# International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science

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# Preface

The 6-th issue of *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science* (May 2020) presents scientific and theoretical articles on various aspects, all of them centred on the area of Philosophy, Theology, and Science.

In the first article: *HANNAH ARENDT IN THE LIGHT OF SAINT AUGUSTINE. FROM POLITICAL ONTO-THEOLOGY TO REPUBLICAN PHENOMENOLOGY*, Prof. Ph.D. Spiros MAKRIS scrutinizes in-depth the theological dimension in Hannah Arendt's political and ethical thinking. The next work is called: *HENRI BERGSON: SCIENCE, LIFE-SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN CONDITION* and it belongs to PhD. Raz SHPEIZER. After that, the paper entitled: *THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE DENIAL OF THE DIVORCE THESIS*, written by Prof. PhD. Sudhakar VENUKAPALLI is a contemporary philosophical understanding of scientific rationality fundamentally distinguishes itself from the conservative positions by what may be considered a categorical reorientation. It replaces the old categories by the new ones in terms of which the essential nature of the structure and dynamics of science are described and explained.

The next study, by Prof. PhD. Roberto Parra DORANTES, presents the issue: *ORIGINALISM, RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS*. Author defends a normative, moderate version of originalism according to which there is a possibility that in a constitutional system there will be cases for there is no correct legal (constitutional) solution. *GENESIS AND BLACK HOLE UNIVERSE: THE FIRST DAY* is the article presented by Prof. PhD. Tianxi ZHANG. This study is an innovative interpretation of Genesis according to the black hole universe model. This paper as Paper-I focuses on the first day - the beginning of creation, enduing words like Earth, Water, Night, and Day in the book of Genesis with physical implications and meanings, eliminating all discrepancies between Genesis and observations.

THE RADICALIZATION PROGRAM OF PHENOMENOLOGY OF JEAN-LUC MARION is the issue presented by PhD. Piotr KARPIŃSKI. The article discusses Jean-Luc Marion's project of radicalization of phenomenology. The very idea of radicalization has been associated with phenomenology since its origin and it is a return to the main idea to study the appearance of phenomena, rethink it and draw the maximum consequences from it. Marion argues with Husserl and Heidegger, who, in his opinion, stopped halfway in the phenomenological path: the first reducing all phenomena to objects, the second reducing everything to being. CO-DEPENDENCY IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP-A LEARNED BEHAVIOUR is the final article of volume presented by Prof. PhD. Claudia VLAICU and PhD. Candidate Felicia Aurica HAIDU, who explain the codependency paradigm in intimate relationship, analysing the symptoms of codependency and suggesting cognitive-behaviour therapeutic ways of healing from codependency.

The scientific content presented in the current issue of *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science* distinguishes the opportunity of examining altogether truth-claims found in Theology, Philosophy, and Science, as well as the methods laid out by every discipline and the meanings derived from them. This is the aim and also the scientific task of IFIASA International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science.

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
# HANNAH ARENDT IN THE LIGHT OF SAINT AUGUSTINE. FROM POLITICAL ONTO-THEOLOGY TO REPUBLICAN PHENOMENOLOGY

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**ABSTRACT**

*This article scrutinizes in-depth the theological dimension in Hannah Arendt's political and ethical thought. In addition to the influences she received at a young age from the Catholic theologian Romano Guardini, Hannah Arendt was influenced, through her doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Karl Jaspers, by the philosophical, ontological and theological thought of St. Augustine. Both the fundamental Arendtian concepts of natality and amor mundi, as well as her phenomenological perception of time (i.e. past, present and future) have been influenced, to a great extent (naturally with Martin Heidegger's influences), by the Augustinian thought. Hannah Arendt, as happens in Marx in his reading of Hegel, namely reverses the Augustinian notion of love, formulating a worldly field of love, full of Socratic and Aristotelian references. Actually, St. Augustine's political onto-theology is transformed into a republican phenomenology where the critical stake of the earthly polis is not exhausted in amor Dei but is defined as a worldly freedom or, in other words, the pursue of public happiness in-the-world of the public sphere.*

**Keywords:** Hannah Arendt; St. Augustine; republicanism; amor mundi; caritas;

## 1. THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL REPUBLICANISM IN HANNAH ARENDT

Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott who, along with Judith Chelius Stark, edited the English translation of Arendt's doctoral dissertation on the concept of love in St. Augustine,[1] points out that Arendt must be seen as a thinker with many intellectual faces. In fact, she claims that we should try to comprehend the fruitful Arendtian oeuvre through many readings and interpretations.[2] It is true that Arendt's corpus, largely with the precious help of her student Jerome Kohn, is now before us ready for new and radical readings. It is also true that her political and ethical thought is subject to a new interpretative process, with many re-visions, as in the case of feminism.[3] Thus, it is no coincidence that a huge literature, concerning Arendt and her work, has already been classified under the term of Arendtian Studies. Her *corpus*, as an open text, urges us for new reflections, something that Arendt herself would strongly desire since the Arendtian public sphere is nothing but the common sense and

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[1] Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1996.
[2] Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott, ''What St. Augustine Taught Hannah Arendt about 'how to live in the world': Caritas, natality and the banality of evil'', In: Mika Ojakangas (ed.), Hannah Arendt. Practice, Thought and Judgment, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Helsinki, 2010, pp. 8-27, p. 8.
[3] Bonnie Honig (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1995.

interplay of speeches, doctrines and deeds in-the-world. For Arendt, the earthly world emerges as a fragile web of human relationships. She calls this ontological and phenomenological phenomenon *amor mundi*, by reversing the Augustinian *amor Dei*. The moral and political topos of *amor mundi* is the public sphere itself. Public sphere is considered as a fundamental republican virtue that is always vulnerable before the danger of Totalitarianism.[4]

The concept of world in Arendt's political and ethical thought exists only through a fact that she defines as acting in concert. World is inhabited by human beings as a definitely earthly home.[5] Each time we leave each other, turning our backs to one another, the earthly world, this space 'in between' according to Martin Buber,[6] is totally destroyed and thus is lost beneath the ruins that collapsed before the feet of Benjaminian *Angelus Novus*.[7] Arendt's political phenomenology and whatever is defined today as Arendtian republican humanism[8] has been critically influenced by the strong theological atmosphere of the Weimar culture.[9] Of course, it is not only the hard theological aspects of Heidegger's thought,[10] but also the dominant position of both Protestantism and Catholicism within the ranks of the intellectual scene of Germany during the interwar period. As noted above, Arendt was taught by the Catholic priest Romano Guardini the mutual influence between philosophy and theology through the great figures of Socrates, Augustine and Kierkegaard.[11] James Bernauer S.J. points out that Arendt, through Guardini's lectures at the University of Berlin and later as a student at University of Marburg, within a university context that was dominated by the eminent figures of existential theology, such as the Protestant theologian Rudolf Bultmann, creatively assimilated a series of crucial concepts in her personal intellectual project.[12] Actually, her entire project about *amor mundi* has been affected so much by the philosophical and theological, either Christian or Jewish, environment of Weimar Renaissance.[13] More specifically, Arendt transforms lots of the theological concepts of Christian forgiving or Jewish messianism into a political and ethical theory about a worldly

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[4] Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics, Schocken Books, New York, 2005, p. 203.

[5] Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, Harper San Francisco, New York, 1993, p. 343.

[6] Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, Routledge, London and New York, 2002.

[7] Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings. Volume 4, 1938-1940, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 2006, p. 392.

[8] Michael H. McCarthy, The Political Humanism of Hannah Arendt, Lexington Books, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth, UK, 2014.

[9] John Kiess, Hannah Arendt and Theology, Bloomsbury, London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi, Sydney, 2016.

[10] Judith Wolfe, Heidegger and Theology, Bloomsbury, London, New Delhi, New York, Sydney, 2014 and Judith Wolfe, Heidegger's Eschatology. Theological Horizons in Martin Heidegger's Early Work, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.

[11] Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt. For Love of the World, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2004, p. 34 and Marcio Gimenes de Paula, ''Hannah Arendt: Religion, Politics and the Influence of Kierkegaard'', In: Jon Stewart (ed.), Kierkegaard's Influence in Socio-Political Thought. Volume 14, Routledge, London and New York, 2011, pp. 29-40.

[12] James Bernauer S.J., ''A Catholic Conversation with Hannah Arendt'', In: Thomas Michel, S.J. (ed.), Friends on the Way. Jesuits Encounter Contemporary Judaism, Fordham University Press, New York, 2007, pp.142-165.

[13] Susannah Young-ah Gottlieb, Regions of Sorrow. Anxiety and Messianism in Hannah Arendt and W. H. Auden, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2003, Daniel Brandes, ''On Messianic Strains in Arendt's Theory of Political Action'', In: *Journal of Jewish Thought* 1 (2013), pp. 1-23 and Robert A. Krieg, ''German Catholic Views of Jesus and Judaism, 1918-1945'', In: Kevin P. Spicer (ed.), Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust, Indiana Univeristy Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 2007, pp. 50-75.

kind of faith, where *amor mundi* is seen, in the final analysis, as the human condition of worldliness.[14]

James Bernauer S.J. constructively connects Arendt's concept of worldliness with the German Lutheran pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theology of hope and responsibility. It is well-known that Bonhoeffer is considered today as a contemporary Christian martyr who was resisted to Nazism and finally was executed by Hitler's regime. James Bernauer S.J. strongly argues that the Arendtian *amor mundi* is governed by a religious aura.[15] The notion of forgiveness is a typical case of how Hannah Arendt has ontologically and theoretically used a worldview that derives from Jesus's own life,[16] building from the Christology of forgiveness the human condition of a new or second or a political condition of natality.[17] Augustine's influence here is no less than critical. Through forgiving and natality, Arendt perceives public sphere as the field of an earthly immortality. Aristotelian polis is the realization of this unstoppable new beginning. Drawing her inspiration from the Augustinian motto 'Initium ut esset homo creautus est / Man was created to have a beginning' (Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, Book 12, Ch. 20), Arendt builds a republican, political and ethical theory with strong theological origins. It is worth noting that Liisi Keedus, by comparing the parallel intellectual trajectories of Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss, argues that, in contrast to Strauss, who remained closer to Judaism, Arendt has re-defined the Christian and Christological perspective in a purely political and moral direction for the love of the world.[18]

Arendt's republican onto-theology was also implicitly influenced by Jewish eschatological mysticism. Although Arendt has not been directly influenced by Jewish mysticism, the concept of miracle, as a phenomenological fact, draws its inspiration from both a political reading of Jesus's life and Jewish eschatology as well. In her opinion, miracle is not just an article of faith confession, but, as Gerschom Scholem points out, nearly a public event that is yet to happen in the historical time in the heart of community in a very visible way. Through a comparative approach of Arendt's The Human Condition, Sussanah Young-Ah Gottlieb explores in-depth the poetic work of her beloved friend W.H. Auden –, her relationship with Jewish messianism. Now, messianic and eschatological human condition is regarded as a condition of contingency, uncertainty and human fallibility, highlighting in this tragic way the inhuman phenomenon of Totalitarianism in 20th century. Benjamin's revolutionary messianism has drastically affected on Arendt's political and ethical thought.[19] It is noteworthy that Danielle Celermajer argues that the influence of Athens on Arendt's thought is not as great as that of Jerusalem, even on concepts such as Augustine's natality, which is traced in the Hebrew Bible and the idea of pure creation.[20] As far as Daniel Brandes is concerned, the concept of miracle in Arendt's thought, as the *locus classicus* of human action, is related not so much to Carl Schmitt's notion of decisionism as

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[14] Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1998, p. 7.

[15] James Bernauer S.J., ''Bonhoeffer and Arendt at One Hundred'', In: *Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations* 2 (2007), pp. 77-85, p. 82.

[16] Thomas Breidenthal, ''Jesus is my Neighbor: Arendt, Augustine, and the Politics of Incarnation'', In: *Modern Theology* 14/4 (1998), pp. 489-503.

[17] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Schocken Books, New York, 2004, p. 616.

[18] Liisi Keedus, The Crisis of German Historicism. The Early Political Thought of Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 13.

[19] Raluca Eddon, 'Arendt, Scholem, Benjamin. Between Revolution and Messianism', In: *European Journal of Political Theory* 5 (2006), pp. 261-269.

[20] Danielle Celermajer, 'Hannah Arendt: Athens or pehaps Jerusalem?',In *Thesis Eleven* 102 (2010), pp. 24-38.

to Franz Rosenzweig's messianic political onto-theology. Eventually, Oliver Marchart perceives Arendt's messianism in the sense of a political temporality between past and future; as a chasm; an abyss; a non-time; an eternal present; a todayness; a small break in the heart of time; as the crucial moment of the beginning and founding of the political community; this *nunc stans*, *i.e.* eternity, in the last analysis, as an eternal present.[21]

Consequently, it becomes apparent that Arendt's theological education is a crucial element in the entire formulation and evolution of her political and ethical thought, which is also related to her Jewish backgrounds, but mainly to the Christian influences she has received since her late teens, within the intellectual and academic circles of the Weimar Renaissance. Theology and philosophy, Christianity, existentialism and phenomenology are a common and wider reflexive field upon which the spiritual becoming of European and especially the German interwar era rests.[22] In particular, Augustine stands as a theological hinterland within the Arendtian *corpus*, in which both Jesus Christ and the great Jewish political theologians constitute the two poles of a mental *continuum*, from which Hannah Arendt (with Aristotle's influence) draws the most important conceptual elements of her work.[23] Thus, Arendtian project has very clear theological references, which must always be emphasized, so that her phenomenological and republican theory on worldliness and public sphere to acquire its true metaphysical and onto-theological dimensions.

Both natality and *amor mundi*, now as a worldly love for the neighbor, are the major conceptual innovations that Arendt owes to St. Augustine and those which, ultimately, define and distinguish her, intellectually and politically speaking, from the dark, Heraclitean and maybe pessimistic fatality of Martin Heidegger.[24] Drawing her inspiration both from St. Augustine and Aristotle, Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott underlines that Arendt profoundly explores the critical political and moral question of how we can live in-the-world with security and putting well-being and eudaimonia as a fundamental onto-theological goal. If there is a reliable answer to this crucial question, it can be found in her doctoral dissertation on St. Augustine.[25] The battered text of her dissertation, which she took with her when she fled to the U.S.A. in 1941,[26] dominates in the American phase of her thought.[27] Thereby, it is well known that she further developed the basic Augustinian concepts of natality and *amor mundi* from 1950s onwards, re-formulating her whole phenomenological, moral and republican thought, through Western onto-theology.[28] It is now a common place, that

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[21] Oliver Marchart, 'Time for a New Beginning. Arendt, Benjamin, and the Messianic Conception of Political Temporality', In: *Redescriptions. Yearbbok of Political Thought and Conceptual History* 10 (2006), pp. 134-147.

[22] Leonard V. Caplan and Rudy Koshar (eds), The Weimar Moment. Liberalism, Political Theology, and Law, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2012.

[23] Spiros Makris, 'Aristotle in Hannah Arendt's Republicanism. From homo faber to homo politicus', In: *Annuaire International Des Droits De L' Homme*, Volume IX, 2015-2016, Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex , Paris (2017), pp. 535-563.

[24] George Pattison, Heidegger on Death. A Critical Theological Essay, Ashgate, Surrey, 2013.

[25] Ronald C. Arnett, ''Arendt and Saint Augustine. Identity Otherwise than Convention'', In: Calvin L. Troop (ed.), Augustine for the Philosophers. The Rhetor of Hippo, the *Confessions*, and the Continentals, Baylor University Press, Waco, Texas, 2014, pp. 39-57.

[26] Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark, 'Rediscovering Hannah Arendt', In: Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1996, pp. 111-211, p. 115.

[27] Richard King, Arendt and America, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2015.

[28] Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1998, Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, Penguin Books, Middlesex and New York, 1985, p. 211 and Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, Penguin Books, London and New York, 2006, pp. 65-66 and pp. 165-166.

Arendtian anthropology and existentialism take place, as an entire theoretical project, on the constructive crossing field both of political philosophy and theology.[29] Therefore, the relationship between *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa* must always be examined as a single effort where Aristotelian republicanism is coming to touch with Augustinian theology.[30]

Rodrigo Chacón points out that the overseeing of the influence of St. Augustine on Arendt's political and moral thought is not due only to the fact that this text became widely known in the mid-1990s but because the most of the intellectuals that study her work refuse to acknowledge the theological references of her thought.[31] In this sense, we can study Arendt's texts within the context of an explicit theological-political perspective, as in the case of Leo Strauss, who belongs to the intellectual environment of the Weimar Renaissance as well, but, ontologically and ideologically speaking, is conservative and more Platonic than Aristotelian.[32] Rodrigo Chacón explains St. Augustine's influence on Arendt through the liberal, dialectical and existentialist theology of Rudolf Bultmann, who, together with Martin Heidegger at the University of Marburg from 1923 to 1929, have shaped, through a phenomenological deconstruction of Western onto-theology, the reflexive prerequisites of a neo-orthodox conception of the Christological meaning and the related world affairs, where the Being-in-the-world, as the metonymy of human homelessness and anxiety, finally acquires a consciousness of its existence through the Other and the love for the neighbor.[33] Behind this diffusive eschatological sense of a collapsing modernity, excellently outlined in the Origins of Totalitarianism, through the historical crystallization of Totalitarianism on the structural pillars of imperialism, anti-Semitism and racism,[34] Arendt seeks, by building an analogy between the City of God and Rome, which collapsed under its suicidal *libido dominandi*, a way out of the catastrophic and deadly worldlessness that shakes modern humanity.

Augustine's neo-Platonic existentialism of natality (see 'Initium ergo ut esset, creatus est homo') led Arendt, through Martin Heidegger and the Weimar culture, to the earthly political phenomenology of plurality, responsibility and enlarged mentality.[35] Since human is becoming a major issue for himself (see here the Augustinian 'Quaestio mihi factus sum'), it is not the Cartesian, but the reflective consciousness that is being put at the forefront of history. Augustine's theory of temporality, in the eleventh Book of his Confessions,[36] with the precious help of Socrates and Immanuel Kant,[37] is gradually transformed into a political

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[29] Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, A Harvest Book. Harcourt Brace & Company, San Diego, New York, London, 1978.

[30] Shin Chiba, 'Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political: Love, Friendship, and Citizenship', In: *The Review of Politics* 57 (1995), pp. 505-536.

[31] Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1996.

[32] Michael P. Zuckert & Catharine H. Zuckert, Leo Strauss and the Problem of Political Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2014, p. 267.

[33] Rodrigo Chacón, 'Hannah Arendt in Weimar Beyond the Theologico-Political Predicament?', In: Leonard V. Caplan and Rudy Koshar (eds), The Weimar Moment. Liberalism, Political Theology, and Law, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2012, pp. 73-107.

[34] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Schocken Books, New York, 2004.

[35] Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and Brighton, 1992 and Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, Schocken Books, New York, 2003.

[36] Saint Augustine, Confessions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008 (Translated by Henry Chadwick), p. 221.

[37] Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics, Schocken Books, New York, 2005, p. 5 and Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and Brighton, 1992.

and moral theory of consciousness as understanding.[38] Paraphrasing Augustine, it could be said that Arendt perceives understanding either as a reminder of the past or as a promise of the future. To the extent that the Augustinian present becomes a 'time-crucible', i.e. an interpretative and semantic time through remembrance and expectation, Augustine becomes a 'figure-crucible' of a kind of conceptual eclecticism, reminding us much of Marx's close relationship with Hegel. This means that by putting Augustine on his feet, Arendt actually restores the Aristotelian tradition of *vita activa* against the Platonic view of *vita contemplativa*. Thus, 'with Augustine and against Augustine', so to speak, Arendt creates another strong reverse within the long tradition of Western political thought, aiming, in terms of modern Jewish mysticism (tikkoun),[39] not only at the restoration of the forgotten philosophical concepts, but much more at the re-construction of the violently broken and brutally disintegrated human relationships after Auschwitz and Shoah. Thus, the political reading of St. Augustine, which was completed in America in the 1950s, clearly shows that Arendt had begun to draw her theoretical attention to the so-called worldly affairs before 1933 and the politicization of her thought through the Jewish Question.[40] Thereby, it can be argued that she became herself a *homo politicus*, through her passionate engagement with Augustine's thought. This Arendtian onto-theological project was completed in the U.S.A and eventually took the theoretical form of a republican-led and phenomenological-driven political metaphysics of *amor mundi*. Augustine's figure is catalytic within this entire reflexive political and ethical project.

## 2. ARENDT'S POLITICAL AND ETHICAL READING OF THE AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY OF CARITAS

In 2014, under the supervising of Dana R. Villa, a contemporary maître in Arendtian Studies, Sarah Elizabeth Spengeman supported her doctoral thesis on Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin at the University of Notre Dame in U.S.A. A large theoretical circle had been coming to an end. In the beginning of her doctoral dissertation, Sarah Elizabeth Spengeman underlines the strong elective affinity between Augustine and Arendt in the following emphatic and characteristic way: ''Arendt's first study of Augustine in her 1929 dissertation, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, had an enduring and significant influence on the development of her political theory. It was in her dissertation that she first became interested in — the relevance of the other, — or what she would later call the human condition of plurality. Arendt's concern for human plurality guided her inquiry into the origins of totalitarianism, namely anti-Semitism and imperialism, as well as her analysis of totalitarianism in power. Her first study of Augustine also provided key theoretical resources that she later reappropriated to develop her more mature political theory in The Human Condition. There, she drew upon Augustinian resources to develop her concept of the man-made world, labor and work, plurality and natality''.[41] In a sense, Arendt uses these sources as an onto-theological basis for her neo-republican and phenomenological theory of *amor mundi*. To put it differently, by turning Augustine's Christian transcendental charity into an

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[38] Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding. Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism 1930-1954, Schocken Books, New York, 1994 and Hannah Arendt, Thinking Without a Banister. Essays in Understanding 1953-1975, Schocken Books, New York, 2018.

[39] Michael Löwy, Redemption and Utopia. Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central Europe. A Study in Elective Affinity, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1992.

[40] Gabriel Piterberg, 'Zion's Rebel Daughter. Hannah Arendt on Palestine and Jewish Politics', In: *New Left Review* 48 (2007), pp. 39-57.

Aristotelian republican-inspired *amor mundi*, *i.e.* an eternal worldly present between past and future,[42] Arendt gave absolutely new meaning to the *vita activa* in a post-Totalitarian era where, from the very beginning, the emerging mass society established worldlessness and loneliness as a sort of human condition. From this point of view, Arendt's constructive relationship with St. Augustine must be considered as a crucial moment within the long course of Western tradition, which in turn affects the content of the reading of the Arendtian *corpus* itself.

Exploring the philosophical aspects of Arendt's republican thought further, Samuel Moyn namely formulates the position about an Arendtian political theology.[43] It is not by accident that Liisi Keedus, searching for Arendt's profound intellectual influences just from her early teens, refers to the intensely interdisciplinary character of her academic education. Thus, in addition to Rudolf Bultmann's influence, Keedus also points out the case of the theologian Martin Dibelius. Dibelius, a professor at the University of Heidelberg, where Arendt gained her doctorate in August 1929 under the supervision of Karl Jaspers, is perceived as the founder of the so-called form criticism, according to which the Gospels are not historical texts but texts that reflect the word of God within the living environment of the early Christian communities.[44] However, we must not overlook the fact that all this debate is inspired by an interpretive pluralism, to the extent that there are also opposing voices. For example, Nathan Van Camp argues that Arendt should not be seen merely as the antagonist of Carl Schmitt's decisionist political theology, but as a neo-Aristotelian, that is to say a theorist of a strong republican action, where *vita activa* is put, historically and philosophically speaking, against a dominant political technology, that has attempted to subject homo politicus to the state of *vita contemplativa*, since Plato.[45] As it is well known, in this purely mechanistic and deterministic dialectic of means / ends, Hannah Arendt, also placed Marx in the context of The Marx Project, concluding that, while intending to release *vita activa* from her deadly embrace with the tradition of *vita contemplativa*, he ultimately contributed to the formation of a new idealistic system that degenerated into Stalinism.[46]

The fruitful interpretative and bibliographical literature of Arendt's intellectual origins no more can challenge Augustianism in her political and moral thought.[47] Although Sarah Elizabeth Spengeman's doctoral thesis is the first mainstream research on Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, it should be noted that the first academic dissertation on Arendt's Augustianism was defended in 2005, in Rome, at the Pontifical John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family, by Stephen Kampowski, who, in a more holistic interpretative horizon, places Augustine's 'Initium ut esset homo creatus est' at the

[41] Sarah Elizabeth Spengeman, Saint Augustine and Hannah Arendt on Love of the World: An Investigation into Arendt's Reliance on the Refutation of Augustinian Philosophy, Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, U.S.A., 2014.

[42] Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, Penguin Books, London and New York, 2006.

[43] Samuel Moyn, 'Hannah Arendt on the Secular', In: *New German Critique* 35/3 (2008), pp. 71-96.

[44] Liisi Keedus, 'Thinking Beyond Philosophy: Hannah Arendt and the Weimar Hermeneutic Connections', In: *Trames* 18/4 (2014), pp. 307-325.

[45] Nathan Van Camp, 'Hannah Arendt and Political Theology: A Displaced Encounter', In: *Revista Pléyade* 8 (2011), pp. 19-35.

[46] Tama Weisman, Hannah Arendt and Karl Marx. On Totalitarianism and the Tradition of Western Political Thought, Lexington Books, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth, UK, 2014.

[47] Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott, ''What St. Augustine Taught Hannah Arendt about 'how to live in the world': Caritas, natality and the banality of evil'', In: Mika Ojakangas (ed.), Hannah Arendt. Practice, Thought and Judgment, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Helsinki, 2010, p. 16.

epicenter of her republican and ethical theory. For Kampowski, Arendt constitutes, obviously influenced by Heidegger, a radical hermeneutic of political *praxis* as a new beginning, either from the individual point of view, through the Heideggerian concepts of temporality and facticity, or from the viewpoint of human condition in the sense of human finitude. Human, as a finite and temporal being, formulates his imagination and thus by extension his enlarged mentality through the perspective of the others (this is the Kantian aspect of her thought) and simultaneously builds his memory and so his facticity within the context of *amor mundi*. In this way, Arendt, through the Augustinian notion of natality as a creation *ex nihilo*, according to the Christian theological assumption, restores political action as a new beginning; creative and reflexive; unpredictable and irreversible; a pure event; something like the republican counterpart of the Christian miracle. By doing this, she tries, having plurality and public sphere as conceptual axes, to reverse the tradition of Western political thought towards the direction of a new synthesis between *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa*, so that acting is regarded as a creative reflection and thinking as an constitutive activity.[48]

Love and Saint Augustine is being brought to the fore when Arendt prepares The Human Condition, essentially, as a politicization of the well-known Augustinian motto 'Initium ut esset homo creatus est'. In this regard, it could be supported that here is taking place the so-called Arendtian political theology. Within a new historical environment, that of postwar mass society, which for Arendt represents a fatal post-Totalitarian threat for the Western democracy, she draws attention to the Augustinian concept of natality in order to underscore the importance of plurality and diversity in the foundation of a public sphere. According to George McKenna, Arendt's doctoral thesis is dominated by three readings of the Augustinian *caritas*. One can trace here the analogies with the Heideggerian notion of Sorge.[49] *Caritas* I is the Christian desire for the God. *Caritas* II is the love of the neighbor, while *Caritas* III is the love of human as the offspring of Adam and as an entity that is governed by the feature of original sin. In fact, Arendt attempts to fulfill the Augustinian love for the God through the love for the neighbor in the sense of *amor mundi*. By doing so, she puts *Caritas* III as a fundamental dimension of human condition. Human community is built as a plurality of singularities.[50] Thereby, it could be claimed that the reversed Augustinian natality condenses republican political anthropology of The Human Condition. Julia Reinhard Lupton claims that Arendtian natality translates, ontologically and politically speaking, the theological conception of creation into the secular idiom of philosophy. Natality, as human createdness, precisely signals this becoming or potentiality and by extension the enigma of our existence in the world. At the same time, Arendtian natality signifies the element of human event as temporality and historicity and thus it realizes human freedom in the sense of free will or *liberum arbitrium* within the horizon of alterity, plurality and worldliness, *i.e.* public sphere as such.[51]

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[48] Livio Melina, 'Foreword', In: Stephen Kampowski (ed.), Arendt, Augustine and the New Beginning. The Action Theory and Moral Thought of Hannah Arendt in the Light of Her Dissertation on St. Augustine, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Michigan, 2008, pp. xi-xiv, p. xiii.

[49] Frank Schalow and Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy, The Scarecrow Press, Inc., Lanham, Toronto, Plymouth, UK, 2010, pp. 78-79.

[50] George McKenna, 'Augustine Revised', In: *First Things* 72 (1997), pp. 43-47.

[51] Julia Richard Lupton, 'Hannah Arendt's Renaissance: Remarks on Natality', In: *Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory* 7/2 (2006), pp. 7-18.

This element of the human event and so of the human miracle of natality is also another powerful argument in favor of an Arendtian political theology not in the sense of essentialism, since Arendt does not refer to human condition in the meaning of a specific human nature, but in the sense of a quasi-transcendence of worldliness (or ontological immanentism), which is quite proportional to Emmanuel Levinas's notion of exteriority.[52] For Hannah Arendt, human dwells in-the-world and so completes it through the human condition of *amor mundi*, but, in the final analysis, he does not come from this world. Consequently, within the element of *creatio ex nihilo* always is latent the element of a kind of a divine presence as an out-worldly reference system, which in Arendt's republican reading acquires the characteristic of a Messianic and miraculous political temporality of *nunc aeternum* à la Walter Benjamin.[53] It is worth noting here that in St. Augustine the present, as a continuously escaping fluid period between the past and the future, finally represents what Arendt defines as *nunc stans*: this eternal Now; or a *nunc aeternitatis*; or a worldly model of temporality; or, in other words, an appropriate metaphor for the divine eternity itself. Within this eternal worldly temporality, she puts the relevant concepts of remembrance, expectation, Christian and Jewish repentance/teshuvah,[54] forgiveness and mutual promise, giving all of them jointly an Aristotelian and republican perspective.[55]

Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin marks the beginning of Arendt's long academic career, which, however, was interrupted violently in Nazi Germany in 1933, and was continued until her early death in 1975 in the U.S.A. Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, within a hostile atmosphere, not only to any Jew, but also to every democratic citizen, does not simply provokes Arendt's psychological and mental awareness to answer the crucial question of how to live in the world, but, much more than this, transforms the Augustinian desire for the God and the neighbor (*Caritas* I and II) into the love for the world (*Caritas* III or *amor mundi*).[56] Through the buttered pages of her doctoral dissertation, Arendt followed a course of a long and painful exile, a hermeneutic of distance (une herméneutique de la distance), according to Enzo Traverso,[57] that transformed her from a marginal *persona* into a woman of the world (*feminini generis*) and in turn, into one of the most significant thinkers within the Western canon of political and ethical thought.[58] According to Benjamin Aldes Wurgaft, Arendt, by adapting the model of German Bildung to the treasure of American republicanism,[59] managed to redevelop the profile of the modern philosopher as a *homo universalis* into a model of an intellectual of the public sphere, who fights, even through the

[52] Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority, Duquence University Press, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2007 (Translated by Alphonso Lingis).

[53] Oliver Marchart, 'Time for a New Beginning. Arendt, Benjamin, and the Messianic Conception of Political Temporality', In: *Redescriptions. Yearbbok of Political Thought and Conceptual History* 10 (2006), pp.134-147.

[54] Anya Topolski, Arendt, Levinas and the Politics of Relationality, Rowman & Littlefield International, London and New York, 2015, p. 84.

[55] Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, A Harvest Book. Harcourt Brace & Company, San Diego, New York, London, 1978, p. 202.

[56] Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott, ''What St. Augustine Taught Hannah Arendt about 'how to live in the world': Caritas, natality and the banality of evil'', In: Mika Ojakangas (ed.), Hannah Arendt. Practice, Thought and Judgment, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Helsinki, 2010, p. 8.

[57] Enzo Traverso, L'histoire comme champ de bataille. Interpréter les violences du xx siècle, La Découverte, Paris, 2016.

[58] Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt. For Love of the World, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2004.

[59] Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, Penguin Books, Middlesex and New York, 1985, p. 215.

daily press, for the values and principles of republic. Hence, her entire life must be considered as a high standard on how a contemporary citizen should think, behave and act; in other words, as the Weberian ideal type of a democratic citizenship.[60]

It can be strongly argued that her masterpiece The Origins of Totalitarianism, such as St. Augustine's City of God concerning ancient Rome,[61] summarizes the suffering and calamities of the first half of 20th century, mainly within the European context, by scrutinizing the ideological and political worldviews of imperialism, anti-Semitism and Totalitarianism.[62] Although she was, philosophically and ontologically speaking, sceptical about modernity,[63] Arendt never abandoned the republican virtue of the public sphere, attempting, through her oeuvre, to inspire us with the love for democracy in the sense of public happiness and, more generally, with the love for the world in the meaning of *amor mundi*.[64] In fact, exactly the same rationale was served by St. Augustine, who attributed Roman decline not to the laws and institutions of ancient Rome but to the passion of *libido dominandi*.[65] In the reissue of The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1958, just the same year as The Human Condition was released, Hannah Arendt, at the end of her book, as a conclusion, places a chapter under the eloquent title Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government,[66] in which St. Augustine's theory of *initium* is projected within the republican and democratic post-war American context as the promise of new politics itself.[67]

Both the Augustinian concepts of natality and *initium* signify for Arendt the ontological, phenomenological and ethical dimensions of political *praxis*. More specifically, natality does not symbolize the political *praxis* of new foundation as a new rule, *i.e.* in the sense of a new type of political leadership (ἄρχειν), but in the meaning of a genuine political beginning (αρχή). Thus, every end within Tradition leads to a new beginning.[68] Augustine's *initium* as natality denotes human diversity and so human contingency in the Kantian sense of absolute good and absolute evil. To put it differently, *initium* as natality indicates the transformative, even in a catastrophic way, power of human freedom.[69] Although the Arendtian key-concepts of natality, plurality, community *etc.* emerge under the spell of her American experience, it is absolutely clear that she builds her neo-Aristotelian republican and ethical theory in light of Love and Augustine by translating the ontological and theological category of *caritas* into the political term of *amor mundi*. Even though the entire project manifests a Heideggerian approach of St. Augustine, it is entirely apparent that her republican and ethical theory regarding public sphere as a passionate love for the world and

[60] Benjamin Aldes Wurgaft, Thinking in Public: Strauss, Levinas, Arendt, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2016, p. 2 and p. 153.

[61] Spiros Makris, 'Political Onto-Theologies or towards a Political Metaphysics. Some Critical Analogies from Plato to Jürgen Moltmann', In: *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science* 5/3 (2019), pp. 84-109.

[62] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Schocken Books, New York, 2004.

[63] Liisi Keedus, The Crisis of German Historicism. The Early Political Thought of Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015.

[64] Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, Penguin Books, Middlesex and New York, 1985, p. 115.

[65] Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott, ''What St. Augustine Taught Hannah Arendt about 'how to live in the world': Caritas, natality and the banality of evil'', In: Mika Ojakangas (ed.), Hannah Arendt. Practice, Thought and Judgment, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Helsinki, 2010, p. 8.

[66] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Schocken Books, New York, 2004, p. 593 and p. 616.

[67] Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics, Schocken Books, New York, 2005.

[68] Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, Penguin Books, London and New York, 2006, p. 164.

[69] Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic, A Harvest Book. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. New York, 1972, p. 103.

by extension as a fiery desire for a new political beginning display the strong Augustinian flavor of her philosophical thought on the whole.[70]

Through the onto-theological work of St. Augustine, Hannah Arendt meets the Christian existentialism of Søren Kierkegaard.[71] More than this, the Augustinian spirit of confession before God provides Arendt with the ontological idea of a public sphere where the individual becomes a responsible citizen before its human fellows.[72] The pessimistic atmosphere of the Weimar era, an era full of human agnst and existential anxiety, is transformed by her, with the precious assistance of St. Augustine's concept of love, into a republican awareness for worldliness and since the end of WWII for the advent of postwar phenomenon of mass society and comformism. Both of them connote the alienating power of Totalitarianism.[73] To put it in a nutshell, through St. Augustine's onto-theological thought, Hannah Arendt constructively overcomes Edmund Husserl's pure phenomenology and Martin Heidegger's formalist existentialism and by doing this, she actually redefines human's love both for the neighbor and the world. Human is again put as *Quaestio* at the epicenter of contemporary political theory, via the onto-theological and thus conceptual framework of Augustinian terms of *caritas* and natality. From this point of view, it is no coincidence that we speak more and more of an Arendtian political theology.[74]

Hannah Arendt rewrites St. Augustine's onto-theological thought within the historical horizon of an entirely transitional epoch, as obviously was also the Augustinian era, where that eternal Now, *i.e. nunc stans*, prevails between past and future.[75] In the position of Heideggerian Dasein, she places the Augustinian Creator, while in the position of Heideggerian mortality she places the Augustinian concept of natality in the sense of *initium*.[76] For Arendt, new beginning suggests a religious, philosophical, political and ethical rupture with Tradition or, more correctly, a rediscovery of the long past. This intellectual and conceptual rediscovery, including St. Augustine himself, is taking place within the context of a long journey towards the emergence of another Tradition; in fact, an anti-Tradition; where the crucial issue, as in the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida,[77] is not the phenomenological reduction of things per se, but first and foremost our relationship with our neighbor; or our relationship with the Other.[78]

[70] Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott, ''What St. Augustine Taught Hannah Arendt about 'how to live in the world': Caritas, natality and the banality of evil'', In: Mika Ojakangas (ed.), Hannah Arendt. Practice, Thought and Judgment, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Helsinki, 2010, pp. 9-10.

[71] Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding. Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism 1930-1954, Schocken Books, New York, 1994, pp. 44-49.

[72] Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding. Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism 1930-1954, Schocken Books, New York, 1994, pp. 24-27.

[73] Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, Penguin Books, London and New York, 2006, p. 194.

[74] Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott, ''What St. Augustine Taught Hannah Arendt about 'how to live in the world': Caritas, natality and the banality of evil'', In: Mika Ojakangas (ed.), Hannah Arendt. Practice, Thought and Judgment, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Helsinki, 2010, p. 11.

[75] Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, A Harvest Book. Harcourt Brace & Company, San Diego, New York, London, 1978, pp. 202-213.

[76] Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott, ''What St. Augustine Taught Hannah Arendt about 'how to live in the world': Caritas, natality and the banality of evil'', In: Mika Ojakangas (ed.), Hannah Arendt. Practice, Thought and Judgment, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Helsinki, 2010, pp. 12-16.

[77] Spiros Makris, 'Emmanuel Levinas on Hospitality. Ethical and Political Aspects', In: *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science*, 2/2 (2018), pp. 79-96.

[78] Spiros Makris, 'Politics, Ethics and Strangers in the 21st Century. Fifteen critical reflections on Jacques Derrida's concept of hos(ti)pitality', In: *Theoria & Praxis. International Journal of Interdisciplinary Thought*, 5/1 (2017), pp. 1-21 and Spiros Makris, 'Public sphere as ''ultimum refugium''. The philosophical, political

The republican way that Arendt reads St. Augustine places her in the field of *vita activa*, away from the intellectual spell of the pure *vita contemplativa*. In the most of her life, especially in her American years, Arendt played the critical role of a public intellectual at the epicenter of the public sphere, by expressing a public speech full of passion for political freedom and public happiness.[79] More specifically, since 1941, in the United States of America, Arendt established herself in the public space as a radical intellectual figure who shifted the focus of contemporary political and ethical theory to the issue of Nazi extermination camps and in particular to the issues of guilt and personal responsibility.[80] St. Augustine's *initium* as natality,[81] in the face of absolute evil, is transformed into a *Quaestio* for the human itself ('quaestio mihi factus sum'), no longer in the abstract sense, but now in the meaning of thoughtlessness, that is, the inability of each individual to wield his or her moral judgment; to reflect on his or her position in-the-world; in particular, to understand the importance and consequences of his or her habits, actions and behaviors upon the others.[82] The evil, then, comes out of a certain inability to think broadly or to imagine the position of Other in-the-world (see some of Arendt's relative concepts as enlarged thought, representative thinking, imagination *etc.*).[83]

In pure Augustinian terms, radical evil is provoked by our inability to consciously perform the onto-theology of love in-the-world (*ordo amoris*); a worldly love, which transforms the divine creation into a new beginning (*initium*) of my equal relationship with the others in front of God. However, this Arendtian consciousness is not an instrumental process of means and ends. Human free will is constantly tested by intense dilemmas, where radical good and radical evil confront each other, shaking the ontological basis of the individual. Therefore, the absurdist, or sometimes heroic, action of choice in Søren Kierkegaard's theology is not a product of a cool Cartesian will.[84] Instead of it, every human decision is tested, almost tragically, by a feeling of aporia and undecidability,[85] where judgment and understanding are taking place as a single action of courage. ''Courage'', Arendt writes, ''is the earliest of all political virtues, and even today it is still one of the few cardinal virtues of politics, because only by stepping out of our private existence and the familial relationships to which our lives are tied can we make our way into the common public world that is our truly political space''.[86] Thereby, to sum up, Arendt perceives St. Augustine and his existential onto-theology as an actual performance of courage in the public sphere, by transforming *amor Dei* into *amor mundi* under a bright light of visibility,

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and ethical theory of Hannah Arendt', In: *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science*, 3/4 (2019), pp. 77-92.

[79] Richard King, Arendt and America, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2015, p. 125 and Benjamin Aldes Wurgaft, Thinking in Public: Strauss, Levinas, Arendt, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2016, p. 205.

[80] Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, Schocken Books, New York, 2003.

[81] Patricia Bowen-Moore, Hannah Arendt's Philosophy of Natality, The Macmillan Press Ltd., Hampshire and London, 1989.

[82] Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil, Penguin Books, New York and London, 2006, p. 280.

[83] Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and Brighton, 1992, p. 43, p. 79 and p. 106.

[84] Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding. Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism 1930-1954, Schocken Books, New York, 1994, p. 44.

[85] Jacques Derrida, Aporias, Stanford California Press, Stanford, California, 1993 (Translated by Thomas Dutoit).

[86] Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics, Schocken Books, New York, 2005, p. 122.

where the life of the mind is actually the life of a person who speaks, acts and judges responsibly and having as a human measure the common good.

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
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[64] Thomas Breidenthal, ''Jesus is my Neighbor: Arendt, Augustine, and the Politics of Incarnation'', In: *Modern Theology* 14/4 (1998), pp. 489-503.

[65] Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings. Volume 4, 1938-1940, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 2006.

# HENRI BERGSON: SCIENCE, LIFE-SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN CONDITION

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## ABSTRACT

*This article scrutinizes in-depth the theological dimension in Hannah Arendt's The developments in 19th century life-science were, in many ways, a continuation of the scientific revolution that begun in the 16th century. Yet, these developments also marked a new era, since now not only matter, but also life and humans, could, ostensibly, be understood within the scientific paradigm. In the article, I argue that these developments met with two basic and polarized responses, which are manifested in the dichotomy between modernism and postmodernism. Moreover, this dichotomy continues to divide both the academic world and society more generally. However, I suggest that there is a third possible response, one taken by Henri Bergson and one that has received much less attention. This response offers a middle way between these extremes, acknowledging scientific achievements yet emphasizing the uniqueness of life and human existence. It thus seeks to maintain the autonomy of the study of life and of philosophy as a life-oriented discipline.*

**Keywords:** Henri Bergson; Science; Life-Science; Philosophy; Human Condition;

## INTRODUCTION

On October 18th, 2019, occurred the 160th anniversary of the birthday of the French philosopher Henri Louis Bergson, one of the most influential philosophers at the beginning of the 20th century. I think that it is quite safe to say that this birthday has not been celebrated in too many places around the world, despite voices that are being heard from time to time claiming a renaissance of Bergsonism. I do believe, however, that there are good reasons why Bergsonism, or rather Henri Bergson's Philosophy, should be revived, some of which I would like to outline in this paper.

Curiously enough, and one may say ironical too, Bergson's year of birth was the same year in which Charles Robert Darwin's *On the Origin of Species by way of Natural Selection* was first published.[1] The irony here is two-faced. First, Bergson, despite the great appreciation he had for science, especially for (then) modern biology, tried to exceed and in a way overcome it, so much so that one could say that his entire philosophy engages in this mission. In each of his major books, as in most of his articles and lectures, Bergson takes on a central scientific theme, and while accepting and using many of the scientific discoveries and theories, he nevertheless criticizes, corrects and attempts to go beyond them. His best-known book, *The Creative Evolution* (*L'Evolution Creatrice*),[2] is devoted to debating

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[1] Charles R. Darwin, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*, Penguin, London, 1859/1985.
[2] Henri L. Bergson, *The Creative Evolution*, Dover, New York, 1907/1983 (Translated by A. Mitchell).

Darwinism and 19th century life-science. The second and bitter side of the irony is that while most of the world continues to celebrate Darwin's most notable work and his overall achievements, those of Bergson's seems to be rather neglected and forgotten.

What was it in modern science in general and particularly modern biology that evoked Bergson's reaction and motivated his entire philosophical project? And what can we learn, or rather should learn, from this project?

## 1. THE DOUBLE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

The developments in 19th century life-science, led by Darwin's theory of evolution and later by Mendel's Genetics, were a continuation of what is traditionally referred to as the *scientific revolution*, that took place in Europe since the Renaissance.[3] The main characteristics of this revolution have been vastly addressed in the literature, and therefore need only be described briefly.

(1) A growing reliance on empirical data, combined with the elaboration of the experimental method,[4] which was supported and enhanced by technological developments.

This empirical approach was combined with:

(2) Mathematization and geometrization of the empirical data,[5] under the assumption that all natural phenomena can be understood and described in mathematical and geometrical formulas. In Galileo's famous words: "Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe… but the book is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are… geometric figures."[6]

(3) Materialization and mechanization of the world view,[7] that usually were combined with determinism, such as to form a picture of the universe as a product of the necessary motions of matter, that themselves are the necessary outcome of natural laws.

(4) Naturalization and objectivization of all methods and foundations of knowledge,[8] so there is no place nor need for "that hypothesis," in Pierre Laplace's words, of God;[9] and even more, though not as clearly pronounced, no room for what is subjective in essence, namely, consciousness and its related phenomena.[10]

To be sure, all these characteristics are intimately linked – a point that will soon be made explicit. But what is important to notice is that 19th century life-science applied them both as techniques and as presupposition, and in so doing marked a new era.[11] For it was no longer only the realm of matter that could be explained within this framework, but also the realm of life, that from now on will be understood as just another phenomena in the material-mechanical-natural world.

What were the consequences of this double revolution? At least from one perspective, it formed, as Sigmund Freud put it, a huge assault on humanity's views of itself.[12] It deprived humanity of its assumed position in the center of the universe (the Copernican boost to the first scientific revolution); from its conviction of being at the center of earth and the crown of creation (the evolution theory); and in short, from its belief in its uniqueness and its special place in the world. It went, however, even deeper. For the process

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[3] While there is an ongoing debate as to whether the concept of revolution is suitable for describing the changes that occurred in the scientific realm during the early modern period, there is a wide agreement that this realm has undergone fundamental transformation, which profoundly affected society and culture. Here, in order to emphasize this transformation and its consequences, I will continue to use the phrase *scientific revolution*, without committing to a view of sharp and clear-cut historical boundaries. On this subject see: John P. McKay, *A History of Western Society: From the Renaissance to 1815*, Vol. B (8th ed.), Bedford/St. Martin's, Boston, 2005; Thomas Nickles, Scientific Revolutions (winter 2017), in E. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/scientific-revolutions (accessed 29.01.2020).

of digesting the new scientific paradigm seemed to yield a necessary and rational rejection of a whole cluster of beliefs that went together under the old worldview. Not only the belief in God was undermined – and in fact it was possible to leave this belief intact by putting God as a non-intervening creator, as did many (e.g., Deism) – but the beliefs in human freedom, creativity, autonomy and even, as aforesaid, the belief in subjectivity itself. For under the new scientific paradigm, all subjective phenomena were claimed to be nothing but an illusion, epiphenomena, no more.[13]

## 2. THE DUAL REACTION TO THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

Of course, these consequences of the scientific revolution did not occur at once but were taking shape in a long process. It is my claim that this process is still going on and its fruits, not all tasty and healthy, are actively present in our days, on all levels of life – theoretical as well as practical. It is also my contention that there were, and still are – though in a changing outfit – two basic and polarized responses to the double scientific revolution, especially the second, life-science one. These responses are manifested in the dichotomy between *modernism* and *postmodernism*.

Now, while it is clear that these titles were not chosen arbitrarily, it is important that they will not be understood, in the present context, as encompassing too much or too little. Especially, they should not be understood solely in their historical connotation, that is, as only describing different historical phases, because I claim them to exist concurrently. Therefore, there is a need to explain what is meant by the claim that they are the basic reactions to the first, and mainly the second, phase of the scientific revolution.

By *modernism* I mean the philosophical and cultural reaction which accepts science as the only guide to truth and rejects as false all other methods and ways. Here we find the philosophical expression of an attitude which Richard Double calls "Philosophy as continuous with science,"[14] i.e., philosophy which adopts and follows the main epistemological, metaphysical and methodological presuppositions of science. On the broad

[4] Floris H. Cohen, *The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994; David Wootton, *The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific Revolution*, Penguin, London, 2015.

[5] Piers Bursill-Hall, (2002, May 1). Why do We Study Geometry? Answers Through the Ages. *The Department of Pure Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics, University of Cambridge*, ©2001. Retrieved from https://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~piers/F-I-G_opening_ppr.pdf (accessed 20.01.2020); D. Wootton, *The Invention of Science*: *A New History of the Scientific Revolution.*

[6] Peter K. Machamer (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Galileo*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 64.

[7] Richard S. Westfall, *The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.

[8] J. P. McKay, *A History of Western Society: From the Renaissance to 1815.*

[9] Carl B. Boyer, *A History of Mathematics*, Wiley, New York, 1968, p. 538.

[10] Edwin A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 2001; Steven Shapin, *The Scientific Revolution*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996.

[11] Though it was Mendel, rather than Darwin, who laid the mathematical foundations of evolutionary biology. See, for example, Vitezslav Orel, *Mendel*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984 (Translated by S. Finn).

[12] Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis*, Boni & Liveright, New York, 1922 (Translated by G. Stanley), p. 247. Freud added psychoanalysis to this continuum, as to form the "three big blows" to humanity, but here I leave aside the third one.

[13] E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*; Alan B. Wallace, *The Taboo of Subjectivity: Toward a New Science of Consciousness*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

[14] Richard Double, *Metaphilosophy and Free Will*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 22-32.

cultural level, we find a total secular approach, as well as different kinds of scientism, which reject, as stated, all other views about life as nonsense. By *postmodernism* I mean, on the contrary, the philosophical attitude which rejects any interpretation of science as a privileged way of knowledge and claims it – as do Richard Rorty[15] and Jean-François Lyotard[16] for example – to be just another way of storytelling. On the broad cultural level, this attitude reveals itself in varied ways. For instant, skepticism, or the relativization of both truth and values, but also – and this is an expansion of the usual meaning of the term – in various kinds of fundamentalism. One should think here about occurrences like the *Scopes Monkey Trial*, the *creationism* versus *evolutionism* debate, or, from another perspective, on Umberto Eco's novel *Foucault's Pendulum*,[17] where a straight and un-mistakable line is drawn between the "anything goes" attitude and religious-fundamental one.

Of course, one can argue against the above use of the terms *modernism* and *postmodernism*, claiming it is inaccurate. However, it should be noted that these terms are not being used here as rigid definitions but rather as a suggestive tool which attempts to pick out and identify some of the main reactions and processes that followed the double scientific revolution. What is more important is that three main features, which can be identified as emerging from the analysis above of the reactive processes to the scientific revolution, should be quite acceptable. These features are, firstly, that in both reactions, philosophy is no longer taken to be a leading, or even autonomous, discipline that seeks the truth in its own right and in its own way. That is to say that, for the modernists, philosophy is coming to be primarily a critical tool, which mainly support and clarify the scientific (as well as other) discourses;[18] while for the postmodernists, philosophy, as much as science, is now just another way of talking and writing.[19] Secondly, that these opposite reactions, although not the only reactions to the double scientific revolution, do represent the most basic and wide-spreading reactions to it, both by the academics and the general public, and thus represent an ever-growing mutual antagonism and dichotomy both in society in general and in the sphere of knowledge-seeking. Thirdly, that underneath the first two points and of the overall reaction to the double scientific revolution, there lies true confusion and an attempt to deal with an all new picture of the world; a picture in which, as stated above, not only is there no need for God, but also the very sense of subjectivity is being challenged, as are the beliefs in autonomy, freedom, and telos of life and in life.

It is exactly here, at the diachronic clashing point between past and present worldviews and the synchronic clashing point of reactions that follows it, that Bergson can be of great assistance. His relevance and significance are due to the fact that – unlike the two basic reactions to the scientific revolution – his reaction to the diachronic clash does not take the shape of either a regressive, aggressive, or submissive attitude which are so often the identifying mark of human reaction to big changes. Thus, Bergson is able to offer a third, middle way and balanced approach to the revolution that has shaken humanity so deeply.

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[15] Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

[16] Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis, 1984 (Translated by G. Bennington & B. Massumi).

[17] Umberto Eco, *Foucault's Pendulum*, Ballantine Books, New York, 1989 (Translated by W. Weaver).

[18] Stephen R. C Hicks, *Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault*, Scholargy Publishing, Tempe, AZ, 2004.

[19] See, e.g., Richard Rorty, "Philosophy as a kind of writing: An essay on Derrida," in *New Literary History* 10/1 (1978), pp. 141–160.

### 3. BERGSON'S ALTERNATIVE REACTION TO THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

#### 3.1. The Middle Way

As mentioned, in all his major works Bergson referred directly to science, showed respect for science and invested lot of time studying its findings and methods. He understood, appreciated and accepted the gains made by science. Bergson was not, then, a postmodernist. However, he was not a blind follower either. He critically examined science, and his findings led him both to draw the limits of science and the scientific way and to offer a different method of knowledge that would not substitute science, but will work shoulder to shoulder with it, exploring levels of reality which science, as his investigation showed, could not reach. In this way, Bergson aimed both at recovering the traditional place of philosophy as a central discipline of knowledge and defending humanity`s fundamental beliefs that were shaken so hard by the scientific revolution. Bergson then, was not either what has been defined above as modernist.

Bergson's most famous book, *The Creative Evolution*, deals directly with life-science and life as such. In it, Bergson examines in depth the scientific developments in the field of Biology. Still more, he accepts what he takes to be the factual content of this science, that is, he accepts evolution as a proven fact and even makes it the cornerstone of his philosophical outlook.[20] However, Bergson rejects the interpretation that the new science gives to the facts; rejects it, as will be shown, for three reasons: as not being sufficiently coherent; and – in a deeper level, as being the outcome of epistemological misunderstanding that farther leads to a metaphysical misconception.

#### 3.2. The Argument from Coherence and the Élan Vital

Before turning to this last issue, there is a need to point out that knowledgeable as he was, Bergson – as most of his generation – could not appreciate the full scale of the genetic discoveries of George Mendel which are, alongside Darwin's theory of evolution, the cornerstone of modern biology, simply because that in his time Mendel's ideas were hardly known and understood. Hence Bergson referred much more to Darwin's theory and to the science of embryology which was developing rapidly at the time. Having said this, however, it is quite remarkable to notice that it is possible to read Bergson's arguments in the first part of the *The Creative Evolution* as arguments against the present day evolutionary biology, that is, biology that attempts to explain evolution in a mechanical and statistical way by combining Darwin's concept of evolution by natural selection with Mendelian genetics.[21]

Regarding the incoherence of the Darwinian theory of evolution, the central argument in *The Creative Evolution* is that no mechanistic model of evolution can sufficiently explain neither the parallel lines of evolution, nor its growing (in some directions) complexity. Without entering too deep into these argument, since, as will immediately become clear, this subject will lead us too far from the main purpose of this paper – we can note that, as to the first claim, Bergson argues that it is not reasonable to suppose that accidently almost the same organs (eyes, ears, etc.) were developed in different and remote species, classes or even subphylum such as vertebrate and invertebrate, even though those were separated before the organs developed.

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[20] Magda C. Carvalho & Maria P. Neves, "Building the 'true evolutionism': Darwin's impact on Henri Bergson's thought," in *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 66/3 (2010), pp. 635-642.

[21] María D. I. Wolsky, & Alexander A. Wolsky, "Bergson's vitalism in the light of modern biology," in Frederick Burwick & Paul Douglass (eds.), *The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 158-163.

"What likelihood is there that, by two entirely different series of accidents being added together, two entirely different evolutions will arrive at similar results? The more two lines of evolution diverge, the less probability is there that accidental outer influences or accidental inner variations bring about the construction of the same apparatus upon them, especially if there was no trace of this apparatus at the moment of divergence."[22]

In other words, both the hypothesis of genetic mutations and the hypothesis of selection by adaptation, as well as the combination of the two, fall short of supplying a sufficient explanation for the almost identical structures in such remote lines of evolution.

As to the second point, Bergson argues that neither the concept of small and gradual variation, nor the one of quick and big ones, can explain the development of complex organs, like the eye.[23] Regarding the first instance, it seems that in the process of development of the organ, each small variation – prior to the organ is completed and functioning well – will be disadvantage to the creature, since it will interrupt rather than help its survival. The small variations, therefore, should be eliminated by natural selection before the organ is completed. Then again, great repeated luck, indeed a miracle, is needed in order to produce abruptly new, complex and well-functioning organs.[24]

Of course, what insures for Bergson the creation and coordination of evolution is the notorious *élan vital* – the creative force of the universe. This seems unfortunate because, not only does modern biology reject all kind of *vitalism*, i.e., the belief in some special force needed to produce life, but also it seems like the dispute between vitalism and its antagonist – *mechanism* – has long been decided in favor of the latter. The case, however, is far from being simple. For example, some claim that vitalism is being revived our days under the headings of *complex-systems* and/or *emergentism*.[25] In addition, there are substantial differences between Bergson's vitalism and other forms of vitalism, so much so that one might hesitate to label Begson's approach as vitalistic.[26] This subject, then, deserves a detailed treatment that cannot be given here. It should, however, be remembered that the concept of élan vital is an expansion and extrapolation of a more fundamental and more defensible concept, that of *duration* (la durée), or real time.[27] Thus, and in order to emphasize the *relevance* of Bergson's alternative reaction to the double scientific revolution while at the same time clarifying this reaction, it is better to direct the discussion to a different, more primal, perspective, one that focuses on a crucial distinction that was drawn by Bergson. This is the epistemological distinction between *intellect* (l'intelligence) and *intuition* (l'intuition) and its metaphysical counterpart – the distinction between duration and

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[22] H. L. Bergson, *The Creative Evolution*, p. 54.

[23] Ibid., pp. 64-66.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Timothy O'Connor & Hong Yu,Wong, Emergent Properties (Summer 2015), in E. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/ (accessed 29.01.2020). See also: Cécilia Bognon-Küss, Chen Bohang & Charles T. Wolfe, "Metaphysics, function and the engineering of life: The problem of vitalism," in *Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science* 20 (2018), pp. 113-140; Paul Douglass, "Deleuze's Bergson: Bergson redux," in Frederick Burwick & Paul Douglass (eds.), *The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 368-388.

[26] Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Bergson's encounter with biology: Thinking life," in *Angelaki* 10/2 (2005), pp. 59-72; James DiFrisco, "Elan vital revisited: Bergson and the thermodynamic paradigm," in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 53/1 (2015), pp. 54-73; P. Douglass, "Deleuze's Bergson: Bergson redux."

[27] See, e.g., Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, Zone Books, New York, 1988 (Translated by H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam). I will return to this point towards the end of the paper.

matter.[28] These are the most central concepts of the all Bergsonian philosophy and exploring them is probably the best way to understand and appreciate Bergson's criticism of modern science and his positive answer to it. From this angle, it would also be easier to understand Bergson's position about life as such.

### 3.3. The Epistemological-Metaphysical Argument: Intellect, Intuition, Time and Space-Matter

Bergson's basic epistemological claim is that there are two human fundamental forms of knowledge. One is the intellect, which operates through the medium of space, its working tools are concepts and language, and its working method is breaking reality into parts and reconstructing it in varied ways, according to the various human needs.

"… Homogeneous space concerns our action and only our action, being like infinitely fine network which we stretch beneath material continuity in order to render ourselves masters of it, to decompose it according to the plan of our activities and our needs."[29]

Intellect, claims Bergson, is the prime human cognitive faculty. Its first aim is pragmatic, but since it works, and works well, to keep humans alive in the material world, it manages to adapt better and better to this world, until it actually fits it and is able to disclose it.[30] In Bergsonian jargon, matter is extensive, which means that it tends toward spatiality, although is not completely spatial since, as can be understood from the above quotation, space is an ideal projection of the human mind and does not exist outside it.[31] Matter exists simultaneously, statically and without inner change,[32] and these traits are exactly what the intellect is looking to find in reality, since they give humans the firm base necessary for their survival. The intellect, then, cuts from the material reality the areas which interest it, freezes them and creates separate and permanent objects, permanent states, permanent relations, which, seemingly, never change and thus offer humans the safe and secure route to the satisfaction of their needs.[33] For example, on my table I grasp now a pen, a sheet of paper and a book. Each of them seems to me to be an object separated from the others, with certain spatial qualities and certain spatial relations to the other objects in the room. Thanks to their apparently separateness, I can identify them. With the help of concepts and language, I can classify them as (general) things – 'pen', 'book' etc., and thus I can know what to do with them – I can use them. Thanks to their spatial characteristics I can later put them back to

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[28] Bergson does not always use the word *intelligence*. Sometimes, especially in *The Creative Evolution*, he uses the word *entendement*, which has narrower meaning that refers mainly to the discursive aspect of the intellect. As shall be seen, this is indeed an essential aspect of the intellect, as well as its ability to understand and discriminate, which is captured more precisely by the term *intelligence*.

[29] Henri L. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1896/1950 (Translated by N. M. Paul & W. S. Palmer), p.308.

[30] Henri L. Bergson, *The Creative Evolution*, ch. 3; *The Creative Mind; An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Carol Publishing Group, New York, 1934/1903/1992 (Translated by M. L. Andison), pp. 37-45.

[31] For Bergson spatiality means the absolute (mutual) externality of objects and so mutual independence. Matter, on the other hand, is a continuum which its particles interpenetrate each other, and that is why the intellect said to "cut it", or "decompose" it (see H. L. Bergson, *The creative Evolution*, p. 189, and also below). It might also be noted that on space the Bergsonian position can be read as Kantian. But of course, as soon will become clear, the case is different regarding time, which for Bergson is a primal ontological being. On Bergson's treatment of the Kantian position regarding space and time see, for example: H. L. Bergson, *The Creative Evolution*, pp. 356-362.

[32] Although it should be noticed that according to Bergson even in matter there are some areas of indeterminacy, and thus possibility of indeterministic change (and this is why and how freedom and creation are possible for bodily humans. See, for example, H. L. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, pp. 326-332).

[33] H. L. Bergson, *The Creative Evolution*, pp. 151-164.

their place in the room, which seemingly never changes, due the apparently same relations it keeps with other spots in the room.

Therefore, the material sphere and the intellect can be understood as epistemical-metaphysical counterparts: The inert and homogenous matter lending itself to intellectual treatment of "decomposing according to any law and of recomposing into any system" exactly because it is devoid from inner movement, inner life, inner development.[34]

Beside the intellect, according to Bergson, there is another different human cognitive faculty, one he terms intuition. Intuition, unlike the intellect, is an uninterested, truth-oriented – as oppose to pragmatic – way of knowledge, that forms a direct and inner – not mediated (i.e., through the medium of space) – link to reality. In order to distinguish the two ways of knowledge, Bergson gives an example.

"When you lift your arm you accomplish a movement the simple perception of which you have inwardly; but outwardly, for me, the person who sees it, your arms passes through one point, then through another, and between these two points there will be still other points, so that if I begin to count them, the operation will continue indefinitely. Seen from within, an absolute is then a simple thing; but considered from without, that is to say, relative to something else, it becomes, with relation to those signs which express it, the piece of gold for which one can never make up change."[35]

The intellect first throws the *spatial network* on the perceptual data, breaking it into different and separate units – the points through which the hand supposedly travels; then reconstructs the data with its tools, i.e., concepts and signs, so the movement can be described, for example, as a series of points on a system of axes. However, this description, argues Bergson, does not capture the essence of movement itself, but it is rather a static and spatial, or intellectual, translation of it. Therefore, the intellect's knowledge of the movement is relative – both to the knower and to the system of signs. The intuition, on the other hand, grasps the movement in one, indivisible act, knows it, claims Bergson, in an absolute manner.[36]

Since intuition is a direct knowledge, it discloses first and foremost the inner life, inner reality, that is to say, the life of consciousness, of which every consciousness being has a direct link to. Since intuition is an absolute knowledge, it reveals, or at least might reveal, to each consciousness being, their true nature. What intuition discovers, according to Bergson, is that consciousness is an unbroken, evolving, qualitative-heterogeneous process;[37] it discovers, in other words, that the structure of consciousness is that of real time, of duration.

In *The Creative Evolution* Bergson suggests that intuition developed as a combination of intellect and instinct. I shall not elaborate on this theory here, as doing so will divert the discussion to overly remote territories.[38] What need to be noticed about it, and more important, about Bergson's epistemological theory, are the following points:

(1) He tries to ground his theory on the assumption of evolution.

(2) This theory explains science's success and development, mostly the physical sciences' success, by relating the characteristics of the intellect and the material world, so it

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[34] Ibid., P. 157.

[35] H. L. Bergson, *The Creative Mind; An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 161.

[36] Ibid., pp. 159-162.

[37] See, e.g., Ibid., p. 32.

[38] On this issue see, for example, John Mullarkey, *Bergson and Philosophy: An Introduction*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1999.

becomes clear why and how this success occurred. That is to say, the characteristics of the scientific revolution mentioned above – mathematization, geometrization and mechanization of knowledge – are being explained as the natural outcome of the intellect's way of working, which in itself is a natural outcome of adaptation to the material world.

(3) But while Bergson attributes to science and intellect the ability to disclose material realty, he also claims that they cannot reveal *all* of reality. They cannot reveal reality of life in general, especially of consciousness, simply because these escape the tools and operating system of the intellect and can only be grasped by intuition.

Why does Bergson claim that the intellect cannot grasp the true nature of consciousness and life? Recall that Bergson equates consciousness with real time or duration and characterizes real time – and therefore the stream of consciousness – as an unbroken, evolving, qualitative-heterogeneous continuity. To take an example that Bergson himself gives in order to demonstrate the processes that constitutes consciousness, the formation of the feeling of pity: The first stage of this feeling consists, according to Bergson "… in putting oneself mentally in the place of others, in suffering their pain."[39] This element of pity is not, however, the whole feeling because suffering invokes revulsion in humans and deters them, and hence this element alone would cause them to back away from the subject who suffers. But this primal feeling is joined by "the need of helping our fellow men and of alleviating their suffering."[40] Bergson acknowledges the possibility that this additional element of the feeling is based upon utilitarian consideration that "I myself might suffer in the future,"[41] However, he continues, here another emotional factor appears which is a kind of desire to suffer. This element turns the feeling of pity into something noble in our eyes, because it goes above and beyond utilitarian considerations, and with this the feeling of pity reaches its completeness.[42]

In this example are manifested all the characteristics of duration mentioned above. Firstly, there is the heterogeneous, or qualitative, multiplicity of the different feelings – revulsion, fear, sympathy, nobility – which cannot be reduced to each other. Secondly, this multiplicity is being created over time, that is to say, as a succession of one stage after another. However, thirdly, this is not a succession of atomic units which are external to each other but rather mutual co-permeation and merging. This means that the past is preserved, permeates the present, influences it and, together with it, creates a new reality. This reality is qualitatively, and not quantitatively, different from the preceding reality, because the new feeling created is not the aggregated sum total of the feelings preceded it, but it is distinguished and different from them, and yet includes them.

Bergson maintains that sensations and perceptions, and not only emotions, are fashioned according to the same model of qualitative development. For example, a certain sensation of heat is not just greater or stronger than other sensations of heat that preceded it but is qualitatively different from them as any "close attention" will reveal.[43] As Lacey points out, every sensation, emotion or other psychological state, involves time and time involves memory.[44] The events of the past – in the last example these will be the sensations of heat that preceded the present sensation of heat – are preserved and accumulated into a

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[39] Henri L. Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, Dover, London, 1889/1957 (Translated by F.L. Pogson), p. 18.

[40] Ibid., p. 19.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., p. 46.

[44] Alan R. Lacey, *Bergson*, Routledge, London, 1989, pp. 49-50.

new sensation that is qualitatively different from those that preceded it. In other words, the actuality of the time factor necessitates qualitative change from moment to moment since the past joins up with the present and so creates a new reality.

In *Time and Free Will*,[45] Bergson analyses many more examples of perceptions, sensations and emotions, and show them all to be of the same nature of the examples given. Bergson establishes, thus, a firm base to the claim according to which the structure of consciousness is duration. It is also important to notice that, since according to Bergson each event in consciousness includes something completely new – that cannot be reduced to the former events or states – it follows that the structure of consciousness, and hence of real time, is indeterministic, that is, each event in consciousness, while necessarily connected to the past, is also unpredictable and unnecessarily outcome of it.[46]

Now, recall that Bergson's contention is that the intellect's initial goal is pragmatic, namely, to make our actions in the world as efficient as possible in order to satisfy our needs; and that it pursues its goal by dividing the material sphere and stamping the parts as permanent forms, that can be used over and over again. Recall also that the intellect's tools are symbols and signs, that their nature corresponds to their function, meaning they are, in themselves, atomic units that stand for constant and atomic things, relations and properties, and have only external relations; units that represent only the abstract and general aspects of realty, its common and homogeneous, rather than exceptional and heterogeneous, face. If all this is true, then it is clear why, according to Bergson, the intellect cannot grasp the unbroken, heterogeneous, indeterministic process which is consciousness, since the intellect can only know and describe the discrete, un-continuous, homogenous, simultaneous, in short spatial, aspects of the real.[47]

On the same ground, it is possible to apprehend now the distinction drawn by Bergson between real and false time. The later, the normative time of clocks and convention, is a combination of homogeneous, completely discrete, units (seconds, minutes, hours) which – because of its nature, can be thought of as reversible and part of deterministic world.[48] This is the time that the intellect, which dominates both common sense and science,[49] constructs and presents as real time. However, according to Bergson it is not so, since real time is a duration: an unbroken, indeterministic, evolving, heterogeneous continuity; duration, that because of its structure, cannot, in principle, be grasped by intellect only by intuition which is a direct, sympathizing introspection that reveal the true nature of the self, nature whose essence is being in time not in space.[50]

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[45] Entitled in French *Essai Sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*.

[46] For example, H. L. Bergson, *The Creative Evolution*, pp. 1-7; *The Creative Mind; An Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 11-29. See also; Milič Čapek, *Bergson and Modern Physics*, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1971, pp. 99-105.

[47] H. L. Bergson, *The Creative Evolution*, p. 162.

[48] James W. Felt, *Making Sense of Your Freedom*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1994; Raz Shpeizer, *Henri Bergson and the Problem of Free Will*, Resling, Tel Aviv [in Hebrew], pp. 50-68.

[49] H. L. Bergson, *The Creative Mind; An Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp, 37-45.

[50] The sense of the term *sympathy* for Bergson is close to its original Greek meaning of sharing feelings or experiences (in Greek *sympatheia*, which is composed from *syn* - "together" and *pathos* -" feeling"). He uses the term first and foremost to indicate the epistemic relation between the conscious knower and their (real) self. See, Ibid., pp. 162-163).

Turning back to Bergson's treatment of life as such, it should become clearer now why Bergson equates life with consciousness, claiming that both share the same structure.[51] Accepting evolution as a matter of fact, Bergson recognizes in it an evolving stream of heterogeneous forms, which can be created unpredictably in any new direction – similar to the stream of consciousness. It should also become clearer why Bergson claims that science cannot reveal the essence of life, science being the methodization of the intellect way to treat and investigate reality. Recall the characteristics of the scientific revolution that were enumerated in the first section. Mathematics and geometry, which during this revolution became the main tools and means of science, are in themselves the culmination and pure manifestation of the intellect's function and tools. As Bergson stresses and demonstrates in many places,[52] geometry is the science of space, i.e., of things and qualities that exists simultaneously, meaning, timelessly, without change; while mathematics is the language which takes into perfection all the intellectual properties mentioned above. Thus, argues Bergson,[53] we find in mathematics

(1) Total separation between the mathematical symbols (the numbers), and therefore between the objects they represent in the world. It is imperative that the numbers will be completely separate and external to each other, for without such separation no act of calculation will be possible. If the arithmetic units will merge with each other, they would lose their meaning and mathematics would collapse.

(2) Permanence – the signs of the mathematical language never change and always have the same meaning (same value).

(3) Homogeneity – the numerical units are perceived during the arithmetical calculi as identical and any quality that might differentiate them is being removed.

(4) Simultaneity – to perform a calculation, or even just to build a number, the numerical units must be placed side by side, so they can be combined in order to create a new number.

This mutual externality of the units, their permanence, the need to place them simultaneously side by side require, according to Bergson, ideal space, i.e., an empty homogeneous environment, in which the arithmetical functions can be treated.[54] Hence, both mathematics and geometry are meant, by their very nature, only to construct and describe spatial pictures, which are permanent pictures built up from completely homogeneous, external, simultaneous units, and cannot be used to grasp nor describe realty which is a continuous, evolving, heterogeneous process, the reality of real time, of duration.[55]

Duration, then, can be known only through intuition. It is, claims Bergson, an undeniable fact known through a subjective experience of introspection which proves subjectivity itself,[56] namely, consciousness – the one which science denies in the name of objectivity – to be primal fact. We come to know consciousness and its structure through consciousness. Intuition is consciousness tuned-in to itself and becomes one with itself. What is more, since the study of duration reveals, according to Bergson, its indeterministic

[51] Henri L. Bergson, *Mind energy*, Henry Holt & Company, New York, 1929 (Translated by H. W. Carr), pp. 22-23; *The creative evolution*, p. 207.

[52] See e.g., H. L. Bergson, *The Creative Evolution*, ch. 3; *Time and Free Will*, ch. 2.

[53] See especially, H. L. Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 75-85.

[54] Ibid., pp. 77-78.

[55] M. Čapek, *Bergson and Modern Physics*, pp. 139-140.

[56] H. L. Bergson, *The Creative Evolution*, pp. 1-2; *The Creative Mind; An Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp, 159-163;

and immaterial (in Bergsonian terminology non-spatial) nature, the door is re-opened to the old beliefs in freedom and spirituality. Freedom being the creative way in which the durational consciousness can act, produces an unnecessary and unpredictable future;[57] spirit being its timely – rather than spatial – structure.

### 3.4. Consciousness and Life

We can see, then, that for Bergson there is an essential difference between science and life-science. For him, the essence of Being lies in life and the essence of life lies in consciousness. Hence for Bergson, it is the supposedly natural importing of the scientific method that works so well in the inanimate sphere to the animate sphere that causes confusion and mistake in the scientific and philosophical understanding and plays a major role in creating the crisis of the modern era. Notice that Bergson is not claiming that science should not at all investigate life, only that this investigation has clear limits, which are the limits of the scientific method and the intellect in general.

It might be argued, as indeed it has been, that the extrapolation made by Bergson from the sphere of consciousness to the sphere of life in general is not satisfactorily justified and therefore, in the light of modern-biology's rejection of the concept of élan vital, one should reject Bergson's concept of life altogether.[58] However, it should be noted, first, that even if it is true that the plausibility of the Bergsonian position regarding life-in-general is not as strong as the plausibility of his position regarding consciousness, since only the latter can be known directly, the question should not be whether something like the élan vital is true, but rather whether life-in-general displays the qualities that Bergson claims that consciousness is endowed with. In other words, is real time, duration, a constitutive element of life? And here, the answer that Bergson gives is at least as plausible as any other answer that has been given until today. Second, and more importantly, even if one only accepts the claim according to which consciousness constitutes at least part of the human essence; and if one also accepts the Bergsonian intuition of the durational structure of this consciousness, which, I have tried to show, stands on a strong and firm ground, then one should accept the strength of the Bregsonian alternative: If a fundamental element of our existence is indeed duration, then the gate – even if it is leading to a different path than the one followed by the Bersonian evolutional theory – is reopened to the possibilities of subjectivity, freedom and autonomy; the same possibilities that seemingly were shut down by the double scientific revolution which turned the human world upside down.

### CONCLUSION

To return to the three consequences of the scientific revolution which were described earlier, it is possible to see, first, that as against both modernism and postmodernism, Bergson secures for philosophy an important place in the sphere of truth-seeking, since for him philosophy is, or at least should be, the bearer of the method of intuition, and therefore the prime discipline that should investigate life and spirit. Second, that against the philosophical and cultural dichotomy of scientism on the one hand and anti-scientism and

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[57] For Bergson, although freedom is always possible – because of the durational structure of consciousness – only rarely do people exert their ability to act freely, since they bound to their habits and, in a dipper level, to their superficial-intellectual self which, according to Bergson, conceal from them their true free nature, exactly because its mechanistic and deterministic biases. On this, see H. L. Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 163-173.

[58] For a sympathizing discussion on the apparently jump made by Bergson from the immediate data of consciousness to the outer reality see Francis C. T. Moore, *Bergson: Thinking Backwards*, Cambridge university Press, Cambridge, 1996, ch. 8.

fundamentalism on the other, Bergson offers a way that at once respects science, acknowledges its strength and contribution, but nevertheless limits it scope, and thus does not turn it into a new religion. As has been shown, for Bergson science should investigate the realm of matter because its method of investigation, that is, the intellectual method, matches matter and correlates to it, as an outcome of extended period of adaptation to the material environment. However, for the same reason, science cannot adequately and accurately investigate life and spirit, since the structure of life and spirit is essentially different from the structure of matter, and so is beyond the grasp of the intellect per se. Third, that by drawing the limits of science and intellect on the one hand, while on the other hand developing the method of intuition in order to dive into the depths of subjective experience, Bergson seeks to re-establish the truth, or at least the possibility of truth, of human subjectivity, freedom, creativity and autonomy, in short, sense of telos in life, that seems to have been taken away from humanity during the process of the scientific revolution.

Reflecting our days, when an ever-growing dichotomy is developing between religious fundamentalism on one side and scientism on the other; when a seemingly un-bridged gulf exists between the layman and the scientist, as much as between the postmodern and the modern philosopher; one can find in Bergson an inspiration for a third and middle way. This is a way which accepts science but does not worship it; which accepts the religious aspirations but does not confuse them with blind faith; which accepts the need for critical thinking but does not confuse it with skepticism. This is a way which embraces evolution as an ever-growing development and progression yet does not discard the old beliefs – neither in truth nor in humanity.

One should not, however, understand Bergson's philosophy to be solely, or even mainly, a moral one, that is, a philosophy which aims only to rescue our fundamental beliefs. To the contrary, what I have tried to suggest here is that we should understand it first and foremost as a truth-seeking philosophy, that claims that far as science and intellect can and do go they will never, in principle, be able to completely comprehend life in their pure sense – as duration or consciousness – and so as subjectivity, freedom and creativity. In order to understand these, we need, according to Bergson, a different method of knowledge, a different approach to reality, one that should coexist and cooperate with science and does not aim at replacing it. This method Bergson termed intuition, and its object he claimed to be real time, or real life.

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# THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE DENIAL OF THE DIVORCE THESIS

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## ABSTRACT

*The contemporary philosophical understanding of scientific rationality fundamentally distinguishes itself from the conservative positions by what may be considered a categorial reorientation by which it is meant that it replaces the old categories by the new ones in terms of which the essential nature of the structure and dynamics of science are described and explained. In the beginning, the radicalization of the categorial framework has been brought through category transformation, which is very well exemplified in the nullification of the discovery-justification distinction. Apart from this parasitic semantic content, 'discovery' carried a negative meaning in terms of what it is not. With the nullification of the distinction, the semantic content of discovery has become not only autonomous, and positive but also, comprehensive so much as to become the focal concept in grasping the essence of scientific activity. These changes have fundamentally altered the discourse about discovery in ways that can be of momentous significance to science education (Schickore and Steinle, 2006). An attempt is made in this paper to illuminate how the denial of the divorce thesis has been justified by the philosophical arguments of Marcello Pera(1981, 1994), Robert McLaughlin (1982), John Worrall (1985,2003)and Jarrett Leplin(1987,1997,2009) and Thomas Nickels(1985,2003,2014).*
**Keywords:** scientific discovery; scientific practice; context of justification; epistemic significance; divorce thesis;

## INTRODUCTION

The traditional discourses of the problem of scientific discovery normally taken to be the methods of discovery such as, the method of analysis and synthesis, inductive method, deductive method, retroductive method, analogical reasoning, model building, etc. However, valuable such discussions might be, they have started giving diminishing returns. First of all, many of those methods, going by their conscious adoption by practicing scientists are of a limited generality. Secondly, to the extent some of those methods have a great generality as in the case of analogical reasoning and model-building, the discussions of those methods *per se* is, epistemologically speaking, less important than the implications they have for our construal of the overall nature of scientific knowledge. Though such a discussion might clarify and explicate the nature of these methods utilize in scientific practice, they will not directly place scientific practice within a radically new perspective that is transparent to the students and practitioners of science who very much need to understand those dimensions of scientific practice which are either overlooked or soft pedaled by the conventional picture of science. Hence it would be beneficial to study the different dimensions of the contemporary philosophical positions on discovery in terms of its various constituents such as the

nullification of discovery-justification distinction that is overlooked by the conventional understanding of science.

## 1. REACTIONS TO LARRY LAUDAN'S CHALLENGE

The contention that discovery and justification are logically distinct from each other has been a major plank of the attack on the possibility of a philosophical account of discovery. Larry Laudan, who maintains the impossibility of a logic of discovery and who maintains a strict distinction between discovery and justification, challenged the pro-discovery philosophers to show that the methods of generation *per se* do carry special epistemic weight, that is, to establish that the methods of generation as such have special epistemic force. The pro-discovery philosophers like Pera and McLaughlin attempt to meet Laudan's challenge by trying to establish what Nickles calls the *per se thesis*. It may be noted that the *per se thesis* has to be established in a non-trivial way. As Peter Achinstein (1970) and others have shown, virtually any argument used in the context of discovery could, in principle, be found in the context of justification and vice versa. Hence care must be taken in establishing the identity-relation while justifying the *per se thesis*. Similarly, care must also be taken to see that the *identity thesis* must not result in making the philosophical account of discovery as a shadow of that of justification. More importantly, the relation between them must be one of *de jure* and not *de facto* (Nickles, 1985). After all a *de facto* relation amounts to merely saying that what happened in a generative context, in fact carries probative weight. On the other hand, a *de jure* relation amounts to saying that it did so by virtue of its role in generation. To establish the *per se thesis* one must show that at least some moves made in the context of discovery have *de jure* relevance to justification of the claim under consideration. As Laudan holds, *de facto* relevance is not enough to establish a philosophically significant connection between discovery and justification. In fact, Laudan might even grant such a *de facto* relevance. By granting only a de facto relevance Laudan and others uphold what we might call *difference thesis* about discovery and justification relation.

In countering Laudan's challenge, Pera, McLaughlin and others try to establish an identity relation between discovery and justification. Finding the *Identity thesis* of Pera, McLaughlin and others highly wanting and even as attempts at an unrealizable goal, Nickles comes out with what may be called an *Identity-In-Difference thesis* about discovery-justification relation. The question is whether such a thesis seeks to establish *per se thesis*. Nickles says that it might not. But nothing is lost since establishing *per se thesis* is neither necessary nor possible for nullifying the distinction between discovery and justification, at least to the extent that this distinction stands in the way of winning for discovery a philosophical legitimacy. In what follows, I try to explicate the attempts of Pera, McLaughlin and others to nullify the distinction between discovery and justification.

## 2. PERA AND MCLAUGHLIN'S ATTACK ON DIVORCE THESIS

In his article 'Inductive Method and Scientific Discovery', Pera attacks what he calls *discontinuist thesis* of hypothetico deductivists and puts forward what he calls the *continuist thesis*, according to which, "a hypotheses springs from the very same argument which provides the initial reasons for its plausibility" (Pera,1981,p.158). According to Pera the Hypothetico-deductive Model suffers from a logical paralysis accruing from the fact that the initial probability being zero, no amount of positive results would increase the probability of a hypothesis and this is counter-intuitive. The second logical paralysis accrues from the fact

that in the hypothetico-deductivist model there is no limit to test just as there is no limit on the quantity of observations the crude inductivist has to collect. Pera points out that if the inductivist is compelled to observe everything, the Hypothetico-deductivist is forced to test everything. But this would block al scientific activity (Pera, 1981,p.159) The only way out, according to Pera, is to acknowledge that the plausibility considerations are not post-invention additions to an hypothesis but are constitutive of its conception and advancement such that *"A hypothesis is not an a-logical or pre-logical guess but the plausible conclusion of an inference and hence the result of an induction"* (Pera, 1981,p.157).

Undoubtedly Pera confronts Laudan's challenge head on by attempting to show that justification cannot even make a start and if at all it does start, can never reach its end, unless we concede the logicality of the invention of the hypothesis and thus break the distinction between discovery and justification. The question is, how far Pera is successful in this endeavor. Nickles says that Pera has not established *per se thesis*, for he has made discovery derivative from justification. This is because he has not established that the probative force of the arguments is due to the fact that they play a generative role. Secondly, since it is possible to test a hypothesis by persons other than the one who generated the hypothesis, it is difficult to maintain that the plausibility of the judgment made by the inventor has a logical bearing on the justification. In fact Pera admits it when he attempts to explain such plausibility in terms of the fact that generation was guided by constraints. But this implies that the second parties can assess the prospects of a hypothesis independently of the source. It may or may not be the case that such an ignorance of the source adversely affects the efficiency of scientific procedure. But that question has nothing to do with the issue whether the relation between discovery and justification is one of logical necessity, which Pera has failed to establish. However, it may be noted that Pera has made, wittingly or unwittingly, an important point. The *de jure* relation that he seeks to establish as a logical entity can be watered down into a pragmatic necessity. That is to say, what Pera considers to be a logical feature should be treated instead as a practical guide in making a choice among a host of competing candidates for the position of a tentative hypothesis. This need arises in connection with the demands of economic viability, practical convenience and work-efficiency. It may be objected that Pera's point by doing so, looses epistemological significance. However, the topic of economy of research very much forms a part of the discussion of rationality and methodology, more and more so as the equations between logic and methodology, and logic and rationality are being weakened, Secondly, it may be objected that the practical interpretation of what Pera takes to be a logical point brings down the relation between discovery and justification from the *de jure* level to de facto level and thus Pera is left to compromise his *per se thesis*. But as Nickles says, the economically required *de facto* linkage of generation to justification undercuts the Popperian claim that no information used to construct a theory ever counts at all in its support (Nickles, 1985) In short, though Pera fails to establish a *de jure* relation between discovery and justification, the attempt is not futile. For Pera establishes a relation which is however weak as a *de facto* relation is sufficient to undercut the Popperian construal of the distinction in terms of psychological versus logical.

McLaughlin makes a distinction between context of generation, context of preliminary evaluation and context of final assessment – a distinction which looks like that of Laudan. However, the final evaluation, according to McLaughlin, depends upon the preliminary evaluation not only in the sense that the prior assessment precedes empirical test and thus must establish plausibility of an hypothesis but also in fixing non-zero initial

probability very much required by the Bayesian construal of probability assessment. Similarly, according to McLaughlin, what happens in the context of generation is crucial to the preliminary assessment. The considerations that go along with the generation of a hypothesis might engender 'advancement' arguments for a new hypothesis H in the context of generation and the same argument may serve the purpose of 'enhancement' for H and thereby fix the prior-probability whose function is the posterior probability that accrues in the context of final evaluation. McLaughlin (1982) says that *"the aim of a logic of invention (i.e., a philosophical account of discovery as generation) is to explicate the 'advancement of plausible hypothesis"*. However, McLaughlin fails to establish a *de jure* coupling, because he has not shown that the considerations, which bring about 'enhancement' of hypothesis in the context of preliminary appraisal, do so because of the fact that they have brought about an advancement of that hypothesis in the context of generation. Secondly, in a full-blooded logical relation between these contexts, the common considerations should not have diminishing utility. But though we may not accept Popper's strong statement that no information used to construct a theory ever counts at all in its support, we cannot overlook the fact that McLaughlin has not advanced any argument against the possibility of the progressive diminishing of the utility of those considerations. That is to say, it remains an open question whether the considerations may be very strong for the purpose of advancement and less strong for the purpose of enhancement and positively weak for the purpose of final evaluation. After all, the identity of the considerations does not guarantee non-variance of the epistemic power.

## 3. EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF DISCOVERY: JOHN WORRALL AND JARRETT LEPLIN

John Worrall seeks to counter Laudan's challenge by showing that the *divorce thesis* is wrong since *" in order to decide whether a particular empirical result supports or confirms or corroborates a particular theory the way in which that theory was developed or constructed needs to be known - more especially, it has to be checked whether or not that empirical result was itself involved in the construction of the theory"* (Worrall,1985 ,p.301). Those who reject any link between discovery and justification, think of justification always in terms of novel predictions. But this is wrong because it is historically true that many a times novelty has not been insisted upon. That is to say, many times confirmation of a theory was accepted as genuine when it was based upon a fact known before the theory came into existence. But it is also true that many a time 'confirmations' based upon facts known prior to the theory were rejected as spurious. Worrall draws our attention to this peculiar historical fact of the diametrically opposite points of view towards confirmation in terms of already known facts. This curious historical phenomenon has generated diametrically opposite points of view in confirmation theory with J S Mill and others treating the temporal priority of the facts as being irrelevant to the confirmatory role and Whewell and his followers insisting upon novelty as a precondition for a genuine confirmation. Perhaps, both of them were right and perhaps they were speaking at cross-purposes.

Worrall by resolving the conflict tries to arrive at a via-media point of view according to which a fact, which is known prior to theory i.e., which is not novel, can be used for confirmation of the theory if it has not played a role in the construction of the theory. This heuristic view of empirical support concurs with the non-temporal view, which does novelty a necessary condition for confirmatory role. It agrees with the temporal view to the extent it stipulates and supports on historical ground the thesis that if knowledge of a fact

is used in the construction of a theory it is illegitimate to use that fact in confirmation the theory. That is to say*, "even if a theory entails an accepted empirical result, the theory is not supported by that result, if the result was used in the construction of the theory"* (Worrall, 1985,p.301) It may be pointed out that it is not always easy to detect whether or not a piece of our knowledge of prior facts has been utilized both in the construction and in the confirmation of the theory. But this is precisely what makes discovery a methodologically important domain and related it to the context of justification. That is to say, in order that out justification be not trivial and therefore spurious, it is necessary to take into account that part of the story of a theory which is prior to justification, namely, the construction of a theory.

Worrall's heuristic view insists that the role of our knowledge of facts prior to the emergence of a theory is epistemologically important. Though those facts do not contribute to confirmation they have an important role in the success of a theory. After all, even Whewell agreed that his exclusive emphasis on novel predictions presupposes a belief that the theory cannot have made the correct predictions by chance. But this assumption cannot be conclusively proved. The rationality of our belief is somewhat adversely affected by this missing link. To a great extent the heuristic role of factual knowledge acquired prior to theory in the construction of the theory compensates for this. Of course, known facts (prior to theory) do also confirm. In this way Worrall attempts to establish the truth of the *per se thesis* and the falsity of the *divorce thesis*. But unfortunately, the terms of the *per se thesis* in Worrall's scheme are negative. It only tells us in what way the context of discovery should be kept at a distance from that of justification on order that justification be genuine. It does not at all tell us anything about the positive role discovery factors play in the process of justification. In fact it makes a virtue of what the divorce theories treat as a vice. Though Worrall's thesis, like that of McLaughlin and Pera, undercuts the divorce thesis, it fails to establish the *per se thesis*. However, it is to Worrall's credit that he brings out the epistemological significance of the discovery context in spite of its lack of positive bearing on justification.

Hence, Worrall can be credited with a double achievement, namely, weakening the *divorce thesis* and, more importantly, strengthening the independent epistemological significance of the discovery process. However, Worrall seems to think that the question of whether or not something has gone into the construction of a theory is not a trouble-shooter for there are very clear-cut cases, which make the answer transparent. But the question is whether such clear-cut cases are standard one. It may be that in standard cases the material of construction may not be articulated except from hindsight. Secondly, the so-called knowledge of the old facts when utilized in the constriction of theory may undergo a metamorphosis by the very fact of its role in construction such that our knowledge of old facts does not remain old. This is especially so in the case of explanatory theories. The acquired novelty of such old knowledge might contribute not only to the plausibility of the hypothesis but even to the acceptance of it, whenever "acceptance" is considered in terms other than the veracity of the test-implications.

Jarrett Leplin attempts to present an alternative version of same thesis. Worrall's negative per se thesis was left to apply to the construction and evaluation of any type of theories. Leplin confines the applicability of his thesis to the domain of only one type of theories, namely, theories of realist import i.e., theories which invoke reference to the unobservable deep-structures that are resorted to in explaining the observable phenomena. Leplin's strategy is to show that if the *per se thesis,* at least in its negative form is not

accepted, then the autonomy of explanatory theories with realist import gets adversely affected and such an autonomy is axiomatic for any convincing philosophy of science.

Leplin accepts the widely shared view that not all positive instances of a theory's laws are confirmatory, although it is unclear and controversial what more the confirmation requires. He finds that the difficulty accrues from an ambiguity in the notion of confirmation. Different types of theories might require different types of confirmation. The degree of stringency of confirmation, according to Leplin, is directly proportional to the explanatory depth of the theories. The theories with realist import are the deepest, didactically speaking of all the theories and hence require most stringent conformation. One way of characterizing the stringency in this connection is by accepting that a favorable epistemic evaluation must be in terms of an empirical result that is independent of, or different in kind from, results that have a formative role in the generation of the theory confirmed. That is to say *"inference to the truth or reference of a theory is warranted, if at all, only by confirmations independent of results that instantiate empirical laws that function as premises in rational reconstructions of the reasoning that generates the theory. For the epistemic realist, at least, justification depends on discovery"* (Leplin, 1987 ,p.809). Of course Leplin's thesis is contingent upon the existence of the type of theories which realism looks upon as paradigmatic. In other words , Leplin must presume that non-realism is a false thesis . Leplin accepts this and holds against non-realism what he considers to be their failure to help us understand the ability of a theory to predict successfully phenomena that instantiate no law having any formative role in the reasoning, which produced the theory.

The significance of Leplin's attempt lies in the fact that it goes a long way in establishing some sort of a *de jure* relation between discovery and justification. But this is done at the cost of the breadth of the magnitude, which *per se thesis* had in the previous attempt. That is to say, in Leplin's scheme the *per se thesis* stands, if at all, within the domain of theories of realist import. Undoubtedly, it is a credit to Leplin that he brings to bear discovery-justification relation on the distinction between deep structural theories and phenomenological theories. However, the critics of Leplin might point to a possible circularity here; the stringency of confirmation is sought to be articulated in terms of realist - non-realist distinction and unless the latter distinction is established in terms of independent and logical terms, Leplin's position becomes circular. In other words, Leplin has to establish the realist position on the basis of something other than stringency of confirmation. Leplin (2009) says,

*" Having taken a position on this question, arguing that justification extends to theoretical hypotheses, I came to wonder about the nature of justification generally. This is not a belated discovery of the skeptical problem or a reconsideration of what I took to be unproblematic. It is simply an interest in the possibility of locating epistemic advance in science within a broader understanding of the nature of epistemic justification. Now that I know that justification extends to theory, I am taking a step back and asking what justification is."*

Further, it may be noted that the stringency of confirmation in terms of novel facts on the one hand, and such theories having a real import in the realist sense of 'real' on the other are not logically continuous with each other in the sense that one does not logically imply the other, however compelling psychologically their association be. This fact very much erodes the logical strength of the relation between discovery and justification that is construed in very strong colours by Leplin.

## 4. GENERATIVE JUSTIFICATION/DISCOVERABILITY: THOMAS NICKELS

Establishing the *per se thesis* on *de jure* lines is impossible. But, according to Nickles, it is not necessary also, because discovery has been established as methodologically important in its own right apart from any connection to justification. Because discovery has an autonomous methodological significance, it is not necessary to establish *per se thesis*. However showing an identity-in-difference relation between discovery and justification even on *de facto* lines is a significant advance beyond the classical view of Positivists and Popperians. By showing that justification itself is shot through discovery tasks of search and generation one is able to arrive at a unitary picture. Such a relation if recognized, however loose, at least highlights the role of heuristics in scientific thinking in general and context of justification in particular, not only economically but also epistemically. In other words, the through-going dualism between discovery and justification shared by both enemies of discovery like Popper and friends of discovery like Hanson was undoubtedly put on the defensive by people like McLaughlin and Pera, who though they could not establish a monism of discovery and justification, nevertheless, considerably reduced the gap between them. The gap is further reduced by acknowledging, as do the followers of Lakatos like Urbach (1978) and Wimsatt(1980) that the evaluative weight of a theory increases if it is found promising in terms of future discoveries. Nickles (1985) in his paper "Beyond Divorce: Current Status of the Discovery Debate" seeks to further reduce the gap and establish an almost, if not literal, *de jure* relation by invoking the notion of discoverability. It may be noted that whereas Urbach and Wimsatt extend the notion of discovery forward, Nickles does it backwards. Taking both of them together the context of discovery of a theory extends over past, present and future.

Is discovery epistemically relevant to justification in the sense of providing surplus support for the generated claims? In answering 'yes to this question, Nickles invokes the notion of *"justification as potential discovery"* or *"generative 'justification"* or *"discoverability"*. By this he means the rationally reconstructed discovery path that maps a derivation of the new claims from data. That is to say, the type of thinking that starts from data and ends up in a theory as different from the type of thinking, which goes from theory to observational test implications. Anyone who does not commit himself totally to hypothetico-deductive model can recognize the type of justification that is associated with the former mode of thinking where *"justifying a claim establishes its 'discoverability' in the sense that, regardless of how the claim was discovered or invented historically - regardless of how or why it was first thought of - it could have been discovered in the rationally specified manner had the necessary information and analytical techniques been available"*( Nickles, 1985 p. 195) Of course, it is true that the "*discoverability"* as explicated above and the actual process of discovery are very rarely, if at all, identical. But *"Despite this divorce of initial conception from discoverability, discovery-type moves will be central to the latter, and certainly important in searching for discoverability arguments. Scientists search for theoretical derivational justifications even of well-confirmed hypotheses. Such searches are at once searches for derivations and searches for rational discovery paths"* (Nickles,1985.p.195-196). It is obvious that Nickles' notion of empirical support is different from that of the hypothetico-deductivist model which allows only a consequentialist construal of justification. According to Nickles, both consequential justification and generative justification are important and in fact, equal importance is attached to both in mature sciences.

Nickles admits that he has established a de jure relation between *discoverability* and *generative-justification* but not between discovery and justification. But to the extent *generative-justification* provides surplus justification, which is over and above that, provided by a consequential justification, the *divorce thesis* has been given a jolt. Nickles (2014) says,

*"Scientific practices do not neatly separate out in this manner, either logically or temporally. Search-and-discover operations are ubiquitous in research, from problem formulation to predictive testing. For example, writing and evaluating research proposals requires heuristic appraisal – evaluation of the future promise of fertility of problems, approaches, models, techniques, pieces of apparatus, etc. Although normative, this exercise often involves constructing what might be called "discovery sketches" – plausible lines of development and application – and it differs from epistemic appraisal of truth based on the past empirical track record. We also meet discovery issues at the meta-level".*

In establishing, in however round about and loose a way, the positive bearing of discovery on justification, Nickles has driven home the point that the *divorce thesis* is based upon the dogma of consequentialism. If one realizes that justification in actual scientific practice is construed in a sense broader than the one construed by consequentialism, the *divorce thesis* gets sufficiently weakened not to stand in the way of the legitimation of discovery as a worthy object of philosophical study.

**CONCLUSION**

It may be pointed out that the semantic content of "discovery" had been till now earmarked or specified in terms of its antagonistic relation with justification. This divorce-specified content is bound to give way to divorce-free content once the *divorce thesis* is rejected. With this the category of 'discovery' undergoes a transformation. It is this category-transformation in connection with "discovery" that constitutes the first major achievement of the contemporary view. It thus showed that the dominant notion of discovery was parasitic upon a myopic understanding of 'justification'. The conception of discovery resulting from such a transformation becomes synonymous with the whole process of scientific inquiry and a philosophical study of discovery becomes, instead of an appendage to a supposed logic of justification, a study of the whole development of an idea from its inception to its acceptance. Gutting brings out this point very vividly when he says: "the positivists' exclusive emphasis on the testing of already developed hypotheses did not just overlook one aspect of science; it misrepresented the entire enterprise. The case for discovery is no longer a call to add a new topic to our discussions of scientific methodology but to transform them by regarding discovery as the primary goal of all science."(Gutting,1980,p.222). Nickles' contention is that 'discovery' has a philosophical importance independent of whatever it has due to its methodological proximity with justification. That is to say one must not loose sight of the philosophical i.e., methodological importance of discovery in itself, even if one has sufficient arguments against the divorce position.

As we have seen, the relation between discovery and justification is one of identity-in-difference. It is both strong and weak. It is strong enough for countering *divorce thesis* and yet loose enough to permit independent relevance of discovery for methodological inquiry into science. The independent philosophical significance consists in its ability to shed light upon those aspects of scientific thinking, which were eclipsed by the justificationist dogma with its divorce thesis. The dogma refused to attach any methodological significance to what preceded justification in the consequentialist sense. Once we free ourselves from such an idea we may be able to recognize certain things in the

context of discovery that might have consequences for the fundamental epistemological problem, namely, the nature and, limits of scientific knowledge. One can find such a promise in the nature of scientific problems and the constraints that characterize their solutions. The contributions of the contemporary philosophers of science are a major advance in the discourse of scientific discovery.

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# ORIGINALISM, RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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## ABSTRACT

*In this paper I shall defend a moderate version of original meaning originalism in constitutional interpretation. First, I will explain some relevant distinctions and qualifications related to originalism and to the specific version of the theory of constitutional interpretation which I will present here. Next, I will briefly compare this version of originalism with the view traditionally regarded as originalism's natural opponent, the doctrine of the living Constitution, and I will argue that these two views are in fact compatible with each other once certain reasonable qualifications have been made to both of them. I shall then offer arguments in favor of the version of originalism presented here, which mainly have to do with the relation between a democratic system under a written constitution and the concepts of the rule of law and human rights. Finally, I will defend this version of originalism against views that hold that, in certain constitutional cases, once the original meaning of the Constitution, so to speak, "runs out", non-originalist methods should be employed to reach a legal solution.*

**Keywords:** originalism; constitutional interpretation; rule of law; human rights;

## INTRODUCTION

In this paper I shall defend a moderate version of original meaning originalism in constitutional interpretation. First, I will explain some relevant distinctions and qualifications related to originalism and to the specific version of the theory of constitutional interpretation which I will present here. Next, I will briefly compare this version of originalism with the view traditionally regarded as originalism's natural opponent, the doctrine of the living Constitution, and I will argue that these two views are in fact compatible with each other once certain reasonable qualifications have been made to both of them. I shall then offer arguments in favor of the version of originalism presented here, which mainly have to do with the relation between a democratic system under a written constitution and the concepts of the rule of law and human rights. Finally, I will defend this version of originalism against views that hold that, in certain constitutional cases, once the original meaning of the Constitution, so to speak, "runs out", non-originalist methods should be employed to reach a legal solution.

Perhaps I should warn that some parts of my proposal could at first glance appear to be radical and revisionist. But calling a view 'revisionist' is not necessarily attributing a flaw to such a view. More importantly, when present practices merit improvements, anything less than revisionism in a theory about such practices is likely to help prevent such improvements. On the other hand, I believe that the view I will defend here, once clarified, turns out to be less radical that what it may appear to be at the beginning.

## 1. ORIGINALISM: SOME DISTINCTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Originalism can be characterized as a group of theories of constitutional interpretation which distinctively hold the following two claims jointly: first, the meaning of a Constitution is fixed at the moment that Constitution acquires validity, i.e. at the moment it is ratified; second, the meaning of the constitutional text has a predominant importance when deciding constitutional cases. This is just a general characterization of originalism; it would be a mistake to assume that the different originalist theories share much more than what these two claims state. The general idea underlying originalism is that a constitutional text represents the core of constitutional law within most modern legal systems, and should therefore be considered as the main guide to the resolution of disputes concerning constitutional law.

An important distinction between to different kinds of originalism has been frequently made; it is the distinction between 'original intention originalism' and 'original meaning originalism'. (Barnett, p. 89) According to those who defend original intention originalism, the meaning of the Constitution must be sought in the intentions and purposes that the people in charge of writing, approving, and ratifying the constitutional text had in mind. This kind of theory has been rightly criticized by some constitutional theorists, for example Paul Brest (Brest, pp. 229 ff.), as being impracticable: if it is often difficult to know with some degree of certainty the intention of any person while performing any action even when that person is available to answer our questions, it seems practically impossible to determine 'the' intention that a collective group composed by members with heterogeneous backgrounds and interests had many years ago in the course of creating and conferring validity to each one of the clauses of the Constitution. Presumably, these people had different conceptions of what they were doing, and probably even incompatible purposes and objectives while doing what they did. Furthermore, it seems there is a large measure of probability that the intentions of those who drafted the constitutional text did not exactly match the intentions of those who approved it or ratified it. Because of these and other similar objections raised against this view, original intention originalism has declined in popularity in recent years.

Original meaning originalism, however, eludes these criticisms by attaching predominant importance, in the context of constitutional interpretation, not to the intentions or purposes that the framers might have had, but to the constitutional text itself, which, after all, was what the framers approved and ratified, and therefore what is still binding in the present. According to this view, then, the meaning of the Constitution must be extracted from the ordinary meaning that at the time of the ratifying the words within constitutional provisions had. This ordinary or 'plain' meaning is understood here as what a competent speaker of English (or any language in which a given constitution is written) at that time would have understood these words to mean.

Another relevant distinction between originalist views, and one which can be applied to both versions of originalism just described, is the one between strict originalism and moderate originalism (Brest, pp. 222 ff.). The difference between these has been characterized as a difference in attitude regarding the level of precision with which the object of interpretation (in the case of original intention originalism, the intentions of the drafters, and in the case of original meaning originalism, the constitutional text) must be related to a particular case in order to be correctly applied to it.

The difference between strict originalism and moderate originalism, although important, is, so to speak, only a matter of degree, and therefore the limits between these two

kinds of originalism are diffuse and more comparative than qualitative. Strict originalism aims for a high level of precision in the correspondence between the interpreted meaning of constitutional provisions and the situations to which those provisions should be applied. Moderate originalism, in turn, by being willing to settle for a lesser degree of exactitude in this correspondence, becomes capable of taking into account, during constitutional interpretation, facts concerning the context of the situations and the imprecision (such as vagueness and ambiguity) which naturally accompanies ordinary language.

The defect of strict originalism, as compared with moderate originalism, is that the level of precision that this kind of theory demands for the application of the meaning of constitutional norms to concrete cases is in many cases simply impossible to obtain. Legal (and constitutional) interpretation will unavoidably have to deal with problems of indetermination in language. This point can perhaps be made clearer if we take into account the ideas of Hans Kelsen about the nature of legal interpretation. According to Kelsen (pp. 348 ff.), the natural indetermination inherent to general words—the very quality which makes it possible for them to be applied to many different concrete objects and situations—causes any written law to correlate not just one specific set of legal consequences to a certain situation or set of facts, but always at least several sets of such consequences, between which the legal interpreter in charge of applying the norm must choose.

Kelsen explains that a written law, regardless of the care and precision with which it is drafted, can therefore only establish a 'frame' of acceptable interpretations, all legally valid, between which the judge must choose (ibid., p. 351); however, in Kelsen's opinion, once the law has been interpreted and the frame which includes all the possible legal solutions has been identified, the judge is, from the point of view of the law, at liberty to select any of those interpretations that fit in that frame. Of course, in order to correctly identify such a frame, it might be possible that the judge will need to interpret simultaneously many legal provisions, including legal norms from different levels of abstraction, perhaps also including very general constitutional norms stated in the form of moral principles. Kelsen's account of legal interpretation does not exclude these considerations. But once the frame has been correctly identified, he thinks, from the point of view of the law there is no reason to give preference to any of the solutions contained in that frame. He writes: "The law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications are possible, whereby every act is legal that stays within the frame" (ibid.).

The urge commonly felt by legal interpreters to find the only correct legal solution is then, from this perspective, mistaken; it is sufficient that the solution selected by the judge fits in the frame established by the law for it to be as legally valid as it can be. In practice, there will often be other sorts of considerations a judge will take into account to reach a decision, for example an appeal to alleged objective moral rules not contained in the legal system; there could perhaps even be an objective moral obligation for the judge to prefer one among all the possible legal solutions (or even to prefer a solution which is not included in that frame), but there is no legal obligation for the judge, while applying the law to a particular case, except to select a solution for it that fits the legal frame of the norm and apply it. Kelsen's ideas about legal interpretation as the identification of a frame are important for constitutional interpretation not only because they help us understand that strict originalism requires a level of precision in the laws and the Constitution which is impossible to obtain through ordinary language. They are also helpful, as we shall see later, for understanding the limits that constrain a judge applying the law insofar as the judge is actually applying the law and not doing something else.

## 2. A NORMATIVE VERSION OF ORIGINALISM

The theory of original interpretation which I intend to defend here is explicitly normative and not descriptive. This point merits some clarification. A descriptive theory has the objective of accurately representing the features of the object of interpretation such as that object actually is. A normative theory, in contrast, attempts to justify a position according to which an object should be conceived in a certain way when seen in the light of a certain normative standard, usually implying by this that, in accordance with that normative standard, only certain sorts of attitudes or actions are justified or authorized in response to certain situations regarding the object of the theory.

In the context of constitutional interpretation theories, a claim is commonly made to the effect that a successful theory of constitutional interpretation must be at the same time normative and descriptive (e.g. Fallon, pp. 1232-1234). The reason offered in support of this claim is that, according to those who hold this view, a normative theory which does not contain descriptive elements to help it correctly identify its object (for example, a national Constitution) cannot even be correctly said to be a theory about that object.

This reasoning is wrong. Although it is true that a normative theory must take into proper account the features of its object (so that it constitutes a theory about that object in the first place), this does not entail that a normative theory must include descriptive elements. It might well be possible that the constitutional interpreter will need two kinds of theories, one normative and one descriptive, to adequately perform his or her job. However, this does not lend any support to the claim that a constitutional theory should be a mixture of both normative and descriptive elements.

Once having clarified that the version of originalism I shall defend here is normative and not descriptive, we are in a position to see how many of the objections that have been frequently directed towards originalism in general do not touch the version of originalism proposed here, since these criticisms are applicable to originalism, if at all, only as a descriptive theory.

Thus, for example, Brest regards as a serious defect of moderate originalism the fact that "contrary to the moderate originalist's faith, the text and original understanding [of the Constitution] have contributed little to the development of many doctrines she accepts as legitimate." (Brest, p. 231) And Fallon, while discussing what he calls the problem of commensurability in constitutional theory (the problem about how the constitutional interpreter should combine the weight of the different kinds of arguments commonly utilized in the context of constitutional interpretation) argues that originalism "fails spectacularly" as a descriptive theory because it is not capable of accommodating the importance which is given to those arguments used in constitutional interpretation which are not derived from the constitutional text or the original understanding. (Fallon, p. 1213) Needless to say, these criticisms could only affect originalism conceived as a descriptive theory, and not as normative theory.

Having presented the main characteristics of the version of originalism that I shall defend, perhaps it is useful, in order to understand it better, to compare it with one of the theories traditionally regarded as the opposite of originalism, the doctrine of the living Constitution.

### 3. ORIGINALISM AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION

Originalism is frequently contrasted with what has been called the doctrine of the living Constitution, according to which, in rough terms, the Constitution is a living organism which adapts itself to the changing circumstances in society. In less metaphorical terms, this means that, according to this view, the meaning of the language of the Constitution does not remain fixed through time, and is therefore able to be reinterpreted in different ways so as to provide solutions for controversies that the framers did not and could have not been able to foresee. It is easy to caricaturize this idea. The late US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, has said that the argument in favor of this doctrine goes like this: "the [American] Constitution is over two hundred years old and societies change. It has to change with society, like a living organism, or it will become brittle and break. But you would have to be an idiot to believe that. The Constitution is not a living organism; it is a legal document. It says something and doesn't say other things." (cited by Epps, p. 25)

I would like to argue that, once some reasonable qualifications have been made on both sides, originalism is perfectly compatible with the idea of a living Constitution in a way that preserves a large part of the appeal of both views.

To understand this perhaps it is useful to make a distinction, originally made by John Stuart Mill, between the connotation and denotation of words (Mill, p. 31-32). According to this distinction, the connotation of a term consists of a certain set of features that an object must possess in order to be rightly considered a member of the class designated by said term. The denotation of a word, in turn, consists in the set of all the objects that possess those features and therefore are designated by that word. For example, the usual connotation of the English word 'vehicle' could be described as, say, the feature of being an object the function of which is to transport people or other objects from one place to another. The denotation of 'vehicle' is constituted by all the objects that have this feature, including automobiles, horse carriages, trains, airplanes, etc.

It is well known that the meaning of words is susceptible to change from time to time; the word 'gay', for example, previously used to signify roughly the same as 'joyful', in the last decades has acquired the meaning of 'homosexual', so that hardly anyone now would use it with its original meaning. In such a case, what has changed is the connotation of the term. However, and this is a much more interesting case for our present purposes, it is also possible and common for the connotation of a term to remain constant while its denotation changes over time. In the example of 'vehicle', this would happen every time a new type of vehicle was invented, for instance, a personal spaceship. In this case it could be said that, in a way, part of the meaning of the term (its denotation) has changed, even though it is clear that an essential part of its original meaning (its connotation) remains unchanged. The same can happen with many other kinds of words, not only with those whose denotation depends on scientific and technological advancements. For example, it is obvious that the set of objects correctly designated by the word 'fashionable' can change from year to year (or even from season to season), while it is plausible to think that the connotation of this word has remained more or less stable through generations.

For the purposes of legal interpretation in general, and even more within the context of constitutional law, where the legal interpreter is bound to having to deal with texts written a long time ago, the distinction between connotation and denotation seems to be very helpful, since it allows us to understand how, even if the meaning (i.e., the connotation) of the words included in the constitutional provisions is fixed at the moment that the Constitution acquires validity (as the originalist holds), it is perfectly natural for its

denotation to change over time, in a way that could be rightly considered as an adaptation to new circumstances. I believe that the long dispute about the meaning of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" in the Constitution of the United States, in the context of the discussion about the constitutionality of the death penalty, could come nearer to a solution acceptable for both originalists and non-originalists if the importance of the distinction under discussion was understood more clearly. I think practically anyone (both in the eighteenth century and in current times) would agree that a 'cruel punishment' is just a punishment which inflicts a large amount of suffering without an adequate justification. Nonetheless, it is perfectly conceivable (and to some extent empirically verifiable) that an average reasonable citizen two hundred years ago would think that the death penalty is not a cruel punishment, while perhaps for an average reasonable citizen from our times the death penalty probably would in fact constitute a cruel punishment. This kind of view would allow reconciling the originalist ideal of interpreting the Constitution faithfully and according to how it was understood at the moment of the ratification, with the living constitutionalist attractive idea of having a Constitution that adapts itself to, as the US Supreme Court expressed in the Trop v. Dulles decision, the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" (cited by Van den Haag and Conrad, p. 166).

In the next section I turn to the arguments in support of the version of originalism proposed in this paper.

## 4. ORIGINALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW

The main argument in support of the version of originalism here defended is misleadingly simple; its power depends on recognizing the value of a written constitution for a democratic society. A written constitution makes it possible for the basic rules of the functioning of the government, as well as the limits to the exercise of government action, to be known by everyone that should abide by the legal system, including state authorities. A valid written constitution is a special public agreement in constant renovation between the government and the people, in which every clause of the agreement can be known by the parties bound by it. Implicit in the notion of a written constitution of a democratic regime is the idea that the government must respect in its actions the limits imposed by the Constitution, and that the people, in exchange for that, grants legitimacy to such Constitution and government. The version of originalism defended here simply states that the government, and in particular the judicial branch, must always base its actions in the content of the Constitution, and that, when the Constitution is written, the only way of doing this is basing its decisions on the constitutional text. Whenever state authorities (including judges) guide their institutional actions by anything different to the written content of the Constitution, both the Constitution and the government lose a certain measure of legitimacy, for reasons that will be explained later in this section, even if the authorities act in a way which is in some sense even better than what the Constitution requires.

In a constitutional framework such as the one from the United States, partly because of the importance that is given there to the precedent system, this important feature of written constitutions sometimes runs the risk of passing unnoticed. In contrast with other legal systems, for instance those derived from a Roman tradition, within American law it is perfectly common for a judicial decision to routinely become a general norm for future similar cases. The US Supreme Court itself functions in that way, and so its decisions in specific cases are binding for similar cases that may arise in the future. In constitutional cases, the decisions reached by the Supreme Court through a certain interpretation of the

Constitution become, in a sense, constitutional law. Still, this does not mean that the justices of the US Supreme Court are in any way authorized to create the norms of the constitutional system more generally. After all, the justices of the Supreme Court are the authorities within that system only in virtue of the rules stated by the Constitution.

Antonin Scalia complains about this tendency to generalize the American common law system to the constitutional realm: "the ascendant school of constitutional interpretation affirms the existence of what is called The Living Constitution, a body of law that (unlike normal statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a changing society. And it is the judges who determine those needs and 'find' that changing law. Seems familiar, doesn't it? Yes, it is the common law returned, but infinitely more powerful than what the old common law ever pretended to be, for now it trumps even the statutes of democratic legislatures." (Scalia, p. 38) Scalia notes also how, if one attends a class on American constitutional law, or examines a textbook of American constitutional law, or pays attention to how briefs are written in constitutional cases, one will hardly ever find any discussion revolving around the text of the relevant constitutional provision, or the meaning of that text. The starting point, he says, is always previous cases decided by the Supreme Court, and new cases are expected to be solved in accordance with the principles expressed in those past decisions, "with no regard for how far that logic, thus extended, has distanced us from the original text and understanding" (ibid., p. 39).

I think Scalia raises an important issue here. The non-originalist could respond that the distancing from the text and the original understanding of the Constitution are justified, at least in the United States, by the highly-regarded American tradition of common law, and that it is simply a built-in characteristic of the American constitutional system (and a desirable characteristic for that matter) that constitutional precedents, although originally derived from the Constitution, should on the long run distance themselves from it and acquire, for the resolution of future constitutional cases, the same or even more importance than the constitutional text itself. This is a perfectly understandable and coherent view, defended for example by David Strauss (Strauss, 1996). Nevertheless, I believe there are decisive political and moral reasons to reject it. These reasons, which I will discuss presently, have to do with the concept of the rule of law.

According to Joseph Raz, whose arguments I follow on this issue, the rule of law is a political and moral ideal often expressed by the slogan 'government by law and not by men', where 'law' should be understood as a "general, open, and relatively stable law" (Raz, p. 213). The notion of the rule of law in a literal sense is composed, according to this author, by two parts: first, the people must be governed by the law and they must obey it at least generally, and second, the law must be such that the people who it addresses can be successfully guided by it. But the law is capable of guiding a person's behavior (and thus capable of being obeyed by that person) only if "one part of his reason for conforming is his knowledge of the law". (ibid., p. 214) It is impossible for someone who does not know or understand the law to follow it (as opposed to merely acting in conformity with it by chance). Therefore, a prerequisite for the rule of law to be possible is that the law can be known and understood by the people, in such a way that they can guide their actions based on such knowledge and understanding.

Raz derives from the idea of the rule of law three principles which must be followed in order to make the rule of law possible. The first one states: "All laws should be prospective, open, and clear" (ibid., p. 214). With this, he means that laws should not be retroactive, that they should be readily accessible for people governed by them, and that they

should be capable of being understood by the people. The second principle reads: "Laws should be relatively stable" (ibid.). If laws are constantly changing, this may affect their capability of being known and understood by the people. Finally, the third principle says: "The making of particular laws (particular legal orders) should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules." (ibid., p. 215) Here Raz is referring to particular legal decisions by authorities in charge of applying the law to concrete cases. This process and its rules should be as open, stable, and clear as the laws, for otherwise the people will frequently not be able to guide their conduct by the law even if the know it and understand it.

Raz, while discussing these principles, only talks explicitly about laws, but the force of his arguments is the same, or perhaps greater, when applied to constitutional norms: if knowledge of statutory law is fundamental for the rule of law, even more important will it be for the people to know and understand the content of the Constitution, which includes the scope and limits of state authority action and the most fundamental rights that must be respected by the government. It seems clear that if the entire legal system, including its constitutional component, does not abide by these principles, the ability of the citizens to know the law and to understand and predict the acts of the authorities will be seriously compromised.

Moreover, as Raz contends, an essential part of individual freedom and of respect for human dignity depends on the people's ability to plan their activities in accordance with their knowledge of what the law requires them to do or prohibits them from doing. Raz writes: "Observance of the rule of law is necessary if the law is to respect human dignity. Respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and plotting their future". (ibid., p. 221)

All this leads Raz to conclude that "the rule of law is not merely a moral virtue—it is a necessary condition for the law to be serving directly any purpose at all. […] Conformity to the rule of law is an inherent value of laws, indeed it is their most important inherent value. It is of the essence of the law to guide behaviour through rules and courts in charge of their application." (ibid.)

These considerations, I believe, overwhelmingly support the conclusion, generalizable to any constitutional framework, that constitutional norms, as much as any other laws, should be clear, stable, and prospective if they are to promote the rule of law in the way that is required by the respect of human rights and freedom. This cannot occur when the constitutional order relies excessively on the system of precedent, where each previous decision potentially changes the meaning of the norms, and where little by little the distancing that Scalia objects to between the constitutional text and the set of criteria effectively utilized to solve constitutional disputes appears and only increases over time.

But these reflections also point to another important universally generalizable conclusion: constitutional provisions that suffer from obscurity in a relatively high degree can also constitute threats to the possibility of rule of law inasmuch as they prevent the people from being able to predict state action and plan their lives accordingly. It is generally accepted that a Constitution should be written in terms with a high level of abstraction so that it is able "to be accommodated to times and events". However, it must be acknowledged that a markedly high degree of abstraction in constitutional language will frequently entail a high degree of obscurity and indeterminacy, and the people that must obey the Constitution (including the authorities), under these circumstances, will not on many occasions be able to base their conduct adequately on their knowledge of the law, as detailed as this knowledge may be.

Furthermore, when a legal statute (as opposed to the Constitution) is obscure, a judge can make use of certain resources to clarify its meaning. Among these strategies, an important one is that the judge can look up to higher norms within that legal system, for example the Constitution, and decide on that basis between the apparent possible interpretations for the obscure statute. In some cases, whatever the intended meaning of that statute was, it should be interpreted only in a certain way because of the fact that any alternative interpretation is prohibited by hierarchically superior norms, ultimately constitutional norms.

In the constitutional realm this strategy is not open to the interpreter, simply because there is not any higher legal norm. It is understandable, though, that the constitutional judge is often tempted to apply a similar strategy, where the "superior norms" under the light of which the Constitution should be interpreted are supposedly objective moral principles and ideals. I would like to argue that a judge, and especially a constitutional judge, should always resist this temptation. The reason for this is not that the judge, by applying this strategy, will inevitably apply morally wrong principles and values (although this is certainly an open possibility in any such case), but rather that in these cases the judge will simply not be applying the law in his or her decisions, and therefore any decision he or she makes will be in detriment of the rule of law.

Raz supports this view, I believe, when he claims that "the one area where the rule of law excludes all forms of arbitrary power is in the law-applying function of the judiciary where the courts are required to be subject only to the law and to conform to fairly strict procedures." (ibid., p. 219, emphasis added)

## 5. ORIGINALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

This leads us, finally, to the topic of constitutional construction, as opposed to constitutional interpretation. Randy Barnett traces this distinction in a helpful way; he says: "interpretation determines the meaning of words. Constitutional construction fills the inevitable gaps created by the vagueness of these words when applied to particular circumstances" (Barnett, p. 102).

According to Barnett, who proposes a version of originalism which is similar in many respects to the one defended in this paper, originalist constitutional interpretation is not always sufficient to decide a constitutional case, for in some cases a judge, after using the originalist method will have not one, but several legal solutions available, all of them permitted by the original meaning of the Constitution. Barnett says: "when interpretation has provided all the guidance it can but more guidance is needed, constitutional interpretation must be supplemented by constitutional construction", and he readily adds, "within the bounds established by original meaning". (ibid., p. 123) I could not agree more with this statement, but I fear that, given the way it is formulated, it may be difficult to understand precisely what it means.

Larry Solum, for example, describes this part of Barnett's proposal saying that, when the original public meaning "runs out", the application of the Constitution must be supplemented by non-originalist methods. (Solum, p. 934) I think there are at least two different ways to understand the expression about original meaning 'running out' in this last sentence, and therefore at least two different ways of interpreting the need to supplement constitutional interpretation with constitutional construction.

Recall the idea proposed by Kelsen according to which legal interpretation consists in identifying a frame of valid legal solutions, where the legal interpreter in charge of applying

the law has the freedom to choose between any of these solutions, being all of them equally valid from the standpoint of the law. According to the first sense of 'original meaning running out', this is exactly what happens once the judge has identified the frame; now he or she must only choose one between the several legal options contained in that frame.

According to the second sense, it could be meant by this expression that there are cases in which the law or the Constitution do not provide a complete frame, either because of the existence of a legal gap or because the content of the law or the Constitution is not clear enough to allow the identification of a frame of legal solutions. I would say I agree with Barnett's position about supplementing the originalist method of interpretation with non-originalist constitutional construction only when the expression 'original meaning has run out' is understood in the first sense; but it seems to me that many important authors (perhaps including Barnett) would allow for constitutional construction in cases where the expression is understood also in the second sense, and with this I disagree.

Ronald Dworkin, for instance, recommends what he calls the 'moral reading' of the Constitution (Dworkin, 1996) as a part of his doctrine of 'law as integrity' (Dworkin, 1986). Through these notions, Dworkin explicitly defends the inclusion of moral considerations by the constitutional judge in the process of applying the Constitution to particular cases. However, Dworkin emphasizes that the interpretation of constitutional provisions must be done not only taking into account what is the solution best supported by the best moral justification. There is also a previous condition, what has been labeled a 'threshold' requirement, according to which any valid legal interpretation must 'fit' the legal text.

Dworkin's ideas on this topic underwent several revisions, and it is not always clear what the definitive position of this author is regarding specific problems of constitutional interpretation. However, I would argue that if Dworkin's view can correctly be described as saying that a specific constitutional interpretation can sufficiently meet what he calls the 'fit requirement' by simply not contradicting what the Constitution explicitly states, then I disagree with his position, for I think that for constitutional interpretation to be valid, it must not be merely consistent with the Constitution, but also, and more importantly, it must be substantially based on what the Constitution says. Following Kelsen's expression, I would say that for any constitutional interpretation to be valid in a specific case, it must be possible to identify in the meaning of the constitutional text a frame containing the legally valid solutions.

Once such frame has been (correctly) identified by the judge, I believe Dworkin's proposed moral reading is applicable to help the judge select the best available legal solution. But, based on the considerations previously stated about the relation between the rule of law and constitutional interpretation, it is important to note that when the Constitution is not sufficiently clear about a certain issue, on occasions it may be entirely correct to say that the Constitution simply fails to establish a complete frame of possible legal solutions for that kind of case, and then the constitutional judge lacks any legally valid basis to make a decision.

Other criteria might be used (and are commonly used) to reach a decision for any of these cases. But I would contend that in such cases judges are not applying the law, and that their action as state authorities violates the rule of law and therefore the human rights of the people governed by that constitutional system.

**CONCLUSION**

I have defended a normative, moderate version of originalism according to which there is a possibility that in a constitutional system there will be cases in which there is no correct legal (constitutional) solution. This follows from the consideration that all legal solutions for constitutional cases must be based directly on what the Constitution explicitly states if the system is to promote the rule of law and thereby respect human dignity and human rights. If the constitutional provisions are not sufficiently clear so as to be able to allow the constitutional judge to identify a frame of legal solutions, the judge must be able to recognize that the legal system lacks the legitimate power to solve the case using the law. Judges then may leave it to that country's legislative power to amend this problem; but they can also argue in their opinions in favor of constitutional amendment which clarifies the issue at hand. Obscurity and indeterminacy are, when they reach this point, great defects in the constitutional framework, and the judicial power of a country should be permitted, in order to respect human rights and human dignity, to recognize and address explicitly these problems in a way that does not undermine the rule of law.

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# GENESIS AND BLACK HOLE UNIVERSE: THE FIRST DAY

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## ABSTRACT

*The ancient biblical or Hebrew's cosmology, conventionally developed from the book of Genesis, apparently and severely contradicts with observations of the universe. The book of Genesis about the creation of the universe could not be fully addressed, described, and understood by any universe model developed so far. Recently, the author developed a new cosmological model called black hole universe, which can explain all known observations of the universe and overcome all existing cosmic problems without any hypothetical entities. This study attempts to make an innovative interpretation of Genesis according to the black hole universe model. We aim to examine the origin and development of the universe scientifically, philosophically, and theologically for the truth, beauty, and love of the universe. This paper as Paper-I focuses on the first day from the beginning of creation, Enduing words like Earth, Water, Night, and Day in the book of Genesis with physical implications and meanings, we eliminate all discrepancies between Genesis and observations. The black hole universe model makes Genesis to be understandable, consistent with observations, and support of the model to thoroughly reveal mysteries of the universe. The second through fourth days will be addressed in next papers.*

**Keywords:** Genesis; Cosmology; Black Hole; Universe;

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Nature of Cosmology

Cosmology is the study of the universe, including its origin and development [1-3]. The cosmological method should not be only scientific, but also philosophical and theological (Figure 1). The science of cosmology discovers the truths of the universe and explains why the phenomena scientifically occur in the nature. For instances, in 1929, Edwin Hubble discovered the truth that light from galaxies was all shifted towards the red end and he then interpreted the phenomenon as the expansion of the universe [4]. Seven decades later, Adam Riess, Saul Perlmutter, and their colleagues discovered the truth that distant type-Ia supernovae were all fainter than expected luminosity from the redshift of their light and they further explained the phenomenon as the acceleration of the universe, driven by the mysterious dark energy [5, 6]. Recently, the author developed a new simple redshift-distance relation from Mach's principle and light relativity [7], that not only perfectly explained the redshift and distance measurement of type-Ia supernovae but also inherently derived Hubble's law, so that did neither support acceleration nor expansion of the universe, which holds up Einstein's static universe. He also corrected the approximate luminosity distance-

redshift relation, conventionally used to explain the supernova measurement, with an elegant redshift factor that can also rule out the acceleration of the universe and hence removes the need of dark energy [8].

The philosophy of cosmology reveals the beauty of the universe, including the conceptual foundations of cosmology and the philosophical contemplation of the universe as a totality [9]. Big questions to the universe are usually the philosophical questions of cosmology such as the fine-tuning of the universe, the arrow of the time, the origin of the universe, and so on. Philosophically, the universe must be in all aspects characterized as beauty, simplicity, and completeness. An ugly, complicated, and incomplete stuff cannot be a work done by God. The theology of cosmology reveals the love of the universe, including the initial creation and origin of the universe and lives, and shows God's spirit, power, and love to the entire universe and all lives created by him including our earthly beings. Therefore, cosmology is a branch of study to find scientifically the fundamental truths of the universe, to explore philosophically the complete beauty of the universe, and to uncover theologically the great love of the universe.



Fig. 1: Cosmology is the study of the universe, combining science, philosophy, and theology. The science of cosmology explores the fundamental truths of the universe; the philosophy of cosmology reveals the complete beauty of the universe; and the theology of cosmology shows the great love of the universe

## 1.2. History of Cosmology

The history of cosmology can be traced back to some thousand years BC, e.g. the 3000 BC's Babylonian cosmology with the heavens and the earth being equal and joined as a whole without the geocentric worldview [10], the 1700 BC's Hindu cosmology for the universe to be cyclically created and destroyed with the multiverse concept [11], the ancient Hebrew or biblical cosmology of a flat earth at the middle connecting via gates with a hell below and heavens above [12], the 2 AD's Ptolemy geocentric model of the universe that describes our earth to be the center of the universe and all planets including stars and moon to be revolving around the earth [13], and the 1600 AD's Copernicus-Kepler-Newton

heliocentric model of the universe that describes the Sun to be the center of the universe and our earth (also planets and moon) to rotate by its own [14].

The modern cosmologies were developed or grown up on the basis of the ideas of those early cosmologies and the observations of the universe with modern instruments and started their eras especially after Albert Einstein developed his general theory of relativity in 1916 [15], such as Einstein's infinite static cosmology [16], de Sitter's infinite dynamic cosmology [17], and Friedmann-Lemaitre's finite dynamic big bang cosmology [18-19], Zhang's black hole model of the universe with infinite layers [20-21] and so on of many other alternative models. Ancient cosmologies were most mainly philosophical and theological, while modern cosmologies including the Copernican heliocentric model of the universe were more scientific, but here the author prefers to suggest that it should also cross borderlines among science, philosophy, and theology as shown in Figure 1. It should be pointed out that any finite universe model must face critical issues and difficulty on the outside worlds and prehistory of the universe. Any infinite universe model cannot actually scientifically address the origin of the entire universe, but can philosophically describe it as being existed forever beginninglessly and endlessly or theologically describe it as being created by God in the beginning.

However, a consistent understanding of the universe has not yet been developed from these three aspects. Arguments and battles between creationists and scientists have been on-going for many decades and centuries. Nowadays, philosophers almost cannot provide any essential help or action. Covincingly relying on the well-developed modern sciences of the nature and well-developed high-tech observations of the universe, scientists systematically developed the standard big bang cosmological model. The strength of the big bang model includes that it solidly bases on the Einsteinian theory of general relativity to describe the effect of matter on spacetime and the Newtonian cosmological principle to describe matter and radiation to be uniformly (or isotropically and homogeneously) distributed in spacetime. The weakness of the big bang model is that the model strongly relies on an increasing number of hypothetical entities (HEs) in order for it to be capable of explaining the observations of the universe and overcoming the cosmic difficulties [22]. The big bang model of the universe is not yet enough scientific because it includes many HEs that may never be tested or justified such as dark energy and inflation, not yet enough philosophical because it has many uncertain issues that cannot be appropriately solved or answered such as what the outside of the universe is, what the era before the big bang was, where the universe came from, etc., and thus is incomplete or imperfect, and not yet theological at all because it is severely inconsistent or conflicts with the book of Genesis of the bible and thus excludes the creator, God. A big bang of this finite universe does not need God, but for the outside and prehistory, we may still have to think it philosophically or theologically.

## 1.3. Black Hole Universe

A new cosmological model called black hole universe (BHU) was recently developed on the bases of three fundamentals by the author [20-21] in attempt to model the universe, explain the existing observations, and overcome the cosmic problems and difficulties without relying on a set of HEs [23-24]. The three fundamentals of black hole universe are: (1) Einstein's general theory of relativity (GR) that describes the effect of matter on spacetime, (2) Newton's cosmological principle (CP) of spacetime homogeneity and isotropy in a large scale, and (3) Zhang's newly proposed principle of spacetime black hole equivalence (SBHEP) that suggests that a black hole constructs an individual spacetime and

a spacetime wraps a black hole. In comparison with the currently accepted standard big bang model of the universe (BBU), the black hole universe model uses one extra principle to remove all hypothetical entities (Figure 2).

The black hole universe model does not exist the horizon and flatness problems so that an inflation epoch is not required. Its origin and growth from star-like and supermassive black holes removes the initial big bang singularity and magnetic monopole problems. A black hole is static when it does not accrete or merge with others, otherwise it becomes dynamic, expands, and emits. Gamma ray bursts, X-ray flares from galactic centers, and quasars can be self-consistently explained as emissions of dynamic star-like, massive, and supermassive black holes [25-29]. The entropy of a dynamic black hole obtained from this model is quite lower than that of a static one obtained from the Hawking radiation. Cosmic microwave background radiations are blackbody radiations of the black hole universe, an ideal blackbody [30]. A black hole universe can be static if nothing enters in, expands if it accretes matter, and accelerates if it accretes matter in an increasing rate, so that an explanation of the supernova type-Ia redshift and luminosity distance measurements does not need dark energy [31].



Fig. 2: The comparison of fundamentals between BBU and BHU. The BBU is based on two fundamentals, GR and CP, with innumerable HEs in order for it to explain observations and overcome cosmic problems and difficulties. The BHU is based on three fundamentals: GR, CP and SBHEP, with one more base (i.e. SBHEP). The BHU can also perfectly explain all the existing observations of the universe and meantime overcome the cosmic problems and difficulties in terms of the well-developed physics without needing any other HEs [23-24].

### 1.4. Motivation and Objective

The ancient biblical or Hebrew's cosmology, conventionally developed from the book of Genesis, apparently and severely contradicts with observations of the universe.
The book of Genesis likely appears to describe the universe with a flat earth at the middle connecting via gates with a hell below and heavens above as shown in Figure 3 [12]. The disagreements between observations of the universe and Genesis of the bible are most probably resulted either from the ancient bible writer, who did not appropriately describe God's inspiration for the creation of the universe, or from the later bible translators, who did not precisely translate the book of Genesis from Hebrew to English. There has not yet been any universe scientific model developed so far to be able to fully address, describe, and understand the book of Genesis about the creation of the universe.

The objective of this study is to describe and understand the Genesis of bible, by applying the black hole model of the universe. This paper especially focuses on the first day

of God's work on the creation of the world. The next papers will self-consistently explain God's work on the 2nd through 4th days. We aim at an attempt to develop a cosmological model which is consistent with observations of the universe for revealing the mysteries of the universe and making the consistency between science of cosmology and the book of Genesis in order to provide a new interpretation of Genesis and meanwhile to confirm and support the black hole universe model in terms of Genesis. Through this effort, the black hole universe model will be demonstrated to be scientific because it reveals truths and self-consistently explains observations of the universes, to be philosophical because it is complete and simply answers questions and overcome difficulties without any non-testable hypothetical entities, and to be theological because it is biblical and innovatively interprets the Genesis of the bible.



Fig. 3: Jewish/Hebrew/biblical cosmology constructed directly from the current understandings of Genesis of the bible [12] (credit: 1. NIV Faithlife Study Bible, James McGrath, patheos.com; 2. Graphic by Karbel Multmedia, Copyright 2012 Logos Bible Software).

## 2. GENESIS AND BLACK HOLE UNIVERSE: THE 1ST DAY

In this section, we interpret the book of Genesis according to the black hole universe model. We apply the New International Version (NIV) of the bible [32].

### 2.1. Creating the Entire Space

The first sentence in the first chapter of Genesis says: [1]*In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth*. Here, the heavens without any doubt should not simply be the skies around the upper atmosphere or the celestial spheres that we can usually see but the worlds of spirit, i.e. the holiest places or paradises, that God, angels, and other heavenly

beings reside or live in. Many other parts in the bible said indeed that the heavens are the dwelling places of God, God's angels, God's saints, and some human spirits at death to go. In contrast or comparison with the heavens (i.e. the words of spirit), the earth here should not simply be the celestial sphere or planet that we are now standing on but the world of matter or the entire space (later on, we will call it as the grand universe) that all the matter and earthly beings including our human beings and other lives exist or live in.

This understanding of the earth as the entire space is further supported by the first part of the second sentence in this chapter of Genesis. Henceforth, the earth means the whole world of matter rather than just our planet. The earth is contrasted with the heavens; and the things earthly are contrasted with the things heavenly. Considering the earth as our planet tinily constrains or shrinks the grandness of God's significant work, super power, and great love on his creation of the entire world of matter or the universe. Since the Hebrews had no proper word for "world" in its wide sense of "universe" [33], the bible writer chose the word "earth" to represent the world of mater or the universe.

[2a]*The earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep*,. Any object, if it is finite, should have its form no matter whether the form is describable or not. An irregular form is also a form. Thus, the formlessness of the earth strongly implies that the earth is infinite, so that supports the understanding of that the earth is not the finite celestial sphere or planet that we are now standing on but the entire space, which is infinite in size or radius of $R = \infty$. Then, the emptiness of the earth obviously refers to that, in the beginning, the entire space did not contain any matter or was massless (more strongly says energy-less), $M = 0$. That darkness was over the surface of the deep further noted us that the entire space was lightless or more strongly radiation-less with zero degree of the temperature in the absolute scale, $T = 0$. In physics, an object, if has a darkness surface (no emission of light), can be considered as a black hole.



Fig. 4: The infinite, empty, and dark three-dimensional space (or an empty black hole) that God created in the beginning. In the first chapter of the book of Genesis, it is called the earth. Because it is formless and thus infinite, we interpret the earth as the entire universe (i.e. the world of matter) that God created for matter to exist and earthly beings to reside in. In contrast to the earth as the world of matter, the heavens that God created are the worlds of spirit.

Therefore, the first part of the second sentence in the first chapter of Genesis told us that the entire space created by God in the beginning was an empty infinite large dark/black hole, a three-dimensional (3D) dark empty space (see Figure 4). Time, which is a quantity to measure change and motion, could not be started (or say $t = 0$ was kept or remained) because there was no matter and thus no motion and no change. The quantity of space determines positions and measures sizes and an empty space is not yet physical, but purely geometrical. God is a spaceless being and space only opened with his creation of the universe. Therefore, in the beginning, God opened an infinite empty dark geometric space without matter and energy, called the earth in the Genesis of the bible.

## 2.2. Creating the Matter and Powering It

The second part of this sentence says: [2b]*and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters*. Here, there is a question obviously: In such an initial empty space, where did these waters come from? Of course, the answer should be that God created/made these waters and filled them into the empty earth (i.e. the entire space). Therefore, after creating/making waters and further filling the waters into the entire space, God let his Spirit be hovering over the waters. Here the waters, obviously, should not be the waters that we are using and drinking everyday, whose molecules are made of two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms ($H_2O$), but can be understood as God's waters, a type of the initial matter or substance that is super fluidal and neutral. The Greek philosophers believed water to be the original substance and that all things were made from it [34]. The Koran stated that: "From water we have made all things". Everything nowadays we see are all made from this initial matter, God's waters.

The amounts of matter that can fill up the empty infinite large black hole are determined in accordance with the following mass-radius relation,

$$\frac{2GM}{c^2 R} = 1, \tag{1}$$

which is the relation between the mass and radius of a black hole according to the Schwarzschild solution of Einstein's general relativity [16, 35]. It is also the relation between the effective mass and radius of the gravitational interaction according to Mach's principle (or conjecture) [36-39] and the relation between the mass and radius of the observable universe according to the observations of the universe. Eq. (1) is the simplest relation between matter and space because the amount of matter is linearly proportional to the scale of space (in God's units, it might be simply just $M = R$). In the recent review of the black hole universe model [24], the author named the Mach-Schwarzschild mass-radius relation (Eq. 1) as the $0^{th}$ law of black hole universe (or God's law of matter and space).

The matter is uniformly (i.e. homogeneously and isotropically) distributed in the entire space and the density of matter, which is defined as mass $M$ divided by volume $V$, is thus given by

$$r \circ \frac{M}{V} = \frac{3c^6}{32\rho G^3 M^2} = \frac{3c^2}{8\rho G R^2}, \tag{2}$$

which is infinite small or tends/limits to zero if $R$ or $M$ is infinite large. In Eqs. (1) and (2), the constants $G$ and $c$ are the gravitational constant and the speed of light in the free space, respectively. Newton's cosmological principle, one of three fundamentals of black hole universe, requires the universe or spacetime in a large scale is homogeneous and isotropic.

The metric of a finite isotropic and homogeneous spacetime or black hole including our black hole universe is given by the Friedmann-Lemaitre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) metric [19, 40-42]

As the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters, God was using his Spirit or power to do work in order for the initial super flowable matter (or the waters) to have energy and to move via the work done by the gravitational interaction (i.e. the interaction between masses), a fundamental force created by God in this era for the nature, followed by the first and second laws of thermodynamics, i.e. the law of energy conservation including heat and the law of entropy (defined as a measure of system's disorder) increase for any isolated system or the entire universe. The rotational or spinning characteristics of all celestial objects including the later formed planets, stars, galaxies, and clusters might be due or come from the initial hovering of God's Spirit and power. With this fundamental force, the mass of an object in the entire space measures the inertia of motion of the object. As Mach's principle stated, the inertia of an object is resulted from the gravitational interaction of the object with the rest of the universe. In this era, the time was started or created by God to measure the change and motion and it always points to the future along the direction of entropy increase. God is a timeless being and time only began with his Spirit to power his created matter and universe.

Therefore, the space and time (shortened as spacetime) of the grand universe that God created was an infinite large black hole with infinite mass and radius, but a constant mass-radius ratio as shown in Eq. (1) and an infinite small mass density as shown in Eq. (2). In other words, the spacetime created by God is equivalent to a physical black hole. Until this point, the universe is darkness that God later called night as seen from the next sentence. The temperature of the grand universe is not absolute zero but still infinitesimal because both the density and pressure of the matter are infinitesimals.

## 2.3. Creating the Light

[3]*And God said, "Let there be light," and there was light*. In physics, light is a type of electromagnetic radiation, composed of varying electric and magnetic fields, which are produced by accelerating electrically charged particles. According to the decreasing order of wavelength or the increasing order of frequency, physicists usually categorize electromagnetic radiation/waves as radio wave, microwave, infrared, visible light, ultraviolet, X-ray, and gamma ray. Oscillating negatively charged electrons and positively charged nuclei including protons may produce radio and microwaves. Thermal motions of electrons may produce infrared. Orbital (i.e. energy level or state) changes of electrons in atoms may emit visible light and ultraviolet. Sudden stops of high-speed electrons on a target can emit X-rays. Nuclei reactions and decays may produce gamma rays. It should be noted that, to God, a light with any frequency is visible, but to human beings, the visible light has a rather narrow range of frequency or wavelength (~ 700 - 400 nm). A dog visualizes infrared light also with its eyes and a bat visualizes microwaves also with its ears.

To have charged particles for emitting light or electromagnetic waves when they accelerate, God first set the free neutrons ($n$) that are composed of the initial super fluidal matter (i.e. God's waters) to be unstably decaying to protons ($p$), electrons ($e^-$), and antineutrinos ($\overline{n}_e$) with a mean lifetime of just under fifteen minutes, a quarter of one hour (or one "ke" in Chinese),

$$n \to p + e^- + \overline{n}_e \qquad (3)$$

This decay is usually called as the $\beta$-decay because an electron (or $\beta$ particle) is emitted. In the particle physics, the $\beta$-decay is resulted from the weak interaction, which was innovatively interpreted as the interaction between electric and color charges within a quark or among quarks by the author recently [43].

This implies that God created the weak force (an extremely short range interaction, ~ $10^{-18}$ m) in order for neutrons to decay into protons and meantime emit electrons and electron-type antineutrinos. Here, protons are positively charged particles with mass $m_p = 1.67 \times 10^{-27}$ kg and charge $q_p = e$ with $e = 1.6 \times 10^{-19}$ C as the fundamental unit of electric charge. Electrons are negatively charged particles with mass $m_e = 9.1 \times 10^{-31}$ kg and charge $q_e = - e$. Neutrons are neutral particles but with mass slightly greater than protons. Neutrinos are also neutral particles but with very small amount of mass and about the light traveling speed. The mystery of solar neutrino missing is addressed by the oscillations of neutrinos between different flavours or types. The author also addressed neutrino oscillations according to his quark annihilation and pair production model [44]. The entire space (i.e. the grand universe) contains equal amount of positive and negative charges and thus is neutral. For charged particles to accelerate and hence to produce light, God created another fundamental force, the electromagnetic interaction (i.e. the interaction between electric charges). Because the charges that created by God have two types (i.e. positive and negative), the electromagnetic force can be repulsive and attractive. Among one another, like charges repel while unlike charges attract.

Neutrons and protons fuse together via the strong force (i.e. the interaction between color charges) to form elemental nuclei. A Russian chemist, Menchelev, listed all the nuclear elements according to their physical and chemical properties or their number of protons into a table called Periodic Table of elements. So far, the total number of elements that scientists discovered in the nature and formed in labs has been over one hundred and eighteen. Various kinds of nuclei combine with electrons via the electromagnetic force to form various kinds of atoms. Multiple same and different atoms bound together to form chemical molecules of gases, liquids, and solid objects. Particle physics suggests hadrons such as neutrons and protons to be composed of quarks, which carry both electric and color charges and thus participate in the both strong and weak interactions. Leptons such as electrons and neutrinos can participate in weak interaction but not strong interaction. Therefore, when God created light, he created not only electric charges with the electromagnetic force, but also atoms and nuclei with the weak and strong forces.

In the ancient times, the natural world or universe was ever considered to have five elements: space, wind, water, fire, and earth. In the traditional Chinese Yin Yang, five-elements, and eight diagrams theory, the space and wind are replaced by metal and wood. All the natural phenomena are described by the interactions among the five elements. There are two types or cycles of interactions: generating (or sheng in Chinese) and overcoming (or ke in Chinese). The generating interaction includes that wood feeds fire, fire creates earth (or ash), earth bears metal, metal carries water, and water nourishes wood; while the overcoming interaction includes that wood parts earth, earth absorbs water, water quenches fire, fire melts metal, and metal chops wood.

From the modern scientific view, how many fundamental elements are there in the nature? And how do these fundamental elements interact one another? Chemists have found 118 chemical elements. But they are not fundamentals because all elemental atoms are made up of three types of particles: protons, neutrons, and electrons. Physicists have found over 300 elementary particles and each of them has a corresponding antiparticle. They are

categorized into hadrons and leptons according to their participation in the strong interaction or not. All hadrons are made up of quarks, which have six types or flavors. Physicists have also made a periodic table for particles. This periodic particle table includes 57 particles in total. But these particles are still not fundamental elements of matter because they have a lot of common properties.

Recently, the author [43, 45] proposed that in the nature there are only four fundamental elements, which are the massless radiation (or light), mass, electric charge, and color charge. Any known matter or particle should be only composed (or a combination) of one or more of these fundamental elements (Table 1). For instances, photons are radiations only, neutrons and neutrinos are masses only, protons and electrons are combinations of masses and electric charges, and quarks are combinations of masses, electric, and color charges, etc. A particle that contains only electric charge (e.g. the Weyl fermion such as the massless electron) predicted by Weyl [46] nine decades ago was recently discovered by Xu et al. [47] based on theoretical predictions from a team led by M. Z. Hasan [48-49].

Table 1: Four fundamental elements in the nature, which are radiation, mass, electric charge, and color charge. Any known matter or particle is a combination of one or more these fundamentals.

| Particles | Real Energy | | Imaginary Energy | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Radiation ($\gamma$) | Mass (M) | Electric Charge (Q) | Color Charge (C) |
| Photon | ✔ | | | |
| Neutron | | ✔ | | |
| Weyl Fermion | | | ✔ | |
| Proton | | ✔ | ✔ | |
| Quark | | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ |

Radiation and mass are further considered as two forms of real energies, while pure electric and color charges are two forms of imaginary energies. Energy of any charged particle including quarks is a complex number. Einstein's mass-energy relation is then reformed as this

$$E \equiv E_M + E_g + i\left(E_Q + E_C\right), \tag{4}$$

where $i$ is the imaginary number, and $E_M = mc^2$, and $E_\gamma = hv$ are real energies of mass and radiation (both were obtained by Einstein in 1905), while $E_Q = Qc^2/(4\pi\varepsilon_0 G)^{1/2}$ and $E_C = Cc^2(\alpha/G)^{1/2}$ are imaginary energies of electric and color charges (both were given by the author recently). Here $h$ is the Planck constant, $v$ is the frequency of the radiation, $Q$ is the electric charge, $C$ is the color charge, and $\alpha$ is the coupling constant of strong interaction.

Among these four fundamental elements, there are ten fundamental interactions [43]. The interaction between real energies is the gravitational force, which has three types: mass-mass, mass-radiation, and radiation-radiation interactions. Calculating the work done by the mass-radiation interaction on a photon derives the expression of Einstein's gravitational redshift. This mass-radiation interaction may also explain the deflection of starlight by the Sun. The interactions between imaginary energies include the electromagnetic force between

electric charges, the weak force between electric and color charges, and the strong force between color charges. In addition, we have four imaginary forces between real and imaginary energies, which are mass-electric charge, radiation-electric charge, mass-color charge, and radiation-color charge interactions. These imaginary forces may explain why charges always attach on masses. All the fundamental interactions are unified as a single interaction between complex energies,

$$\vec{F}_{EE} = -G\frac{E_1 E_2}{c^4 r^2}\hat{r},\tag{5}$$

(see Figure 4 in [43]). Substituting the complex energy Eq. (4) into Eq. (5) and replacing the expression of each type of energy, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\vec{F}_{EE} &= \vec{F}_{RR} + \vec{F}_{II} + i\vec{F}_{RI} \\
&= -G\frac{\left[E_{1\gamma} + E_{1M} + i\left(E_{1Q} + E_{1C}\right)\right] \times \left[E_{2\gamma} + E_{2M} + i\left(E_{2Q} + E_{2C}\right)\right]}{c^4 r^2}\hat{r} \\
&= -G\frac{\left(E_{1\gamma} + E_{1M}\right) \times \left(E_{2\gamma} + E_{2M}\right)}{c^4 r^2}\hat{r} + G\frac{\left(E_{1Q} + E_{1C}\right) \times \left(E_{2Q} + E_{2C}\right)}{c^4 r^2}\hat{r} \\
&\quad - G\frac{\left(E_{1\gamma} + E_{1M}\right) \times \left(E_{2Q} + E_{2C}\right) + \left(E_{1Q} + E_{1C}\right) \times \left(E_{2\gamma} + E_{2M}\right)}{c^4 r^2}\hat{r} \\
&= -G\frac{M_1 M_2}{r^2}\hat{r} - G\frac{h\nu_1 h\nu_2}{c^4 r^2}\hat{r} - G\frac{M_1 h\nu_2 + M_2 h\nu_1}{c^2 r^2}\hat{r} + \frac{Q_1 Q_2}{4\pi\varepsilon_0 r^2}\hat{r} \\
&\quad + \alpha\frac{C_1 C_2}{r^2}\hat{r} + \sqrt{\frac{\alpha}{4\pi\varepsilon_0}}\frac{Q_1 C_2 + Q_2 C_1}{r^2}\hat{r} \\
&\quad - i\left(\sqrt{\frac{G}{4\pi\varepsilon_0}}\frac{M_1 Q_2 + M_2 Q_1}{r^2}\hat{r} + \sqrt{\alpha G}\frac{M_1 C_2 + M_2 C_1}{r^2}\hat{r}\right) \\
&\quad - i\left(\sqrt{\frac{G}{4\pi\varepsilon_0}}\frac{h\nu_1 Q_2 + h\nu_2 Q_1}{c^2 r^2}\hat{r} + \sqrt{\alpha G}\frac{h\nu_1 C_2 + h\nu_2 C_1}{c^2 r^2}\hat{r}\right) \\
&= \vec{F}_{MM} + \vec{F}_{\gamma\gamma} + \vec{F}_{M\gamma} + \vec{F}_{QQ} + \vec{F}_{CC} + \vec{F}_{QC} + i\vec{F}_{MQ} + i\vec{F}_{MC} + i\vec{F}_{\gamma Q} + i\vec{F}_{\gamma C}
\end{aligned}\tag{6}
$$

There are ten fundamental interactions among the four fundamental elements of nature: mass, radiation, electric charge and color charge. Mass and radiation are real energies, while electric and color charges are imaginary energies. The nature is a system of complex energy and all the fundamental interactions of nature are classically unified into a single interaction between complex energies. There are six real and four imaginary interactions among the four fundamental elements. All these interactions as shown in Eq. (6) can be listed in Table 2.

Table 2 Fundamental elements and interactions of the nature.

| Forces | $M$ | $\gamma$ | $iQ$ | $iC$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $M$ | $\vec{F}_{MM}$ | $\vec{F}_{M\gamma}$ | $i\vec{F}_{MQ}$ | $i\vec{F}_{MC}$ |

| $\gamma$ | | $\vec{F}_{\gamma\gamma}$ | $i\vec{F}_{\gamma Q}$ | $i\vec{F}_{\gamma C}$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $iQ$ | | | $\vec{F}_{QQ}$ | $\vec{F}_{QC}$ |
| $iC$ | | | | $\vec{F}_{CC}$ |

There are two types of electric charge, positive and negative, and thus two types of electromagnetic interactions, repulsive between like charges and attractive between unlike charges. There are three types of color charges usually denoted as red, green, and blue and thus six types of strong interactions: red-red, red-green, red-blue, green-green, green-blue, and blue-blue interactions. There are also six types of weak interactions: positive-red, positive-green, positive-blue, negative-red, negative-green, and negative-blue interactions. Considering the strong interaction to be asymptotically free [50], The author replaced the color charge *C* by *rC*, which refers to that the color charges become less colourful when they are closer [43]. This leads to the weak force depends on (or is an odd function of) the radial distance rather than the square of it, while the strong force is independent of the radial distance. These characteristics of weak and strong forces are consistent with measurements.

*[4]God saw that the light was good, and he separated the light from the darkness. [5]God called the light "day" and the darkness he called "night." And there was evening, and there was morning - the first day*. Here, before the creation of the light, the universe was darkness, i.e. in the evening. After the creation of the light, the universe began its daytime, i.e. the morning at first. Lighting the dark universe, God changed the universe from night to day (i.e. darkness to brightness or evening then morning). We usually say a day morning then evening, but in the Genesis of bible, it always said a day first evening then morning. That God saw that light was good indicates that he liked the daytime more than the night. Therefore, the first day of creation was actually a long day. It contained the entire time period for God to create the 3D infinite and empty space, to make matter and fill in the space with a full of matter, to power the matter with motion and start the time, to create the fundamental forces and issue inertia, and to generate light that switched the entire space or the grand universe from night to day. It should not just be the earth day, which is only the time needed for the earth that we reside in to make one rotation about its axis, i.e. 24 hours. In fact, at this moment, the Sun, the planets including our earth, and the moon were not formed and placed yet, and thus it is meaningless to say the earth day.

## 3. CONCLUSION

The first day was the day of creating the entire space. It was the time for God to change the darkness of the entire space (empty) to the lightness of the entire spacetime (with matter and light). Therefore, in the first day, God created the entire space and time, the matter and motion, the energy, and the radiation and light with the four fundamental interactions. The earth refers to the world of matter or the infinite entire space and the water is the initial super fluidal neutral matter that God initially created for everything to be made from. The night or evening refers to the time period before light was created and the day or morning is the time period after light was created.

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# THE RADICALIZATION PROGRAM OF PHENOMENOLOGY OF JEAN-LUC MARION

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## ABSTRACT

*The article discusses the project of radicalization of phenomenology in Jean-Luc Marion. The very idea of radicalization has been associated with phenomenology since its origin and means a return to the main idea to study the appearance of phenomena, rethink it and draw the maximum consequences from it. Marion argues with Husserl and Heidegger, who, in his opinion, stopped halfway in the phenomenological path: the first reducing all phenomena to objects, the second reducing everything to being. Meanwhile, Marion is about freeing the phenomenon so that it appears on its own and as it is. In this purpose, he adopts the fundamental principle of phenomenology as "so much reduction, so much givenness", which shows that he bases his project on two concepts: reduction and givenness. The next step is to develop the issue of givenness and describe phenomena in its light. Marion's precious discovery is the saturated phenomena, which are characterized by an excess of visibility relative to the concept. Marion's project is completed with an analysis of the gift and the subject. It should be noted that, despite polemics, Marion's phenomenology is an interesting and successful attempt to radicalize phenomenology. Its valuable contribution is reflection on the fundamental principles of phenomenology, which gains value especially in the time of various "applied phenomenologies".*

**Keywords:** gift; givenness; Marion; phenomenology; reduction; saturated phenomenon; subject;

## INTRODUCTION

The phenomenological method was formulated in the early work of Edmund Husserl *Logische Untersuchungen* (*Logical investigations*)[1]. Although it was clearly polemical with psychologism and cognitive naturalism, its *novum* lies in the discovery of the difference between what appears and the appearance itself. Phenomenology is not to deal with the subject sphere, but to appearing itself[2]. However, as demonstrated by Jan Patočka, developed by Husserl in later works, from *Ideas*[3] to *The Crisis*[4], transcendental phenomenology is only one possible implementation of the phenomenological method[5]. It

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[1] Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Bd. 1-2, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Halle, 1913.

[2] Philippe Huneman, Estelle Kulich, *Introduction à la phénoménologie*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1997, p. 18.

[3] Edmund Husserl, *Ideen ze einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Halle, 1913.

[4] Edmund Husserl, *Die Kreisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*, in: "Philosophia", Bd. 1, Belgrad, 1936.

[5] Jan Patočka, *Der Subjektivismus der Husserlschen und die Möglichkeit einer "asubjektiven" Phänomenologie*, in: "Philosophische Perspektiven", 2 (1970), p. 317-334.

involves a reduction to pure immanence, to the subject or transcendental consciousness, which in turn met with criticism of Husserl's students, as well as Martin Heidegger. The next generations of phenomenologists did everything to return to the beginning, to the first phenomenological intuition in *Logical investigations*.

The idea of radicalization of phenomenology, in the sense of a return to the roots, to the original program, has been present in phenomenology almost from the very beginning. This means that recognition of it as a method goes hand in hand with disappointment as to specific implementations and applications. One of the first programs for the radicalization of phenomenology was formulated by Heidegger in the work *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*)[6] and in his continuing lecture *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*)[7]. According to Heidegger, in order to understand phenomenology one should explain the two words from which this name originates: *phenomenon* and *logos*. This first term means "showing-itself-in-itself"[8]. *Logos*, on the other hand, is to bring to light, to make manifest what one is talking about[9]. In phenomenology, therefore, the point is to see what is being shown, as it is to be seen from its own side[10]. Phenomenology has no subject matter but examines the way something is and appears. And the real phenomenon is being. Heidegger's phenomenology is an attempt to reach further than just the objectivity or subjectivity of something – it is an attempt to reach the very sense of being. And since its task is to bring out being as a being, it becomes an ontology.

Phenomenology has undergone intensive development in the Francophone environment, where not only studies of new phenomena have appeared, but also new programs for radicalization of phenomenology have been formulated, which in turn meant further polemics with Husserl and Heidegger. One of the most interesting approaches to phenomenology is the work of Jean-Luc Marion, which we intend to extract and present in this article. The main reason Marion rejects the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger is too much conditioning of the phenomenon, i.e. its dependence either on the subject or on being[11]. Whereas, the phenomenon must be released, and one should struggle for it to speak by itself and in the way it wants[12]. The phenomenon should not be kept in the subject-object or noetic-noematic schema, but as an event that transcends human concepts and is completely surprising. What does Marion's radicalization program of phenomenology consists of? First, it is to discuss the phenomenological principles in the search for the most fundamental one. Then research on phenomenological reduction and the discovery of givenness as the final instance of phenomenality. In the third step, Marion performs a specific typology of phenomena, treating them more event-related, which lead him to discover the saturated phenomenon. Finally, as a result of the radicalization of phenomenology, the concept of the subject changes, which is not so much constituting the objective sense as it is the recipient. We will follow these issues, and finally recall some critical voices that have been formulated in relation to Marion's phenomenology.

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[6] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1960.

[7] Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1975.

[8] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 47. All translations in this paper by Piotr Karpiński, unless otherwise noted.

[9] *Ibidem*, p. 52.

[10] *Ibidem*, p. 54-55.

[11] Jean-Luc Marion, *La rigueur des choses. Entretiens avec Dan Arbib*, Flammarion, Paris, 2012, p.124.

[12] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné. Essai d'une phénoménologie de la donation*, PUF, Paris, 1997, p. 33.

## 1. A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES

The indication of the primary phenomenological principle is the first step in Marion's phenomenological program. This undertaking should seem a fairly easy, given that Husserl formulated several principles of phenomenology that determine its method and foundation. However, Marion wants to point out one fundamental principle. Husserl has formulated several of them, but they invalidate and abolish each other, and above all lose the idea of primality. Is it possible to indicate one, indisputable phenomenological principle? This question resembles a Cartesian starting point and the search for *inconcussum quid*. Thus, along with the search for the primary principle, phenomenology in Marion's vision should become not so much an ontology as in Heidegger, but the first philosophy[13]. For this purpose it is necessary to examine the fundamental principles of classical phenomenology, as Michel Henry had already done[14], and see if any of them could be the first principle.

In Husserl's phenomenology, three fundamental principles can be identified: "so much appearance, so much being"[15], "back to the things themselves"[16] and the principle of all principles according to which "every originary presentive intuition is the legitimizing source of cognition"[17]. The first of these is borrowed from the Marburg school and was formulated by J. F. Herbart far before Husserl. It is an anti-Platonic formula in which *doxa*, sensual knowledge is equated with being. It can be said that being and appearing have the same ontological dignity. What's more, Husserl admitted the primacy of appearing, because only what appears can reveal the only face of being. There is no being apart from what appears. However, the question immediately arises: what operation allows what appears to achieve the status of being? And besides, is not confusion or at least identification of both appearance and being, the end of phenomenological research? The correlation between being and appearing is unclear. What is grounded in what: appearing in being or being in a phenomenon? Hence, the ambiguity and imprecision of this principle must be stated. It remains largely metaphysical, or at least pre-phenomenological, and is unsuitable for the principle of phenomenology as the first philosophy[18].

The second principle, "back to the things themselves", in its German formulation (*Auf die Sachen selbst zurückgehen*) emphasizes both the very return to the things and its necessity and even urgency. But what does "back to the things" mean? Certainly, this cannot mean a return to dealing with beings, objects, things that are already there, because it would again mean the primacy of ontology over phenomenology. According to Marion, one should return to things in the sense of matter, a spoken thing (Fr. *chose en question*; Ger. *Sache*), and not in the sense of the object (Fr. *objet*; Ger. *Ding*)[19]. The phenomenon consists in the appearance of things beginning with itself and as itself, which in turn privileges not so much

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[13] Jean-Luc Marion, *De surcroît. Études sur les phénomènes saturés*, PUF, Paris, 2001, p. 16.

[14] Michel Henry, *Quatre principes de la phénoménologie*, in: *Phénoménologie de la vie. Tome I. De la phénoménologie*, PUF, Paris, 2003, p. 77-104. Michel Henry, *Incarnation. Une philosophie de la chaire*, Seuil, Paris, 2000, p. 41-47.

[15] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 18. In the footnote Marion explains that the formula was originally formulated by J. F. Herbart, and then appeared in §46 of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* and in §7 of Heidegger's *Being and Time*.

[16] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 19. In the footnote Marion explains that the formula appeared twice in Husserl: in §19 of *Ideas* and in work *Philosophy as a strict science*.

[17] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 20. This formula is found in §24 of Husserl's *Ideas* and in P. Ricoeur, *Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie*, Gallimard, Paris, 1950, p. 78.

[18] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 19.

[19] *Ibidem*, p. 19.

perception of something, but allowing to be seen by somebody. Marion postulates, in phenomenology, to move from demonstrating (*démontrer*) to manifesting (*manifester*)[20]. While demonstrating means constituting something, manifesting means allowing something to appear starting from itself, without any production or conditioning. Thus, phenomenology in Marion's vision should not be a priori knowledge. It is hard to find these postulates in Husserl, whose principle means that things are already given, which again sets the priority of being over appearance and determines its metaphysical character[21].

The third principle, formulated in § 24 of the Husserl's *Ideas* states that every originary presentive intuition is the legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originally offered to us in intuition is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there. It opposes Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason, which required the phenomenon to be well established. In his opinion, mere appearance does not sufficiently satisfy the phenomenon, hence the reference to reason. Leibniz's position is continued by Kant, according to which intuitions without concepts are blind – the visibility of something is not enough to justify the phenomenon. Husserl opposes this requirement of an external foundation for the phenomenon. Its mere visibility, appearance, is a sufficient source of the validity of cognition. At the same time, Husserl expanded Kant's concept of intuition – it is not limited only to the sensual sphere, but also includes categories. Intuition or visibility gives us the whole phenomenon. However, the principle of all principles has its limitations: by intuition, everything is present in consciousness and captured as an object. Thus, intuition does not ask about the way of giving the phenomenon, but is subordinated to objectivity and its intentional consciousness. The principle of all principles cannot be the first principle of phenomenology, but it even suppresses any phenomenality that would not be the object of intentional consciousness.

Marion's first stage of phenomenological research ends with the statement that none of Husserl's principles can be the fundamental one of phenomenology. Or maybe there is no such principle and phenomenology is doomed to be implicit and fuzzy knowledge? Marion, however, follows the sentence that Husserl formulated in the article *Philosophy as a strict science*: "phenomena should be taken as they are"[22]. It is here that he finds the fundamental characteristics of the phenomenon: something is given in it. This self-givenness of phenomenon is the most important phenomenological principle. However, it should be referred to reduction, since Husserl writes: "phenomenological reduction in no way means limiting research to the sphere of effective immanence, to the sphere of what is effectively included in the absolute »this« of *cogitatio*, but limitation to the sphere of pure data, limitation to the sphere of pure evidence, provided this word is taken in a certain precise sense, which already excludes mediate evidence, and above all excludes all evidence in the loose sense"[23]. Research on evidence, givenness and pure phenomenon led Marion to formulate a new principle of phenomenology: "so much reduction, so much givenness"[24]. It is reduction that allows the phenomenon to be transformed so as to give it the status of pure

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[20] *Ibidem*, p. 16.

[21] Pascale Tabet, *Amour et donation chez Jean-Luc Marion. Une phénoménologie de l'excès*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2017, p. 40.

[22] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 23.

[23] Edmund Husserl, *L'idée de la phénoménologie. Cinq leçons*, trad. A. Lowît, PUF, Paris, 2004, p. 86.

[24] Jean-Luc Marion, *De surcroît*, p. 21.

data (*pure donné*) and only the reduction allows it to reach an absolute givenness[25], and the latter is the ideal limit of phenomenology. Marion takes up Husserl's idea of the giving nature of intuition, but places it in a broader context, where the givenness is grounded in reduction. The more one reduces, the more things are given to him. The Marion's principle thus exceeds the three principles of Husserl, since the reduction leads to givenness. In this way, Marion discovered the principle of phenomenology as the first philosophy. Phenomenology becomes a phenomenology of givenness, thanks to which the field of phenomenality is expanded, because one can study not only objects, not only what appears, but also phenomena somehow given, although not appearing. However, before considering the givenness itself, we should look at the issue of reduction, which as a fundamental operation must also find a new formulation.

## 2. THREE TURNS OF REDUCTION

Although Marion described reduction as the "inaugural operation"[26] of phenomenology, it must also undergo a process of radicalization and deepening. The point is not to reduce, like in Husserl, to *eidos*, to pure consciousness or to the primordial sphere, but to givenness. The latter, however, may appear only as the reduction is radicalized. How does reduction become radicalized? Reaching the point that is the most root and unconditioned. With it, the givenness expands its field. Hence Marion's principle: "as much reduction, as much givenness"[27].

Marion in his work *Réduction et donation* analyzes three turning points in the development of reduction. The first stage was Husserl's transcendental reduction, which reduced phenomena to the I intentional by giving to it constituted objects. Such a reduction thus excluded from phenomenological cognition everything that could not be included as an object, and even more excluded givenness. According to Marion, Husserl's approach is imprecise, at least at the point where he identifies being and beings, forgetting about the ontological difference between them, or reducing all beings to the objects. According to Marion, Husserl is so dazzled by the abundance of given objects that he does not ask for the donation itself, i.e. the givenness and it is the "thing itself" to which one should return[28]. For Husserl, everything is given visible, everything is present. Therefore, transcendental reduction comes to the subject as the I transcendental, beginning from which all phenomenal field opens. Phenomenology becomes transcendental egology[29]. It rises to "things themselves", but only to a certain extent, reaching its limit in the consciousness. According to Marion, the Husserlian reduction is an abuse of the phenomenological method, because one cannot privilege something that cannot be shown and does not show itself, and which is constituted by the subject – precisely objectivity[30]. Husserl's identification of objectivity and givenness leads to similar confusions. The object is not reduced to givenness, because

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[25] Fr. *donation* can be rendered in English as "donation" as well as "givenness", but we use "givenness", a use upon which Marion has insisted. "Donation" keeps open a play between donation as an act ("Mr Smith made a donation to our Community") and donation as a fact ("There was a donation left at the front door"). In other words, "donation" retains the possibility of a giver, and the distinction between act and fact is one Marion himself makes in *Étant donné*.

[26] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 23.

[27] For the first time Marion introduced this principle in *Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Husserl, Heidegger et la phénoménologie*, PUF, Paris, 1989, p. 303.

[28] Jean-Luc Marion, *Réduction et donation*, p. 22.

[29] *Ibidem*, p. 29.

[30] *Ibidem*, p. 78.

reduction does not achieve givenness, and only the latter makes it possible. According to Marion, the Husserl reduction is insufficient, because it has not got rid of the basic threat to the phenomenon – its constitution, production by the subject[31]. And while reducing everything to objectivity, it remains deeply metaphysical indeed.

The second stage is Heidegger's existential reduction, which resulted from the accusation of forgetting of being. However, it should be noted right away that, according to Marion, Heidegger made the same mistake as Husserl, but while the latter one reduced everything to objects, Heidegger sees the source not in givenness, but in being. Despite this, Heidegger noticed the givenness, expressing it impersonally as *es gibt*, which Marion translates not as *il y a*, but as *cela donne*[32]. The phenomenon is given to us, and this giving has no objective content, no ontic dimension related to beings. The real phenomenon for Heidegger is being access to which is given by *Dasein*. Being cannot be considered in the order of beings (ontics), but needs a new horizon, because giving is its way of being. Being has to withdraw from beings – the more it withdraws from beings, the more it gives. This is also the logic of givenness, so being must be considered not in the horizon of beings, but in the horizon of giving. Thus, givenness occurs in Heidegger, both in the early work *Sein und Zeit* and in later thought, where its anonymity and objectlessness will be further emphasized, and the givenness itself will be replaced by the term *Ereignis* – event or happening[33].

Marion, however, estimates that Heidegger failed to grasp the ontological difference between being and beings in the perspective of givenness. In his view, while he saw the givenness as something beyond and above being, he ignored it as something below *Ereignis*. So, similarly to Husserl, he refuses to recognize the givenness as a phenomenological source operation. According to Marion, Heidegger showed some properties of the givenness, but immediately subordinated it to *Ereignis*, which rejects it as a phenomenological principle. Both objectivity and being do not recognize givenness as such. Husserl's object and Heidegger's being are rather two modalities of the phenomenon manifestation, two possible horizons of what is given. Marion rejects this previous reductions, because both the object and being, first give themselves as data, and thus within the limits of givenness. The phenomenon may take the way of an object or being, but it could not appear if it had not been given, and thus stands on the foundation of givenness as something original and source. Hence yet above mentioned Marion's principle: "as much reduction, as much givenness". As Marion writes: "the reduction to objectivity, that of Husserl (first reduction), and the reduction to being, that of Heidegger (second reduction), can and must give way to a third position, namely the reduction to givenness"[34].

## 3. GIVENNESS OR GIFT WITHOUT BEING

In Marion's project, givenness is the most radical concept of phenomenology, it is the foundation of both what appears and what does not appear, but somehow is given. The concept of givenness includes all data that concern the subject. What's more, the givenness also includes negative data that does not appear directly in intuition[35]. Nothingness, darkness, emptiness appear to the subject as negations of being, appearing or affecting –

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[31] *Ibidem*, p. 78.
[32] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 56. Jean-Luc Marion, *Figures de phénoménologie. Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, Henry, Derrida*, Vrin, Paris, 2012, p. 38.
[33] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 59.
[34] Jean-Luc Marion, *La rigueur des choses*, p. 131.
[35] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 47.

Marion will say that they are given in a way of disappointment[36]. Givenness, therefore, has no limits, it is earlier than being or nothingness. Even any negativity implies givenness. Nonsense and contradiction are also given. Givenness cannot be denied, because then we fall into the vicious circle error, as negation is also given. On the basis of givenness, hermeneutics becomes possible, the task of which is to translate phenomena considered as objects into phenomena given more originally. And the combination of two terms – reduction and givenness – makes it possible to extend phenomenology to non-appearing phenomena, to include phenomenality given, although not visible.

But this still seems insufficient. It is not enough to put together reduction and givenness somewhat externally. The reduction must be carried out in the givenness itself. In other words, the givenness must be freed from any objective and subjective elements, according to Marion's postulate, for the phenomenon to give itself, starting from itself, in its own way, as it is. If something is given, it means that it was given to me. There is a donor behind every phenomenon. If someone can give me something, it is logical that he can be the source of the givenness itself. This problem touches on the transcendence issue. Perhaps Marion introduces the transcendent factor to phenomenology, as a result of which givenness would not be the ultimate concept of phenomenology? Marion demonstrates that the givenness in phenomenology is not only without a donor, but also without the recipient and without the gift itself. In the givenness itself a triple *epochè* should be carried out: of the donor, of the recipient and of the gift, which distinguishes givenness from the economic exchange[37].

First, Marion parenthesizes the instance of the recipient. This reduction takes place in three figures: the recipient of the gift is anonymous (such as in a charity event), is an enemy (giving to the enemy is certainly free, because unreciprocated), the endowed is an ingrate[38]. The second step is to parenthesize the donor – here the self-reducing donor is shown in three consecutive figures: the athlete, the lover and the artist (each of them provides a *jouissance* to recipient, but ignores it because he never knows his taste)[39]. And finally, the third reduction of the gift as such, i.e. showing the situation of non-objectivity of the gift. The first figure in parenthesis of the gift itself is the gift of power. The second figure is giving yourself to the other in your own body. The more the body is treated as an object of economic exchange, the less it is a gift. Finally, the third figure is giving the word – the most unreal of the gift figures[40]. After these three reductions, a pure givenness is revealed that takes place in the non-objective field. Pure givenness cannot be further reduced, because everything else has already been put in brackets.

So givenness has revealed itself in Marion's project as the most source instance of phenomenology. In its horizon, the phenomenon is not dependent on the subject or being, it speaks from itself, starting from itself. Such reduction leads us not to what is given, but to pure giving. The phenomenology of givenness exceeds metaphysics, especially its two principles: the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient reason.

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[36] *Ibidem*, p. 91.
[37] *Ibidem*, p. 140.
[38] *Ibidem*, p. 143-157.
[39] *Ibidem*, p. 157-170.
[40] *Ibidem*, p. 170-187.

## 4. TYPOLOGY OF PHENOMENA

Marion established equivalence between givenness and phenomenality. The question then arises, how does phenomenality manifest and function in terms of givenness? What phenomenality does givenness open and enable? The development of phenomenality and the discovery of new types of phenomena is the next stage of Marion's phenomenological program.

If the phenomenon appears, and to appear it must be given, then the basic factor of givennes cannot be intentionality and object constitution, but intuition, or visibility. Each phenomenon consists of two elements: visibility and intention. Visibility is giving of something, appearing, intuition of a given object to which intention, meaning, fulfillment, concept or notion correspond. This distinction corresponds to Husserl's noesis-noema pair. Both dimensions of the phenomenon must meet with each other: visibility fills the content of a given concept, the concept finds itself in a given visibility. In this way, both instances not only condition, but also reinforce and verify each other.

When intuition fills the intention (concept) completely, we talk about obviousness, evidence, absolute verification. However, complete fulfillment of the concept by visibility is rare. Much more often we are dealing with partial fulfillment of intentions by intuition. Husserl did not, however, raise the third option: when visibility exceeds the concept, and this one gives Marion to think[41].

Marion distinguishes three types of phenomena depending on the relationship between intuition (visibility) and intention (meaning). First, phenomena that are poor in intuition, like the phenomena of mathematical objects. Their feature is a significant overgrowth of intention (concept) over sensual visibility, which in this case is minimal or completely absent[42]. Secondly, the common-law phenomena, the meaning of which is found as an adequacy of intuition (visibility) and intention (concept). It is here that the constitution of objects is possible. Common-law phenomena can be found, for example, in technical or produced items[43]. Thirdly, the saturated phenomena, where the excess of intuition exceeds objective comprehension[44]. This third kind of phenomena Marion deduces as a conclusion that the givenness is prior to intention, meaning and any other category. Saturated phenomena are constituted in a reverse way – the visible givenness goes beyond any horizon of intentionality or concept. Marion, therefore, advocates the necessity of a phenomenon in which visibility gives incomparably more than what intention could ever have predicted.

The concept of the saturated phenomenon wants to introduce into the horizon of consciousness the phenomena of non-appearing (*inapparent*) ipseities (*soi*). It is the result of exceeding the principle of all principles by which Marion wants to extend the limits of phenomenology to all areas of human life. How can we explain the cognition of such phenomena as religion, which transcend the sphere of visibility? Religion is a phenomenon that philosophy excludes. Determine under what conditions this phenomenon is definable or not – this is the challenge that Marion takes on in the issue of saturated phenomena.

The saturated phenomena in Marion's approach are not objects but have the structure of an event. Their features are: surprise, astonishment and unpredictability. The saturated phenomenon cannot be presumed or predicted. It is not something that can appear in accordance with the intentional directness of consciousness. It cannot be adequately

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[41] Jean-Luc Marion, *La rigueur des choses*, p. 143-144.
[42] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 365.
[43] *Ibidem*, p. 366.
[44] *Ibidem*, p. 370-373.

described or included in categories of understanding. It also does not undergo scientific measurement or verification. The saturated phenomenon is an absolute givenness of visibility that exceeds all defined and limiting horizons. It gives itself absolutely and freely. The saturated phenomenon is both possible and impossible – so it is something paradoxical[45]. It is also equipped with ipseity (*soi*) – it gives itself autonomously as such and by itself, it constitutes itself. Marion gives the saturated phenomenon a unique status, sees in it an autonomous, self-donating phenomenality *par excellence*.

Marion distinguishes four types of saturated phenomena: the event, the idol, the corporeality and the icon[46]. This is not about metaphors or figures, but about specifying the features of the saturated phenomenon based on Kantian categories. According to Kant, every visibility should be presented according to quantity, quality, relation and modality. Whereas, Marion points to phenomena that exceed this categorical approach.

Determining a phenomenon by quantity is its predictability – each phenomenon has a quantity that can be predicted based on the sum of its parts. Meanwhile, there are saturated, unpredictable phenomena because they exceed the sum of their parts. What Marion describes as an event emerges without a reason known in advance, without any supposition that would make it known in advance. The event cannot be determined by a specific moment, place or experience of the individual. It is a historical event whose effects will be felt by all people, and whose meaning cannot be grasped by any single interpretation[47].

The second categorical term: each phenomenon has a quality, the level of which determines its reality. Qualities are perceived and constituted in objective senses. Again, there are unbearable saturated phenomena, because they exceed the level of intensity that limited sensitivity can withstand. Marion points to an idol, i.e. a work of art[48] – it imposes on the gaze such a level of visibility that it fills it to such an extent that it can no longer deal with the transformation of visibility into an object and no longer experiences this visibility without synthesis as an objective spectacle, but as a state of the subject experiencing something that he is not able to synthesize. We can bring concepts or categories to a work of art, e.g. a picture, but they will not be able to finally capture the excess of sensual visibility of it.

The third category is to describe the phenomenon according to the relationship: no objective phenomenon could appear if it were not associated with another through the concept, like substance and accidents, cause and effect. Meanwhile, instead of connecting to another phenomenon according to the analogies of experience, there are saturated phenomena that are not related to any relation, because they occur without any other reference, except that which relates them to themselves. What is called *par excellence* corporeality (*la chair*)[49], referring only to itself, experiences itself before it can experience something else.

Finally, the category of modality means that no phenomenon can be synthesized into the form of an object unless it relates to the conditions that must be met: formal for possibility, material for actuality and universal for the necessity of experience. Meanwhile, instead of referring to the regard of the subject, according to the postulates of empirical thinking in general, there are saturated phenomena that are free from the requirements of

[45] *Ibidem*, p. 370.
[46] *Ibidem*, p. 373.
[47] *Ibidem*, p. 374-376.
[48] *Ibidem*, p. 376-378.
[49] *Ibidem*, p. 378-380.

transcendental viewing, phenomena that are unobservable and cannot be constituted into objects within a finite phenomenological field. What is visible in the full sense of the word in the face of the other or in the icon, which, facing me, looks at me, not allowing me to look at it. The icon is what provides nothing to the gaze and which, being inaccessible to the viewer, nevertheless keeps its gaze on it. The icon is the other's look at me[50].

What makes saturated phenomena inconvenient to learn does not come from difficulties in experiencing them, but from an excess of intuition. Although their phenomenality is characterized by an excess of uniqueness, they are rather banal and common in our experience. However, they dissolve in the dazzle caused by the excess of intuition, and this is not about dazzle as the sensitivity of the eyes to the light excess, but as the inability to designate the concept of intuition, which gives nothing but itself. Hence, the saturated phenomenon is not present in any direct experience. What's more, it even enables counter-experience (*contre-expérience*)[51], which we can define as a negative experience, an outflow of intuition that hides the form of what is withdrawing and can only be known by the resistance it puts on my intentional look. Negative experience confirms the presence of the saturated phenomenon, but at the same time makes it inaccessible.

We can see now how Marion reverse our objective attitude to the world, turning Kant's categories of understanding. Saturated phenomena appear by themselves and transcend any human notion. Only the saturated phenomenon appears by itself, starting from itself. Marion defines such an independent and possible phenomenon as revelation, but he explains: "by revelation, we mean here a strictly phenomenological concept: an appearance purely from oneself and starting from oneself"[52]. Revelation combines all four saturation figures and become its fifth type – saturation of the saturation[53]. It is not a paradox, but a paradox of paradoxes, which Marion describes as a *paradoxotaton*[54] – the most surprising.

## 5. SUBJECT AS *L'ADONNÉ*

Description of the free and possible phenomenon, starting from itself, leads us to the last point of the phenomenological program of Marion. The phenomenon as an event, as a given, as saturating visibility is neither an object nor a being, but something given, and even a givenness. This already indicated a great distance of phenomenology towards metaphysics, which is part of the idea of exceeding metaphysics in 20th-century philosophy[55]. However, the subject side remains to be clarified: to whom is the phenomenon given? Let us remember that in Husserl reduction meant reducing the phenomenon to immanence, that is, to constitutive and intentional consciousness, which made the phenomenon dependent on the subject, almost created by it. So what role does the subject play in Marion's phenomenology? What is his idea of subjectivity?

Certainly, the subject in Marion's phenomenology takes a secondary position to the phenomenon and givenness[56]. The phenomenon is prime because it comes first before any

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[50] *Ibidem*, p. 380-383

[51] *Ibidem*, p. 353.

[52] Jean-Luc Marion, *Le phénomène saturé*, in: Michel Henry, Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chrétien, *Phénoménologie et Théologie*, Criterion, Paris, 1992, p. 127.

[53] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 397.

[54] *Ibidem*, p. 385.

[55] Jean-Luc Marion, *La « fin de la métaphysique » comme possibilité*, in: *Heidegger*, red. M. Caron, Cerf, Paris, 2006, p. 11-38.

[56] Stéphane Vinolo, *Dieu n'a que faire de l'être. Introduction à l'œuvre de Jean-Luc Marion*, Germina, Paris, 2012, p. 61.

subject. Marion strongly emphasizes that the subject is not the producer of the phenomenon. It should not be understood as a source of appearance, but as a its witness[57]. The subject has a secondary position, which also means a grammatical change from the nominative (Lat. *nominativus*; Fr. *nominatif*) to the dative (Lat. *dativus*; Fr. *datif*). The subject is not a "who" (nominative), but "to whom" (dative) is to give a testimony[58]. The subject follows the phenomenon – it is not its producer or condition, but a witness and recipient. Marion describes this new type of subjectivity as *l'adonné*[59]. The Cartesian ego is deprived of its transcendental purpose. The subject must admit that he receives the phenomenon, is endowed with it, and it is the fact of giving that makes him who he is. The phenomenon, therefore, by giving itself, simultaneously gives the subject to himself. The subject reaches himself only through the gift and discovers himself as the recipient (*l'adonné*).

However, several questions arise regarding this concept of the subject. First, does not considering the subject as *l'adonné* mean the end of the idea of subjectivity and a return to the ordinary empirical ego? Secondly, since the phenomenon is active and the subject as *l'adonné* only receives, it means that it is completely passive – so do we not return to classical metaphysics with an active thing and a passive mind? Is this concept of the subject not a turn of the Copernican revolution, or the discovery of the active role of the subject in Kant? Marion is aware of these doubts, but points out that his goal is not to simply reverse the hierarchy in such a way that what was active becomes passive and conversely. Marion argues that all oppositions, like subject-object or active-passive, are illusory. The subject as *l'adonné* should be thought outside of them. As he writes: "*l'adonné* exceeds both passivity and activity, because, by freeing itself from the transcendental purple, it cancels the distinction between the transcendental I (*le je transcendental*) and the empirical self (*le moi empirique*)"[60]. Moreover, Marion undertakes to prove that receiving and being gifted does not necessarily mean radical passivity. This is because receiving also means some work to be done. For something to be given, the subject must be able to receive. This explains why we do not receive everything at once, for example at birth, which is a hidden polemic with nativism, but all our lives we must become able to receive with every event of the day. The recipient recognizing himself as such makes himself capable of receiving and enables the givenness event. The subject only accepting thinking of himself as the recipient allows that what comes to appear as a gift. Thus, receiving a gift as a gift and enabling its visibility as such is not pure passivity, since the recipient must first accept it and recognize it as a gift. Two things should not be confused here: receiving as pure passivity and revealing the gift, recognizing something as a gift from the recipient. By making it possible to see what is given the subject as *l'adonné* becomes a screen (*ecran*)[61].

**CONCLUSIONS AND CRITICISM OF MARION'S PHENOMENOLOGY**

We may conclude that the entire phenomenological project of Marion is an attempt to return to the original program formulated by Husserl in *Logical investigations* and to draw the maximum consequences from it. Marion wants to free the phenomenon from any conditions so that it can appear on its own initiative and present itself as it is. Therefore, the phenomenon cannot be the object, but also it cannot be dependent on the subject. Thanks to

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[57] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 405.

[58] *Ibidem*, p. 373.

[59] *Ibidem*, p. 427.

[60] Jean-Luc Marion, *De surcroît*, p. 57.

[61] *Ibidem*, p. 59.

such outlined program, Marion not only overpasses metaphysics, but also extends the possibilities of phenomenology, which can study non-appearing phenomena that have no object structure but events.

The phenomenological principles formulated by Husserl proved to be insufficient, metaphysical and pre-phenomenological. The ideal term to phenomenology is not transcendental awareness, but givenness – everything that appears is given first. What's more, there are phenomena somehow given to us, but which do not appear. Hence the fundamental phenomenological principle, according to Marion, should be: "so much reduction, so much givenness". The reduction reveals various degrees of what is given to us. The reduction of Husserl (to the object) and Heidegger (to being) stopped halfway. To really reduce something is to come to the fact that the phenomenon is given, and then to parenthesize three instances: the giver, the recipient and the gift itself. The effect of such reduction is givenness as a essential concept of phenomenology.

What is given has various degrees of phenomenality. Marion distinguishes three types of phenomena: poor in intuition, common-law and saturated phenomena. While in the first type of phenomena there is a surplus of the concept over visibility (as in mathematical quantities), and in the second type their balance (Husserl recognized only this case), in the saturated phenomenon there is an excess of visibility over the concept. Such a phenomenon becomes an event and comes as a surprise. The saturated phenomenon more reveals to the subject than it is constituted by him. The subject in this approach does not play a primary and source role, does not condition the phenomenon, but receives it, and along with the phenomenon receives himself as the recipient – *l'adonné*. The subjectivity in Marion is definitely weakened, but it does not mean pure passivity. We would say that the subject's activity is moral and performative – recognizing the phenomenon in the gift enables its visibility as such.

Marion's phenomenology has become the subject of numerous polemics and critics, which, however, only emphasizes its importance in philosophical area. Three main critical voices were formulated by D. Janicaud, J. Benoist and J. Derrida.

Dominique Janicaud made an accusation of "theological turn" against many contemporary French phenomenologists, including Marion[62]. In his opinion, by opening up to non-appearing phenomena, which in itself is a contradiction, they introduced transcendence to phenomenology, and thus did not practice phenomenology but crypto-theology. Janicaud's objection can be described as "theologization of phenomenology". It does not seem right, however, for several reasons. First, starting with Husserl, there are no taboos that phenomenology should not deal with. Secondly, phenomenology, especially in its French formulation, has gone through numerous turns (e.g., aesthetic, anthropological, cognitive turn), and has continually sought to broaden its horizons, the phenomenal field, which is in line with its assumptions. Thirdly, phenomenology is not a field defined by the object, but by the method – phenomenological research is not determined by the "what" of the phenomenon, but by the way it is examined and revealed. Finally, fourthly, we should speak not so much of "theologization of phenomenology" in Marion as of the "phenomenologization of theology". In this approach, the phenomenological method is maintained and begins to bear unexpected fruit in new areas, such as the religious phenomenon, God or revelation.

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[62] Dominique Janicaud, *Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française*, Éditions de l'éclat, Combas, 1991.

Jocelyn Benoist in the work *L'idée de la phénoménologie* criticized Marion's reduction to givenness[63]. Its effect is a call, an appeal, but it is not known where it comes from, because it consumes the person of its interlocutor. The appeal steaming from the phenomenon in advance reduces itself to its pure form and does not allow to think a word, hence in Benoist's view remains empty, without content. This apriority and transcendence of the appeal shows the relationship between Marion's phenomenology and Christian revelation. So, Benoist sees in Marion's phenomenology a turn, if not towards theology, then at least towards "phenomenology of appeal", which throws it out of the proper field of phenomenology, and becomes more hermeneutics. However, Benoist's objection must be answered that phenomenology should not refuse to speak of God. Phenomenological thinking of God does not necessarily mean crypto-theology. God, as a possible phenomenon, intrigues human, so one should look for his sense. For Marion, such phenomenology becomes a "hermeneutics of love", which is nothing more than a special phenomenology of givenness and love. Speaking of God, Marion never leaves phenomenology.

Polemics with Jacques Derrida is another type. It is not about unilateral accusations, like the above-mentioned voices of Janicaud and Benoist, which rather flowed from inattentive reading Marion, but a mutual polemic about the gift. Marion reads critically the book *Donner le temps* of Derrida[64] and discusses it in his book *Étant donné*, which in turn met with criticism of Derrida. According to Derrida, absolutely pure giving is impossible. If the act of giving is to be pure, then we cannot deal with a returning gift of the giver, because in that case the gift will cease to be a gift and will become the object of economic exchange. Derrida's gift is totally subordinated to economics that will cancel it. There is no logic of the gift that underlies Marion's phenomenology. According to Derrida, Marion is wrong, because any appearance of phenomena does not occur in the horizon of givenness, but is always conditioned by the economy and the process of exchange. Marion, however, is trying to refute these deconstructivist allegations about his phenomenology of givenness and claims that the gift analysis of Derrida cannot be applied to phenomenological givenness. Derrida's mistake is to confuse the phenomenological order and the sociological one. Phenomenological giving is by no means economical, because the gift is given in the framework of the paradoxical logic: "what is given, resulting from the givenness process, appears, but leaves concealed the givenness itself, which becomes enigmatic"[65]. Giving is detached from the economy of exchange, because giving of oneself is anonymous and its source cannot be determined. The lack of a recognizable giver interrupts the economic exchange cycle. When it comes to appearing, each of the elements of giving – giver, gifted and gift – is put in brackets, i.e. reduced.

Despite the critical voices, Marion's phenomenological project should be considered one of the most interesting and promising. It is a unique attempt to rethink phenomenology in two dimensions: in the dimension of its fundamental principles on the one hand, and in the dimension of new its applications on the other. This is all the more valuable because today hardly anyone deals with the principles of phenomenology, but all sorts of "engaged phenomenologies" and "applied phenomenologies" flourish, such as the phenomenology of psychiatry, artificial intelligence, sex or feminism. Meanwhile, without a thorough reflection on the foundations of phenomenology, we do not know what status these "engaged" statements have and whether they bring us closer to the truth.

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[63] Jocelyn Benoist, *L'idée de la phénoménologie*, Beauchesne, Paris, 2001.
[64] Jacques Derrida, *Donner le temps. 1. La fausse monnaie*, Galilée, Paris, 1991.
[65] Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant donné*, p. 115.

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# CO-DEPENDENCY IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP-A LEARNED BEHAVIOUR

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**ABSTRACT**

*The present paper is structured as a theoretical article, explaining the paradigm co-dependency in intimate relationship, analysing the symptoms of co-dependency and suggesting cognitive-behaviour therapeutic ways of healing from co-dependency.*

*The psychological premise of this approach is that co-dependency is a learned behaviour. The early life scenarios of co-dependents encompass actions of our parents displaying problems with boundaries, and unhealthy ways to communicate, so the most likely learned these behaviours and brought them into their intimate relationships. Children who grow up with emotionally unavailable parents also are at risk for being co-dependent. They often find themselves in relationships where their partner is emotionally unavailable, yet they stay in the hopes that they can change the person. The list of symptoms of co-dependency and being in a co-dependent relationship includes: low-self-esteem, reactivity, caretaking, control, dysfunctional communication, obsessions, dependency, denial, problems with intimacy and painful emotions.*

**Keywords:** co-dependency; cognitive-behaviour therapy; relationship; dependency; self;

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The term *co-dependency* has been around for decades and although it was first applied to alcoholics, in time, researchers found out that a person who was raised in a dysfunctional family or had an ill parent, could also be co-dependent.

Researchers also found that co-dependent symptoms got worse if left untreated. The present paper refers to co-dependency in intimate relationship as a learned behaviour. It also presents the symptoms of co-dependency and suggests means of treating it.

## 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. **The co-dependency construct** has its genesis traced back to 1784, when one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, Dr. Benjamin Rush, first described habitual drunkenness as a disease. The construct of co-dependency evolved from the chemical dependency field in the treatment of families of alcoholics. This term has become popular among mental health professionals as well as the general public since its inception at the end 1970s.

Later on, the family systems movement also contributed to the formation of the co-dependency construct. Alcoholics 'drinking behaviour had an impact on the entire family system as well as its individual members.[8]

Although originally co-dependency described an unhealthy pattern of coping adopted by someone who was closely involved with a chemically dependent person, the label "co-

dependent" was gradually preferred for its greater inclusiveness. Thus, experts in the treatment field started realizing that other problems, such as overeating and gambling, paralleled the illness of alcoholism, and could affect family members in a similar fashion. Since the early 1980s, the term has been expanded and popularized so that it has surpassed its situational boundaries. Consequently, a co-dependent person has become one who has a relationship, personally or professionally, with a "troubled, needy, or dependent person.[1]

Among co-dependency theorists, similar definitional ambiguity can be seen. More and more, the co-dependency label, in its definitional ambiguity and societal endorsement, seems almost impossible to reject.

To be labelled co-dependent is increasingly to be judged as sick. The industry rewards people for calling themselves helpless, childish, and addicted, and punishes people who call themselves healthy (they are simply "in denial").[5]

On the other hand, although alcoholism is a societal problem, it is the co-dependent individuals who live with the alcoholic who often appear to carry the blame for the damage caused. Therefore, it can be expected that a person who embraces the co-dependency label may experience deleterious psychological consequences.

In 1989, experts at a National Conference on Co-dependency arrived at a consensual definition: "A pattern of painful dependency on compulsive behaviours and on approval from others in an attempt to find safety, self-worth and identity."

Co-dependents have been described as having a "lost self." John Bradshaw (2010) defined co-dependency as "a loss of one's inner reality and an addiction to outer reality."[4]. Darlene Lancer (2015) refers to a co-dependent "as a person who can't function from his or her innate self and instead organizes thinking and behavior around a substance, process, or other person(s)." [2] The disorder exists in the person whether or not he or she is in a relationship.

Co-dependents become dependent on other people in unhealthy ways, even though they might do fine on their own. The degree of co-dependency varies on a spectrum. Some experts consider co-dependency a disease and addiction because, like alcoholism, the behaviour is compulsive and worsens over time if untreated. It progresses through stages of degeneration and regeneration during its decline and recovery.[2]

## 2.2. Co-dependency as a learned behaviour

Co-dependency is connected not just to alcoholism or chemical dependence in families but to various types of chronic family stressors. They may be predictors of co-dependency. In addition to parental chemical dependency, other family stressors may include ineffective parenting styles, parental abuse, as well as parental mental and physical health. In their works M. Crothers and L.W. Warren studied parental chemical dependency and the results of their study indicate that parental chemical dependency, maternal and paternal co-dependency as well as maternal coercion are significant predictors of co-dependency. The results also indicated that the co-dependency occurred not only in the families of drug addicts, alcoholics, abuse problems but in those who have been physically or sexually abused. [7]

The effects of much more serious childhood experiences such as abuse have been explored more recently by Reyome and Ward (2007). They investigated the relationship between co-dependency and reported child abuse and neglect. [7]

Still attempting to establish a relationship between co-dependency and family of origin, other researchers (Ancel and Kabakci, 2009) explored the relationship of co-

dependency with individuals' attachment styles and perceived family dysfunction in childhood. Students with high levels of reported co-dependency presented more attachment-related anxiety and reported more family problems in childhood. These results suggested that anxiously related people may engage in dysfunctional relationships in an attempt to gain a sense of value and self-worth. Other types of research findings on the issue contended that family stress, independently from parental alcoholism, may be associated with the onset of co-dependency in adults (Fuller and Warner,2000; Crothers and Warren, 1996). The majority of the studies on the topic suggested an association between co-dependency and reported difficulties in family of origin (Ancel and Kabakci 2009; Reymond and Ward 2007; Fuller and Warner's 2000; Crothers and Warren's 1996). [6]

However, two studies (Knudsun and Terrell 2012; Cullen and Carr, 1999) suggested that these difficulties may be related to learning behaviours associated with family conflict, not necessarily parental substance misuse; however, not all statistical associations were based on validated scales. [6]

Studies suggested a range of difficulties in families of origin associated with parental dysfunction (compulsivity, co-dependency and substance dependence), negative parental styles (coercion, control, non-nurturance), child abuse and neglect, and interpersonal conflicts in the family of origin.

Cognitive-behaviour therapies on co-dependency imply the interviewing part encompassing the client's perceptions and recollection of their family experiences. People who identify themselves as having co-dependent characteristics usually frame their family of origin as responsible in some way for their difficulties and selectively report problems in early relationships (or indeed recall higher levels of childhood trauma). Therefore, they try to identify and analyse in the therapeutic process specific factors which may or may not increase the risk of co-dependency understood as a psychological problem.

The psychological premise that this type of therapies use is that the family patterns of thinking and behaviour are unconsciously copied by the child and he or she uses them later on in adult relationships in the same form or in a different one. More specifically, what we see as the actions of our parents when we are children ( our mother or father having a problem with boundaries, for instance or was always the martyr, could never say 'no' to people, and had unhealthy ways to communicate) we most likely learned these behaviours and brought them into our intimate relationships.

Children who grow up with emotionally unavailable parents also are at risk for being co-dependent. They often find themselves in relationships where their partner is emotionally unavailable, yet they stay in the hopes that they can change the person. No matter what happens, they won't stop hoping that one day things will be good. [3]

## 2.3. Symptoms of Co-dependency

The following is a list of symptoms of co-dependency and being in a co-dependent relationship [2]:

**Low self-esteem** (the person feels that he/she is not good enough or comparing himself/herself to others; what such persons actually feel is that he is unlovable or inadequate; feelings of shame and guilt and perfectionism often go along with low self-esteem)

- **People-pleasing** (co-dependents usually don't think they have a choice. Saying "No" causes them anxiety. Because some co-dependents have a hard time saying "No" to

anyone, they go out of their way and sacrifice their own needs to accommodate other people)

- **Poor boundaries.**( They have blurry or weak boundaries. They feel responsible for other people's feelings and problems or blame their own on someone else.)
- **Reactivity.**(A consequence of poor boundaries is that react to everyone's thoughts and feelings. )
- **Caretaking.**(Another effect of poor boundaries is that if someone else has a problem, the want to help them to the point that they give up themselves)
- **Control.**(Control helps co-dependents feel safe and secure. Everyone needs some control over events in their life. For co-dependents, control limits their ability to take risks and share their feelings)
- **Dysfunctional communication.** (Co-dependents have trouble when it comes to communicating their thoughts, feelings and needs)
- .**Obsessions (Due to their anxieties and fear, c**o-dependents have a tendency to spend their time thinking about other people or relationships)
- **Dependency (**Co-dependents need other people to like them to feel okay about themselves. They're afraid of being rejected or abandoned, even if they can function on their own)
- **Denial. (this is one major problem** for co-dependends, that they're in denial about it; not only about facing their problem, but also about their feelings and needs. Often, they don't know what they're feeling and are instead focused on what others are feeling.)
- **Problems with intimacy.**(they often experience sexual dysfunction and find it very difficult to be open and close with someone in an intimate relationship. )
- **Painful emotions.**(Co-depends experience stress and painful and complex emotions: shame and low self-esteem, fear about being judged, rejected or abandoned; feeling trapped by being close or being alone, anger and resentment, depression, hopelessness, and despair. )
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**3. ARGUMENT OF THE PAPER**

Our perspective relates the phenomenon of co-dependency to the formation of personality regarding it as arising as a symbiotic phase of development in early childhood and interrupting separation-individuation phase, which in turn has a profound influence on subsequent relationships. They form relationships that are not healthy, looking to 'fix' the other person.

The argument of the paper revolves around the psychodynamic view of early child development. Frequently, the primary caretaker is the mother; it may be the father, grandparent, or other relative or combination of people. When infant parenting is inadequate, it likely reflects dysfunction in the whole family, which further damages the growing child's self.

A person with co-dependent tendencies may find themselves in an intimate relationship with a person who has addiction issues that cause them to be emotionally unavailable. Their partner or they themselves may be workaholics or develop some other compulsive behaviour to avoid the feeling of emptiness in the relationship. This is easier in the short term than looking within and dealing with emotions.

## 4. ARGUMENTS TO SUPPORT THE THESIS

Children are born vulnerable, full of needs and dependent on their caretakers for everything. To grow, they need touch as much as food plus attention, empathy, nurturing, and security. Starting at four to six months and continuing onward, babies must confidently achieve separation from their mothers and establish their own boundaries. The key to the separation-individuation process and the formation of a healthy Self is the mother's ability to mirror the child's feelings. She does this by empathically and intuitively matching her responses to her child's needs. Generally, deficient or inadequate mirroring reflects a mother's incomplete Self, which is how co-dependency becomes generational. The mother's defective mirroring may be caused by her: illness, grief, stress due to external events, mental or emotional deficits, including depression and narcissism, rigid boundaries, mother's inability to empathize, weak boundaries.

Weak boundaries are typical of codependents. With inadequate mirroring, children learn that their needs, feelings, and thoughts are unimportant, wrong, and shameful Codependent mothers may unconsciously fail to support their children's emerging drive for independence.

On the other hand, there may be family problems and crises, such as a member's absence, illness, or addiction, that never get talked about. Parents think that if they try to act normal and pretend the problem doesn't exist, maybe it will go away, and children won't notice or be harmed; the children adopt behaviors to relieve the family tension, which vary depending upon the child's personality and birth order.

## 5. ARGUMENTS TO ARGUE THE THESIS

Critics of co-dependency tend to see it as merely a social or cultural phenomenon; the basis idea is that co-dependent mothers may unconsciously fail to support their children in their emerging drive for independence. They state that it is natural to need and depend upon others. This aspect of relationships when you depend upon a partner doesn't need to be changed. They claim that you only really thrive in an intimate relationship and believe that the co-dependency movement has hurt people and relationships by encouraging too much independence, and a false-sense of self-sufficiency, which can pose health risks associated with isolation. In Romania, the orthodox dogma regarding family relationships, for instance, encourages the preservation of traditional family customs, where men should be the ones who work and women should stay at home raising children. Being financial dependent upon the husband, the wife is compelled to agree to the partner's overall vision of the world, family and relationship.

Other directions of analysis of the construct of co-dependency tend to regard it as being merely an outgrowth of Western ideals of individualism and independence, which have harmed people by diminishing their need for connection to others. Feminists also criticized the concept of codependency as sexist and pejorative against women, stating that women are traditionally nurturers and historically have been in a non-dominant role due to economic, political, and cultural reasons. Investment in their relationships and partner isn't a disorder, but has been necessary for self-preservation. Still others quarrel with Twelve Step programs in general, saying that they promote dependency on a group and a victim mentality.[2]

### 5.1. Cognitive-Behavioural interventions in the treatment of Co-dependency

Among the interventions that proved their efficacy to treat co-dependency, the cognitive-behavioural therapies gained their rank both in Western cultures and in European

ones. In cognitive treatment of co-dependency the accent is placed on changing the person's cognition about him and others and making new cognitions; it is, therefore, believed that improvement of cognition can change and improve co-dependent behaviours.

Since our theoretical approach argues that co-dependency is a learned behaviour, the implication is that it can be unlearned. If you love your partner and want to keep the relationship, you need to heal yourself first and foremost.

We present here a few steps that such therapeutic approaches follow to heal a person from co-dependency:

1. Taking a start in being honest with him. Being honest in one's communication and in expressing their needs and desires.
2. Working upon negative thinking and errors in thinkings
3. Learn not to take things personally. It takes a lot of work for a co-dependent person not to take things personally, especially when in an intimate relationship. Accepting the other as they are without trying to fix or change them is the first step.
4. Putting in practice the process of socializing. There is nothing wrong with taking a break from your partner. It is healthy to have friendships outside of your partnership. Going out with friends brings us back to our centre, reminding us of who we really are.
5. Consider couple therapy or individual therapy. A therapist serves as an unbiased third party. They can point out co-dependent tendencies and actions between the two that the may not be aware of.
6. Rely on peer support. Co-Dependents Anonymous is a 12-step group similar to Alcoholics Anonymous that helps people who want to break free of their co-dependent behaviour patterns.
7. Establish boundaries. Those who struggle with co-dependency often have trouble with boundaries. We do not know where our needs begin or where the other's end. We often thrive off guilt and feel bad when we do not put the other first.
8. Self-Care programme. In a healthy relationship, both people have fully formed identities outside of their time together. They each bring unique attributes to the table—creating a partnership that allows both of them to grow and thrive. Watching a loved one struggle with drug or alcohol addiction is heart breaking, but they won't be in any position to support their partner's addiction treatment unless you make time to address your own mental health needs.

We shall take the example of co-dependency in intimate relationships. The signs and symptoms of love addiction include:

✓ Always craving and searching for a romantic partner
✓ Choosing a partner who is non-committal or emotionally unavailable
✓ Trying to re-create the 'honeymoon' phase of a relationship and inability to maintain a relationship once this is phase is over
✓ Constantly feeling desperate and afraid that a partner will leave
✓ Choosing a romantic partner over family, friends, work, school, hobbies and interests
✓ Compromising your values or beliefs in order to keep a significant other
✓ When single, constantly using sex and fantasies as a means to avoid loneliness
✓ Choosing partners who are abusive, demanding or require caretaking

Love Addiction can be cured. The first step is to address the major issue, that is the lack of love. Not a lack of love for others, but love for oneself. The first step to ending a

toxic relationship starts with the self. Establishing a daily practice of self-love is key to being able to walk away from a relationship that is harming you.

The following steps are suggested for healing co-dependency in intimate relationships in Kaminer's book [5]:

1. Getting Help for love addiction in a toxic relationship

Love addiction can get to the point where it requires professional help. Certified and highly trained clinical professionals help the person to get to the root cause of their addiction and create a treatment plan individually tailored to their needs. Through counselling, the provide the person with the tools necessary to engage in healthy relationships.

2. Avoid Relationship addiction by shifting the person's focus

Rather than obsessing about their relationship, the should begin to shift the focus to their self. Whether the person believe the kind words the person tell the himself or not, simply repeating certain mantras every day will have an effect on altering entrenched false beliefs and brain patterns that the person hold. Some messages of positive self-regard are: *I am a lovable and valuable person/ I deserve to be happy/I am capable/I am enough/I am worthy of love/I accept and love myself fully.*

2. Combat Co-dependency with Independence

Love addiction is fraught with issues of co-dependency. If the person is struggling with shifting their focus to the themselves, a great way to achieve this is by finding areas in the person's life where the person can be independent from the partner. Some examples of being independent are: joining a fitness class or interest group, ensuring to have at least one night with  friends a week or picking up a hobby that the person had left behind due to the relationship.

3. Be Prepared for Relationship Withdrawal

As with any addiction, if the person are addicted to a relationship, the person will experience withdrawal when the person decide to stop it. The physical symptoms of love addiction withdrawal are: nausea, insomnia, anxiety and depression.

The person can prepare for this by creating the proper supports before exiting the relationship. Supports can come in the form of friends and family or professional help. If the person put these supports in place beforehand the person will be better prepared for the inevitable withdrawal from the relationship.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

The controversy around co-dependency is divided into two camps. At one end there are mental health professionals who advocate that co-dependency is a widespread and treatable disease. A major obstacle is the lack of consensus about the definition of co-dependency and diagnostic criteria. For insurance purposes, clinicians usually diagnose patients with anxiety or depression, which are symptoms of co-dependency.

Co-dependency is a big factor in addiction, and it can come from the person who is addicted or their partner. Co-dependency is an emotional and behavioural issue that causes a person to be incapable of having a mutually satisfying, healthy relationship. A co-dependent partner will stick by their partner suffering from addiction no matter how unhealthy the relationship is.

Relationships can be one of the major triggers in a person's addiction and they may not even realize it. Whether the relationship appears healthy or not, many people get stuck in the cycle of drinking or using as a way of managing their relationship. One of the biggest suggestions for anyone suffering from co-dependency is to get professional help and try not

to get into a new relationship. It's important to understand unhealthy relationships, co-dependency, as well as the benefits of loving oneself in order to recover.

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