel, err when they attempt to universalize history or find meaning, regular patterns, or common themes throughout the march of time since there is no comprehensive way of finding general indicators of what is yet to come.⁸⁴ One reason for Danto's assertion is that history is not over, and as continuing, the most a substantive philosopher of history can hope for is a philosophy concerning fragments of the past and not the entire scope of history.⁸⁵ Seen in this light, one may claim that writing a universal history is impossible because the story of humanity is not yet complete.⁸⁶ Consequently, Danto would claim a philosophy of history like that of Hegel is unachievable, due to no form of a common destiny shared by all people yet occurred, because the history of humankind is ongoing.⁸⁷

Moreover, Danto criticizes the idea that a unifying theme is findable in history. Danto believes this to be so because though one may analyze historical events, and try to fit them into a basic mold, the fact that time's expiration is still to happen, shows that no one can verify his/her prediction until the series of time is whole.⁸⁸ For one to grasp Danto's point more easily, one may claim that he adheres to the view that universalizing history is akin to one claiming to know the meaning of an entire novel without first reading all of it through.⁸⁹ Thus, if one claims that a specific happening in a book captures its whole story, that person can never know for sure unless he/she completes that volume, much like how history by not being in a state of cessation, is not entirely knowable now.⁹⁰ To complicate matters further, because people can never know the end of history until it genuinely finishes, Danto finds that picking out one facet of it, and making an entire system from that aspect, can only be unsound.⁹¹ That is because history is still happening, and any primary *motif* derivable from it is only speculative because there is no end to compare and confirm it with precisely.⁹²

⁷⁹ Danto, A.C. *Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1965)., 1-2.

⁸⁰ Ibidem

⁸¹ Ibidem

⁸² Ibidem

⁸³ Ibidem

⁸⁴ Ibidem, 2-3.

⁸⁵ Ibidem, 4-5.

⁸⁶ Ibidem

⁸⁷ Ibidem

⁸⁸ Ibidem, 5-6.

⁸⁹ Ibidem, 11-12.

⁹⁰ Ibidem

⁹¹ Ibidem, 6-8, 11-13.

⁹² Ibidem



Lastly, Hegel's claim that Freedom's progression, as that uniting theme found throughout all history, Danto would assert, captured only Hegel's epoch at best, and if it were the last say on the matter of history, no further theorization of it would persist.⁹³

Also, Danto asserts that both descriptive and explanatory accounts of history are requisite for a historical theory to be a genuine philosophy of history, further damaging the substantive approach to the passage of time as displayed by Hegel and others.⁹⁴ That is, Danto believes historical theories can only become philosophies of history if they draw upon both descriptive events of the past, or data which provides a path to finding a pattern indubitably applicable to future times, and explanatory ways of expressing that pattern via causal language.⁹⁵ Accordingly, Danto attests that when historical theories only emphasize one element of this two-part requirement for an authentic philosophy of history, such as those who try to break down the past into a collective journey generated by some main driving cause, those theorists can only fail.⁹⁶ That is because it is illogical to support the idea that a leading historical force pushes humanity forward since no complete or comprehensive history of the world exists.⁹⁷

Indeed, even if it did, historical events are still not so uniform as to ever unquestionably prove the existence of just one universal purpose to the movement of time.⁹⁸ Hence, something such as the Hegelian assertion that history is that "slaughter-bench" which necessarily works with cunning toward the ever-increasing actualization, recognition, and realization of Freedom on Earth, would be just an explanatory historical theory to Danto.⁹⁹ That is because Hegel fails to tie his view of Freedom's unraveling throughout the world to every integral historical fact ever recorded.¹⁰⁰ Thus, because the unfolding of Freedom, as that all-encompassing reason for humanity's epochal progression, can never be truly universal, or apply to every decisive historical instance ever on Earth, renders it unable to be a genuine philosophy of history.¹⁰¹ Finally, Danto would agree with this analysis of Hegel's understanding of history because by failing to draw from concrete historical facts to support his explanation for why history is Freedom's evolution in the terrestrial realm, Hegel could not provide the last say on this matter.¹⁰²

Furthermore, Danto continues his barrage on substantive philosophies of history, such as Hegel's, because it is impossible to capture the full meaning of history as it is occurring as opposed to viewing it in hindsight.¹⁰³ A helpful illustration of this point is when Danto draws his readers' attention to the idea that contemporaries in philosophy, though having some knowledge of the influences and approaches each takes to his/her work, can never know the full impact of those influences until one finishes a career another can overview.¹⁰⁴ Thus, only

⁹³ Ibidem, 13-16.

⁹⁴ Ibidem, 7-8.

⁹⁵ Ibidem, 7-8, 11-13.

⁹⁶ Ibidem, 1-2, 3-8, & 11-13.

⁹⁷ Ibidem, 11-13.

⁹⁸ Ibidem, 13-16.

⁹⁹ Danto, A.C. *Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1965), 13-16 & Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 31-34, 35.

¹⁰⁰ Danto, A.C. *Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1965), 1-3.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem, 3-6.

¹⁰² Ibidem, 2-3, 6-8.

¹⁰³ Ibidem

¹⁰⁴ Ibidem, 13-16.



if a philosophy of history can capture how major historical events will come to shape future times based on the centrality of what influences historical actors in the present, can it start to be truly universal.¹⁰⁵ However, because no one can assess someone's actions without first knowing the ends he/she produced, and because it is only in retrospect that one can find total significance in those actions, a so-called universal philosophy of history cannot yet emerge.¹⁰⁶

Another critique of substantive philosophies of history, including Hegel's, Danto argues, derives from the notion that these philosophers of history link together the past and present from the lens of a future which is still unsure.¹⁰⁷ Accordingly, Danto claims substantive philosophies of history make declarations that are prophetic, however, not historical.¹⁰⁸ That is because, like prophecy, substantive philosophies of history narrate from the standpoint of an era that remains uncertain.¹⁰⁹ In other words, one cannot claim that an unactualized future is compatible with events of the past or present.¹¹⁰ That is due to the past and present being real, while the future something no one can know for it is still in a state of mere possibility.¹¹¹ Thus, something such as Hegel's claim that a rational Providence realizes itself throughout the course of human affairs defies logic.¹¹² One reason why one may make this claim, which Danto would concur, is that Hegel envisions Freedom's growth from immaturity to a state of maturity as being history itself, which is problematic because how can that which already is, turn into something it is not.¹¹³ Finally, this problem, Danto claims, bars Hegel's philosophy of history from being genuinely historical, because by postulating from a viewpoint which is not indubitably sure, it is more theological, or prophetic than initially thought.¹¹⁴

5. BENJAMIN'S CRITICISM OF MARX'S WORLD HISTORY

As understood by philosopher Walter Benjamin, Marxist's historical theory is a play on the weak messianic power harbored by people concerning humankind's recorded past.¹¹⁵ Benjamin charges Marxists as adhering to weak messianism, or the claim that people have the power to rectify the mistakes of past centuries, so that they can change the world for the better, and consequently, redeem, or exercise a power of salvation over themselves, and their planet, as theoretically misguided.¹¹⁶ That is because Benjamin points out that Marxists, like those who believe in messianism, understand history as reaching an end that will ultimately and undoubtedly result in the well-being of humanity.¹¹⁷ This creed of the cessation of history as guaranteed to be righteous Benjamin claims Marxists are aware of, and the first

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem

¹⁰⁸ Ibidem, 2-7.

¹⁰⁹ Ibidem

¹¹⁰ Ibidem

¹¹¹ Ibidem

¹¹² Ibidem, 1, 2-7.

¹¹³ Ibidem

¹¹⁴ Ibidem

¹¹⁵ Benjamin, Walter. Edmund Jephcott et, all, trans., *Selected Writings Vol.4 1938-1940* (Mass: Harvard University Press., 2003)., 388-391.

¹¹⁶ Ibidem

¹¹⁷ Ibidem



reason why it is problematic is that it does not match their stress on anti-idealist and anti-theological explanations of times past.¹¹⁸

Secondly, Marxist teachings, like messianism, or that Judeo-Christian theme of the world's deliverance from suffering and the forces of evil, by promising that the history of humanity will inevitably end righteously, are guilty of adhering to a utopic understanding of time's progression which can never precisely play out in the future.¹¹⁹ That is due to the reality of reaching this goal as being impossible since Marxists, Jews, and Christians alike could never validate their redemptive understandings of history unless it precisely plays out in their respectively envisioned ways.¹²⁰ Hence, some predetermined end of history, to Benjamin, lacks justifiability not only because it ignores humanity's power to choose a way to develop without having to move toward an End of Days scenario necessarily, but it also ascribes an immutable finality to history that is still unsure.¹²¹ That is because, if, as Marxists believe, history does have an end, it means it had a beginning and understood as such it would have to have an already firm structure, which would leave no room for chance or future progress.¹²² However, progress is another doctrinal feature of Marxism, and as such its utopian promise, like Judeo-Christian apocalyptic theories can only remain in a state of limbo, due to the logical incompatibility of its belief in history's progressive nature and its undoubted end.¹²³

Now, to Benjamin, Marx's universal history, as undivorceable from idealist claims that history is progressive and the religious notion that it must come to an end helps to debase Marx's view because he contradicts his historical materialist approach.¹²⁴ In other words, Marx, by postulating that history is the continuing tale of class opposition while holding to the belief that it will end in the annihilation of all class warfare, shows he believes real material conditions will lead to a future ideal time.¹²⁵ This historicizing is problematic for a Marxist understanding of the common destiny of humanity because it is unlikely that real economic conditions driving the course of history will lead to the time in which people no longer rely on those conditions for their subsistence.¹²⁶ Moreover, if material economic conditions determine people's actions, which shape history, Marx's claim that an ideal time in which people cease to need economies would mean the end of history.¹²⁷ However, Benjamin points out that history would only be at a standstill for time itself would not cease.¹²⁸ Thus, even if an ideal communist world order emerged, and the final point of history declared, the persistence of time would imply that history is not yet over.¹²⁹ Finally, these problems, or the incompatibility between the real and the ideal, in either experience or reason, not only shows that Marx made mistakes in his framework, it shows that the flaws in his universal history are irresolvable.¹³⁰

¹¹⁸ Ibidem

¹¹⁹ Ibidem, 391-393.

¹²⁰ Ibidem, 393-396.

¹²¹ Ibidem, 391, 393-396.

¹²² Ibidem

¹²³ Ibidem

¹²⁴ Ibidem, 392-394, 396-397.

¹²⁵ Ibidem, 395-397, 402-404.

¹²⁶ Ibidem, 402-404.

¹²⁷ Ibidem

¹²⁸ Ibidem

¹²⁹ Ibidem, 392-392, 404-407.

¹³⁰ Ibidem



Also, concerning Marx's universal history, as paralleling certain religious notions, and thus defying its historical materiality, Benjamin details how Marxists revolutionary theory is akin to the Judeo-Christian hypothesis of the Last Judgment.¹³¹ First, Benjamin shows that the Marxist's belief in the shared fate of humanity as culminating in that time when the proletariats will unite and overthrow the powers that be corresponds neatly to the Judeo-Christian theory of the fulfillment of history when the righteous come to recognition over the wicked as the inheritors of the New Jerusalem.¹³² Accordingly, Benjamin would claim that Marxism, as understood in this sense, is not a historical but rather a theological materialism.¹³³ Aside from being a contradiction in terms, Benjamin reminds his readers that Marxist followers themselves refuse any such label since they stress that their theoretical roots are not in religion but in the progression of history itself.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, the idea that history is building toward a moment when those most downtrodden necessarily come to reorganize the world benevolently still has religious undertones.¹³⁵ Lastly, since the progression of world history after Marx's time still featured unfathomable horrors that went unpunished, and because those tragedies did not spell Armageddon, is proof to Benjamin that Marx's world history did not only miscalculate the future, it is also likely that it wrongfully defined its end.¹³⁶

6.SPINOZA'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOGY AND PROPHECY IN HISTORY

Per 17th-century philosopher Benedict De Spinoza, teleological as well as prophetic beliefs are unsound, or at least problematic for a variety of reasons. First, take for instance Hegel's teleological belief that the end of history is the undoubtedly, and unavoidable maturation of Spirit, or that deistic force that is becoming ever-growingly aware of its Freedom until reaching its freest state.¹³⁷ To Spinoza, Hegel's concept of Spirit's end as the cessation of recorded human affairs would be an impossible happening due to the problematic nature of a teleological Deity.¹³⁸ One reason why Spinoza would doubt Hegel's concept of a goal-oriented Spirit is due to his view of God as infinite, immutable, and eternal.¹³⁹ By the infinitude of God, Spinoza claims that because one understands God as boundlessly omnipotent, it is the case that no form of finite life, such as people, can be compatible with his/her limitless nature, let alone exceed his/her bounds, to stop him/her.¹⁴⁰

¹³¹ Ibidem, 405-408.

¹³² Ibidem

¹³³ Ibidem

¹³⁴ Ibidem

¹³⁵ Ibidem

¹³⁶ Ibidem

¹³⁷ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 25, 57, & 97-99.

¹³⁸ Spinoza, Benedict De. *Ethics*. Edwin Curley trans., (Princeton Penguin Books., 1996) 1p10, 1p11, 1p15-1p17, Jaspers, Karl. *The Great Philosophers: Spinoza*. Hannah Arendt ed., Ralph Manheim trans., (New York: Harvest Books., 1966) 9-25, & Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster., 1967), 569-580.

¹³⁹ Spinoza, Benedict De. *Ethics*. Edwin Curley trans., (Princeton Penguin Books., 1996) 1p10, 1p11, 1p15-1p17, Jaspers, Karl. *The Great Philosophers: Spinoza*. Hannah Arendt ed., Ralph Manheim trans., (New York: Harvest Books., 1966) 9-25, Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster., 1967), 569-580, & Popkin, Richard H. ed., *The Columbia History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press., 1999), 329-336, 363-366, & 373-382.

¹⁴⁰ Ibidem



From this one may claim that Hegel's teleological vision of Spirit, or God, is faulty because nothing can cap God's power, rendering any end to him/her, as the complete realization of Freedom in the terrestrial realm, to be a misunderstanding of his/her nature in Spinoza's eyes.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, because God is limitless, and hence, uninterrupted by any conditioned form of life, Spinoza would claim God is already free, and thus the notion of his/her movement toward Freedom, in the Hegelian sense, is unsound due to it being a reality already.¹⁴² Though Spinoza believes that God can only be free in a way that always coheres with his/her Nature, he nevertheless claims that the most uncompelled being is still God.¹⁴³ To Spinoza, this is so due to only God setting the conditions of Nature, since he/she alone possesses the power to do so. This version of freedom, Hegel seems to want to claim, especially if one recalls his idea that Spirit's drive is what causes the world to recognize higher states of liberty.¹⁴⁴ Consequently, because Hegel's understanding of Freedom, upon analysis, is not so different from Spinoza's understanding of God's uncoerced essence and existence, it is the case that Hegel wrongfully ascribes a *telos* to the Deity.¹⁴⁵ That is due to the idea that both Hegel and Spinoza share, that God is supremely determinant and as already free no movement toward a more significant Freedom can be possible due to the non-existence of such a degree.¹⁴⁶ Hence, comprehending history as Spirit's evolution toward a pristine awareness of its Freedom is wrong from Spinoza's perspective, since history cannot display that stride, due to God already being most free.¹⁴⁷

Moreover, due to the impossibility of anything possessing the might to exceed God, Spinoza would claim justifies that God is immutable, and by being unable to change, nothing can cause the Deity to develop into a more excellent state.¹⁴⁸ In other words, Spinoza adheres to the outlook that something such as an end to history is logically nil due to the

¹⁴¹ Ibidem

¹⁴² Spinoza, Benedict De. *Ethics*. Edwin Curley trans., (Princeton: Penguin Books., 1996) 1p17-1p22, Jaspers, Karl. *The Great Philosophers: Spinoza*. Hannah Arendt ed., Ralph Manheim trans., (New York: Harvest Books., 1966) 9-25, Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster., 1967)., 569-580, & Popkin, Richard H. ed., *The Columbia History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press., 1999)., 329-336, 363-366, & 373-382.

¹⁴³ Ibidem

¹⁴⁴ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988)., 25, 57, & 97-99.

¹⁴⁵ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988)., 25, 57, & 97-99, Spinoza, Benedict De. *Ethics*. Edwin Curley trans., (Princeton: Penguin Books., 1996) 1p17-1p22, Jaspers, Karl. *The Great Philosophers: Spinoza*. Hannah Arendt ed., Ralph Manheim trans., (New York: Harvest Books., 1966)., 9-25, Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster., 1967)., 569-580, & Popkin, Richard H. ed., *The Columbia History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press., 1999)., 329-336, 363-366, & 373-382.

¹⁴⁶ Hegel, G.W.F. A.V. Miller trans., *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1977)., 266-296, 364-374, 410-418, & 453-495, Spinoza, Benedict De. *Ethics*. Edwin Curley trans., (Princeton: Penguin Books., 1996) 1p17-1p22, 2d1-2p1, Jaspers, Karl. *The Great Philosophers: Spinoza*. Hannah Arendt ed., Ralph Manheim trans., (New York: Harvest Books., 1966) 9-25, Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster., 1967)., 569-580, & Popkin, Richard H. ed., *The Columbia History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press., 1999)., 329-336, 363-366, & 373-382.

¹⁴⁷ Ibidem

¹⁴⁸ Spinoza, Benedict De. *Ethics*. Edwin Curley trans., (Princeton: Penguin Books., 1996)., 1p20, 2d4, 2p32, & 5p17-18.

inability of anything to change God.¹⁴⁹ Hence, the Hegelian narrative of Spirit's maturation causing the world to achieve a deeper understanding of liberty would be an impossibility to Spinoza because God, as necessarily immutable, cannot progress, but instead remains statically complete.¹⁵⁰ As such, it would be more accurate to drop Hegel's belief in the movement of Spirit, because of Spinoza's justifiable assertion, or claim that God's permanence cannot vacillate due to the lack of anything being able to kilter him/her.¹⁵¹

Also, Spinoza's theory of the eternal nature of God is another way to argue against and debase Hegel's teleological understanding of world history as that universal tale shared by all people, driven by Spirit's stride toward completion.¹⁵² First, Spinoza would assert that God is eternal or it is the case that he/she exists without temporality due to him/her being he/she who determines the rules for time to emerge.¹⁵³ Accordingly, Hegel's view of Spirit's development as genuinely reflected in times past, cannot be right. That is because, on the one hand, that which is eternal is not subject to interference by that which is not eternal, such as humankind.¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, because God is exempt from the conditions of time, it follows that history cannot have any relation to God since history as a temporal record does not capture the essence of eternity, and is only incompletable.¹⁵⁵ Lastly, prophetic takes on history like that of Marx would be another challengeable stance to agree with, due to Spinoza's critique of religion and prophecy further found in his *Ethics*, as well as his *Theological-Political Treatise*.¹⁵⁶

Spinoza, who famously declares that dogmatism can quickly lead to superstitions, expresses this, to illuminate the fact that others may use dogma to assert and at times abuse political power, which Marx's prophetic vision of the end of history as that epoch when the proletariat dismantles the bourgeoisies' power structure, invites.¹⁵⁷ First, Spinoza would argue that because God is necessarily impersonal, due to his/her distinct glory which renders him/her to be incompatible with the nature of less magnificent beings, like people, provides evidence to believe that history is absent of any overarching plan.¹⁵⁸ As such, one should not adhere to Marx's revelatory perspective of history, and his aim to paint the recorded past as surely culminating toward a universally just end because it can only result in unjustifiability or unreality.¹⁵⁹ That is, Spinoza would adhere to the view that no plan of God could be knowable to people due to the incoherency between the nature of God's Intellect and human reason.¹⁶⁰ Lastly, God, by being necessarily impersonal, cannot possess a plan for humanity

¹⁴⁹ Ibidem

¹⁵⁰ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 25, 57, & 97-99, & Spinoza, Benedict De. *Ethics*. Edwin Curley trans., (Princeton: Penguin Books., 1996), 1p20, 2d4, 2p32, & 5p17-18.

¹⁵¹ Ibidem

¹⁵² Spinoza, Benedict De. *Ethics*. Edwin Curley trans., (Princeton: Penguin Books., 1996), 1p8-1p12.

¹⁵³ Ibidem

¹⁵⁴ Spinoza, Benedict De. *Ethics*. Edwin Curley trans., (Princeton: Penguin Books., 1996), 1p8-1p12, 2p30-2p32.

¹⁵⁵ Ibidem

¹⁵⁶ Spinoza, Benedict De. Jonathan Israel, ed., *Theological-Political Treatise* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), B. §§1-10, C. §§1-15.

¹⁵⁷ Ibidem, §§1-4, §§7-10, & §§14-20.

¹⁵⁸ Spinoza, Benedict De. *Ethics*. Edwin Curley trans., (Princeton: Penguin Books., 1996), 5p17-18.

¹⁵⁹ Ibidem, 1p15-1p22

¹⁶⁰ Ibidem 1p15-1p22, Bk. 1 Appendix, & 2p1-2p2.



in the slightest, and as such if not even the Deity can project a common theme findable throughout human affairs, neither can anything else.¹⁶¹

At a more profound level, Spinoza would claim that God, as understood to be personally part of humanity's destiny could only lead one to err logically; for God, by not possessing finite, limited, or determinate attributes must be unanthropomorphic.¹⁶² Consequently, God, by not being human in any way, cannot be personal, and as such Marx's underlying prophetic tone, as he describes an unavoidably comprehensive end to history, where all people live utopically, is neither of God nor human nature, and thus, it is false.¹⁶³ That is because Spinoza would charge Marx with unjustifiably deifying human nature when he asserts that individuals can achieve a perfect state of coexistence due to only God having the power to exist perfectly.¹⁶⁴ Finally, Spinoza would also declare that Marx's view of the end of history mistakenly humanizes Providence, which cannot be the case because the Divine surpasses humanity's abilities so much so that it would be small-minded to believe that a prophetic historical theory, like that of Marx, is a concern of God.¹⁶⁵

Moreover, Spinoza adheres to the view that when interpreting scripture, one should be mindful of the fact that one must remain in the realm of scripture itself, and know that it is a moral tale to enrich people's lives by revealing a sure path to blessedness.¹⁶⁶ However, this implies that Spinoza would believe that when one attempts to apply any pattern adopted from religious texts, such as Marx's belief in the sure stop to humanity's recorded history, that person can only be at fault.¹⁶⁷ That is because Spinoza would assert that Marx's belief in only material aspects of life determining the course of history, is an attempt to mix two distinct and incompatible disciplines, namely, sociopolitical and economic studies with religious theory.¹⁶⁸ Hence, Spinoza who would support the view that Marx, regardless of knowing or not, mistakenly put a revelatory twist to his philosophy of history, stepped out of the bounds of all canons he tried to unite.¹⁶⁹ Finally, Spinoza would claim that due to the different approaches, methods, aims, and truths discoverable in theology as compared to the social sciences, demonstrates that Marx did not unproblematically try to combine these fields since any further discussion on the matter would be impossible if he had.¹⁷⁰

8. ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY

So far, one may understand the purpose of this essay as an attempt to explicate and critique Hegel and Marx's views concerning what each believed was an accurate portrayal of history or that universal tale shared by all humanity, as well as its end. However, this paper will now explore whether the possibility of a common destiny of humankind and its cessation can ever be capturable philosophically. First, to achieve this task, this paper will enter the philosophy of Karl Löwith. Lastly, through his analysis of the modern person, as neither satisfied by reason nor faith, and with neither a firm belief in recurrent historical

¹⁶¹ Ibidem, 1p15.

¹⁶² Ibidem, Bk. 1 Appendix

¹⁶³ Ibidem

¹⁶⁴ Ibidem

¹⁶⁵ Ibidem

¹⁶⁶ Spinoza, Benedict De. Jonathan Israel, ed., *Theological-Political Treatise* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), B. §§1-10, C. §§1-15.

¹⁶⁷ Ibidem

¹⁶⁸ Ibidem

¹⁶⁹ Ibidem

¹⁷⁰ Ibidem



patterns nor a solid trust in a teleological interpretation of history, will help to clarify why universal histories of humanity can only be unsound.

As understood by Löwith, if one analyzes the great historical philosophies of the past, including Hegel and Marx's, those theories are either foundationally eschatological or teleological or both.¹⁷¹ By an eschatological portrayal of history, Löwith envisions that pagan view of times past, in which life-cycles, recurring themes, and seasons of existence pave the way for the belief that history is comprehensible and is akin to the adage "nothing is new under the sun."¹⁷² Thus, Marx's claim that all history boils down to the recurrence of class struggles, and Hegel's understanding of history as necessarily featuring cycles of crisis, so that Spirit grows more aware of its Freedom on Earth, Löwith would claim are eschatological views, which ultimately find their roots in pagan religious beliefs.¹⁷³ Consequently, because the grounds of universal histories, like Hegel and Marx's, rests on religious ideas, they can never be purely philosophical, and as such when theorists label their philosophies of history as all-encompassing, they can only do so by comprising the philosophical aspect of their projects.¹⁷⁴

Next, Löwith also draws his readers' focus to teleological accounts of history or those theories which postulate that history is progressive since it has a beginning, as well as purposeful for by having a start it must have an endpoint or goal.¹⁷⁵ To him, this teleological understanding of history as possessing a first and last moment did not begin in Judeo-Christian creeds but became significant features of them.¹⁷⁶ Hence, something like the Hegelian assertion that history's critical moments are necessary for Spirit's realization of its Freedom in the world, or the collective progress of humanity as approaching a state of perfection, is, to Löwith, a teleologically driven theological speculation.¹⁷⁷ That is because, Hegel's belief in time as moving toward a final epoch in which Spirit recognizes its Freedom, which will play out on the world stage as the embrace of constitutional monarchy across the globe, epitomizes a teleology of history for it describes an irreversible process continually pushing human affairs ahead.¹⁷⁸

Moreover, Hegel's account of history as the recorded realization of Freedom on Earth, driven by Spirit, which works for-itself, while simultaneously always pushing humanity toward a new degree of perfection, Löwith would claim is more of a religious than philosophical utterance.¹⁷⁹ That is, Löwith would claim Hegel's view of history is not too different from the Judeo-Christian belief that God works outside the world for his/her purposes, solely by his/her will, and ceaselessly for the benefit of humanity.¹⁸⁰ To Löwith these similarities give credence to the view that Hegel attempted to secularize a theological view of history, in his philosophical reflections of times past, which by using religious language, to deify philosophy, took attention away from the importance of levelheaded critique, for the fancies of speculation.¹⁸¹

¹⁷¹ Löwith, Karl. *Meaning in History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press., 1949)., 204-207.

¹⁷² Ibidem, 14-18.

¹⁷³ Ibidem,

¹⁷⁴ Ibidem, 204-207.

¹⁷⁵ Ibidem, 182-184.

¹⁷⁶ Ibidem, 14-18.

¹⁷⁷ Ibidem, 52-55.

¹⁷⁸ Ibidem

¹⁷⁹ Ibidem, 55-59.

¹⁸⁰ Ibidem

¹⁸¹ Ibidem, 54-57.

Likewise, Marx's certainty in the inevitable end of the bourgeoisie as setting the stage for universal harmony between all people, Löwith would claim, is teleological because of Marx's adherence to the view that history is culminating in an inevitably final breaking point.¹⁸² Also, Marx's understanding of history as ending utopianly, in peace and communal living, with the proletariat as those victors of history, Löwith would assert is theological for, like religions, it projects an unsure future as sure.¹⁸³ Finally, like the flocks of religious believers who have faith in the End Times, and the salvation, or redemption of the world, Löwith believes Marxist doctrines contain similar ideas, such as the proletariat's hope to unite as class-conscious, to usurp their oppressors, and fulfill history righteously.¹⁸⁴

From this, one critique of universal histories, Löwith would claim, is that they are not indeed philosophies of history but instead theologies of history.¹⁸⁵ That is due to philosophers, including Hegel and Marx, writing universal histories in a way that relied more on either the paganists' eschatological approach or the Judeo-Christian treatment of time.¹⁸⁶ Problematically, since neither paganism nor Judeo-Christianity is real philosophy, but, instead, faiths of lore, Löwith finds that those creeds, when attempting to provide historical concepts, nevertheless always produce notions that are contradictory, incoherent, or archaic.¹⁸⁷ One reason for this is that if one takes an eschatological view of time as opposed to a teleological one, then that person cannot understand history fully for without any temporal frameworks no history can be dateable. As such, if history were without any recorded direction, it would not only be unanalyzable, but no one would ever be able to explain why time displays progressiveness.¹⁸⁸

At the same time, if one were to take a teleological view of history alone, history would lack meaning since reemerging *motifs* would never resonate with people if the progressiveness of time were entirely independent of them.¹⁸⁹ Therefore, whichever way, eschatologically or teleologically, that one may interpret history, it remains that because both are not historical notions, and instead remnants of religious doctrine, these so-called concepts can only be forever impure, negating the possibility of legitimate universal philosophies of history.¹⁹⁰ Finally, even in modernity, where people can blend both eschatological and teleological takes on time, implying that there still may be hope for a universal philosophy of history to emerge, Löwith would remain in vehement disagreement.¹⁹¹

Also, the archaic nature of historical concepts thought up by theologians, which influenced philosophical attempts at universalizing history, Löwith believes, no longer fits well with people's present-day understanding and experience of history.¹⁹² One reason for this is that modernity brought to light issues concerning the analytical incompatibility of eschatological and teleological views of history, despite the appeal to resolve and blend both

¹⁸² Ibidem, 41-44.

¹⁸³ Ibidem

¹⁸⁴ Ibidem, 48-51.

¹⁸⁵ Ibidem, 192-195.

¹⁸⁶ Ibidem

¹⁸⁷ Ibidem

¹⁸⁸ Ibidem, 199-203.

¹⁸⁹ Ibidem, 203-207.

¹⁹⁰ Ibidem

¹⁹¹ Ibidem

¹⁹² Ibidem, 10-19, 203-207.



for the sake of a complete philosophical history of humanity.¹⁹³ To Löwith, merging the eschatological and teleological outlooks of history, to trace a common tale and destiny shared by all individuals can only lead philosophers to inaccuracies.¹⁹⁴ That is because if eschatology is valid, and “nothing is new under the sun,” then the end or *telos* of history must be repetitive.¹⁹⁵ However, this implies that the end of history already happened, making it either illogical to believe it will reoccur or false to assert that any final point is accomplishable.¹⁹⁶ Similarly, if teleology is sound, and everything is in a becoming state of progress, rendering each successive generation to feature something historically new, then finding a steady, ever-present, and meaningful theme to history would have to be nil.¹⁹⁷ Thus, to Löwith, universal histories are always incomplete because if a philosopher stresses eschatology more than teleology, or teleology more than eschatology, then that theorist is either denying the reality of new historical events for a supposedly uniting historical trend, or a shared historical fate at the expense of so-called historical significance.¹⁹⁸

From these problems and criticisms of the possibility of universal philosophies of history, including those of Hegel and Marx, Löwith helps to expose such projects as inherently frictional due to the incompatibility of elements like eschatology and teleology, reoccurrence and progress, faith and reason, and theology and historical method. As such, this essay hoped to convey not only the universal histories of Hegel and Marx, as well as the critiques of each by Danto, Benjamin, and Spinoza respectively; it also intended to reveal the complexities of ever achieving a flawless and undiluted philosophy of history for all people, and for all time. Therefore, it is safest to assume, as well as honest to admit that no all-encompassing philosophy of history is yet achievable, and, it may never be.

CONCLUSION

The beginning of this piece conveyed to the reader Hegel’s understanding of history as that recorded process by which Spirit finds, or grows conscious of its essential Freedom on Earth, or in the realm of inscribed human affairs.¹⁹⁹ Following this essay’s explication of Hegel’s philosophy of history, the more socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and materialist take on universal history, through Marx’s *The Communist Manifesto*, came to the fore. The purpose of surmising both theorists’ takes on the collective destiny of humanity was to cast light on a similarity between them, that one may overlook all too easily. However, a deeper purpose of surmising Hegel and Marx’s outlook on history as that shared story of humankind was to prepare the reader for the philosopher Danto’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of history, as well as the theorist Benjamin’s assault on Marx’s universal history. Lastly, by drawing from the philosophers Spinoza and Löwith, this piece aimed to simultaneously reinforce Danto and Benjamin’s arguments against Hegel and Marx, while, also, paving the way to show why any attempt at universalizing history is unachievable due to elements outside of philosophy, like theology and faith, compromising that effort.²⁰⁰

¹⁹³ Ibidem

¹⁹⁴ Ibidem

¹⁹⁵ Ibidem

¹⁹⁶ Ibidem

¹⁹⁷ Ibidem

¹⁹⁸ Ibidem

¹⁹⁹ Hegel, G.W.F. Leo Rauch trans., *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company INC., 1988), 25, 57, & 97-99.

²⁰⁰ Löwith, Karl. *Meaning in History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press., 1949), 204-207.



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