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


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Preface

The 3-rd issue of *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science* (November 2018) presents a cluster of articles on various aspects, all of them centred on the area of Philosophy, Theology, and Science.

Thus, first paper: *Uncertainty and Ignorance* by Katherine JOHNSON explore the significance of uncertainty as it bears on our judgments of agents' epistemic position. The next work is *From Galileo to Hubble: The Copernican principle as a philosophical dogma defining modern astronomy* and it belongs to Spyridon I. KAKOS. The author examines one of the most important principles in modern astronomy and how this principle has turned into a dogma defining the way cosmology moves forward today. To do that, the case of Galileo will be first examined.

After that, the paper entitled: *The Mindful Seon Hwadu: Sisimma as a healing utility; its efficacy for AD/HD and Beyond*, written by M.D. Jay J. Choi, Ph.D. B. HYUN CHOO presents the Mindfulness meditation (MM), as revealed in the Satipaṭṭhāna, has become a useful alternative treatment modality for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (AD/HD). The next study, by dr. Cecilia CURIS, presented a new important issue: *Emotional Intelligence in context of Therapeutic-Relationship*. This study approaches the subject in modern medical conception who places more emphasis on the involvement of emotional factors in medical communications. From a hermeneutic-philosophical point of view, any medical act involves a meeting between two individuals, with the establishment of a special type of inter-human relationship, conditioned by the specific context of this encounter. The paper of Augusto Trujillo WERNER, *Metaethics: Aquinas, Hume and Moore*, concerns Aquinas' practical doctrine on two philosophical difficulties underlying much contemporary ethical debate.

Marin BUGIULESCU signs the subsequent article: *Church and Political Society*. In this paper, the author proved multiple relations interactive for the Church and Society. Every society assumes the idea of community, and the entire human society is the sum of all human communities. Universal ideals are being invoked through universal systems. The following academic pursue is that of Spyros MAKKRIS, entitled: *Masses, Turbo-Capitalism and Power in Jean Baudrillard's social and political onto-theology*. In this actual article, the author explore this novel and innovative Baudrillardian theoretical frame of power analysis and its potentialities for a New Critical Theory in the 21st century.

A comparative study of "Self-examination or self-knowing" from the viewpoint of *Rumi and Shankara* is the final article of issue presented by Ali Reza KHAJEGIR, Mohammad Reza AFROOGH, PhD. Ali Reza FAHIM. Authors in this study presented the mystics always have a special interest in human beings. They think about both human being and his ideas, that is, in their thinking anthropology is of great importance from various dimensions especially epistemological, ethical and social.

The actual and scientific content presented in the issue No. 3 of *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science* distinguishes the opportunity to examine the altogether truth-claims found in Theology, Philosophy, and sciences, as well as the methods laid out by every discipline and the meanings derived from them. This is both the aim and the scientific mission of our *International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science*.

November 2018

PhD. Marin BUGIULESCU,



UNCERTAINTY AND IGNORANCE

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to explore the significance of uncertainty as it bears on our judgments of agents' epistemic position. I present and evaluate a series of cases to show that cognitive habits of mind like the hindsight bias impair our evaluative judgments about ignorance. Initial judgments of ignorance in cases of wrongdoing are often the result of this bias and not grounded on genuine moral criteria. I claim that these cases demonstrate uncertainty in ethics-especially in connection to ignorance of non-moral facts. From this, I make a bold leap to offer a rationale for what I call "educated ignorance"-when an agent chooses ignorance as his or her epistemic position. I conclude by offering some suggestions for why the project of what I call "educated ignorance" is a promising area of study to an ethics of uncertainty.

Keywords: educated ignorance; uncertainty; scholarship; ethics;


INTRODUCTION

A growing body of scholarship continues to yield a rich discussion about ignorance and its moral significance. Ignorance can be an obstacle to fulfilling our moral duties and its impact on moral practice is often treated as an excusing condition for moral responsibility provided an agent is not culpable for his ignorance.¹

When evaluating cases that involve agents who are ignorant, we tend to focus on the source of one's ignorance in order to make a moral judgment. However, those who investigate its moral significance do not adequately acknowledge the inevitable presence of uncertainty in ethics - especially as it relates to ignorance.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the significance of uncertainty as it bears on our judgments of agents' epistemic position. I present and evaluate a series of cases to show that cognitive habits of mind like the hindsight bias impair our evaluative judgments about ignorance. Initial judgments of ignorance in cases of wrongdoing are often the result of this bias and not grounded on genuine moral criteria. I claim that these cases demonstrate uncertainty in ethics-especially in connection to ignorance of non-moral facts. From this, I make a bold leap to offer a rationale for what I call "educated ignorance"-when an agent chooses ignorance as his or her epistemic position. I conclude by offering some suggestions for why the project of what I call "educated ignorance" is a promising area of study to an ethics of uncertainty.

¹ Excusing conditions are descriptions of states that explain how an agent's action is not genuinely attributable to him. If an agent fails to possess knowledge or beliefs relevant to his acting, we often tend to excuse him on the ground that ignorance in some way mitigates his responsibility for acting provided that he is not in some way culpable for the ignorance from which he acts. For a discussion of excusing conditions, see Rosen (2003).



Consider the following cases.

The case of John.²

One morning my husband John decides to make my cup of coffee and adds the usual heaping scoop of sugar that I enjoy. John believes that the white substance he is spooning into my coffee is sugar. But, it's not sugar-in fact, it's poison. John falsely believes that the white substance in the sugar bowl is sugar. As a result, I die from drinking the poisoned coffee that John made for me.

The case of Ann.

Ann is 7 months pregnant and her obstetrician informed her that it is time to start exploring her options for designing a birth plan. Ann signs up for a labor and delivery class at the hospital. The class is offered in two parts. After the first session, Ann is terrified about giving birth and jokingly (although, with a bit of truth behind it) informs her husband that she'd like to carry around the baby in utero for the rest of her life. Ann refuses to go to the next session. She doesn't want to know anything more about labor. She reasons that if she remains informed about the rest of the process then she will become anxious and panic. She is truly terrified and believes that not knowing is all-things-considered *better* than knowing the facts. As a result, Ann was able to fully experience the birth of her first child without anxiety.


These cases are strikingly different. First, Ann did not kill anyone due to her ignorance but John did. Second, John did not know that the sugar was poison and while he did not choose to be ignorant of this fact, he did not make any effort to know better. Indeed, John was ignorant of his ignorance. Ann knew that she did not know much about labor and delivery and she chose to be ignorant. Nevertheless, Ann willfully chose ignorance, not for its own sake (just to be ignorant), but in order to achieve her goal. Third, after his wife's death, John wished he had known better about the true nature of the white substance he spooned into the coffee-that is, he wished he had not been ignorant. By contrast, even after delivering her baby, Ann was pleased that she had chosen ignorance. Interestingly, these striking differences are those that concern their epistemic position.

John and Ann also share a few things in common. I will highlight three similarities. First, they both had good intentions that resulted in choices to do good. John made his wife her coffee that morning because he wanted her to feel loved and appreciated. He believed this small act of kindness would increase the chance of her feeling this way. Like John, Ann wanted to do good-she wanted to have a successful and positive birth experience and chose a course of action that she believed would increase the possibility that she reach this goal. Both John and Ann acted in ways that they believed would be conducive to achieving their goals. Second, there is an element of luck in the outcomes of both cases. Ann's decision resulted in a good outcome and it was what she desired.

However, the choice John made did not result in a good outcome and certainly did not bring about the end he desired. Third, John's and Ann's epistemic position is judged, in part, upon the *consequences* of their choices. John did not choose to investigate the bowl of sugar to ensure it did not contain poison-and this choice resulted in the death of his wife. While his choice was neither reckless nor premeditated, we pause to question whether he should have been more thoughtful-even cautious-about what he put in his wife's coffee.

Given the horrible outcome, we may tend to over-exaggerate and examine how he was negligent.³ We seriously question whether he was culpable for his ignorance and in some

² I have borrowed and modified this example from Harman [2011].



way even culpable for his wife's death. As for Ann, she chose not to pursue more information and to remain ignorant about the labor and delivery process. Ann's epistemic conduct was deliberate. Fortunately, she gave birth to a healthy baby and experienced no complications during delivery. We do not scrutinize Ann's conduct in the way that we are critical or wary of John's because no harm came to the baby or Ann. We think Ann was rational—not negligent or thoughtless—in her decision not to acquire information in this situation. If either Ann or her baby suffered harm, I suspect that many of us would be inclined to blame her and criticize her choice to be ignorant.

1. UNCERTAINTY IN THE CASES OF JOHN AND ANN

John's ignorance led to the death of his wife. However, is he responsible for her death? In what follows, I explore four competing responses to this question: (1) The Standard Response, (2) The Aristotelian Response, (3) The Skeptical Response, and (4) The Hard Luck Response. Each of these responses directly address the epistemic position of an agent and attempts to evaluate its cause. They illuminate complimentary as well as competing perspectives about the significance of ignorance to moral responsibility.

The Standard Response (SR) to the case of John turns on whether he could have prevented his ignorance.⁴ On this view, John may be culpably ignorant and hence, blameworthy for killing his wife if he could have prevented or avoided his ignorance. However, John may be non-culpably ignorant and hence, excused for his actions, just in case his ignorance was inevitable or unavoidable.⁵

SR captures our ordinary intuitions about the relationship between ignorance, action, and accountability.⁶ The things that are out of our control *cannot* be things for which we are accountable and the things within our control are those for which we *can be* accountable. George Sher nicely captures this point.


The principle that it is unfair to hold agents responsible for what is beyond their control is compatible with many theories of rightness. [...] Because the only facts to which we can appeal when we deliberate are facts of which we are aware, a deliberating agent's conscious beliefs must be central both to his conception of what is within his control and to

³ This is consistent with the halo effect. See Kahnemann [2011], p. 199-200: "The halo effect helps keep explanatory narratives simple and coherent by exaggerating the consistency of evaluations: good people do only good things and bad people are all bad."

⁴ I draw on Rescher's [2009] concise distinction between culpable and non-culpable (or what he calls 'venial' or 'excusable') ignorance. He states: "Culpable ignorance obtains when the requisite information is available, but insufficient, incompetent, or inadequate efforts are made to obtain it. [...Excusable ignorance] obtains in all of those situations where ignorance is inevitable because the requisite information regarding the fact is unavailable thanks to the general principles of the situation" (Rescher [2009] p. 11).

⁵ Or, in this case, non-culpable ignorance could be ignorance that we could not have reasonably been able to prevent or avoid. However, in part, one of the major issues concerning discussions of the excusing force of ignorance is this very point – namely, identifying what is a reasonable expectation for preventing one's epistemic shortcoming.

⁶ SR has a number of proponents, like George Sher, who offer a variety of response that attempt to locate the moment of culpability or excuse. See Zimmerman [1997], Vargas [2005], and Smith [1983]. Zimmerman claims we ought to hold moral agents responsible for his having brought about his state of ignorance provided that "culpability for ignorant behavior must be rooted in culpability that involves no ignorance" (Zimmerman [1997] p. 417). Vargas employs Van Inwagen's 'tracing principle' to the knowledge condition for moral responsibility. He makes the point that a tracing principle strategy for difficult cases (involving ignorance) "anchors responsibility in either prior decisions to act, or acquisitions of dispositions, habit, or the self" (Vargas [2005] p. 271). Holly Smith maintains that ignorance is only an excusing condition to the extent that the state of affairs was such that the agent "should have realized what he was doing" (Smith [1983] p. 453).



his conception of what he may fairly be asked to do. When we deliberate, we necessarily view our control as extending only as far as the possibilities of which we are conscious.⁷

SR concentrates on the connection between the excuse of ignorance and the control one has over his epistemic position. On this view, freedom or some kind of control condition must be present in order to assign culpability. Ignorance can exculpate only when it the result of something *outside* of our control. John's ignorance of the white substance was something that he had the opportunity to correct. It did not occur to him that he needed to investigate any further.

The Aristotelian Response (AR) suggests that John is responsible if he lacks knowledge of *moral facts* relevant to the circumstance.⁸ Accordingly, John should have access to or constitutional understanding of what is good, bad, right, wrong, beneficial or harmful.

Ignorance in moral choice does not make an act involuntary – it makes it wicked; rather, it is ignorance of the particulars which constitute the circumstances and the issues involved in the action.⁹

In this case, John was not ignorant of moral facts but he was ignorant of non-moral facts. He believed that it is morally good to make your wife feel loved and this is beneficial to persons and to one's marriage.¹⁰ He also believed that this small act of kindness would satisfy this moral belief. However, if John had known better, he would not have spooned poison into his wife's coffee.¹¹ He would have thrown out the poison and figured out a different way to make his wife feel loved.

Also, had it been a different day or different bowl of sugar, it is possible that John's wife would not die and the outcomes been more in line with his actual intent and goal. If so, perhaps we would have perceived John differently—and not questioned his conduct. Interestingly, John's actions do not change in either scenario, only the outcome. This point highlights that John's knowledge of moral facts is not what is at issue here. An assessment of John from the perspective of AR turns on his knowledge of moral facts. On this view, then, John's ignorance would excuse him from responsibility.

Atypical responses to the case of John focus on the limits of knowledge and the influence of factors beyond our control. The Skeptical Response (SKR) would likely claim that he cannot be morally responsible for his wife's death in light of his ignorance about the nature of the white substance in the sugar bowl because we cannot know anything with absolute certainty.¹² According to SKR, John will inevitably be ignorant in some way—

⁷ Sher [2009] p. 55, 59.

⁸ Admittedly, this is a very strict interpretation drawn from Aristotle's distinction between culpable and non-culpable ignorance. He does acknowledge that we can be culpably ignorant for ignorance of non-moral facts in certain cases. For the purposes of this paper, I present this strict interpretation to stress a very specific point, namely, that the type of one's ignorance is also another way of looking at and understanding the nature of ignorance in determining responsibility. See Aristotle [1999].

⁹ Aristotle [1999] 1110b31-35.

¹⁰ For the sake of argument, I will presume that this is a moral belief. To defend a conception of what counts as moral belief goes beyond the scope of this paper.

¹¹ I presume this is the case because John's intention was to make his wife feel loved and appreciated.

¹² I have drawn SKR from Unger [1975]. 1975). Unger's classic defense of skepticism is a thesis denying the possibility of genuine knowledge claims. He argues that there is no degree of sufficient justification to make (or warrant) such claims. Thus, the beliefs we hold are no more or less reasonable (or justified) than another. On this view, we cannot assess agents in virtue of the claim for universal ignorance. The case of John is a good model for SKR. Yet, a willfully ignorant agent—like Ann—may have a different kind of epistemic status.



whether he knows it or not—so there can be no meaningful moral assessment of his actions. Nicholas Rescher [2009] acknowledges a similar point.

One of the great defects of cognitive scepticism is that it annihilates the very idea of culpable ignorance. For if (per impossible) the sceptic were right and we could know nothing whatsoever, then of course ignorance of any and all sorts would be at once eventualities. Where no one can know anything, no one is open to reproach for a lack of knowledge.¹³

Sher [2009] also sketches out a version of SKR. He claims that we cannot know everything there is to know and our faculties have limits as to what they can do.¹⁴ On this view, John is not morally responsible for the death of his wife and certainly not culpable for his ignorance. For John to investigate the white substance seems to go beyond our expectations of what we would imagine he would do under such (seemingly) ordinary circumstances. However, what drives us to question John's responsibility in his wife's death is largely the product of hindsight in light of the outcomes.

SKR helps to illuminate the limitations that influence an agent's choices and actions.

Given the many limitations on what we can know, it is impossible for any given agent to be aware of every morally and prudentially relevant fact about every act that he might perform. Thus, if being fully responsible requires being aware of all such facts, then no agent is ever fully responsible for what he does. Still, because agents vary widely in the sorts of things of which they are aware, there remains ample room for the view that how much responsibility any given agent has for what he has done is a direct function of the range of relevant facts of which he was aware.¹⁵

Moreover, Zimmerman [2008] addresses and challenges the impact of skepticism concerning moral responsibility.

What seems usually to be overlooked, however, and may help explain our tendency to overestimate the number of cases in which people are to be blamed for their ignorant behavior, is that, even if it is true on some occasion that someone *should have* known something that he (or she) didn't know, it does *not* follow that that person is *culpable* for not knowing what he didn't know. [...] It is ironic that someone who recognizes the possibility that one have an excuse for wrongful behavior performed in or from ignorance should be blind to the possibility that one have an excuse for wrongful behavior that results in ignorance; yet that seems precisely to be the mistake committed by those who claim that its being the case that one should have known what one didn't know suffices (*ceteris paribus*) for one's being culpable for one's ignorance.¹⁶

Zimmerman's insight here is important to John's case. It challenges our ordinary intuitions about how one's epistemic position determines blame for wrongdoing. Even if a person is ignorant and could have known better does not mean that his ignorance is the product of some kind of (blameworthy) negligence on his part. What we can or cannot know is not necessarily a function of accountability or culpability for moral action. From the skeptical position, if we should only act on what we know, then how can we act?¹⁷

Finally, the Hard Luck Response (HLR) replies by saying that John was unlucky and cannot be morally responsible for his wife's death because he lacked power and control over


¹³ Rescher [2009] p. 12.

¹⁴ See Sher [2009].

¹⁵ Sher [2009] p. 5.

¹⁶ Zimmerman [2008] p. 178.

¹⁷ John Hawthorne claims that we ought to care about what we believe and should act only on what we know. See Hawthorne [2004].



his epistemic position.¹⁸ John is rarely, if ever, free to the extent that warrants being morally responsible for actions that issue from ignorance. Neil Levy argues this point.

Thanks to luck, distant or present, agents who perform wrongful actions *typically* lack freedom-level control over their actions because they do not satisfy one or both prongs of the epistemic conditions on such control. If their ignorance is non-culpable, then they are not responsible for failing to possess such control, and—prima facie—ought to be excused responsibility for their actions.¹⁹

The Hard Luck Response shares an element of the Standard Response in that it acknowledges the distinction between culpable and non-culpable ignorance. However, HLR goes beyond SR by illuminating how luck can impair and disable our ability to be morally responsible agents. Rarely are we culpably ignorant because luck can sometimes explain how we arrived at our epistemic position. John's ignorance is an example of the influence of luck—albeit bad luck in this case—in his life.²⁰ Luck could have had a positive influence instead—no poison wound up in the sugar bowl—and John's wife would have not only been alive but also felt cared for and loved.

How would these four perspectives respond to the case of Ann? Ann deliberately planned to be ignorant and yet no negative consequences arose as a result. According to SR, questions concerning culpability seem out of place because no one suffered harm. Of course, Ann is surely culpable for her ignorance—she *chose* her epistemic position. Nevertheless, she is not culpable for any wrongdoing arising from it since there was none. Similarly, AR would likely respond that Ann clearly is in possession of moral facts, yet she chose to be ignorant of non-moral facts. This is a case of willful ignorance and yet criticism does not seem appropriate. Perhaps choosing non-moral ignorance is a sign of character—however, Ann is typically one who bases her decisions on good reasons and evidence. Ann's decision to choose ignorance as her epistemic position in that context was the result of an all-things-considered reasoned view.

The Skeptical Response does not apply to Ann because it does not seem like we can say anything meaningful about her epistemic position. SKR cannot offer an interesting explanation for a case in which someone chooses ignorance and yet committed no wrongdoing. Ann chose ignorance but the SKR might suggest that she really did not choose anything because you can't really choose not to know what you don't know since you don't really know what you are choosing not to know.²¹


The Hard Luck Response would likely acknowledge that Ann was lucky. The situation could have turned out differently but Ann's choice to be ignorant was no more in her control than the outcome was. HLR cannot offer anything substantive about the case of Ann. However, HLR helps to illuminate the uncertainty of her decision as well as the uncertainty of reaching her desired end.

¹⁸ I draw this view along with its name from Levy [2011].

¹⁹ Levy [2011] p. 115-116.

²⁰ Levy notes: "Blaming agents for false beliefs (once more from the control-based perspective adopted here) requires that we locate a benighting action, and actions whereby an agent *knowingly and freely* passed up an opportunity for knowledge, and in virtue of which they are responsible for their ignorance. But as we have seen, locating such a benighting action is no trivial task. *Very* often there is no plausible candidate for a benighting action. The epistemic conditions on control are so demanding that they are rarely satisfied." (Levy [2011] p. 131.)

²¹ Rescher claims: "while one can know indefinitely *that* one is ignorant of something – that there are facts one does not know – one cannot know specifically *what* it is that one is ignorant of – that is, what the facts at issue are" (Rescher [2009] p. 5).



At first glance, what we can learn about John and Ann's epistemic position from these competing responses appears to be philosophically uninteresting. As far as I can tell, there is no normative guidance drawn from these responses. For example, if the Skeptical or Hard Luck responses are correct, then we rarely, if ever, make any meaningful moral judgments. If the Standard or Aristotelian responses are correct, ignorance as an epistemic position relates to outcomes but it is not clear how we can avoid it—we can infer that we should avoid ignorance when we are aware but there is no clear moral imperative to do so when we are unaware. These perspectives do not offer much in terms of the cases themselves; however, they do bring to light the apparent uncertainty in ethics from a variety of viewpoints.

Upon closer inspection, SR and AR offer us some insight into the connection between our epistemic position and understanding of morality. Consider John. He could have tasted the white substance and would have noticed that it did not taste like sugar. This may have alerted him to investigate further or dispose of the contents of the sugar bowl. Hindsight is the cause of this insight and not any established moral criteria. Hindsight bias is a cognitive habit of mind that “*leads observers to assess the quality of a decision not by whether the process was sound but by whether its outcome was good or bad.*”²²

According to hindsight, John should have investigated the contents of the sugar bowl. From the perspective of hindsight, John *could* have known better. Yet this does not mean that his ignorance is the product of some wrongdoing on his part. Just in case an agent is ignorant and could know better does not mean that the moral infraction resulting from his ignorance is necessarily something for which he *ought* to be accountable.²³

The strategy for isolating culpability for ignorance illuminates the uncertainty present in ethics. Recognizing and understanding the relationship between moral responsibility, skepticism, luck, and uncertainty suggests that ignorance is important to ethics in different way than it is traditionally viewed. As an epistemic position, ignorance demonstrates that ethics *is* uncertain. The uncertainty present in our lives is that for which we wind up being accountable and one cause of this is *hindsight*. Moral judgments based on hindsight are a threat to ethics.

2. A CASE FOR EDUCATED IGNORANCE

We need to reinvigorate our understanding of ignorance—willful and otherwise—and take into account the goals we pursue *in connection to* our epistemic position. Our inevitable epistemic limitations, in whatever form they emerge to affect us—willful, unavoidable, unforeseeable, or merely a matter of luck—tend to be judged on the basis of hindsight. John's ignorance is the result of unreactive agency; he unintentionally fails to take steps to improve his epistemic position because he does not think that he needs to.

Ann's ignorance is the result of reactive agency; she intentionally chooses behaviors that allow her to avoid improving her epistemic position. While John is an unwittingly ignorant agent, Ann demonstrates “educated ignorance”—she *chooses* ignorance as her epistemic position in pursuit of a moral end.

She rationally and deliberately decided not to improve her epistemic position because she believed knowing could interfere with the achievement of moral ends. I think we can learn a lot about the significance of ignorance and the power of uncertainty from the case of Ann. If properly cultivated, ignorance can at times be meaningful—even valuable—to the

²² Kahneman [2011] p. 203.

²³ See Zimmerman [2008].



pursuit of moral ends. Thus, we ought to do a better job of acknowledging uncertainty in ethics with regard to one's epistemic position. One way we can do this is to acknowledge the epistemic position of what I call "educated ignorance."

CONCLUSIONS

"Educated ignorance" helps to make sense of an ethics of uncertainty. It accounts for the uncertainty that regularly shadows our epistemic practices and positions. On my view, an ethics of uncertainty does not presuppose skepticism or hard luck but simply acknowledges that we often have little control over the environment in which we find ourselves. This also includes our access to and the availability of information. In this way, an ethics of uncertainty need not "suppose no knowledge whatsoever."²⁴ An account of "educated ignorance" helps make a case for the uncertainty present in ethics by setting forth clear standards for epistemic responsibility.²⁵ Educated ignorance affirms our epistemic position rather than judges it in order to preserve the possibility of making meaningful and valuable ethical assessments.

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²⁴ Walsh [2001] p. 164.

²⁵ For example, this could include 'a right to be sure' or 'confidence in one's beliefs.' For a discussion of 'a right to be sure,' see Ayer [2000]. For a discussion of what it means to have confidence in a belief, see Dretske [2000].

FROM GALILEO TO HUBBLE: THE COPERNICAN PRINCIPLE AS A PHILOSOPHICAL DOGMA DEFINING MODERN ASTRONOMY

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ABSTRACT


For centuries the case of Galileo Galilei has been the cornerstone of every major argument against the church and its supposedly unscientific dogmatism. The church seems to have condemned Galileo for his heresies, just because it couldn't and wouldn't handle the truth. Galileo was a hero of science wrongfully accused and now – at last – everyone knows that. But is that true? This paper tries to examine the case from the point of modern physics and the conclusions drawn are startling. It seems that contemporary church was too haste into condemning itself. The evidence provided by Galileo to support the heliocentric system do not even pass simple scrutiny, while modern physics has ruled for a long time now against both heliocentric and geocentric models as depictions of the “truth”. As Einstein eloquently said, the debate about which system is chosen is void of any meaning from a physics' point of view. At the end, the selection of the center is more a matter of choice rather than a matter of ‘truth’ of any kind. And this choice is driven by specific philosophical axioms penetrating astronomy for hundreds of years now. From Galileo to Hubble, the Copernican principle has been slowly transformed to a dogma followed by all mainstream astronomers. It is time to challenge our dogmatic adherence to the anti-humanism idea that we are insignificant in the cosmos and start making true honest science again, as Copernicus once postulated.

Keywords: astronomy; dogmatism; scientific dogmatism; Galileo Galilei; church; principles; Hubble; Copernican principle; religion and science



Figure 1: Tycho Brahe¹, prominent astronomer and calculator. Opposed to the model proposed by Galileo.

¹ Source: Wikipedia Commons, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tycho_Brahe#/media/File:Tycho_Brahe.JPG



INTRODUCTION

This paper will examine one of the most important principles in modern astronomy and how this principle has turned into a dogma defining the way cosmology moves forward today. To do that, the case of Galileo will be first examined. Even though most people know the case of Galileo as a case of religion dogmatism against scientific free thinking, the truth is exactly the opposite. To cut the long story short: Galileo was wrong. Not only philosophically (this is related to the abovementioned principle), but mainly scientifically. We will examine the later first. And then we will examine in more depth the philosophical dogmas hidden in this case and how these still determine cosmology today. Detecting the hidden philosophical assumptions (a.k.a. principles, axioms) which lie under today's theories is important so as not to let them turn into dogmas. Unfortunately, many arbitrarily chosen assumptions are considered as self-evident by most people today, thus paving the way to claustrophobic thinking which is inherently unable to grasp the true meaning of the cosmos. Questioning these assumptions is the only way towards a more honest and humane science; a science which will rediscover that it is perfectly compatible with religion. For thousands of years humans were looking for God into the stars. It turns out they might be looking in the wrong place after all.

What this article does NOT

This article does not attempt to “prove” or “disprove” any hypothesis about the cosmological systems used by astronomy (scientifically this is something impossible anyway, as Gödel showed). Its goal is to show that there is no single objective criterion to use when choosing the center of the solar system² and present the philosophy behind this selection. In essence, choosing a Coordinate System (CS) is open to discussion and no single model holds any kind of self-evident correctness, scientifically speaking. As it will be analyzed in more detail later on, science today accepts that changing a reference system does not mean anything as far as the scientific validity of the model is concerned. The goal is not to show that a specific point is more valid as a center than others, but to show the hidden philosophical axioms affecting the selection of that center. Again, the purpose is not to prove or disprove any of the axioms used by modern astronomy (something which is by definition impossible), but to describe how these axioms were crucial in some of the most famous cases in science history and how they still define astronomy. Not recognizing their existence makes us prone to dogmatism. And this is what we should avoid at all costs if true science is to be produced.

1. THE GALILEO CASE

The infamous case of Galileo set the terms of the war between religion and science. And this war is raging ever since. Who doesn't know about the great astronomer who supported the idea of the heliocentric model despite the great opposition from the church. At the end, the church managed to suppress the ideas of Galileo but even though they had won a battle, a bigger war has just begun. At the end, church's dogmatism would lose to the scientific rationale and hundreds of years later the Pope would be asking for an apology. A great story. Too bad not even a word of the above story is correct. Putting things straight

² The selection of the Earth or the Sun as the center of the solar system is not necessarily fully equivalent to what we know as ‘geocentric’ or ‘heliocentric’ systems. For example, the geocentric model calls not only for Earth at the center of the solar system, but for a stationary unmovable Earth at the center of the solar system (and the cosmos). The details however of the various cosmological models are not of importance in achieving the goal of this paper, which is to demonstrate how science can sometimes be driven by our philosophy.



from scientific and philosophical point of view is very crucial if someone is to understand the true issues behind this case and, subsequently, the true cause of subsequent clashes between religion and science.


To begin with, what is important to understand is that the proofs proposed by Galileo were not without a scientific opposition. Many astronomers at the time, were reluctant to accept the new thesis based on the evidence provided. Tycho Brahe was one of the great critics of the heliocentric model; and his authority as an astronomer and an extremely scrupulous calculator conferred special credibility on this criticism^[2].

The main arguments used by Galileo were sufficient to challenge the philosophy of the time regarding the cosmos, but not adequate enough to prove the heliocentric model against the geocentric one. The surface of the moon, the sunspots, the tides, the satellites of Jupiter or the phases of Venus, all proposed by Galileo as ‘proofs’ of a heliocentric cosmos, indeed demonstrated that certain principles of the Aristotelian model of the world (which called for a stable ‘perfect’ universe built around a stationary Earth) could not be upheld. However, they were not enough to change the mind of the scientific authorities of the time regarding the center of the solar system. No, the tides do not prove that the Earth is moving around the Sun. There were other explanations for the tides back then. (we now know that these tides are caused by the Moon’s gravitational pull and are not at all related to the Earth moving around the Sun). No, the phases of Venus do not prove anything regarding the Earth moving around the Sun. They are just related to Venus moving around the Sun (or the other way around, as we will see in the next section of this paper). These are surely arguments against the stable cosmos envisioned by the Aristotelian model, but not an argument in favor of the heliocentric model per se.

Some discoveries which could have helped Galileo in his reasoning, were not yet part of the scientific knowledge of the time. One should not forget that the gravitational theory of Newton was not yet formulated. Any discussion regarding the movement of planets around other planets was conducted without the theory of Newton regarding the laws of planetary motion. It is also true that the star parallax would be used to support an Earth moving around the Sun (or the other way around, as we will see later on). But Galileo was not able to detect any star parallax back then. Strictly speaking and from a purely scientific point of view, the non-detection of star parallax back then should actually be a point *against* the heliocentric model and not for it³.

In 1651 the Italian astronomer Giovanni Battista Riccioli published within his *Almagestum Novum*, a massive 1500-page treatise on astronomy, a discussion of 126 arguments for and against the Copernican hypothesis (49 for, 77 against). Seen through Riccioli’s 126 arguments, the debate over the Copernican hypothesis appears dynamic and indeed similar to more modern scientific debates. Both sides present good arguments as point and counter-point. Religious arguments play a minor role in the debate; careful, reproducible experiments a major role. To Riccioli, the anti-Copernican arguments carry the greater weight, arguments against which the Copernicans have no good response. These include arguments based on telescopic observations of stars, and on the apparent absence of what today would be called “Coriolis Effect” phenomena; both have been overlooked by the historical record. Riccioli’s work sheds light on a fascinating piece of the history of astronomy and highlights the competence of scientists of his time^[4].

³ The parallax was only measured in 1838 by Bessel.




One has also to take into account that the geocentric and heliocentric models were not the only possible models participating in the debate. Galileo never explicitly addressed the question of the third ‘chief world-system’, that of Tycho Brahe, one of the major adversaries against the heliocentric system^[25]. Formulated in the 1580s, it retained the Earth at the center but had the Sun revolve around the Earth, carrying with it the planets. Observationally, the Tychonic and the Copernican systems were equivalent. Despite that fact and the growing support for the Tychonic system among those who for physical or theological reasons were wary of the Copernican choice, Galileo never seems to have taken this alternative seriously, other than hinting in the Dialogue that a huge solar entourage could not possibly maintain a stable orbit around a relatively tiny Earth^[6]. And at this point we must also be careful to understand that the telescope was a new invention and the interpretation of its images was highly problematic⁴. Astronomers in the early 17th century misunderstood the images of stars that they saw in their telescopes. For this reason, the data a skilled observer of that time acquired via telescopic observation appeared to support a geocentric Tychonic (or semi-Tychonic) world system, and not a heliocentric Copernican one^[20]. Anti-Copernicans could cite careful measurements of star diameters which showed that, were the Copernican system correct, stars would be enormous. The sun compared to even an average Copernican star would be like the period at the end of this sentence compared to a grapefruit. By contrast, under a geocentric system, the sizes of celestial bodies would all fall into a consistent range. The moon would be the smallest celestial body, the Sun the largest. The stars would be comparable to, but smaller than, the Sun. Copernicans could not argue with that data. They resorted to justifying the absurdly large stars in their system by appealing to Divine Majesty and Omnipotence: an infinitely powerful God could easily make such giant stars^[25]. Despite all these and the data he had in hand, Galileo ultimately backed the Copernican system. By contrast, the German astronomer Simon Marius understood that data acquired by telescopic observation supported a Tychonic world system^[20].

At the end of the sixteenth century, only a few astronomers accepted the Copernican system, while the majority rejected it. In Italy, we only have to remember the judgements of Clavius and Magini, among the best-known astronomers and mathematicians, who while they stressed the importance of the contributions of *De revolutionibus*, did not consider that they could accept the heliocentric hypothesis which in their opinion had been developed by extremely complex⁵ geometric proofs sometimes contradicting each other^[2].

There was no ‘theology versus science’ war. The consultors of the Holy Office in 1616 undoubtedly believed the best natural knowledge (the ‘science’) of their day to be on their side, since in 1616, natural philosophers more or less unanimously regarded the Copernican innovation as nothing more than a useful calculational device. Their error was to overlook the possibility, so tellingly pointed out by Galileo in his letter to Castelli, that new discoveries can undermine even the most secure seeming certainties, a process already clearly under way in astronomy^[6]. If and to what extent the Roman theologians went wrong

⁴ Feyerabend in *Against Method* has an elaborate description of the challenges posed by the newly created instrument and the images it produced, images which many times were in contradiction to what people saw with their own naked eyes.

⁵ Contrary to what many people believe, Occam’s razor could not be a good ‘defender’ of the heliocentric model back then. One should remember that the epicycles were an element of both the geocentric and the heliocentric model; they were finally removed only after Kepler proposed the elliptical orbits^[31].



in their theology as well, is another very important question but completely outside the scope of this paper⁶.

From the above it is obvious that from a purely scientific point of view, the church was right not to immediately accept the claims of Galileo. And one should not forget that we are in any case missing to see the elephants in the room: Copernicus postulated the heliocentric ideas before Galileo and neither he nor his disciples were prosecuted for those ideas as Galileo was. In 1616, the church banned Nicholas Copernicus' book "On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres," published in 1543, which contained the theory that the Earth revolved around the sun. After a few minor edits, making sure that the sun theory was presented as purely hypothetical, it was allowed again in 1620 with the blessing of the church^[5]. Until Galileo forced the issue into the realm of theology, the Church had been a willing ombudsman for the new astronomy. It had encouraged the work of Copernicus and sheltered Kepler against the persecutions of Calvinists. Problems only arose when the debate went beyond the mere question of celestial mechanics^[19].

This was not a clash between science and religion. Everyone involved in the case was a Christian. Galileo himself wrote many thousands of words on the theology of biblical interpretation as he sought to make sense of the telescopic observations he was making^[7]. This was just a case of a man deceiving the Pope⁷ and using not-so-strong scientific arguments to impose a new hypothesis as a 'fact' in an era of theological turmoil. The case did not receive all that much attention back in the day as some want to believe it did. The over-exaggerating importance attached to it today is mostly in the context of the hypothetical so-called 'science vs religion' war which exists only in the minds of some people and is not related to the actual importance of the case as a whole. Had the Catholic Church rushed to endorse Galileo's views – and there were many in the Church who were quite favorable to

⁶ The historical context of the case is a crucial element which should not be ignored. What was threatened, what called for defense on the part of the Church, was clearly the integrity of Scripture. In the aftermath of the Counter-Reformation Council of Trent (1545–63) and its strictures concerning Scriptural interpretation, the integrity of Scripture was taken to imply that one should understand it literally unless compelled to interpret it otherwise. Had Galileo published the same book in another point in time, it is very likely that the reaction from the Church could be completely different.

⁷ The 'human' details of the case are not to be ignored, for they played a crucial role in the final decision. Galileo had the Pope's permission to write about the Copernican topic. But how much latitude had he been given? To be on the safe side, Riccardi instructed Galileo to write an introduction and a closing passage in which it would be made clear that the work was intended only as a 'hypothesis', again the fatally ambiguous term. Eventually, he authorized the Florentine censor to make the final decision. The book appeared finally in February 1632. It arrived in Rome at a most inauspicious time. The Pope was under attack from the Spanish faction in the Curia for supporting France and thus, indirectly, its Protestant ally, Sweden, against the Catholic Hapsburgs. He was also being accused of nepotism and of worldly aggrandisement. He was thus in no mood for a further perceived slight. Not only was the Copernican claim being presented as much more, in his eyes, than the 'hypothesis' that had been agreed upon, but also the Pope's own theological reservation about the possibility of demonstrating that claim had been implicitly called into question. Worse still, it had been reduced to an inadequate closing comment from Simplicio, elsewhere in the Dialogue almost invariably the spokesman for the losing side. In September, the Tuscan ambassador, Francesco Niccolini, tried to intercede with the Pope on Galileo's behalf but was met (as he later described it) with an 'outburst of rage' against Galileo who had 'deceived' him and 'had dared to enter into the most serious and dangerous subjects that could be stirred up at this time'. To make matters worse, a record was found in the Holy Office files of Segizzi's having delivered the personal injunction to Galileo in 1616 forbidding him 'to hold, teach, or defend' the Copernican view 'in any way whatsoever, verbally or in writing'. Since he had not let the censors of the Dialogue manuscript know of this, it would immediately be argued that this invalidated the imprimatur given him for the book. At this point, the Holy Office took over and he was ordered to appear before it^[6].



them – the Church would have embraced what modern science has disproved ^[8], as we will see in more detail in the next sections of the paper. Most scientists refused to accept this theory for many decades; even after Galileo made his epochal observations with his telescope ^[26].


The Victorian biologist Thomas Henry Huxley, who had no brief for Catholicism, once examined the case and concluded that “the Church had the best of it”. Prone as we are to what C. S. Lewis called “chronological snobbery”, we must try to understand the prevailing attitude toward science when Galileo began his work back at the era of Galileo. Since the time of the Greeks, the purpose of astronomy was to “save the appearances” of celestial phenomena. To the Greek and medieval mind, science was a kind of formalism, a means of coordinating data, which had no bearing on the ultimate reality of things (as Galileo tried to impose). Different mathematical devices – such as the Ptolemaic cycles – could be advanced to predict the movements of the planets, and it was of no concern to the medieval astronomer whether such devices touched on the actual physical truth ⁸. The point was to give order to complicated data, and all that mattered was which hypothesis (a key word in the Galileo affair) was the simplest and most convenient ^[19]. Not which was more correct or “truer”.

Pope John Paul II expressed in 1979 the wish that the Pontifical Academy of Sciences conduct an in-depth study of the celebrated case. A commission of scholars was convened, and they presented their report to the Pope on October 31, 1992. Contrary to reports in *The New York Times* and other conduits of misinformation about the Church, the Holy See was not on this occasion finally throwing in the towel and admitting that the Earth revolves around the Sun. That particular debate, so far as the Church was concerned, had been closed since at least 1741 when Benedict XIV bid the Holy Office grant an imprimatur to the first edition of the *Complete Works of Galileo*.

What John Paul II wanted was a better understanding of the whole affair by both scientists and theologians. It has been said that while politicians think in terms of weeks and statesmen in years, the Pope thinks in centuries. The Holy Father was trying to heal the tragic split between faith and science which occurred in the 17th century and from which Western culture has not recovered (mostly because it does not want to, but that is another discussion). Following the guidelines of the Second Vatican Council, he wished to make clear that science has a legitimate freedom in its own sphere and that this freedom was unduly violated by Church authorities in the case of Galileo.

However, at the same time – and here the secular media tuned out – the Holy Father pointed out that “the Galileo case has been a sort of ‘myth,’ in which the image fabricated out of the events was quite far removed from the reality. In this perspective, the Galileo case was the symbol of the Church’s supposed rejection of scientific progress”. Galileo’s run-in with the Church, according to the Pope, involved a “tragic mutual incomprehension” in which both sides were at fault. It was a conflict that ought never to have occurred, because faith and science, properly understood, can never be at odds ^[19]. And that is the message one should take from this case as a whole.

⁸ In any case the “truth” is not a matter of science, but it is what philosophy searches for (without being able to conclude on it after thousands of years of research). Science (especially from the case of Galileo and onwards) tried to create physical models to describe the cosmos we observe. Whether those models are close to the ‘reality’ or not is of no concern as long as the model ‘works’, i.e. produces predictions.



1.1 Church and Science

At this point, it is important to make a short parenthesis regarding the infamous “science vs religion” war. That “war” is not something which the church wanted, but something the proponents of scientism have promoted during the last centuries and especially after the French Revolution and onwards. Today, science and religion have a very clear distinction of scope; science is for the research of the physical phenomena while religion deals with questions related to the meaning of life and ethics^[22]. That was not always the case. Science and religion were not separated before Galileo^[1]; they were both considered two sides of the same coin concerning the search for the truth regarding human existence^[21]. And rightfully so, since they share many common attributes. Religion is based on logic and evidence in the same way science is; while on the other hand faith plays an equally important role in both of these realms of human knowledge^[21]. But this is not remotely relevant to the case at hand.

In the case of Galileo, the church did not propose any new model for the description of the physical systems we observe. It simply asked for more scrutiny on what the “experts” say; especially when their arguments claimed the “reality” of the cosmos^[1]. The church determined the invalidity of the heliocentric system based on the science (philosophy) of the time and not based on the prevailing theological doctrines⁹.

And if one wonders why the church had any place in the debate, then he must understand the way the 16th society (and the medieval society before that) worked in general and realize that the church was an integral part of society’s educational system.

The monasteries back then used to be the place where people went to learn about not only theology but also the science of the time (including astronomy). The modern university system has roots in the European medieval university, which was created in Italy and evolved from Catholic Cathedral schools for the clergy during the High Middle Ages^[23]. During the 11th century, developments in philosophy and theology led to increased intellectual activity. There was debate between the realists and the nominalists over the concept of “universals”. Philosophical discourse was stimulated by the rediscovery of Aristotle and his emphasis on empiricism and rationalism. Scholars such as Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard introduced Aristotelian logic into theology. In the late 11th and early 12th centuries cathedral schools spread throughout Western Europe, signaling the shift of learning from monasteries to cathedrals and towns. Cathedral schools were in turn replaced by the universities established in major European cities^[24]. Even one of the greatest adversaries of religion today, Dawkins, is member of a university called “College of St. Mary”. The important role of the church in the formulation of education systems as we know them today is not something one can ignore.

⁹ Christopher M. Graney performed a very interesting analysis of the actual punctuation used in the decision issued against Galileo [25]. The original text read “*Omnes dixerunt dictam propositionem esse stultam et absurdam in Philosophia; et formaliter haeticam, quatenus contradicit expresse sententiis sacrae scripturae in multis locis, secundum proprietatem verborum, et secundum communem expositionem, et sensum, Sanctorum Patrum et Theologorum doctorum*” (En. “All have said the stated proposition to be foolish and absurd in Philosophy; and formally heretical, since it expressly contradicts the sense of sacred scripture in many places, according to the quality of the words, and according to the common exposition, and understanding, of the Holy Fathers and the learned Theologians”) The semicolon after the “absurdam in Philosophia” is an important punctuation mark existing in the original text, which was omitted afterwards. The consultants of the Holy Office did not conclude that Galileo’s model was absurd *because* of the contradiction to the formal theology; it was absurd because it was not properly justified by the *science* of the day. The theological problems were also part of the case, but they were not the justification of the scientific assessment of the consultants.



2 MODERN SCIENCE VS GALILEO

The antilogos against the thesis of Galileo is not limited to the era of his trial. In fact, modern knowledge seems to reach to a conclusion that either the heliocentric nor the geocentric models are essentially any different. From Einstein and onwards we now know that one can change the reference system in any model and still produce equally “correct” (valid) physics. The “center” of the solar system is something one can arbitrarily choose and still the description of the system will be valid as far as physics is concerned.

The struggle, so violent in the early days of science, between the views of Ptolemy and Copernicus would then be quite meaningless. Either CS [Coordinate System] could be used with equal justification. The two sentences, 'the sun is at rest and the earth moves,' or 'the sun moves and the earth is at rest,' would simply mean two different conventions concerning two different CS.

Albert Einstein¹⁰

2.1 Einstein and changing system of reference

Before analyzing how philosophy could play a role in choosing a center for our solar system, the science behind changing reference system must be clarified first. In order to completely understand the situation, one needs to refer to and understand the details behind choosing a point of reference and the potential impact of this choice from a physics point of view. Most people are reluctant in taking a stance regarding the case of Galileo exactly because they know nothing about the science behind the matter; one always fears what he does not know. A high-level analysis of the matter will show that there are no solid rules regulating the selection of a reference system in a physical system and that there is no way to say whether any point has a privileged position over any other as the ‘center’ of any system. Any dispute regarding what is the center of the solar system can now be answered by any 8th grade student, for even he should know that changing the reference system in a physical system does not affect the validity of the physics describing it.

Frames of reference

Physics uses coordinate systems as reference when studying systems. A frame of reference in physics, may refer to a coordinate system or set of axes within which to measure the position, orientation, and other properties of objects in it, or it may refer to an observational reference frame tied to the state of motion of an observer. The need to distinguish between the various meanings of “frame of reference” has led to a variety of terms. For example, sometimes the type of coordinate system is attached as a modifier, as in Cartesian frame of reference. Sometimes the state of motion is emphasized, as in rotating frame of reference^[13].

¹⁰ Einstein and Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics*, The Scientific Book Club and Company Ltd, p.224. The full text reads “*Can we formulate physical laws so that they are valid for all CS [coordinate systems], not only those moving uniformly, but also those moving quite arbitrarily, relative to each other? If this can be done, our troubles will be over. We shall then be able to apply the laws of nature to any CS. The struggle, so violent in the early days of science, between the views of Ptolemy and Copernicus would then be quite meaningless. Either CS could be used with equal justification. The two sentences, “the Sun is at rest and the Earth moves,” or “the Sun moves and the Earth is at rest,” would simply mean two different conventions concerning two different CS . . . Could we build a real relativistic physics valid in all CS; a physics in which there would be no place for absolute, but only for relative motion? This is indeed possible! . . . Our new idea is simple: to build a physics valid for all CS*”. This phrase supports the idea that any reference system can be used for building valid physics, with various implications as it will be shown in the paper.

A Simple example of changing Coordinate Systems

For the needs of presenting a simple example of changing “center” or systems of reference (coordinate systems) I will use a simple example of two cars running in a road, as shown in the figure below ^[14]. These two cars are moving at different but constant velocities and are observed from the stationary inertial frame S attached to the road and the moving inertial frame S' attached to the first car.




Figure 2: A simple example of changing reference system. Here two cars 1 and 2 are shown running on the road, with different speeds v1 and v2 respectively¹¹

At some particular moment, the cars are separated by 200 meters. The car in front is traveling at 22 meters per second and the car behind is traveling at 30 meters per second. If we want to find out *how long it will take the second car to catch up with the first*, there are three obvious “frames of reference” that we could choose.

First, we could observe the two cars from the side of the road. We define our frame of reference S as follows. We stand on the side of the road and start a stop-clock at the exact moment that the second car passes us, which happens to be when they are a distance $d = 200$ m apart. Since neither of the cars are accelerating, we can determine their positions by the following formulas, where $x_1(t)$ is the position in meters of Car 1 after time t seconds and $x_2(t)$ is the position of Car 2 after time t.

$$x_1(t) = d + u_1 * t = 200 + 22 * t$$


$$x_2(t) = u_2 * t = 30t$$

Notice that these formulas predict at $t = 0$ sec the first car is 200 m down the road and the second car is right beside us, as expected. We want to find the time at which both cars will be at the same point, thus $x_1 = x_2$.

Therefore, we set $x_1 = x_2$ and solve for t, that is:

$$\begin{aligned} 200 + 22t &= 30t \\ \Rightarrow 8t &= 200 \\ \Rightarrow t &= 25 \text{ sec} \end{aligned}$$

¹¹ Source: Wikimedia Commons. [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Two_reference_frames.PNG]



Alternatively, we could choose a frame of reference S' situated in the first car. In this case, the first car is stationary (see how a **simple change in the frame of reference** makes one **'moving'** object to seem **'still'** and correlate this to the Galileo case and the geocentric vs heliocentric model debate), and the second car is approaching from behind at a speed of $v_2 - v_1 = 8 \text{ m/s}$ (the difference between the two speeds). In order to catch up to the first car, it will take a time of $\frac{d}{v_2 - v_1} = \frac{200}{8}$ sec, that is, **25 seconds, as before**. Note how much easier the problem becomes by choosing a suitable frame of reference.

The third possible frame of reference would be attached to the second car. That example resembles the frame of reference just discussed, except the second car is stationary and the first car moves backward towards it at 8 m/s (again, note the seemingly incredible **change in the nature of the motion** of the cars when changing system of reference, while we are still discussing about the **same physical system**). The result would still be the same. It would have been also possible to choose a rotating, accelerating frame of reference, but this would have served to complicate the problem unnecessarily.


In any case and regardless of the frame of reference chosen, the result regarding how much time the second car needs to catch up with the first will always be 25 seconds. If we want to expand the implications of this in the solar system center debate, we could say that "Regardless of the chosen center of the solar system, Sun eclipses happen at the same day". And how could they not? Had this not be the case then the ancient Greeks (who used a geocentric model) would not be able to make any predictions of planetary motions.

After this brief analysis it is evident that the frame of reference does not have any impact at all to the physics of the system. Regardless of the frame of reference selected the conclusions we draw regarding the evolution of that system remain exactly the same. Additionally, if the relationship between the different frames of reference is properly defined there is no issue with people communicating results to each other. It is like you are wearing a watch which is set five minutes earlier compared to the local standard time. If you know that this is the case, when somebody asks you what time it is, you are able to deduct five minutes from the time displayed on your watch in order to obtain the 'correct' time. You might say that the bus arrived at five past three, but the other person will still know that according to local standard time it arrived at three. As long as we know the differences between two reference systems, there is no problem in the communication between people using them.

As a conclusion, even though we do need to choose a coordinate system (frame of reference) to use when analyzing a system (since we do need a frame of reference to formulate our equations), this choice does not affect the validity of the scientific analysis of that system. We can choose any frame of reference and still be able to formulate physical laws and make correct predictions. That is why centuries before the Copernican model came to be, ancient Greeks were able to predict with such precision solar eclipses decades or even centuries before they happened.

3. CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING FRAME OF REFERENCE

After it was made clear that changing a reference system does not essentially makes any difference regarding physics, we must nonetheless answer the question we avoid: How do we select a reference system after all? Because at the end and even though Einstein has settled the debate, we will have to choose one in order to describe the physical system we investigate. What is important to show and understand is that science is not the major factor



affecting that choice. Philosophy is. In order for us to understand why and how philosophy determined not only the stance of Galileo and the church, but also still affects the stance of modern astronomy, we will first briefly review the scientific reasoning behind this selection. After this reasoning is demystified it will be evident to any honest reader that the only reason to choose between one model and the other would be a philosophical one. The implications of using a specific philosophical criterion and how this can feed dogmatism within modern astronomy is then analyzed.

3.1 Scientific criteria

There are many different reasons invoked for the selection of the Sun as the center of the solar system. I will concentrate my efforts on the most important ones, by giving a short description of them and then I will try to explain why every single one of them is inherently flawed.

The “elegance” criterion

In the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, the epicycle (literally: “on the circle” in Greek) was a geometric model used to explain the variations in speed and direction of the apparent motion of the Moon, Sun, and the planets. It was designed by Apollonius of Perga at the end of the 3rd century BC. In particular it explained the retrograde motion of the five planets known at the time. Secondly, it also explained changes in the apparent distances of the planets from Earth.

Many people advocate that the heliocentric model is more valid because it is more elegant than the geocentric one, since the latter has to make use of epicycles to fully describe the planetary motions. That is simply wrong. The model of Copernicus faced many issues and also used epicycles.

When Copernicus transformed Earth-based observations to heliocentric coordinates^[18], he was confronted with some entirely new problems. The Sun-centered positions displayed a cyclical motion with respect to time but without retrograde loops in the case of the outer planets. In principle, the heliocentric motion seemed simpler but included some new subtleties due to the yet-to-be-discovered elliptical shape of the orbits. Another problem that Copernicus never solved was related to correctly accounting for the motion of the Earth in the coordinate transformation. In keeping with past practice, Copernicus used the deferent/ epicycle model in his theory, but his epicycles were small and were called “epicyclets”^[18]. In essence, the epicycles were ‘transferred’ from the other planets to Earth in the same way the center was ‘transferred’ from Earth to the Sun. The simple cars example mentioned above regarding the change of reference system and its implications on how we perceive motion, is starting to seem alarmingly familiar.

In the Ptolemaic system the models for each of the planets were different and that was the case with Copernicus’ initial planetary models. As he worked through the mathematics, however, Copernicus discovered that his models could be combined in a unified system. Furthermore, if they were scaled so that Earth’s orbit was the same in all of them, the ordering of the planets we recognize today literally fell out of the math. Mercury orbited closest to the Sun and the rest of the planets fell into place in order outward, arranged in distance by their periods of revolution.

Whether or not Copernicus’ models were simpler than Ptolemy’s is moot. Copernicus eliminated Ptolemy’s somewhat-maligned equant but at a cost of additional epicycles. Various 16th-century books based on Ptolemy and Copernicus models use about equal numbers of epicycles. The idea that Copernicus used only 34 circles in his system comes



from his own statement in a preliminary unpublished sketch called the *Commentariolus*. By the time he published *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium*, he had added more circles. Counting the total number is difficult, but estimates¹² show that he created a system just as complicated than the Ptolemaic one, or even more so^[18].

The “accuracy” criterion

Some people claim that the heliocentric model is more accurate (and, thus, able to produce better predictions) than the geocentric one, but again this is not true. As hinted already, ancient Chinese and Greeks were able to predict celestial events with great accuracy well before the advance of the Copernican model^[27]. Copernicus’ theory was at least as accurate as Ptolemy’s but never achieved the stature and recognition of Ptolemy’s theory. Not to mention that in scarcely more than a hundred years, Copernicus would be overcome by events set in motion by Johannes Kepler.

The first planetary model without any epicycles was that of Ibn Bajjah (Avempace) in 12th century Andalusian Spain. The epicycles were not eliminated in Europe until the 17th century, when Johannes Kepler's model of elliptical orbits gradually replaced Copernicus' model based on perfect circles. So essentially the elimination of the epicycles was not something which took place because of the change from the geocentric to the heliocentric model, but because of the change of the orbits from perfect circles to ellipses^[18]. After that, it was the Newtonian or Classical Mechanics which eliminated the need for deferent/epicycle methods altogether and produced theories many times more powerful. By treating the Sun and planets as point masses and using Newton’s law of universal gravitation, equations of motion were derived that could be solved by various means to compute predictions of planetary orbital velocities and positions. The power of Newtonian mechanics to solve problems in orbital mechanics was illustrated by the discovery of Neptune. Analysis of observed perturbations in the orbit of Uranus produced estimates of the suspected planet’s position within a degree of where it was found. This could not have been accomplished with either the geocentric or the heliocentric models before Newton^[28].

What is interesting to note is that the geocentric (Ptolemaic) model of the solar system is still of interest to planetarium makers, as, for technical reasons, a Ptolemaic-type motion has some advantages over a Copernican-type motion^[44]. The celestial sphere, still used for teaching purposes and sometimes for navigation, is also based on a geocentric system^{[45] [46]}. When you want to find where a satellite is in relation to Earth, then you certainly do not try to figure out where it is in relation to the... Sun. Of course Earth becomes more and more irrelevant when it comes to deep space navigation, where other points of reference need to be used. This is almost tautological in nature and rather irrelevant to the discussion for the center of the solar system, however it is important to mention from time to time so as to remind us the obvious when we analyze a physical system: that most of the times (with the exception of the discussion regarding the solar system) we just select as the center... us. Sounds simple? Yes, it does. And it could be the most scientific criterion you will ever need to use to decide on the ‘center’ of anything. I will come back to that in the next section, where I will analyze the philosophical criteria which are important with regards to the selection of the center of a physical system being studied.

The “center of mass” criterion

¹² The popular total of about 80 circles for the Ptolemaic system seems to have appeared in 1898. It may have been inspired by the non-Ptolemaic system of Girolamo Fracastoro, who used either 77 or 79 orbs in his system inspired by Eudoxus of Cnidus^[18].



Another criterion cited by many is that the Sun makes a so much obvious choice for the center, because the Sun is the center of mass (and gravity) in the solar system. This is not a bad choice indeed and the most scientific of all the criteria we have seen so far (if by 'scientific' we mean adherence to hard cold numbers, which is wrong for many reasons outside the scope of this paper). If we look at the solar system as a whole, then the center of its mass is close to the Sun, so it would be logical to use the Sun as the center. Most navigation systems for space use the Sun or other major celestial objects¹³ as the main points of reference since it is those objects' gravity which plays the most important role when it comes to deep space exploration¹⁴. For people involved in celestial navigation it really makes no sense to use the Earth as a point of reference when the spaceship is intended to navigate through space to reach a comet in the outer area of the solar system. But again, this seems more of a tautology than an argument for or against the use of a specific point as the center of the solar system: It is obvious that the preferred reference system differs per case depending on the needs. For a satellite orbiting Earth, Earth can be the preferred point of reference^[46]. For Voyager spaceships which have left the boundaries of the solar system, Earth as a point of reference is just irrelevant. For the famous Cassini spacecraft, after its probe entered Saturn orbit, the moons of the giant planet became important gravitational bodies. Their locations had to be determined to an accuracy of a few kilometers relative to Saturn, since for the specific spaceship these bodies were important for its navigation^[47]. So it seems that indeed the major gravitational bodies in a physical system do qualify as useful reference points, at least from a practical point of view (navigation).

After this short tour to the universe and coming back to the question at hand, one can say that using the Sun as the center for the whole solar system is something which can be justified on the basis of the Sun's mass. However, even for this criterion which sounds solid, we should ask ourselves the hard question science keeps avoiding: What does this actually mean in terms of reality? Why would that choice be more correct from any perspective? From a modern astronomer's point of view, there is nothing in the universe except matter and lifeless particles. And in a cosmos full of particles, it makes all the sense in the world to select as the 'center' the point with the greatest concentration of those particles. Especially if this selection has important practical implications, like making the navigation easier. Could there be any argument against such a selection? In order to find out, we should turn to philosophy. But before doing so, we should try to discover the true nature of the problem we are trying to solve.

¹³ For example, the Station Explorer for X-ray Timing and Navigation Technology, or SEXTANT (named after an 18th century nautical navigation instrument), uses X-ray technology to see millisecond pulsars, using them much like a GPS uses satellites. [<https://www.sciencealert.com/x-ray-pulsar-space-navigation-nasa-world-first-success>]

¹⁴ One of the most known navigation systems, the JPL Solar System Ephemeris specifies the past and future positions of the Sun, moon and eight planets in three-dimensional space so that they can be used in celestial navigation. [<https://scienceandtechnology.jpl.nasa.gov/research/research-topics-list/communications-computing-software/deep-space-navigation>]



Figure 3: Retrograde motion: We observe it, but we do not 'accept' it exists, based on the theory.

3.2 Science and Philosophy: An invisible bond

Even though many people mistake modern science for philosophy this is simply not the case. Science today is not a way to search for the truth. All it does is trying to model what we perceive through our senses and then builds theories to make predictions. It could not care less about what is “true” and what is not. Scientific models work perfectly well no matter how close they are to “reality” or not.

What is the center of the solar system? The answer lies in the question, as Aristotle postulated. In that sense, it is important to formulate the question properly in order to get the answer. Because once we carefully read the question we will realize that it is incomplete; there are more than one way to read it. Modern science reads that question as a practical issue which needs solving, always in the context of the shallowness of today’s era. When we ask about the center in the solar system we always ask that question with practical issues in our mind: What is the center of the solar system that would serve our calculations best? What is the center of the solar system that would be more useful in navigation? What is the center of the solar system that would better match our theories?

And here lies the great misconception. Because we are not trying to discover which solution could be the most practical one. We try to find the truth regarding the reality for the matter at hand. Remember, Galileo did not claim that “The Sun is at the center because the celestial navigation would be easier this way”. Galileo claimed that the “Sun *is* at the center” as an absolute truth which everybody should know, despite the plea from the church to clarify that his proposal was merely another theory and nothing more. If scientists find it useful to have the Sun as a center for practical reasons, they can surely do so. But this selection has nothing to do with anything else than those practical reasons. And this was surely not the question in the first place; the question we try to answer is whether the Sun *is* the center of the solar system and not whether choosing the Sun as the center makes our life practically easier. Science is always focused on the practical implications and the true problem here is not a scientific one. It is a problem of science trying to disguise itself as philosophy but without the proper tools to do it. The final selection regarding the true nature of the center can only be made based on philosophical criteria (i.e. the belief that we are insignificant) even though even the scientists using them do not realize it. Only philosophical



criteria can claim anything with regards to “reality” in the first place; the only thing science has proved in this case is that it cannot prove anything (since any point of reference could be equally valid).

That is why in order to answer to our initial question we should try to explore the validity of the philosophy which stands behind the selection of the Sun as the center, leaving aside the scientific practical implications. Unless of course anyone believes that the truth would be in any way related to our easiness in performing orbital calculations. The next section will check if the philosophical analysis of the problem at hand can have any impact on the above-mentioned criteria and undermine their importance. Do the scientific criteria mentioned hold against the slightest scrutiny by philosophy? Or do they fall apart like a castle built on sand when the tide rises?


3.3 Philosophical criteria

As already mentioned, from the scientific criteria analyzed above, only one holds some kind of validity; the “center of mass” criterion. However, this criterion is more about the practicality of the problem than the actual essence of the question. And this essence can only be addressed by philosophy. One must remember that science is not an independent field of knowledge and certainly not the only one. And even though many people like to think it is the king of human’s endeavors towards discovering the always elusive notion of “truth”, its true place is far away from that. Science is nothing more than one of the many children of philosophy. It has been born out of philosophy and was grown inside its bosom. And as any kid which needs to seek approval from its parents for its new great adventures, science has to turn to philosophy once more in order to conduct the final approval test on its conclusions. To do this examination we must first analyze on which philosophical propositions the above-mentioned criterion is based upon. Then, all we need to do is offer alternatives and see if those are equally (or more) valid.

The criterion for choosing the Sun, as mentioned above, is based on the fact that Sun has more matter than any other object in the solar system. This makes it a perfect candidate for the “center”, since it is logical for anyone to envision the “biggest” (and, thus, most important) thing of a set of things at the center of that set. But is that logic correct? For economy of the analysis reasons, I leave out of the discussion any questions regarding the prejudiced notion that the “biggest” is the “most important” part (a notion which would make Confucius turn into his grave) and I also leave out of the picture any practical implications regarding the effects of that selection in celestial navigation (since I consider these practicalities as a peripheral issue to the main question, which is related to the true nature of what is the ‘center’). Instead, I focus on the argument as a whole. An argument which makes use of the notion of “matter” and uses the comparison between different sets of matter (Earth and the Sun) to make the choice. For this choice there are two important comments to be made.

First, the notion of “everything is matter” is a pure philosophical dogma known as “materialism” in its shortest typical form. Materialism is a thesis which modern scientists like to think as obvious and self-evident and that is why it is of crucial importance to always remind ourselves that it is not. The current observational data could fit with equal ease in a world which is not materialistic. The existence of spirit or a soul in the cosmos does not make the planets move differently. And yet, they may create an interesting factor we should weight in the problem at hand.

For a long time, humans have been trying to find their place in the cosmos. For most of the time until the days of Galileo, the answer to that question was obvious: we are



important. And thus, we sit at the center of everything. The selection of Earth as the center was never questioned simply because the place of man in the cosmos was never questioned either. And why should it be?

In a cosmos full of inanimate matter, humans were the only ones with the ability to ponder on their own existence, to look at the sky and question why everything is the way it is. Science, even before it was even called science, was based on the premise that we could understand the mind of God who rules the cosmos¹⁵. Even Galileo himself admitted that “Holy Scripture and nature, are both emanations from the divine word: the former dictated by the Holy Spirit, the latter the observant executrix of God’s commands.” Thus, “...no truth discovered in Nature could contradict the deep truth of the Holy Writ”^[30]. As the sons of God, created in His image, it was more than logical to accept our place at the center of the solar system – it was natural and scientific.

Of course, there can be many objections to what was described above. And these objections would be based on the premise that humans are not important. Why should we consider ourselves special? As it is logical for a theist to believe¹⁶ that he is important, it is also logical for an atheist to believe otherwise. Even though I have serious arguments in favor of the former, I will for the moment accept the latter as an equally valid stance of life. For the goal of this paper is not to argue in favor or against a specific cosmology, but to argue on the (philosophical) dogmatism pertaining current astronomy; while proposing ways to get past that dogmatism in the future. The starting point for fighting dogmatism is to recognize that there are alternatives to your way of thinking.

What we need to keep from this discussion is that the view which has the Sun as the center because of its greater mass is not the only one and should not be accepted without scrutiny. Yes, the Sun has the greatest mass, but one could easily counter-argue that the Earth is much more valid as a ‘center’ since it is the only place in the solar system hosting conscious beings pondering on what that center should be. A set of inanimate particles – no matter how big - is certainly less important than even a single human being with a soul and spirit. (at least for someone who accepts the existence of a soul and spirit)


To sum up, regarding philosophy the selection of the center is arbitrary and inherently related to the place your cosmology holds for humans. This is neither good nor bad. It is what it is. All we can do, all we ought to do if we are to formulate a theory, is make a selection and be honest enough to admit the philosophical background supporting that selection. How modern astronomy makes that selection and whether it admits the philosophical foundations supporting it, is something that will be analyzed in the next section of this paper.

3.4 The common-sense criterion

In all great problems, there is a closely guarded secret that neither scientists nor philosophers would ever like to admit its existence: Besides the high-end science, beyond over-analytical and sometime obscure philosophy, there lies the common mind. And even though what we call ‘common sense’ may well be related to some of the biggest misconceptions, in some cases the same common sense proves incredibly wise within its

¹⁵ “This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all: And on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God παντοκράτωρ or Universal Ruler” [Newton, *The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, 1729]

¹⁶ Here I use the word ‘believe’ with the sense of adhering to a position based on someone’s logic and the data available; I am not referring to blind dogmatic faith.



simplistic ignorance. It is this common mind which sometimes reveals a simple yet often overlooked aspect of the whole issue under analysis and provide the solution, by simply overriding all the obstacles put into our path by our adherence to over-analysis of things. In our case, the solution on what is the center of a system might be much simpler than we thought. (and as we will see, anyone driving a car could attest to that)

The solution goes like this: Why not choose the point of the observer as the center of the system he is observing? Why are we trying to find out what is the center of the solar system while we are sitting here watching it? What is more natural than saying that the center of an observed system is where the observer stands?

As most simple answers do, this argument is deeper than it initially looks. The whole question under analysis was raised by men who sit at night observing the sky. Would there be any logical reason for them to choose as center for that system any different place than the place from which they are watching it in the first place? The immediate answer is a simple "No". Why would there be such a reason? Think of yourself driving your car. You observe the other cars, their velocities, their direction. What do you say when looking at them? Which point of reference do you use when describing their motion? Do you describe the situation in the road as if the center of the whole "road and cars" system is somewhere outside your own car? Or do you simply describe everything as if you are the center of everything in the road? Do you care how fast a car is travelling in relation to another third car? Or do you care about how fast it travels as compared to you?

When we think of the above situation the answer that comes to our mind is obvious: We are the center of the system we are analyzing. Not the (potentially bigger) truck next to us. So why don't we apply the same logic to the situation where we observe planets moving around? Or when we observe the Sun moving in the sky? The answer to these simple (thus, hard) questions lies in a centuries-old dogma penetrating astronomy from the days of Galileo.


4. HIDDEN DOGMAS: THE COPERNICAN PRINCIPLE

Cosmology, as any other field of science, has created models based on many unproven assumptions (also known as 'axioms' in other fields). Those axioms/ assumptions are the principles with the help of which the observations of astronomy are analyzed and based on that analysis specific scientific models are developed. If we took alternate assumptions, then those same observations would support wholly different models. Two major assumptions which lie in the foundations of astronomy are the isotropy (the universe looks the same in any direction and from any place) and homogeneity (the make-up of the universe is more or less the same everywhere) of the cosmos.

These two points taken together are called the Cosmological Principle^[34]. Since it is a "principle", this means that pretty much all cosmologists and astronomers will make this assumption. In an over-simplification, it can be said that the Cosmological Principle supports the idea that "on a large scale the universe is pretty much the same everywhere"^[33]. What does mainstream astronomy call on for support? Observed isotropy of the cosmic microwave background radiation (CMB), combined with the Copernican principle: If you observe the universe being isotropic then, taking for granted that the Copernican principle is true, you can infer the conclusion that the universe is homogeneous.

But what is the Copernican principle?

In physical cosmology, the Copernican principle states that humans are not privileged observers of the universe. Named for Copernican heliocentrism, it is a working assumption



that arises from a modified cosmological extension of Copernicus's argument of a moving Earth. It is a principle with very important implications to science ^{[9] [12] [17]}. It essentially states that we are in no special place in the cosmos. Just a random planet moving along in a random galaxy. And that is why if we assume this principle is valid, then the fact that we observe the universe to be isotropic from a totally random point, then it should be logical to say that it is in general homogeneous. In some sense, the Copernican principle is equivalent to the mediocrity principle.

The mediocrity principle is the philosophical notion that “if an item is drawn at random from one of several sets or categories, it's likelier to come from the most numerous categories, than from any one of the less numerous ones”. The principle has been taken to suggest that there is nothing very unusual about the evolution of the Solar System, Earth's history, the evolution of biological complexity, human evolution, or any one nation. It is a philosophical statement about the place of humanity. The idea is to assume mediocrity, rather than starting with the assumption that a phenomenon is special, privileged, exceptional, or even superior than others ^{[10] [11]}.

Given the physics described in the previous section, it is not difficult to see that these principles (axioms) are the basis for the belief that Earth is not at the center of the solar system; sometimes despite contradicting empirical data as in the case of Galileo or Hubble (which will be analyzed in the next section). And even though it is necessary for science to start from somewhere its quest for exegesis, it is important to at least understand what this starting point is. Astronomy has been adhering to the above-mentioned principles for too long that it has almost forgotten that these principles can change as easily as they were chosen in the first place. Galileo was an early example on how personal beliefs can drive scientific conclusions, but certainly not the last. The scientific community should learn from the example of geometry, where it took us almost 2,000 years to question an axiom. And when we did, a whole new world and two new geometries came to surface. What should be clear is that the Copernican principle is what it is: a principle. And what is important is that not only it can be questioned, but it should be. If not, that principle will soon become a dogma. And from that, no good science was ever born.

5. DOGMATISM INTO SCIENCE: FROM HUBBLE AND BEYOND

Most modern scientists (like Hawking or Neil de Grasse Tyson) don't miss a chance to claim that philosophy is dead. And yet, it is their philosophy which defines their science. The example of Galileo is not the last case of scientists letting their own philosophical beliefs get in the way of the science they produce. This is not something bad per se. There is nothing wrong with having philosophy influencing your stance in the matter under analysis. Philosophy is and will always be the basis of not only our science, but our life itself. What is wrong (and potentially scientifically dangerous) is not to acknowledge that this influence exists. Because then is when science gradually regresses into dogmatism. The case of Hubble can illustrate how this can happen.

The famous astronomer Edwin Hubble published on 1937 a study on the cosmological model of the universe, under the title “*The Observational Approach to Cosmology*”. In the data published in that study it was evident that Earth appeared like having a *unique* (sic) position in the cosmos, i.e. that it was in the center or very close to it. However, Hubble chose not to accept that unique position based on philosophical propositions (principles) that be believed in. (and against all the observational data)



In particular, even though the nebula distribution showed that Earth should be in a center position, he discarded that idea based on the “principle” (axiom) that we are not unique. Based on that principle it would be illogical to say that we are in a privileged position (in the center of the Universe) and in order to accommodate that belief (axiom) he added some corrective factors to his equations! As simple as that! No hard data, no scientific analysis - a plain philosophical choice was the basis of the choice for what is valid and what is not.

One of the parts of Hubble's research where he makes those philosophical choices is cited below ^[17] (emphasis added by me):

[Beginning of excerpt from “The Observational Approach to Cosmology”]¹⁷

“The departures from uniformity are positive; the numbers of nebulae increase faster than the volume of space through which they are scattered. Thus the density of the nebular distribution increases outwards, symmetrically in all directions, leaving the observer in a unique position. Such a favoured position, of course, is intolerable; moreover, it represents a discrepancy with the theory, because the theory postulates homogeneity. Therefore, in order to restore homogeneity, and to escape the horror of a unique position, the departures from uniformity, which are introduced by the recession factors, must be compensated by the second term representing effects of spatial curvature.

There seems to be no other escape. Observations demonstrate that
 $\log_{10} N = 0.6m_c + \text{constant}.$

Relativistic cosmology requires that

$$\log_{10} N = 0.6(m_c - d\lambda/\lambda + C_v) + \text{constant}.$$

Therefore,
 $C_v = d\lambda/\lambda.$

The curvature of space is demonstrated and measured by the postulated recession of the nebulae. To the observer the procedure seems artificial. He has counted the nebulae to various limits, applied only the corrections that are necessarily required (energy-corrections), and derived the quite plausible result of uniform distribution. Now, in testing the relativistic theory, he introduces a new postulate, namely, recession of the nebulae, and it leads to discrepancies. Therefore, he adds still another postulate, namely, spatial curvature, in order to compensate the discrepancies introduced by the first. The accumulation of assumptions is uneconomical, and the justification must be sought in the general background of knowledge. The outstanding argument is the fact that velocity-shifts remain the only permissible interpretation of red-shifts that is known at the present time.”

[End of excerpt from "The Observational Approach to Cosmology"]

¹⁷ Retrieved from http://ned.ipac.caltech.edu/level5/Sept04/Hubble/Hubble3_6.html on 2018-09-06. The full text of the abovementioned research paper by Hubble can be found online at The Observational Approach to Cosmology archived at the respective site of the NASA/ IPAC Extragalactic Database (NED), which is operated by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), California Institute of Technology (CalTech), under contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).



If anyone wondered, that is the true face of modern dogmatism. Crude and raw. Scientists (and all other people in general, this is not only a science issue) have the tendency to adhere to things they already 'know', thus destroying the possibility to learn anything new. (or remember things we already knew, if we get more philosophical) The worst enemy of knowledge is sometimes knowledge itself.

Note that I am not trying to make any claim regarding the validity of the research of Hubble, or the correctness of his conclusions. The comment raised here relates only to the blatant use of axiomatic principles in the formulation of those conclusions, thus leading to the exclusion of other possible conclusions. It could be said that it was honest of him to admit the use of specific principles; and that would be true up to a point. However, one would expect a little bit more of an analysis of why such principles are selected when it comes to conclusions related not to just a minor detail but to the very nature of our cosmos (i.e. static or expanding universe). A proper examination of the observational data would at least entail a short presentation of the alternative options; discarding one of those options simply on the premise of "this is intolerable" is not only shallow and crude but deeply unscientific as well. And if one wanders how this was acceptable, the answer is simple. Science uses axioms to formulate theories for thousands of years. Once an axiom is formulated and accepted, then a whole set of theorems are based on that axiom and whole worlds (theories) are built upon them. It is not so easy to discard all this just in order to present the other potential options. It takes courage to do that (and a lot of time, the scarcest resource for modern scientists, who are always under pressure to publish their next new original research as soon as possible). It took the world more than 2,000 years to discard the belief that only one parallel line exists for any given straight line. Discarding the notion that we are unimportant will take much more; especially by people who do believe that they are not important in the first place.

The abovementioned cases are not the only ones in the history of science. Anti-humanity dogmatism runs deep into astronomy, as in modern science in general. During the last centuries there has been a systematic promotion of the idea of humans being unimportant. The (scientifically valid) biological theory of evolution was wrongly used by many in philosophy (where it doesn't belong) to promote the unimportance of the human species in the context of nature. Carl Sagan watched the stars and postulated that we are nothing more than a speck of dust in the vast space. Hawking also said "We are just an advanced breed of monkeys on a minor planet of a very average star". In the modern era of scientism, there is no place for theories which hint of humans being more important than the scientific models per se. And yet, if we do believe into our insignificance we cancel our own selves and the science we produce. Which speck of dust wanders about its own existence? What kind of "minor planet" is full of conscious beings observing the cosmos in awe and postulating on the meaning of life? How many unimportant beings have you met which ponder about all the important questions of existence? How valid could anyway be the science produced by a random set of particles which just happens to be called human?

The need for a new kind of astronomy, closer to humans, which will be compatible with the importance of our very existence is more evident than ever.




Figure 4: Kepler's *Astronomia Nova*¹⁸ is the cornerstone of modern astronomy, denoting a major paradigm shift from the circular orbits^[31]. Our era seems to need again a paradigm shift towards a more humane astronomy.

6. TOWARDS ASTRONOMIA HOMINUM


Astronomy is not the only field of science governed by our adherence to anti-humanism dogmas. Since Descartes and certainly after enlightenment, almost every field of modern research endeavor is dominated by a materialistic and mechanistic view of the cosmos; a view discarding any human from the universe we are investigating¹⁹. Incredible as it may sound, scientists today analyze the cosmos as if we are not around. From biology and genetics to psychology and physics, we examine a cosmos void of anything by matter. It is our genes which dictate what we do. It is our brain which makes us act. We are just a set of particles moving around along with other sets of particles. And surely, we cannot claim to be the center of anything since we can hardly claim that we exist anyway (at least not as humans with a soul).

This path – as any other path flirting with dogmatism – has led to many problems. Despite the latest scientific and technological breakthroughs, modern astronomy cannot in any case claim definite ‘progress’ in our understanding of the movements of celestial objects. Recent discoveries have led us to a weird path of adding more and more variables (dark matter, dark energy) to the equations in order to account for what we see. And yet, some of the problems we now face could be potentially solved had we used different principles in the first place. What we see as ‘problematic’ motion in a homogeneous universe

¹⁸ Source: Wikipedia Commons,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astronomia_nova#/media/File:Astronomia_Nova.jpg

¹⁹ Another good example of materialism setting the path in modern research is the field of neuroscience and the search for consciousness. Check out Spyridon Kakos, "Consciousness and the End of Materialism: Seeking identity and harmony in a dark era", International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science, Vol 2, No 2 (2018) for more details on that.



(something we accept as an axiom) could be normal in an inhomogeneous cosmos. Today, the homogeneity of the universe is greatly at dispute ^{[38] [39] [43]}. Studies show that, given a particular choice of measure, universe is inhomogeneous, and this inhomogeneity actually is a probable outcome of inflationary theory with us being located near the center! ^[36] One cannot dismiss such models out of hand for probability reasons ^[37].


Some astronomers have proposed models where Earth is at the center of the universe, so as to solve the problems modern astronomy has with the explanation of the movement of the galaxies (problems which have led to the introduction of the dark matter notion for example). George Ellis²⁰ has proposed that we live on a planet that is near one of the two centers the universe has and - according to his calculations - that 'semi-geocentric' model removes the need to invent terms like "dark energy" or "dark matter" to explain how galaxies move. He claims that his model gives almost as good a description of the real universe as the conventional models. In an article in Nature journal, Ellis proposes that the universe is like a cylinder-shaped universe with two centers, with the Earth is located on one side and a naked singularity on the other ^[35].

Note again that the point here is not to question the current consensus of modern astronomy (which indeed accepts the existence of dark matter and supports the opinion that the universe is homogeneous), but to illustrate what an important role the principles we use play in the formulation of our conclusions. And to show that under specific models the notion of us being in the center is not so implausible after all. Even astronomers which do not adhere to the above theories, accept that it is plausible to say that we are at the center of the cosmos, along with all other objects of the universe, since we all started our journey into existence from the same single point with the Big Bang. As the universe expands, all points in the universe see all other points getting further and further away from them, as if they are in the center of the universe.

All in all, Ellis explains that scientific exploration can tell us much about the universe but not about its ultimate nature, or even much about some of its major geometrical and physical characteristics. Some of this uncertainty may be resolved, but much will remain. Cosmological theory should acknowledge this uncertainty ^[41]. Taking into account all of the above, we must be very careful when we speak as scientists. When formulating a theory, we must clearly state what are the pre-assumptions that we make and the axioms or propositions that we use ^[42]. And we must most certainly be clear about the limitations of science, the goal of which is mainly to formulate scientific models to describe and predict and not to reach the truth regarding reality as philosophy defines it.

At the end, as is was made clear from the above analysis, science alone can never reach to a solid conclusion on the matter without philosophy. And it is unfortunate that science has lost any connection with philosophy during the last centuries. We tend to look at the stars when studying the universe and yet, the strongest argument for seeing humans at the center of everything is not hiding in the stars, but back here on Earth. On a small planet where conscious beings share their love for the dark sky. Science must regain its connection with philosophy and must find its way towards humans again. It is imperative that our models for the cosmos are compatible not only with the observation data (which anyway

²⁰ George F. R. Ellis is the Distinguished Professor of Complex Systems in the Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics at the University of Cape Town in South Africa. He co-authored *The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time* with University of Cambridge physicist Stephen Hawking, published in 1973, and is considered one of the world's leading theorists in cosmology. From 1989 to 1992 he served as President of the International Society on General Relativity and Gravitation ^[40].



could lead towards to us having a more important place in the cosmos than thought before) but also to the very soul of the universe we observe. And that soul is not the Sun nor the Earth. The soul of the cosmos is us. Shestov said it a long time ago, but few people recognized the importance of his claims: astronomy is the child of astrology and as most children in today's world, it is a spoiled one ^[31]. Modern astronomy is void of any meaning: it just looks for ways to analyze the cosmos which is seen not as a living one, but as an empty shell devoid of any meaning. Astronomers today measure and log data. They do not search for the Logos inside creation. But it was Logos which made creation possible in the first place. And to regain connection with that, we must perhaps start analyzing the cosmos without any principles or axioms holding us back.

CONCLUSION

Even though a scientific ending could seem appropriate, I felt that since philosophy was the source of the problems in the first place it is also the only one able to offer a closure to the issue at hand. Albert Einstein stated, "Once it was recognized that the Earth was not the center of the world, but only one of the smaller planets, the illusion of the central significance of man himself became untenable. Hence, Nicolaus Copernicus, through his work and the greatness of his personality, taught man to be honest"²¹. In a sense, he was right. Despite the disagreements and the debate, this honesty is indeed something we all need to uphold. Beyond the fallacies, the controversies and the mistakes, we are all human. And we should all stay humble in front of the cosmos. A cosmos which is meaningful only if there is someone in it. Like Galileo and Copernicus, one day we will all die. One day, even the Sun will fade away along with all the stars in the universe and our cosmos will eventually fade into oblivion. Some might argue that during our time we were just tiny specks of dust wandering around meaninglessly, but this could not be further away from the truth. We are not just watching the stars. We are deciding on their fate. We are not just the interpreters of their motions, but the ones breathing Logos into the cosmos itself. There is no point in being honest in a cosmos void of any meaning, but it is of cosmic significance to be honest in a world governed by divine wisdom. We used to be kids. We used to have this wisdom, but we chose to grow up and acquire 'knowledge'. And we chose to sacrifice that wisdom in the belief of our insignificance. We used to have everything, yet our lust for more has led us to nothing. The path from Athens back to Jerusalem will be hard, but it is a path we need to tread so as to rediscover the center not of the solar system but of our very existence. We are important. Our words are not just meaningless noise but have the power to make the Sun stop. And we must just open our eyes to make it move again. Our beliefs do not only shape the conclusions of science about the universe but can also shape the universe itself. We are not tiny specks of dust. We are part of God. And even though we look at the night sky without remembering what message it conveys, we do feel that it has a message to convey. Close your eyes. Look carefully and rejoice. For it is not us looking up at the stars, it is them staring back at us in awe...

²¹ Albert Einstein, Message on the 410th Anniversary of the Death of Copernicus, 1953




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THE MINDFUL SEON HWADU: SISIMMA AS A HEALING UTILITY; ITS EFFICACY FOR AD/HD AND BEYOND

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ABSTRACT

Mindfulness meditation (MM), as revealed in the Satipaṭṭhāna, has become a useful alternative treatment modality for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (AD/HD). MM is empirically based, attending areligiously to sensations and thoughts. However, its applicability has not reached its full efficacy due to its being transformed and truncated. We describe how the Seon hwadu, Sisimma can enhance its effectiveness, when coupled with Satipaṭṭhāna through the process of “tracing back the radiance.” By accepting the nature of AD/HD as that of a proactive asset, the mindful hwadu, Sisimma, can lessen the symptomatology of AD/HD, preserving its positives: spontaneity, persistence, and inspiring an experience of ultimate enlightenment. We discuss how Sisimma can contribute to mindfulness science, and enhance its efficacy as a treatment modality for AD/HD.

Keywords: Mindfulness Meditation; Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder; Satipaṭṭhāna; Mindful Seon hwadu Sisimma; Korean Ganwha Seon;

INTRODUCTION

Stimulant medications, prescribed for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children and its adult equivalent, attention deficit disorder (ADD), have shown to be generally safe and effective in reducing the symptoms of AD/HD¹. However, despite ample evidence for the short-term benefits of medication and behavioral therapy, researchers are uncertain as to the relative merits after the acute 2- to 3- month span of most studies. The medications do help about 40-70% of those who use the drugs, but some researchers believe that the effectiveness of medication declines and disappears after a certain period. Therefore, due to growing disenchantment with the various treatment modalities for AD/HD, it makes sense that efforts to further explore AD/HD treatment modalities, such as meditation, are expected and justified.

Mindfulness Meditation (MM) is known to enable the mind to remain calm and settled without distraction, and proponents of MM have claimed it to be an effective alternative treatment modality. The experience of MM and related teachings has been attributed to the Buddha and his subsequent practitioners. Although MM, as revealed in the *Satipaṭṭhāna*

¹ AD/HD will be expressed in this article to describe both ADHD and ADD.



*Sutta*² or *Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness*, is an essential practice through which the Buddha was said to have attained the ultimate enlightenment, its technique may be seen as nonreligious or *areligious* as it is empirically-based, rather than focusing on a deity or God. The practitioner simply pays close attention to his/her bodily sensations, feelings and specific thoughts. For this reason, intellectual resistance has been minimal on the part of Western medicine in employing the mindfulness modality; indeed, over the last 15 years there has been an impressive increase in public interest and scientific research on mindfulness, with over 3000 scientific publications having been produced on the topic since 1980.³

At first sight, it may appear contradictory to attempt to teach mindfulness to people with AD/HD since the core issue of AD/HD is difficulty in paying attention, and mindfully meditating necessitates a sufficient ability to control one's attention by developing a steadfast awareness of the present moment. However, although MM has the potential for limitless expansion of its applicability, it appears to have not reached sufficiently its full efficacy due to a truncation of the original practice.

Myriads of descriptive features of meditative concentration, *samādhi*, have circulated among practitioners and scholars, some of which present a confused understanding of the experiences encountered as well as its range of meditation techniques. While mindfulness-based practices have been proven effective under various clinical conditions, the use of Chan/Seon/Zen meditation, especially *huatou* or *hwadu*, by itself has not been considered beneficial as a treatment modality as it is construed simply as a distraction from or inattention to the source of suffering. The Chinese term *huatou* (K. *hwadu*) means the “head of speech,” or the “apex of speech.” (Further details in chapter 5.1.) Some *Satipaṭṭhāna* (P. the Foundation of Mindfulness) practitioners find that MM itself may not readily induce deep concentration, while on the other hand some Chan/Seon/Zen practitioners consider the *huatou* as too abstract. In order to provide a bridge for relevant transition, we describe here the Chan/Seon *hwadu*, *Sisimma*, via the method of “tracing back the radiance,” which was popularized by the renowned Korean Seon master, Chinul.⁴

Both the *Satipaṭṭhāna* and the *Sisimma* require retaining concentration while awake and alert; the difference is in the method of concentration, which utilizes bare attention for the former and questioning for the latter. When the meditator arouses and holds the *Sisimma* in his/her mind, he/she traces the radiance back to its source, restoring the mind to its natural enlightened state. The resulting resonance is certainly remindful of the inductive, empiristic practice of *Satipaṭṭhāna*. Notably, it can be said that the Buddha's practice of *Satipaṭṭhāna* has evolved into a *new* version of mindful *hwadu* *Sisimma* in the Korean Seon tradition.

We propose a meeting point of the two practices, mitigating the weakness and enforcing the strength of each tradition, that is, maintaining the questioning of the *Sisimma* advancing to the status of an “emotionalized and sustained doubt,” while being mindful of thoughts, feelings, and sensations without interruption in a non-judgmental way.

² *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness) appears in two versions in the Pāli canon: (1) A long account known as the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, Ch. 22, Maurice Walshe, Wisdom Publications, Boston, 1995, pp. 335–350; (2) A slightly shorter text called the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, Ch 10, Nānamoli and Bodhi, Wisdom Publications, Boston, 1995, pp. 145–155.

³ D.S. Black, *Mindfulness journal publications by year, 1980–2014*, 2015. Retrieved from <https://goamra.org/resources/> 2017

⁴ Robert E. Buswell, Jr., *Tracing Back the Radiance: Chinul's Korean Way of Zen*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1992, pp. 103-104.



Specifically, one can view the various characteristics of AD/HD proactively utilizing as assets, and capitalize on them instantly by employing this novel technique of the mindful Seon *hwadu*, *Sisimma*, through which it can become coupled with the mindfulness of *Satipaṭṭhāna*. By taking advantage of the symptomatology of AD/HD and preserving its positive qualities - spontaneity, boundless energy, and resilient persistence - we proffer a possibility that one can ironically reach an advanced level and even approach an experience of an ultimate enlightenment of a Buddhist kind. What is the ultimate enlightenment of a Buddhist kind, then? While a broad overview of Buddhist meditation lies beyond the scope of this article, we will discuss how mindfulness practice coupled with the *Sisimma* can be successfully applied to AD/HD and further inspire one to an experience of awakening for the relief of all suffering. One may inquire at this point: among the various health issues, why has AD/HD been singled out here as a focus?

1. AD/HD IS A NEUROBEHAVIORAL DISORDER WITH HEAVY SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT

Researchers from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have conducted extensive analyses to estimate the prevalence of parent-reported AD/HD diagnosis, as well as current medication treatments for U.S. children/adolescents aged 4 to 17 years.⁵ They demonstrated that in 2011, 11% (6.4 million) of children/adolescents had received an AD/HD diagnosis. Previous results from surveys in 2003 and 2007 found that 7.8% (4.4 million) and 9.5%, respectively were reported to have been diagnosed with AD/HD. Among those with a history of AD/HD, 83% were reported as currently having AD/HD; furthermore, 69% of children with AD/HD were taking medication (6.1%, 3.5 million children). The parent-reported history of AD/HD increased by 42% from 2003 to 2011 with an average annual increase of approximately 5%. More than two-thirds of those with current AD/HD were taking medication in 2011, demonstrating the increasing burden of this disorder on the U.S. health care system. The CDC concluded that stronger efforts to further understand AD/HD diagnostic and treatment patterns were warranted.

Although AD/HD reportedly carries no risk for incurring other conditions or diseases, it is known that children with ADHD are likely to experience a range of co-existing conditions: learning disabilities, antisocial behavior, bipolar disorder, substance abuse, sleep disorders, and so forth. Treatment plans and medications can be both expensive and stressful. A study on the economic impact of childhood and adult AD/HD in the United States⁶ claimed that the annual price of treating a person with AD/HD is \$14,576, costing Americans 42.5 billion dollars each year; this is a conservative estimate. Overall national annual incremental costs ranged from \$143 to \$266 billion. Most of these costs were incurred by adults (\$105B-\$194B) compared with children/adolescents (\$38B-\$72B); the largest cost category was productivity and income losses (\$87B-\$138B) for adults, and health care (\$21B-\$44B) and education (\$15B-\$25B) for children. As we shall see, there exists even further issues of concern.

⁵ Susanna N. Visser, et al., "Trends in the parent-report of health care provider-diagnosed and medicated attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder: United States, 2003-2011", *J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry* 53(2014), pp. 34-46. e2. doi: 10.1016/j.jaac.2013.09.001. Epub 2013 Nov 21.

⁶ J.A. Doshi, et al., "Economic Impact of Childhood and Adult Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in the United States", *J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry*, 51-10 (2012), pp. 990 - 1002.e2. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2012.07.008>



1.1. Effectiveness of medications

Stimulant medications prescribed for AD/HD have shown to be generally safe and effective for more than 40 years in reducing the symptoms of AD/HD. There are a number of controlled studies of AD/HD that compared the results of medicated and non-medicated children with behavioral therapy. The largest of the controlled studies, the Multimodal Treatment Study of AD/HD, treated 579 children for 14 months.⁷ The study found that those treated with stimulant medications had their symptoms significantly reduced, and the effect was more powerful than in those treated with behavioral therapy. Despite ample evidence concerning the short-term benefits of medication and behavioral therapy, uncertainty has continued among providers and researchers as to the relative merits of behavioral and medication treatments. Some researchers believe that the effectiveness of medication declines and disappears when it is taken longer than two years.⁸ Although the medications have shown to help about 40-70% of those who use the drugs, about 90% experienced serious side effects during the first 6 months of use, which tapered off to about 15% after 2 years. For these reasons, it appears that efforts to further understand AD/HD diagnostic and treatment patterns beyond medications, such as MM, are justified, and needed. What, then, is MM and how does it work?

2. MINDFULNESS MEDITATION AS A THERAPEUTIC ALTERNATIVE

A national survey conducted in the United States in 2008 showed a marked increase in the number of people meditating, with approximately 10 percent of the population having some experience with meditation.⁹ The National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine describes meditation as a mind-body method, and includes it among interventions that employ a variety of techniques designed to focus attention and to facilitate the mind's capacity to affect bodily function and symptoms. The mindfulness form of meditation (MM) instructs the individual to become mindful of thoughts, feelings, and sensations and to observe them in a non-judgmental way. Practitioners generally believe that MM results in a state of calmness, physical relaxation, and psychological balance.¹⁰ Mindfulness is defined by Jon Kabat-Zinn as "the awareness that arises by paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally."¹¹ He stresses that as it is also defined as heartfulness, it may be viewed as beyond conceptual knowing, a complementary form of intelligence, and more akin to wisdom. Scott Bishop, et al. proposed an operational definition of mindfulness as the self-regulation of attention on the immediate experience in the present moment, characterized by curiosity, openness, and acceptance.¹² Ruth Baer, et al. have described mindfulness' five key component skills: observing, describing, acting with

⁷ P. S. Jensen, et al., "Findings from the NIMH Multimodal Treatment Study of ADHD: Implications and Applications for Primary Care Providers", *J Dev Behav Pediatr* 22 (2001), pp. 60-73.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Patricia M. Barnes, et al., "Complementary and alternative medicine use among adults and children: United States, 2007", *Natl Health Stat Report* (2008), pp. 1-23.

¹⁰ The National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM), <http://nccam.nih.gov/> accessed on January 2018.

¹¹ Jon Kabat-Zinn, *Full Catastrophe Living, Using the Wisdom of Your Body and Mind to Face Stress, Pain, and Illness*, Bantam Books, NY, 2013 (1990), p. xxxv.

¹² Scott R. Bishop, et al., "Mindfulness: A proposed operational definition", *Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice* 11-3 (2004), p. 232.



awareness, nonjudging of inner experience, and nonreactivity to inner experience.¹³ Kabat-Zinn was among the first to study the effects of meditation on chronic pain.¹⁴ He used the practice of MM in a 10-week Stress Reduction and Relaxation Program to train 51 chronic pain patients who had not improved with traditional medical care. After 10 weeks, 65% of the patients showed a reduction of greater than or equal to 33% in the mean total Pain Rating Index and 50% showed a reduction of greater than or equal to 50%. Significant reductions in mood disturbance and psychiatric symptomatology accompanied these changes and were relatively stable on follow-up. Kabat-Zinn concluded that this form of meditation can be successfully used as the basis for an effective behavioral program in self-regulation for chronic pain patients. He postulated that meditation practice seemed to cause an uncoupling of the sensory dimension of the pain experience from the affective evaluative alarm reaction and thus to reduce the experience of suffering via cognitive reappraisal. Since then, nearly all other studies have been follow-ups to his work. However, how effectively can mindfulness meditation train the AD/HD mind to better concentrate and maintain focus?

2.1. Using mindfulness meditation to train the AD/HD mind

The core issue of AD/HD is difficulty with paying attention and controlling impulsive reactions. On the surface, it may seem contradictory to teach mindfulness to people with AD/HD. MM claims to improve one's ability to control the attention, while allowing one to be more aware of his/her emotional state, thus restraining one from reacting impulsively and replenishing one's self-regulation. Technically, the key is being aware of where one's attention is focused while one is engaged in routine activities. When one first practices mindfulness, he/she discovers how busy the mind is; this may be even more striking for someone with AD/HD. A UCLA researcher, Lidia Zylowska, et al., who operates the AD/HD program at the UCLA Mindful Awareness Research Center, says that the basic practice is simply focusing on the sensation of breathing in and breathing out.¹⁵ As soon as one notices that he/she is thinking of something else, the instruction is to refocus one's attention on the breath. It goes without saying that the nature of the mind is to be distracted. Mindful awareness is not about how to breathe per se, but rather about returning to the breath immediately, when the mind wanders away. In this situation, it is important to note that the moment of catching oneself as distracted is in itself a moment of mindful awareness. Zylowska, et al. observing a group of twenty-four adults and eight teens with AD/HD, noted significant pre- to post-training improvements in self-reported symptoms of AD/HD.¹⁶ Improvements in both attention span and hyperactivity continued for three months after the training was completed. This study corroborates the effectiveness of MM on AD/HD. An emphasis on re-shifting one's attention, outwitting the mind's natural tendency to wander, is what makes this technique especially useful to someone suffering from AD/HD. This is the basis of the operation of MM for AD/HD.

¹³ Ruth A. Baer, et al., "Construct validity of the five facets mindfulness questionnaire in meditating and nonmeditating samples", *Assessment* 15-3 (2008), p. 329. doi: 10.1177/1073191107313003.

¹⁴ Jon Kabat-Zinn, "An outpatient program in behavioral medicine for chronic pain patients based on the practice of mindfulness meditation: Theoretical considerations and preliminary results", *General Hospital Psychiatry*, 4-1, (1982), pp. 33-47.

¹⁵ Lidia Zylowska, et al., "Mindfulness Meditation Training in Adults and Adolescents with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: A Feasibility Study", *Journal of Attention Disorders* 11-6 (2008), pp. 737-746.

¹⁶ Ibid.



Meditative techniques can often be categorized into two forms: those that emphasize concentration, such as mantra-based techniques, transcendental meditation (TM) and Chan/Seon/Zen meditation, and those that emphasize mindfulness, such as mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT). Both practices describe a unique attitude or intention associated with the manner in which focused attention is applied, emphasizing differing aspects of meditation practice: concentration requires mental activity, whereas mindfulness emphasizes non-activity.

Typically, standardized programs of MM consist of weekly meetings for 8 weeks, each lasting 2 to 2.5 hours, with an additional 6–8 hour retreat on a weekend day during the 8-week training. MBCT maintains an 8-week course length, similar to MBSR, but it is modified for the particular condition of each individual. MBCT uses traditional cognitive behavioral therapy and integrates it into a newer psychological strategy, MM. The Buddhist meditative practice of mindfulness is meant to promote greater awareness of one's self and environment by developing mindfulness skills, called awareness meditation or, in the Buddhist context, *Vipassana* meditation. *Vipassana* is the original practice from which mindfulness-based techniques are derived. The characteristic technique of mindfulness may not necessarily be religious or spiritual as it employs paying close attention on an empirical basis to one's bodily sensations, feelings and thoughts of a special kind, which means simply developing a greater awareness of what transpires in the present moment.

For these practical reasons, supported by a recent wave of scientific results, the practice of mindfulness has become easily acceptable without much resistance in modern intellectual society. However, how possible is viewing the original concept of mindfulness as used by the Buddha through the use of modern rational approach?

2.2. Scientific evidence supports the effect of mindful awareness

There is evidence supported by research that meditation practice can protect the prefrontal cortex—the area affected in AD/HD and responsible for executive functions. For example, Sara W. Lazar, et al. demonstrated that long-term meditators have developed thicker pre-frontal brain regions, which are related to attention, self-monitoring, and emotional processing, when compared to the average person.¹⁷ Another study by Britta Hölzel et al. showed increases in gray matter after an eight-week MBSR course. In this study, the regions that showed changes are known to play a role in learning and memory, processing emotions, thinking about one's self, and the ability to adopt diverse perspectives.¹⁸ Michael R. Hagerty, et al. produced the first neural recording during ecstatic meditations (called *jhanas*) and tested to determine whether the brain reward system plays a role in the experience of joy.¹⁹ They found that the *jhanas* are altered states of consciousness that imply the following major brain changes based on subjective reports: (1) external awareness dims (2) internal verbalizations fade (3) the sense of personal boundaries is altered (4) attention is highly focused on the object of meditation and (5) joy increases to high levels. The fMRI and EEG results in the eight advanced meditations from an experienced meditator showed changes in brain activity in 11 regions; these changes

¹⁷ Sara W. Lazar, et al., "Meditation Experience Is Associated with Increased Cortical Thickness", *Neuroreport* 16-17 (2005), pp. 1893–1897.

¹⁸ Britta K. Hölzel, et al., "Mindfulness Practice Leads to Increases in Regional Brain Gray Matter Density", *Psychiatry Research* 191- 1(2011), pp. 36–43.

¹⁹ Michael R. Hagerty, et al., "Case Study of Ecstatic Meditation: fMRI and EEG Evidence of Self-Stimulating a Reward System", *Neural Plasticity*, Article ID 653572, (2013), [http://dx. doi. Org /10.1155/2013/653572](http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/653572)



occurred promptly after *jhana* was entered. In particular, extreme joy is associated not only with activation of cortical processes, but also with activation of the specific area in the dopamine/ opioid reward system. These researchers demonstrated an apparently novel method of self-stimulating the brain reward system using only internal mental processes, in which the transition to *jhana* is associated with selective increases of signals in the right temporal region and decreases in the parietal lobe and posterior frontal lobe.

However, as Chiesa and Malinowski acknowledged, despite its growing popularity, there remains uncertainty as to what mindfulness exactly is and inconsistency as to how it is taught.²⁰ What limits the therapeutic value of MM in clinical settings? What seems to be the root cause of this limitation and how do we deal with it to maximize a potential benefit?

3. MINDFULNESS IN CLINICAL SETTINGS: A TRUNCATED REPRESENTATION OF THE BUDDHA'S PRACTICE OF *SATIPAṬṬHĀNA*

Since their inception in the 1980's, when mindfulness-based practices were first utilized to target particular conditions (such as Kabat-Zinn's MBSR program for chronic pain), their use in diverse adult clinical conditions has been expanded to the use of MBCT for other stress-related conditions such as anxiety, depression, stress/distress, as well as the following mental health-related issues: inattention, substance use, poor eating habits, sleep, pain issues, and so forth.

However, those practices appear to be predominantly focused on solving problems related to particular clinical conditions rather than on understanding the original motivation for their practice in early Buddhism, let alone on cultivating the essential qualities for the perfection of mindfulness. There seems to be the general presumption, widely accepted among academicians, that anything related to religion is non-scientific and thus unintelligent. Thus, such a truncated collection of heterogeneous mindfulness programs fundamentally neglects an understanding of what mindfulness was created for and how it can be correctly practiced to actualize the entire spectrum of MM. A legitimate question can be raised: Is it acceptable to approach Buddhism, especially the original concept of mindfulness as taught by the Buddha, through the filter of a modern scientific, rational approach? We opine that current mindfulness practice needs to emphasize not only the quality of awareness, but to also adequately reflect its intended purpose as revealed in early Buddhism. However, most mindfulness interventions do not clearly elucidate it as described in the Pali Canon, but merely indicate how MM can be utilized in a clinical setting. Although this article evaluates the health effects of MM programs on AD/HD, one needs to be reminded that MM was neither necessarily practiced for specific health benefits in early Buddhism, nor for philosophical enlightenment. For the Buddha, the goal was principally that sentient beings be relieved from all suffering, which is described evidently to be the essence of the Buddha's enlightenment.

Physical pain is only a part of all the suffering in life. As the issue of the Buddha's enlightenment exceeds the scope of our discussion here, this paper will not exhaustively explore the fundamental goal of meditation in general, but instead focus on its non-religious aspect within the scope of its health benefits for those suffering from AD/HD.

²⁰ Albert Chiesa and Peter Malinowski, "Mindfulness-based approaches: are they all the same?" *J Clin Psychol* 67-4 (2011), pp. 404-24.



3.1. Limit of clinical meditation programs as an effective therapeutic modality

Despite its popularity as an effective therapeutic modality, there is a varying degree of evidence of the effects of meditation programs. After reviewing 18,753 citations, Madhav Goyal, et al. demonstrated that MM programs of 8 weeks indicated moderate evidence in improving anxiety, depression, and pain; low evidence in improving stress/distress and a mental health-related quality of life; and low or insufficient evidence of any effect on mood, attention, substance use, eating habits, sleep, and weight.²¹ The studies do point to a critical issue; the reasons for the lack of a significant reduction of stress-related health behavior outcomes may have involved the method used by the researchers, the difficulties of acquiring such skills or meditative states, and the limited duration of the programs. It needs to be recognized that mind training in awareness of a non-judgmental kind requires obviously diligent effort and takes a rather long period of time to master. However, many of the studies included in the Comparative Effectiveness Review were short-term (e.g., 2.5 hours a week for 8 weeks). Further, those studies appear to have been predominantly focused on solving physical or mental health-related conditions independent of understanding the motivation for mindfulness practice in early Buddhism. Herein a critical question may be raised: Is it necessary to become a Buddhist in order to practice a full-scale MM for the purpose of alleviating AD/HD? One of the underlying reasons mindfulness has become popular seems to have generated from the general presumption, especially among academicians and clinicians, that mindfulness has no correspondence with Buddhism as a religion. This may be in accord with the idea that anything related to religion may be construed to be illogical, irrational, and thus unintelligent. For these reasons, an employment of such heterogeneous mindfulness programs limits the rightful understanding of the purpose of mindfulness. At this point, a legitimate question can be raised: Is it possible to employ MM while avoiding being categorized as a Buddhist? Would this jeopardize the scholarly tradition of being rational and logical?

3.2. Mindfulness is *areligious* and *aspiritual*

Is mindfulness *areligious* and *aspiritual* at its base? Here, the terms, *areligious* and *aspiritual*, are not simply meant to be nonreligious and nonspiritual, but rather to transcend being religious and spiritual. Can modern intellectuals comfortably accept the idea of an *areligiosity* of Buddhism? Perhaps so, but can they do this without compromising the Buddha's original teaching? Probably not. Can Buddhist practice *areligiously* alleviate the suffering of physical pain and psychological stress? We can hopefully say yes. Alan Watts, while raising the crucial issue wherein Buddhism differs from Hinduism, emphasized Buddhism's nonreligious and nonspiritual characteristics:

Buddhism has no idea and no concept of God because Buddhism is not interested in concepts, it is interested in direct experience only. -- It does not believe in an immortal soul or seek any solace in any idea of life after death. The real thing in Buddhism, which is called *nirvana*, is sort of equivalent to *moksa*, or liberation. *Nirvana* means 'blow out'- the sigh of relief. -- Buddhism is saying that you do not need any gizmos to be in the know. You do not need a religion. You do not need any Buddha statues, temples, Buddhist rosaries, and all that jazz.²²

²¹ Madhav Goyal, et al., "Meditation Programs for Psychological Stress and Well-being: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis", *JAMA Intern Med.* 174-3 (2014), pp. 357-368.

²² Alan Watts, *Buddhism, The Religion of No-Religion: the edited transcripts*, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Rutland, VT, 1996, pp. 6-8.



Stephen Batchelor, a former ordained Buddhist monk known for his agnostic and secular approach, describes the Buddha not as a mystic, but as a savior.²³ The Buddha saw himself as a healer, presenting his truths in the form of a medical diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment. The Buddha spoke of having discovered complete freedom of heart and mind from the compulsions of craving; he called this “the taste of dharma.”²⁴ Batchelor may turn out to be an exemplar of the typical modern Western mindset. In his *Confessions of a Buddhist Atheist*, he focuses principally on the early teachings of the Buddha as found in the Pali Canon, and writes from the perspective of a committed layperson who seeks to lead a life that embodies Buddhist values within the context of secularism and modernity, while having no interest in preserving the dogmas and institutions of traditional Asian forms of Buddhism.²⁵ Jon Kabat-Zinn goes even further with his stance on non-religiosity:

Mindfulness is an ancient Buddhist practice, which has profound relevance for our present-day lives. This relevance has nothing to do with Buddhism per se or with becoming a Buddhist, but it has everything to do with waking up and living in harmony with oneself and with the world.²⁶

Kabat-Zinn adds that the key to this path lies at the root of Buddhism, Taoism, and yoga, and is also found in the works of people like Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman, and even in Native American wisdom.²⁷ It is simply the art of conscious living with an appreciation for the present moment and the cultivation of an intimate relationship through a continual attending to it. He claims that one does not have to be a Buddhist or a yogi to practice mindfulness.

Herein, there is a critical missing point in these scholarly intellectuals’ remarks concerning MM. Is the nonreligious aspect of Buddhism excessively emphasized in order to justify truncating the Buddha’s original intent in *Satipaṭṭhāna*, thus limiting its full capacity as a potential therapeutic modality? Shouldn’t MM be understood more as of an “areligious” and “aspiritual” nature rather than simply being labeled nonreligious and nonspiritual? The answer would be a resounding *Yes!*

3.3. Clinical mindfulness programs overlook the Buddha’s utmost concern: suffering and its remedy

Why do clinical practitioners neglect to give appropriate emphasis to the *Satipaṭṭhāna*, which is essential in realizing the true nature of corporeality, feelings, mental formations and reality patterns? This issue will be examined by addressing a subtle difference between the ultimate concerns of the Buddha and those of the clinical mindfulness practitioners, respectively. The Buddha’s primary concern was the issue of suffering and how to overcome it. Specifically, the goal of the Buddha was a complete and permanent liberation from suffering, not merely the transient alleviation of physical or emotional pain. In clinical programs, however, the original *Satipaṭṭhāna* practice in the process of its application has been modified by the individual concerns of the particular medical seeker. It appears from

²³ Stephen Batchelor, *Buddhism Without Beliefs, A Contemporary Guide to Awakening*, Penguin Group Inc., New York, 1997, pp. 5–6.

²⁴ The term has a wide range of meanings in Buddhism: truth, reality; phenomenon, element, mental factor; things,

quality, but the foremost meaning is that of the teaching delivered by the Buddha.

²⁵ Stephen Batchelor, *Confession of a Buddhist Atheist*, Random House, New York, 2011, pp. xi, 253–254.

²⁶ Jon Kabat-Zinn, *Wherever You Go, There You Are, Mindfulness Meditation in Everyday Life*. Hyperion, New York, 1994, p. 3.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.



the various writings of both scholars and practitioners that the vital message of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* has rarely been successfully transmitted in the mindfulness-based therapeutic meditations such as MBSR or MBCT. Rather, this message has often been sifted out or omitted altogether.


A typical elaboration of the *Satipaṭṭhāna* practice is described in condensed form: the body, feeling, mind, and mental objects, experienced through the six sense faculties, but recognized as essentially empty (*shūnya*). This places an emphasis on consequent unique transformation into an ultimate religious experience, non-Self. However, it seems apparent that the practitioners of mindfulness-based therapeutic meditation appear to eliminate this vital understanding of the *Satipaṭṭhāna*, minimizing its paramount centrality and bypassing its elaborate and empirical instructions, rather than addressing the foremost agenda of the cessation of suffering. Such an over-simplification of the *Satipaṭṭhāna* may hardly be sufficient to inspire its original intent, which involves the removal of suffering (*dukkha*) by realizing its conditionality within the contexts of non-Self (*anatta*, insubstantiality) and absence of substance (*anicca*, impermanence). What was the primary object of the Buddha's search for the truth? To answer this, we will focus specifically on the Buddha's discourses as described in the *Pāli Nikāya*.

The Buddha affirmed categorically to the monks, “Bhikkhus, both formerly and now what I teach is suffering and the cessation of suffering.”²⁸ To achieve this goal the Buddha enumerated a threefold path of practice – moral discipline, concentration, and wisdom. Each stage functions as a building block, serving as a foundation for full enlightenment. The Buddha's threefold path of moral discipline, concentration, and wisdom within a single *inseparable* system represents his method which leads to perfect enlightenment. Although the clinical mindfulness practitioners have never stated outwardly that moral discipline is not necessary, it has been assumed implicitly that moral practice should be maintained within a religious domain, in which modern intellectuals are usually not particularly interested. The Buddha continued on to reify three stages of practice for the liberation from all suffering by the specific application of the Noble Eightfold Path.²⁹ These stages embody the training that leads to the cessation of suffering. It was clear to the Buddha that the prevalence of suffering is due to the sentient being's subjection to the three roots of all evil, as represented by three unwholesome actions, viz. lust, hatred, and delusion. The stage of moral discipline eliminates lust. The stage of true concentration and mental culture conquers hatred. Finally, wisdom or right understanding, also called direct knowledge resulting from meditation, dispels all delusion. All these three types of training were promoted by the Buddha through the cultivation of constant mindfulness (*sati*), which is the basis of all earnest endeavors for enlightenment (*Nibbana*). Constant mindfulness needs to be present in every skillful or karmically wholesome thought-moment. Nyanaponika Thera acknowledges that Right Mindfulness represents the beginning as well as the culminating point of the Buddha's mind-doctrine as it is the master key to knowing the mind, the perfect tool for shaping the mind, and the lofty manifestation of the achieved freedom of the mind, and is thus the culminating point.³⁰ He rightfully calls The Foundations of Mindfulness as described in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, “the Heart of Buddhist Meditation” and even “the Heart of the Entire Doctrine.” He stresses that this great Heart is in fact the center of all the blood streams pulsating through

²⁸ Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, p. 234.

²⁹ Right View (Understanding), Right Thought, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood (Living), Right Effort (Exertion), Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration of Mind.

³⁰ Nyanaponika Thera, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation*, Samuel Weiser, Inc., York Beach, ME, 1988, p. 24.



the entire body of the doctrine.³¹ The significance of Right Mindfulness is thus often manifested and emphasized in the Buddha's teaching.

As such, clinical mindfulness practice appears to have become sidetracked from the Buddha's primary concern for suffering and its remediation. This may constitute one rationale to suggest why some religious emphasis on moral practice may be meaningful and perhaps should be required among clinical mindfulness practitioners. This may sound apologetic, however, it may not be necessarily so at least from an empirically rational perspective. We should remember that the Buddha's original motivation in formulating the foundations of mindfulness as espoused in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* was ultimately to unfold the concept of non-Self. How do modern non-Buddhist intellectuals respond to this? How rationally can this seemingly apologetic issue be handled? What is the gist of the *Satipaṭṭhāna* to begin with? Now, a short survey of the Buddha's basic teachings needs to be outlined here, especially those pertaining to the *Satipaṭṭhāna*, the foundation of mindfulness.

4. SATIPAṬṬHĀNA, THE FOUNDATION OF MINDFULNESS

As is written in the Pāli Nikāya, the Buddha practiced the *Satipaṭṭhāna* and attained the ultimate religious experience of enlightenment, *Nibbanā* (S. *Nirvāṇa*), a final liberation from suffering. In the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* or *Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness*, after his first-hand experience of enlightenment, the Buddha declares *Satipaṭṭhāna* as the "direct path" (*ekāyana maggo*) that will lead directly to the realization of *Nibbāna*. According to Anāyalo, direct path is a translation of the Pāli expression *ekāyano maggo*, made up of the parts *eka*, "one", *ayana*, "going", and *magga*, "path". This can be understood as a "direct" path in the sense of leading straight to the goal; as a path to be travelled by oneself "alone"; as a path taught by the "One" (the Buddha).³² The Buddha avows that it is a single path, not a divided path; as a way that has to be walked by oneself alone, without a companion; and as a way that takes one to the goal, *Nibbāna*.³³

In order to justify the efficacy of the medical implications of mindfulness-based interventions, major theoretical and conceptual developments need to be clearly understood. Buddhist scholars generally agree that the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* is one of the most widely commented upon texts in the Pāli canon and continues to hold a central place in the modern *Vipassanā* movement.³⁴ In the text, the Buddha is reported to have set forth the discourse under a fourfold rubric called the "Four Foundations of Mindfulness" (P. *Satipaṭṭhāna*), which are comprised of "contemplation of the body"; "contemplation of sensations," that is, physical sensations that are pleasurable, painful, or neutral; "contemplation of mind," in which one observes the broader state of mind or units in the ephemeral mind-stream of momentary duration; and "contemplation of mental objects" or factors of consciousness making up the respective states of mind, which involves the mindfulness of several key doctrinal categories, such as the five aggregates, the Four Noble Truths, and so forth.³⁵ The central theme of *Satipaṭṭhāna* practice is insight into the true nature of the body, feelings, mind-states and reality-patterns (phenomena, mind-objects, or *dhamma*): this enables the practitioner to achieve a transformation through awareness by means of a rigorous


³¹ Ibid., p. 7.

³² Anālayo, *Satipaṭṭhāna, The Direct Path to Realization*, p. 27

³³ Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, p. 1188.

³⁴ Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Donald S. Lopez Jr., *The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2014, pp. 786–787.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 786.



detachment. Specifically, the practice supports a sustained analysis resulting in the arising of wisdom into the true nature of reality, namely the three marks of all conditioned phenomena in *samsāra*: impermanence (P. *anicca*, S. *anitya*); suffering (P. *dukkha*, S. *duḥkha*), and non-Self (P. *anattā*, S. *anātman*).³⁶

In the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*, being mindful of the body in the body is explained in the following six ways: mindfulness of breathing (*ānāpāna-sati*), the four postures (walking, standing, sitting, lying), clear awareness of all activities of the body, reflection on the repulsive parts of the body, analysis of the four bodily elements (earth, water, fire, and air), and the nine charnel ground contemplation.³⁷ While one abides contemplating in the body, supreme insight is developed through being mindful of its arising and vanishing factors to the extent necessary for bare knowledge and awareness. In mindfulness of feeling, one recognizes three kinds of feelings: pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent, and sees clearly their transitory quality. Supreme insight is developed similar to the contemplation of the body. In contemplation of mind, one remains mindful of every state of consciousness, whether the mind is possessed or not of the impulses of greed, hatred, or delusion. Supreme insight is developed similar to the contemplation of the body and feeling. How does a practitioner abide in the contemplation of mental objects? This is to be practiced in five areas with reference to the Five Hindrances,³⁸ the Five Aggregates of Clinging,³⁹ the Six Internal and External Sense-bases,⁴⁰ the Seven Factors of Enlightenment,⁴¹ and the Four Noble Truths.⁴² Insight is to be developed in the same way as contemplating the body, feeling, and the mind. Nyanaponika Thera encapsulates precisely the entire Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness as “a comprehensive theoretical and practical instruction for the realization of that liberating truth of non-Self (*anattā*), having the two aspects of egolessness and voidness of substance.”⁴³ In psychological terms, *Satipaṭṭhāna* appears to impart a type of *de facto* melting mechanism with regard to the ego formation, namely the dissolution of ego through cultivating penetrating insight. As the Dalai Lama states that the nature of non-Self is not a matter of something that existed in the past becoming nonexistent, the Self is to be understood as being never-existent right from the start.⁴⁴ As Mark Epstein notes clearly, the actual target of Buddhist insight is not the ego in the Freudian sense, but rather the self-concept, the representational component of the ego, or the actual internal experience of one’s self.⁴⁵ A great number of Buddhist texts exist, which contain innumerable resources of rich psychological information to support this view. Further details can be extracted from available publications.⁴⁶

³⁶ Bodhi. The Noble Eightfold Path. *Access to Insight*, <http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/waytoend.html>, Retrieved 11-12-2017.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 145-155.

³⁸ Sense desire, anger, sloth & torpor, agitation & worry, and doubt.

³⁹ Material form, feeling, perception, mental formation, and consciousness.

⁴⁰ Eye-visible forms, ear-sounds, nose-smells, tongue-flavors, body-tactual objects, mind and mind-objects.

⁴¹ Mindfulness, Investigation of reality, Energy, Rapture, Tranquility, Concentration, and Equanimity.

⁴² Suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path leading to the cessation of suffering. See the details in Nyanaponika Thera, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation*, pp. 123–135.

⁴³ Nyanaponika Thera, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation*, p. 75.

⁴⁴ Hopkins, Jeffrey and Napper, Elizabeth, (eds), *Kindness, Clarity, and Insight: The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso*, Snow Lion Publications, Ithaca, NY, 1984, p. 40.

⁴⁵ Mark Epstein, *Thoughts Without A Thinker, Psychotherapy From A Buddhist Perspective*, Basic Books, New York, 1995, p. 98.

⁴⁶ Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, p. 155. Also see Anālayo, *Satipaṭṭhāna, The Direct Path to Realization*, Windhorse Publications, Cambridge, UK, 2003, pp. 117–249.



The methodical practice of *Satipaṭṭhāna* within the system of Buddhist meditation operates on the principle of initially developing calmness (P. *samatha*), which finally leads to insight (P. *vipassanā*). Here, the mental phenomena are analyzed and viewed in the light of the Three Characteristics: impermanence, suffering, and non-Self.⁴⁷ The *Majjhima Nikāya* states repeatedly in the Discourse on *Satipaṭṭhāna* that the Buddha is reported to have taught the systematic cultivation of Right Mindfulness as the most simple and direct method for training and developing the mind. For the Buddha, it was undoubtedly the most effective and thorough way for the ultimate deliverance from greed, hatred and delusion, known as the three poisons.

In summary, the primary aim of the *Satipaṭṭhāna* is to identify the nature of non-Self, thoroughly filtered through the practice of *vipassanā*, and to authenticate it as being non-existent from the start. As revealed in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, the Buddha emphasized the importance of the *Satipaṭṭhāna* even in the words of his last days. He illustrated a detailed account of how a monk should live as “an island unto himself with the Dharma as an island” and the reason why:

Therefore, Ananda, you should live as islands unto yourself, being your own refuge, with no one else as your refuge, with the Dharma as an island, with the Dharma as your refuge, with no other refuge... Here, Ananda, a monk abides contemplating the body as body, earnestly, clearly aware, mindful and having put away all hankering and fretting for the world, and likewise with regard to feelings, mind and mind-objects... And those who now in my time or afterwards live thus, they will become the highest, if they are desirous of learning.⁴⁸

The repetition of the phrase “contemplating the body as body, feelings as feelings,” and so forth, is intended to impress upon the meditator the importance of remaining aware in sustained attention directed on a chosen object, and not straying into the field of a different contemplation. Mind (P. *citta*) in this context means a state of mind or unit within the ephemeral stream of the mind of momentary duration. Mental objects, *dhamma*, are the mental contents or factors of consciousness, making up the respective states of mind. The object of Right Mindfulness comprises the entire human being and one’s entire field of experience. Simply put, the *Satipaṭṭhāna* consists of mindfulness of body (*kāya*), feeling (*vedanā*), mind (*citta*), and mental objects (*dhamma*) in that order.⁴⁹ Further details can be extracted from available publications.⁵⁰

4.1. Psychology of non-attachment in the *Satipaṭṭhāna*: bare attention is an initial tool to unlocking the *Satipaṭṭhāna* as the key to realize non-Self.

Mindfulness is the specific aspect of Bare Attention, which provides the key to the distinctive method of *Satipaṭṭhāna*. Nyanaponika Thera sums up the general principle underlying the practice of Bare Attention:


Bare Attention is the clear and single-minded awareness of what actually happens in us, because it attends just to the bare facts of a perception as presented either through the five physical senses or through the mind which constitutes the sixth sense. Attention is kept to a bare registering of the facts observed, without reacting to them by deed, speech, or by mental comments. Any such comments arising in one’s mind are made objects of Bare

⁴⁷ Nyanaponika Thera, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation*, pp. 102-103.

⁴⁸ Maurice Walshe, *The Long Discourses of the Buddha*, p. 245.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 335–350.

⁵⁰ See R. L. Soni, *The Only Way To Deliverance*, pp. 19–26; Anālayo, *Satipaṭṭhāna*, pp. 117–249; U. Silananda, *The Four Foundations of Mindfulness*, pp. 13–25.



Attention, and are neither repudiated nor pursued, but are dismissed, after a brief mental note has been made of them.⁵¹

However, the word “dismissed” may not precisely describe the method of Bare Attention because it implies an active meaning of reject or refuse. One does not actively dismiss the facts of perception, but rather simply lets go of them. It is like not chasing the fly away, but just letting it buzz off. As Nyanaponika Thera points out, this procedure as adopted in Buddhist meditation serves as a safeguard against the speculative interpretation of meditative experience. Why is it important to clarify the meaning of letting go? This term is used in the sense of relinquishing or renouncing and thus represents central themes that underlie the path to liberation from its outset to its final completion of literally letting go of any clinging whatsoever.⁵² What needs to be let go of in a deeper sense is *control*. Anālayo is right on the mark when he says that the desire to control is simply a manifestation of clinging to a sense of ‘I’, which means the sense of ownership towards goods and possessions. To gradually undermine this sense of ownership, letting go is repeatedly recommended in the early discourses.⁵³ Letting go of grasping at one’s possessions leads to generosity, which manifests in delighting in letting go in the sense of giving and sharing. This indicates that the benefit of such a letting go is the gain of the concentrative depth of the mind; eventually the sense of ‘I’ goes into abeyance, allowing for the subjective experience of a merger between the observing subject and the observed meditative object.⁵⁴ Thus, letting go via the way of Bare Attention operates on a practical method for developing the non-attachment, which provides the key to the principle that tranquility (P. *samatha*) is initially developed which finally leads to insight (P. *vipassanā*).

One may wonder how to incorporate “letting go” practically into his/her daily life. Here is a hypothetical illustration of how Bare Attention may be practiced while meditating via the *Satipaṭṭhāna*: Imagine a practitioner jogging while being mindful of breathing (a *kāya*); S/he happens to fall into a thorny rose bush and pricks her/his face on a thorn. The practitioner remains mindful of feeling a sharp pain (a *vedanā*) from the swollen and bleeding wound. S/he may be aware of various thoughts such as anger or regret and may even begin cursing (a *citta*). Through mindfulness of mental objects, one recognizes clearly their ephemeral quality, devoid of ever-lasting substance, while also being mindful of their arising, abiding and vanishing aspects. While thus engaged, one’s mind is settled, calm and detached, not clinging to the body (a *dhamma*).

As such, a supreme understanding of dependent origination may arise, accompanied by insight into the two aspects of non-Self: lack of ego and absence of substance. In daily life whenever feelings arise upon sense contacts with the surroundings, if these are mindfully monitored at a default setting, one will be led towards the transformation of the natural faculty of ordinary perception into the heuristic status of enlightenment. As Ayya Khema states, “Instinctively we are a constant reactor, but deliberately we become an actor.”⁵⁵

Reviewing the kernel of the *Satipaṭṭhāna*, how can we optimize its practice for the full benefit of an entire spectrum of meditation without sacrificing the original *Satipaṭṭhāna*

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 30.

⁵² Anālayo, *Excursions into the Thought-World of the Pāli Discourses*, Patiyatti Publishing, Onalaska, WA, 2012, p. 266.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 267.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 267–268.

⁵⁵ Ayya Khema, “Here and Now: Ten Dhamma Talks”, *Access to Insight*, 25, III. Awake and Aware (2010), p. 16. <https://www.accesstoinight.org/lib/authors/khema/herenow.html>.



practice? We propose a unique coupling of the *hwadu*, *Sisimma* with the *Satipaṭṭhāna*. This may appease the intellectual resistance on the part of modern intellectuals.

For now, a sketch of how mindfulness was practiced in early Buddhism, transformed in the Chan/Seon/Zen tradition, and amalgamated into a *hwadu*, *Sisimma*, will be briefly reviewed especially in the Korean Ganwha Seon practice,

4.2. Transformation of the *Satipaṭṭhāna* in East Asian countries

During its transmission from India to East Asian countries, the *Satipaṭṭhāna* in conveying its vital message to its followers may have subsequently infused its teaching into various traditions. The Chan tradition in particular adapted itself to the diverse propensities and indigenous nature of the various countries, especially in China, Korea, and Japan. What happened to the Buddha's "*ekāyana maggo*" in the Chan tradition? A search to establish a trace of the *Satipaṭṭhāna* in the Mahāyāna, and particularly the Chan tradition, reveals a scarcity of resources on this issue. One may wonder if its teaching has ever been sustained in the Mahāyāna tradition, especially the Chan tradition. If it has been preserved, what aspects of the *Satipaṭṭhāna* formula are visible in the later traditions and in what particular form? While each Chan/Seon/Zen tradition will not be delineated in detail here, this paper will search for corresponding clues while tracing the *Satipaṭṭhāna* within Chan/Seon/ Zen tradition. We contend that the Mahāyāna tradition carried down some essence of *Satipaṭṭhāna*, but the Chan tradition in particular did not sufficiently give it as much emphasis as was taught by the Buddha. The practice appears rather faded, truncated, transformed or even excluded altogether, especially by the Tang (618-907) to later Song dynasty (960-1279) Chan practitioners.⁵⁶ However, in the Korean Seon tradition the *Satipaṭṭhāna*, which is a prevailing key element of the Buddha's *ekāyana maggo*, had been re-positioned into one of the famous Ganhwa Seon *hwadu*, *Sisimma*, by the 14th century Seon Master Naong Hyegeun (1320–1376 CE) and many other influential Seon practitioners following him.⁵⁷

In searching for a vestige of evidence of *Satipaṭṭhāna* in the Mahāyāna, particularly with regard to its transformation to the *Sisimma*, a bridging mechanism will be explored through the input of "tracing the faculty of hearing," as presented distinctively in one of the eighth century Chinese apocryphal scriptures, the *Śūramgama Sūtra* (*The Sūtra of Heroic Progress*). This *Sūtra* is viewed as a redemptive feature in the Mahāyāna tradition, emphasizing the empirical nature through the sensory faculties, in which a particular path using the faculty of hearing is employed as a tool for enlightenment. Tracing the faculty of hearing has been popularized in the similar practice of "tracing back the radiance" in the Korean Buddhist tradition. The process referred to as "tracing back the radiance"⁵⁸ or "counter-illumination"⁵⁹ refers to turning the light inwards onto oneself, or turning one's attention, which is ordinarily directed to external things, back to reflect on one's original nature. The idea of tracing back the radiance has a long history, dating from early Buddhism through to Chinese Buddhism. It is to be remembered that in the Indian Buddhist meditative traditions the way of practicing tracing back the radiance was treated as one of the mind-object contemplations in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*; the meditator was taught simply to observe

⁵⁶ See details in John R. McRae, *The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'an Buddhism*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI, 1986, pp. 235–253.

⁵⁷ HyungWoo Kim, 'Naong Hwasang' 懶翁和尚, in *Hangukbulgyo Inmulsasangsa*, Minjoksa. Seoul, 1997, p. 258.

⁵⁸ Robert E. Buswell, Jr., *Tracing Back the Radiance: Chinul's Korean Way of Zen*, p. 104.

⁵⁹ John R. McRae, *The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'an Buddhism*, p. 114.



the arising and vanishing of any mind-object, mindfully with bare attention in order to reach the insight that all things are impermanent. Although the mental technique of *Satipaṭṭhāna* from a psychological perspective can be related to tracing back the radiance, it was described implicitly in the Indian traditions, and not addressed explicitly as such.

5. THE CONCEPT OF “TRACING BACK THE RADIANCE” IN THE KOREAN BUDDHIST TRADITION

The Chan tradition in particular adapted itself to the diverse propensities and indigenous nature of the various countries, especially in China, Korea, and Japan. In the Korean Buddhist tradition, Bojo Chinul (1158–1210 CE) introduced his unique method of “tracing back the radiance” in Korea, and was the first teacher in Korea to advocate the use of *hwadu* in its formalized sense.⁶⁰ Today in Korea, as Buswell notes, *hwadu* is the predominant technique cultivated in meditation halls, and almost all masters advocate its use for students at all levels. Chinul proposed a principal means for catalyzing an initial awakening through tracing the radiance emanating from the luminous core of the inner mind back to its source, restoring the mind to its natural enlightened state. This process indicates an awakening to the realization that one’s original nature is not different from that of the buddhas.⁶¹ Here, it may be said that despite Chan’s differing approach, wherein the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* has been less emphasized, and perhaps even tacitly considered inferior, the message of through-the-sensation of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* was specifically communicated to Korean Buddhists by Chinul. A century or more later, the Buddha’s original message of through-the-sensation in the *Satipatthana* was further emphasized by Naong Hyegeun (1320–1376 CE), who introduced the *hwadu*, *Sisimma* to his followers in Korea, while instilling its message with new meaning. The specific origin and evolution of the *hwadu*, *Sisimma* is presented below.

5.1. The evolution of *kung-an* / *huatou*: the *Shishenmo*


The Chinese term *huatou* (K. *hwadu*, J. *watō*), which means literally the “head of speech,” can be taken figuratively as the “apex of speech” or the “point beyond which speech exhausts itself.”⁶² It is a short *holophrase*, functioning as a phrase or sentence, often extracted as a concise summary of an entire encounter dialogue, *kung-an* (K. *gong-an*, J. *koan*) between a Chan master and an interlocutor passed down from earlier *kung-ans*, which is said to be conducive to enlightenment. This phrase becomes the subject of meditation and introspection in its own right, closely connected with the gist of the entire dialogue but is clearly representative.

The *huatou* can be described as equivalent to a computer keyboard shortcut, which is a way to invoke a function [the ultimate state of Great Enlightenment] in the computer [Buddhist practitioner] by pressing [breaking the final barrier of the rationalistic intellectual capacity] a combination of keys on the keyboard [focusing single-mindedly on a *huatou*]. The purpose of focusing on the *huatou* is to move the practitioner beyond the point of rationalization and conceptualization, thus enabling an experience of enlightenment. *Kung-*

⁶⁰ Robert E. Buswell, Jr. ‘The Korean Approach to Zen’, in *The Collected Works of Chinul*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI, 1983, pp. 37–38.

⁶¹ The Buddha signifies specifically the “enlightened Sage” of the Śākya Clan, Śākyamuni, whereas the buddha refers to one of many other buddhas as an “awakened one” or “enlightened one,” as designated in the Buddhist literatures, particularly in the Mahāyāna tradition.

⁶² Robert E. Buswell, Jr. “The Korean Approach to Zen”, in *The Collected Works of Chinul*, p. 67.



an/huatou meditation has been increasingly popular in Asian Buddhist societies since the eighth century. Understandably, not all the same *kung-an/huatou* are used by practitioners in every country. Depending upon people's inclinations and customs, some *kung-an/huatou* have gained more popularity than others. Stuart Lachs lists a number of popular *huatous* which are commonly used among Chan/Seon/Zen practitioners in China, Korea, and Japan, respectively.⁶³

In China it is well known that the most popular *huatou* is "Who is it that recites the name of the Buddha?" (*Nianfo shìshéi*), that is, who recites the invocation to Amitābha Buddha?⁶⁴ This particular *huatou* has been popularized by Xuyun (1840–1959 CE), the most famous Chan monk in the 19th and 20th centuries in China. In the Korean Seon, which is unlike the Chinese/Japanese traditions, the *hwadu*, "*Sisimma*" (C. *shishenmo*, J. *zejinmo*, What is it?) is certainly one of the most popular *hwadus*.⁶⁵ This particular *huatou*, the *Shishenmo* is arguably one of the most famous *huatous* of the entire Kanhua Chan (questioning meditation) which traces its origin to the first encounter of the sixth patriarch Huineng (638–713 CE) and his disciple, Nanyue Huairang (677–744 CE), and has undoubtedly been one of the most popular *hwadus* in Korea ever since. Specifically, it first appears as a *kung-an* in the *Platform Sutra* of the sixth patriarch Huineng.⁶⁶ Nanyue Huairang was one of Huineng's two disciples who were conferred the dharma transmission of mind-seal; the Chan lineage branched out into a number of sublineages thereafter. A historical anecdote of the *huatou*, *Shishenmo* begins when Nanyue Huairang first met Huineng as follows:

... Upon his arrival, and after the first salutation, Nanyue Huairang was asked by the Patriarch whence he came. 'From Sung Shan,' replied he. 'What thing is it (that comes)? How did it come?' asked the Patriarch. 'To say that it is similar to a certain thing is wrong,' he retorted. 'Is it attainable by training?' asked the Patriarch. 'It is not impossible to attain it by training; but it is quite impossible to pollute it,' he replied....Being thereby enlightened, Huairang realized intuitively what the Patriarch had said.⁶⁷

In this particular scenario, however, the message of ultimate enlightenment disregards the relevancy of the sensations in an empirical sense, the observing of which is the key to the distinctive method of *Satipaṭṭhāna* as taught by the Buddha. In the Korean Ganhwa Seon practice, however, in the earlier depiction of this encounter dialogue, *Shishenmo* evolved into the mindful *hwadu* *Sisimma*, which integrated the classical Sinitic Chan praxis with the spirit of *Satipaṭṭhāna* in a format of tracing back the radiance. In the Japanese Zen tradition, especially that of the Rinzai school, the two most popular *koans* are: "*Mu*" (nothing) and Hakuin's⁶⁸ "What is the sound of one hand?"⁶⁹ Peter Harvey speculates that the latter *koan* is

⁶³ Stuart Lachs, "Hua-t'ou: A Method of Zen Meditation", *Non-duality magazine* 6, 2012, pp. 8–10, <http://www.nondualitymagazine.org/nondualitymagazine.6/nonduality-magazine.6.contents.htm>.

⁶⁴ Peter Harvey, *An Introduction To Buddhism: Teaching, History and Practices*, Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK, 2013, p. 366.

⁶⁵ Lachs, "Hua-t'ou: A Method of Zen Meditation", pp. 8-10.

⁶⁶ *T* 2008:48.346b21–362b19

⁶⁷ A.F. Price, and Mou-Lam Wong, *The Diamond Sutra and The Sutra of Hui Neng*, Shambhala Publications, Inc., Berkeley, CA, 1969, pp. 75–76.

⁶⁸ Hakuin Ekaku (1685–1769 CE). A renowned Japanese Zen Master, Hakuin was a strong advocate of questioning meditation (J. *Kanna Zen*, K. *Ganhwa Seon*, C. *Kanhua Chan*), which focuses on the role of doubt in contemplating the *koan*. The contemporary Japanese Rinzai training system is attributed to Hakuin (Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Donald S. Lopez Jr., *The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism*, pp. 342–343).



perhaps an allusion to the Zen understanding of viewing everything as a Oneness, or the Buddha-nature.⁷⁰

5.2. From *Shishenmo* to *Sisimma* in the Korean Seon tradition

The *hwadu*, *Sisimma* is especially significant in the Korean Seon tradition, in which the practice of *Satipaṭṭhāna* has further evolved into a *new* version of *hwadu*, *Sisimma*, which recalls the *Satipaṭṭhāna* at its origin. Both the *Satipaṭṭhāna* and the *Sisimma* require a retaining of concentration when awake and alert, the difference being a bare attention for the former and questioning for the latter. In Korean Buddhist history, Naong Hyegeun (1320–1376 CE) was known to be the first Seon Master who emphasized its importance. He was a famous Seon master in the late Koryeo period (918–1392) and one of the great authorities of Seon along with Taego Bowu (1301–1382 CE).⁷¹ Naong Hyegeun allegedly received dharma transmission, the so-called *mind-seal*, from a Chinese Chan master of the Linji line, Zhikong (?–1366), and firmly established the Ganhwa Seon (C. Kanhua Chan, questioning meditation) in Korea.⁷² Master Taego is revered as the father of the restoration of the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism.

Ever since Naong introduced the *Sisimma*, its unique usage as one of the most famous *hwadus* has prevailed widely among most Korean Buddhist Seon practitioners up until the present day. These include Gusan Suryun (1909–1983 CE), Toeiong Seongcheol (1912–1993 CE), Seungsahn Haengwon (1927–2004 CE), Songdam Jeongeun (1929–), and many more. Gusan was a renowned Korean Seon master, providing a wealth of practical teaching for students, particularly with regard to the unique Korean practice of *Sisimma*. He was the first Seon teacher to have accepted and trained Western students in a Korean monastery. His choice of *hwadu*, *Sisimma* is succinctly described in his book, *The Way of Korean Zen*. He emphasizes that the key factor is to maintain a constant sense of questioning, “emotionalized and sustained doubt,”⁷³ and not just a simple repetition of the words. Having taken hold of the *Sisimma*, a student is advised to sustain the questioning: “What is seeing?” “What is hearing?” “What is smelling?” “What is moving the body?” and so on. Whenever the *hwadu*, *Sisimma* arises in the meditator’s mind, s/he is to trace the radiance back to its source, and to restore the mind to its natural enlightened state. This is reminiscent of the inductive empiristic practice of *Satipaṭṭhāna*. The process of questioning should continue uninterrupted, with each new question adding to the previous one, in an overlapping fashion. Maintaining a smooth and steady overlapping, the practitioner allows the emotionalized doubt to sustain itself continuously and with more intensity. When the mass of questioning grows to a critical point, it is said to suddenly burst and the entire universe is shattered. Finally, one’s Original Nature then appears with various features. This is considered the beginning of the so-called Enlightenment, or awakened state. Gusan declares that when one experiences such a state, s/he should proceed to a qualified teacher to receive confirmation

⁶⁹ Yoel Hoffmann, *The Sound of The One Hand, 281 Zen Koans with Answers*, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 47–54.

⁷⁰ Peter Harvey, *An Introduction To Buddhism*, p. 367.

⁷¹ Y. K. Suh, “The History and Culture of Buddhism in the Koryō Dynasty”, in *The History and Culture of Buddhism in Korea*. ed. The Korean Buddhist Research Institute, Dongguk University Press, Seoul, Korea, 1993, p. 166.

⁷² Jaeryong Shim, *Korean Buddhism; Tradition and Transformation*, Ji Moon Dang Publishing Co., Seoul, Korea, 1999, p. 153.

⁷³ 疑情 *Euijeong* (C. *yiqing*); This refers to a constant state of intense questioning of the ‘doubt – mass’. Some Buddhist scholars translate this literally as “sensation of doubt,” but an “emotionalized and sustained doubt” may be rendered better than a sensation of doubt as a doubt itself is not sensible.



of the level of awakening.⁷⁴ The realization of such innate Oneness, or the Buddha-nature, transcending two extremes of dichotomy, would lead the practitioner to an ultimate enlightenment.

Among recent Seon masters, Songdam is worth mentioning with regard to the actual meditation technique of the *hwadu* practice. Songdam teaches his students to practice the meditation of counting the breath (K. *susikgwan*) before the actual *hwadu* practice of “What is it?” (*Sisimma*).⁷⁵

5.3. The practices of *Satipaṭṭhāna* and mindfulness of breathing

Mindfulness of breathing ranks the highest place among the various subjects of Buddhist meditation and is known to be the most basic practice in Contemplation of the Body. It is particularly worth mentioning that mindfulness of breathing entails a very close observation of one of the essential functions of the body.

Among the various body functions, breathing is unique in that it is the only one in which some degree of voluntary alteration is possible during which the spontaneous aspect of breathing is being maintained involuntarily. Circulation, for example, with its rhythmic pumping of blood from the heart, is mainly an involuntary function. The Buddha seemed to have acknowledged such a characteristic of breathing in that he highly recommends the practice of being mindful of breathing, as described in the *Majjhima Nikāya*.⁷⁶

In a practical setting, the *Sisimma* can be incorporated into one’s daily activity employing the inductive and empirical method of the *Satipaṭṭhāna*; this has been particularly emphasized by Korean Seon practitioners. When one attempts to be mindful of each breath attentively, only then does s/he begin to realize that the mind is being constantly distracted and scattered ubiquitously within the ordinary space-time frame, which leads to a state of disharmony and thus away from wholesomeness.

However, especially during the mindful practice of breathing the *Sisimma* can be an especially helpful reminder for sustaining awareness of mind. The question “What is it?” is to be maintained firmly in every moment of moving, abiding, sitting, lying, speaking, silence, and being tranquil. It creates an ambiance for the undivided attention or mindfulness that the practitioner needs to employ at each and every moment of breathing during all biological functions. With the help of the *Sisimma*, one can more easily learn to divert one’s discursive attention and revert back to one’s original nature through the practice of *Satipaṭṭhāna*; this can be an invaluable tool to alleviate the tendency of constant “popping and switching” the focus of attention in the clinical condition of AD/HD.

This practice may be beneficial for modern people who live in a complex environment and are prone to develop maladaptive behaviors such as the persistent pattern of AD/HD. It is generally believed among Korean Seon practitioners that if practiced profoundly and sufficiently, the practice of *hwadu*, *Sisimma* will eventually lead the practitioner to an ultimate enlightenment since all sentient beings are, at the core, preloaded with the buddha-nature. It follows that this practice may be construed as a novel meeting point of the two practices, the *Satipaṭṭhāna* and the Chan tradition.

⁷⁴ Martine Batchelor, *The Way of Korean Zen by Kusan Sunum*, Weatherhill, Boston & London, 2009, pp. 59–63.

⁷⁵ Songdam, “Hwalgu Chamseon Beop”, *Bulil Hoebo*, July, 1988, pp. 445 & 455.

⁷⁶ Nāṇamolī and Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, p. 943.




CONCLUSION

Notably, stimulant medications prescribed for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children and its adult equivalent, attention deficit disorder (ADD) have shown to be generally safe and effective in reducing the symptoms of these disorders. However, it is known that these medications do help only about 40-70% of those who use the drugs, and the effectiveness of medication declines and disappears when it exceeds two years.

Due to growing disenchantment with the various treatment modalities for AD/HD, Mindfulness Meditation (MM) as revealed in the *Satipaṭṭhāna*, has emerged as an effective alternative treatment modality. Although the *Satipaṭṭhāna* was practiced by the Buddha in order to attain the ultimate enlightenment, its technique has been seen as nonreligious, rather *areligious* beyond being nonreligious, as it is empirically-based, involving close attention to one's bodily sensations, feelings and specific thoughts. For this reason, resistance has been minimal from Western medicine in employing this mindfulness modality, and its popularity has been supported by a recent wave of scientific studies. At first sight, it may appear contradictory to teach mindfulness to individuals with AD/HD as the core issue in this condition is difficulty in paying attention, and mindfully meditating necessitates the ability to control attention by developing awareness of the present moment. MM's potential is limitless, but its applicability has not reached full efficacy due to the truncation of the original practice. While mindfulness-based techniques have been popular in various clinical conditions, Chan/Seon/Zen by itself has rarely been employed as a treatment modality. It has not been considered beneficial, being construed as a mere distraction or inattention. In order to provide a bridge for the nature of self-regulation, a special Chan/Seon *hwadu*, *Sisimma* may be introduced, utilizing the unique method of "tracing back the radiance," popularized by the renowned Korean Seon master Chinul. Thus, the practice of *Satipaṭṭhāna* has evolved into a new version of *hwadu*, "*Sisimma*" in the Korean Seon tradition. Both the *Satipaṭṭhāna* and the *Sisimma* require the retaining of concentration when awake and alert, the difference being a bare attention for the former and questioning for the latter. Whenever the *Sisimma* arises in the meditator's mind, s/he is to trace the radiance back to its source, restoring the mind to its natural enlightened state. This resonates with the inductive, empirical practice of *Satipaṭṭhāna*. Through this complementary method, mindfulness practice coupled with the *Sisimma* broadens its effectiveness, rendering it easily applicable to the alleviation of AD/HD.

To indicate that the *hwadu*, *Sisimma* coupled with *Satipaṭṭhāna* can enhance the effectiveness of MM, we propose herein a meeting point of the two practices, thus mitigating the weakness and improving the strength of each. In this way, the practitioner can maintain a questioning of the *Sisimma*, advancing to the state of an emotionalized and sustained doubt, while being mindful of thoughts, feelings, and sensations in a non-judgmental way without interruption. We have endeavored to focus on one of the most popular Chan/Seon *hwadus*, *Sisimma*, in relation to how it may be utilized along with mindfulness-based programs for individuals with AD/HD.


The main point here is that accepting the various perspectives regarding AD/HD, one may take those perspectives proactively as assets from the start and capitalize on them by employing the novel technique of the mindful Seon *hwadu*, *Sisimma*. Thus, the *Sisimma* can then be coupled or amalgamated into the mindfulness of *Satipaṭṭhāna* in order to manage the negatives of AD/HD, and simultaneously to preserve the positives such as creativity, boundless energy, and persistence. We have attempted to provide an understanding of how to improve AD/HD based on the experience of meditative concentration. This understanding



may inspire one with an ultimate enlightenment of a Buddhist kind for the relief of all suffering in life. Building from this innovative effort, future research may uncover additional merits as an effective alternative treatment for AD/HD.

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EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN CONTEXT OF THERAPEUTIC- RELATIONSHIP

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ABSTRACT

From the technical point of view, the medical act is limited to establishing a diagnosis for the purpose of recommending a treatment. Are things so simple? From a hermeneutic-philosophical point of view, any medical act involves a meeting between two individuals, with the establishment of a special type of inter-human relationship, conditioned by the specific context of this encounter. For this reason, emotional load can reach extreme levels by the existence of factors that include: an nearness that goes beyond the comfort zone of the individual, touching body area, approaching intimate subjects, to receive news (good or bad). But what is the rol of emotional intelligence, in therapeutic communications ?This study approach the subject in modern medical conception who places more emphasis on the involvement of emotional factors in medical communications. The article brings attention, through a study on 200 patients, the importance of the emotional approach of the patient in the light of previously exposed. The patient - centered medicine has emerged as a need to change the paradigm of the medical act, in which the patient's approach is individualized and holistic, in a bio-psycho-social context. The present substudy is a part of a large study carried out between 2008-2016; is a prospective, mixt study who fulfills the conditions for human studies. Applying this medical model leads to the emergence of new concepts in medicine, that go beyond the classical model, namely: redefinition of the therapeutic relationship and its model of functioning.

Keywords: Emotional Intelligence; Empathy; Therapeutic relationship; Patient - centered medicine; Bio-psycho-social model;

INTRODUCTION

Numerous studies published in recent years highlight the role of EI in medicine, highlighting its importance in patient-centered medicine. Starting from this premise, the manifestation of EI in the therapeutic relationship, the present study, demonstrates the causal link between this and the acceptance of diagnosis in patients with psychosomatic disorders. It is important to emphasize that a series of relational variables that can be considered an attribute of emotional intelligence, seen as an ability to understand and manage emotions, contribute to accepting the diagnosis in the study (Jhonson D.R, 2015).

1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

It is recognized that resistance to therapy can be related to the patient's approach, referring mainly to communication between the two actors of the relationship. In the light of this approach, the results of medical literature studies demonstrate that the notion of



therapeutic alliance alters a classical concept: diagnosis and prognosis of evolution are not exclusively patient or physician-related, representing in fact, an interactive process. We preferred to use the notion of therapeutic alliance because its linguistic significance suggests the notion of partnership needed to achieve the goal of any medical act. What are the factors that contribute to the success of the medical act, turning it into a successful action in the fight against diseases, beyond scientific knowledge - medical "technique"? Studies show that the therapeutic relationship has an important share in the economy of any medical act, as evidenced by the literature data. At the same time, it is recognized that "the therapeutic relationship is one of the most profound and difficult to define inter-human relationships." (Gelso; Gelso & Hayes, 2014; 1998).

As a result of these findings, we considered that the notion of therapeutic relationship is based on the following concepts: 1. Working relationship; 2. Configuration of transfer; 3. Real relationship.

The medical and psychological interdisciplinary studies conducted by working groups based on a series of meta-analyses have led to the conclusion that there are several elements of the therapeutic relationship that have proven effective, such as congruence / authenticity, repair of deterioration of the therapeutic alliance and the countertransference; these were considered promising, but the studies currently in place have provided insufficient evidence to be considered conclusive. However, a series of conclusions also supported by studies can't be denied.

The therapeutic relationship has emotional and informational components; De Blasi et al. (2001) called them emotional and cognitive care. Emotional care includes mutual understanding, empathy, respect, authenticity, acceptance, and warmth. Cognitive care involves aspects of communication, information gathering, information sharing, patient education, and management of expectations. This concept interconnects the dual, emotional and cognitive relationship of the doctor-patient relationship, thus being able to improve the quality of the interpersonal relation. As far as psychosomatic disorders are concerned, starting from diagnosis, acceptance and awareness, they involve a special approach from the perspective of the doctor-patient relationship. First of all, it is an emotional analysis of this special type relationship, and then, about the phenomenological - hermeneutical context's of the psychosomatic disorders.

Diagnosis of psychosomatic disorders, beyond the specifics of a medical diagnosis, involves a biopsychosocial diagnostic component.

It is obvious that somatization increases the addressability and rate of use of medical services. The mechanism underpinning the relationship between knowledge, somatization and some type of behavior (abnormal, dysfunctional) to illness is not yet fully elucidated, although it is recognized and accepted that somatization is related to perception and a number of cognitive-behavioral factors. Essentially, in patients with symptomatic-somatic disorders, there is a causal effect between somatization and abnormal behavior.

From the perspective of the therapeutic relationship, it is important for the doctor to recognize somatization and, implicitly, abnormal behavior towards the disease in order to avoid sending the patient to other medical specialties, a process that generates unnecessary costs in the health system (investigations, treatments) and many situations are at the root of the iatrogenic disease phenomenon. From a different perspective of the therapeutic relationship, it is important for the physician to recognize the abnormal behavior of psychosomatic disease of the disease and not to encourage and strengthen it by the attitude towards the patient (Chaturvedy S.K, Desai G & Shaligram D, 2009).



There is also scientific evidence that somatization is related to emotional disturbances. In patients with emotional disturbances (anxiety, depression, or just negative affectivity), there is a diminished capacity to become aware of certain emotional experiences associated with diminishing the to express emotions. This aspect is directly related to the therapeutic relationship, in the context in which, , the patient will exhibit a certain attachment in relation to the physician. Research linked by attachment theory shows that a dysfunctional attachment (as an expression of some childhood traumas, for example) will impose a therapeutic relationship characterized by manifesting a defensive style in the processing and expression of emotions. An essential aspect of the therapeutic relationship is precisely its nature based on unconditional acceptance and empathy, a deeply emotional relationship that, in the context of the previously exposed, can be significantly influenced in a negative sense. This emotional dysfunction, with consequences at the level of the therapeutic relationship, will have implications in both diagnostic and later therapeutic acceptance.

In this context, the therapeutic relationship - the particular social concept - represents a major pillar of diagnosis and later acceptance of specific therapy. Psychosomatic disorders probably illustrate, in the best way, the interface between health and illness, seen from the cognitive and emotional perspective. In this sense, psychosomatic disorders can be defined as a transformation of emotional pain and an internal and relational conflict, in a physical expression, with an accepted social and cultural code.

Communicating a diagnosis has major implications in all areas of patient life. For this reason, in addition to the current impact, in the case of chronic conditions, there are long-term implications. Understanding and accepting the diagnosis depends on certain variables, referring in this case to the experience of the disease, the type of personality, the perception of the symptoms, the level of training and the cultural codes of the patient, the type of person and the ability to adapt to the disease. The consequence of accepting the diagnosis is to accept the social role of the patient. The status of somatic affections is supported by a series of evidence (laboratory analysis, imaging), but in the case of psychosomatic disorders, we are in the field of subjective manifestations that blame the patient and stigmatize it . Therefore, a first step in creating and strengthening the therapeutic alliance is to destigmatize the patient and provide emotional support.

Marinker's theory (Marinker, 1975) postulates the existence of three different ways of perceiving the disease: having a disease, to feeling ill, or being recognized as sick. Depending on the beliefs, the personal or social aspirations, the cultural code of the person, the person accepts or not the role of sick. An essential role in the process of diagnostic acceptance is played by the patient's perception of the disease. Each individual has a certain representation of the disease, starting from the state of health. A possible reason for not accepting the diagnosis and, implicitly, therapy at the level of the therapeutic relationship could be the inconsistency between the terms used by the physician and those used / understood by the patient to define the same notions: health, illness, and also for the description of his own symptomatology. To accept the diagnosis, it is absolutely necessary to create a safe context for the patient . The doctor will use the patient's personal resources to build an efficient coping mechanism.

The therapeutic relationship influences the patient's thinking, expectations and trust, investing the doctor with authority, proving that doctor-patient diada are essential for a positive therapeutic response (reducing symptoms or slowing progression of disease, avoiding complications, accepting therapy). Studies have confirmed that the patient's evaluation from the perspective of the therapeutic relationship has been more strongly



correlated with the favorable outcomes than the assessment from the therapist's perspective. In the medical profession, trust is seen as a global attribute of relationships. Satisfaction must include communication, competence, and patient biopsychosocial approach, including the approach to privacy. This is considered vital to effective cooperation in accepting diagnosis and treatment recommendations.

The notion of attachment is also found in the therapeutic relationship. The attachment theory (Bowlby, 1971 & Aynsworth, 1967) refers to the need of human beings to form and maintain strong emotional ties with / towards other human beings. From the point of view of medical practice, the applicability of the attachment theory refers to the retrieval of the attachment experience in the therapeutic relationship.

The patient's attachment gives the physician the opportunity to perform the anamnesis and implicitly, the fitting into the context of the therapeutic relationship. The consequence of this is the understanding and acceptance of the clinical process by the patient. An emotionally strong therapeutic relationship facilitates both parties' access to effective collaboration that promotes the recognition of mental states that motivate a certain behavior in the relational context. There are more and more studies in the literature that address the role of attachment in somatization. Thus, uncertain emotional attachment leads to increased addressability of patients with psychosomatic disorders in primary medicine (Taylor & Marshall, 2012) Depending on the attachment style, the patient exhibits a certain type of behavior in relation to the disease and in relation to the doctor.

Consequently, the physician needs to decipher the patient's attachment style so that the relationship he / she will establish with him / her is adapted to the attachment pattern.

Recent studies (Rask, Carlsen et al., 2016) demonstrate that patients with somatic symptoms require a complex approach to health care in terms of time and biomedical and psychosocial needs.

In support of the importance of attachment theory in the context of the therapeutic relationship, there is another study (Jimenez, 2016), which reveals that a type of unsafe attachment in chronic illness is correlated with low treatment adherence, increased mortality, the excessive use of medical services, and generally poor medical results.

The patient's approach will be structured by referring to the three fundamental dimensions described above. In this sense, each person functioning by thinking, feeling and adopting a certain type of behavior.

Therefore, when we make the anamnesis, it is necessary to consider explaining the patient's choices and "how" and "why" he did a choice. But for this we need to first describe how he work before finding a plausible explanation for it. The way to achieve this goal is to describe both the situation and the way the person works.

From the perspective of the person's description, it is important to know the person's psychological profile before we solve the problem he is facing. In concrete terms, we will achieve this, respecting the same three fundamental dimensions of the person: cognitive, emotional and behavioral.

Thus the pattern of the personality of the individual will be outlined. In this context, it is important to define a series of psychological variables of the patient. Starting from the above-described aspects, we can identify the strengths we will use as the patient's resources in the medical approach. We will be used the vulnerabilities on either to minimize them, either to give them a positive connotation.



2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research question in this sub-study is: doctor behaviour related to the therapeutic relationship, considered an attribute of Emotional Intelligence (EI) contributes to acceptance of diagnosis at patient with psychosomatic affections?

3. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The physician's contribution to the medical act has undergone a number of changes with the emergence of the concept of patient-centered medicine. The doctor is no longer in the position of a person making decisions that the patient to follow them. The notion of medical service places the doctor in the area of the service provider and its activity is quantified and appreciated by the patient's satisfaction index. This has led to the need to increase the emotional involvement of the physician, which must provide emotional support to the patient, aspect demonstrated in the present study.

The relational variables mentioned are found in the questionnaire items: Determinants of Patient Satisfaction with Physician Interaction.

4. RESEARCH METHODS

The article brings attention, through a study on 200 patients, the importance of the emotional approach of the patient in the light of previously exposed. The patient-centered medicine has emerged as a need to change the paradigm of the medical act, in which the patient's approach is individualized and holistic, in a bio-psycho-social context.

The present substudy is a part of a large study carried out between 2008-2016; is a prospective, mixt study who fulfills the conditions for human studies.

Research Constructs

The sub-study was structured on the basis of the above-mentioned questionnaire. I used the following items:

(F1) I understand my illness better after meeting with my doctor (the cognitive and emotional meaning of illness)

(F2) The consultation (medical examination and anamnesis) does not last as long as it should (allocated time)

(F4) The doctor gives me the chance to say or ask whatever I want (permissiveness or good communication)

(F6) The doctor is interested in me as an individual and not just by my illness (empathy)

(F7) The doctor explains how to take care of me in my condition (communication)

(F8) The doctor greets me before listening to my symptoms (complaints) (respect/consideration)

(F10) Doctor does not use medical terms that I do not understand (communication)

(F17) The doctor listens to me with great patience (communication)

(F11) I can talk openly to the doctor about my sensitive issues (empathie)

(F20) Above all, I am pleased with the relationship (collaboration) with my doctor (indice de satisfactieie crescut)

5. FINDINGS

1. From the analysis of the mentioned items, corroborated with a number of items from the other sub-studies, we have in fact found that is exactly the position occupied by the doctor and the patient on the scale of attitude towards the disease, and that when the patient is satisfied with the explanations given by to the physician, the proportion of patients in the uncertainty area is low (item F1, 5.16%), while, if the patient considers that the physician



ignores certain accusations or empirical explanations he expresses, the level of uncertainty increases, reaching a quarter of respondents "25.76%" who are in the uncertainty area (uncertainty of relationship and diagnosis).

2. Regarding the friendly attitude of the physician, respondents who are participated in the study consider friendly physician. This aspect, viewed from the perspective of the attachment theory, is of particular importance, as it contributes to the consolidation of the therapeutic relationship. When individuals feel vulnerable to threatening situations, such as illness, they are looking for an "attachment person" to feel safe. In the case of patients, this person is the doctor and the results of the statistical processing of the data obtained confirm this fact by perceiving the doctor's friendly attitude to a significant percentage, "64.56%" of patients. An important issue to be clarified in the context of the research theme is the analysis of the sample of respondents who chose the " Uncertainty " option.

3. Another aspect was the state of uncertainty found in all sub-studies. In evidence - based medicine and patient-centered medicine, uncertainty is an important aspect of medical practice. Starting from the existing uncertainty in formulating a diagnosis presumption, we inevitably come to the relational uncertainty, determined precisely by the impossibility of establishing the evidence-based certainty diagnosis. In the case of psychosomatic disorders, this component is all more obviousness, as the degree of indeterminacy and uncertainty appears in the name of the disease itself. Medically Unexplained Symtoms, or somatic symptoms, are notions that do not have a certainty that can be established , and can be attributed to a multitude of causes (psychological variables, impossible to turn into objectively clinically-biological entities, quantifiable). For this reason, patients are often in the uncertainty area of accepting explanations, as we have seen, or making decisions, considering that the area of uncertainty gives them the possibility of a new diagnostic option at any time (by requesting a new consultations), therapeutic or relational (dissatisfaction with the therapeutic relationship due to the physician's communication of a diagnosis that the patient does not accept, or an indication of therapy that the patient does not agree to, considering it inefficient, risky or inappropriate for his medical problem).

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the data obtained, referring to the " Uncertainty " option, revealed in all items its presence, in the proportion between " 5.16% " in Item F1 regarding the perception of the disease, and " 25.76% " at item F12 which refers to the physician's perception and attitude towards certain patient's claims about the disease. We have actually found that this is exactly the position occupied by the physician and the patient on the scale of attitude towards the disease, and that when the patient is satisfied with the explanations given by the physician, the proportion of patients in the area of uncertainty is low (item F1, 5.16%), whereas, if the patient considers that the doctor ignores certain accusations or empirical explanations he expresses them, the level of uncertainty increases, as a quarter of respondents " 25,76% " are in the uncertainty area.

The exposed variables found in selected items can be considered attributes of emotional intelligence, in the sense of the ability to understand and manage emotions that will later be translated into cognitions and behaviors.

The quantitative and qualitative analysis of data obtained by statistical processing reveals that the therapeutic relationship in terms of addressing the significance of the disease by the physician and the patient influences the patient's decision to accept or not the diagnosis.



Another important aspect is that of the uncertainty that can be said to be a characteristic of patients with psychosomatic disease.

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METAETHICS: AQUINAS, HUME AND MOORE

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ABSTRACT

This article concerns Aquinas' practical doctrine on two philosophical difficulties underlying much contemporary ethical debate. One is Hume's Is-ought thesis and the other is its radical con-sequence, Moore's Open-question argument. These ethical paradoxes appear to have their roots in epistemological scepticism and in a deficient anthropology. Possible response to them can be found in that Aquinas' human intellect (essentially theoretical and practical at the same time) naturally performs three main operations: 1° To apprehend the intellecta and universal notions ens, verum and bonum. 2° To formulate the first theoretical and practical principles. 3° To order that the intellectum and universal good be done and the opposite avoided. Thomistic philosophical response to both predicaments will not be exclusively ethical, but will harmonically embrace ontology, anthropology and epistemology.

Keywords: ontology; anthropology; epistemology; ethics;

1. HUME'S LAW AND MOORE'S OPEN QUESTION

The first part of this article will study Aquinas' possible response to *Hume's law*. According to shared interpretation, David Hume sought to reform philosophy (Mackie 1980) and this paper will focus on his moral philosophy, by arguing against his famous *Is-ought thesis* or *Hume's Law 1*. It may be briefly defined as being unlawful to derive *ought* (*what ought to be*) from *is* (*what is*). That means, between *is* and *ought* there is such a dichotomy and separation that it is impossible to derive norms (*ought*) from beings (*is*) (Hudson 1969). In particular, this article will dispute the illegacy of deriving universal rules (*ought*) from persons (*is*).

The second part of this article will examine Aquinas' possible riposte to *Moore's open-question argument*. George Edward Moore sharpened *Hume's law* taking it to its final consequences with his *Open-question argument* (Baldwin 1990). Moore already supported in his youth work *The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics* (Moore 1897) the argument that any attempt to define good is a *naturalistic fallacy*, hence it is recognized as a precursor to *Principia Ethica* (Moore 1903). This book is considered as a revolutionary ethical work (Hutchinson 2001: 88-90). Fundamentally, his thesis maintains that the possibility of defining good must be denied, since it is indefinable (Butchvarov 1982); to confuse good with something temporary or with any natural property would result in a *naturalistic fallacy* (Moore 1903: I,10). If you want to avoid this fallacy, you cannot identify or confuse good or evil with anything (Moore 1903: *Preface*: 3).

2. HUME'S LAW AND AQUINAS' HUMAN INTELLECT

This section will analyse Thomas Aquinas' possible solution to *Hume's law*. It seems that Thomistic moral philosophy, based on ontology, anthropology and epistemology, could



have already satisfactorily addressed the *Is-ought thesis*; since in his doctrine it is possible (using Humean language) to derive *ought* (universal norms) from *is* (person), without falling into *Hume's law* (Lichacz 2008).

The argument must begin with three fundamental premises in Aquinas' ethical doctrine. 1°) It is not from every *is* that is possible to infer a moral *ought*. From a mineral being (*is*) is not possible to infer a moral *ought*. From a vegetal being (*is*) is not possible to infer a moral *ought*. From an irrational animal being (*is*) is not possible to infer a moral *ought*. But only from a rational animal being (*is*) is possible to infer or conclude a moral *ought* (natural law). 2°) According to Aquinas universal good is good, not because it is a result of mere social consensus (contractualism), or just a calculus of consequences (consequentialism) or just a pure duty (Kantian deontologism). But good is good because the human intellect apprehends it as an *intellectum* and universal good (Gilson 2002) 3°) The universal good is not God or Beatific Vision **2**. Since both things, in this earth, are not universal goods. Because the human intellect does not apprehend, in this earth, the reality nor essence of those goods, so the will does not naturally tend to these goods **3**.

The human intellect, which is at once theoretical and practical, apprehends the *intellecta* and universal notions of being (*ens*), truth and good; and their respective opposites, non-being (*non ens*), non-truth (false, illogical) and non-good (evil), in an intentional way. As a consequence, the human intellect naturally understands and formulates the first theoretical principles and the first practical principles or natural law **4**. Rational beings (anthropology) naturally follow the natural universal inclinations or natural law's precepts (ethics); because Aquinas maintains the substantial unity and rationality of the human being (Henle 2012). In the human intellect or human reason, there is a full analogy between its two speculative and practical aspects, one focused more on truth the other focused more on good and operation (Vanni 2007). In consequence, the human reason naturally understands and formulates *per se et quoad nos* the first universal, theoretical and practical, principles. The universal precepts refer to seek the *intellecta* and universal goods and to avoid the contrary. All *intellecta* and universal concepts are abstracted by the reason from the senses and the sensible experience; because in Aquinas' doctrine, "there is nothing in the intellect that has not been in the senses before" (De veritate, q. 2 a. 3 ad 19).

The abstraction occurs in two phases (Lobato 1991). Firstly, the cogitative prepares the phantasm (from the impressions of the senses) for the active intellect. Secondly, the active intellect abstracts from the phantasm the intelligible species (*species impressa*), which presents it to the passive intellect that finally, expresses the *intellecta* notion (*species expressa*). The passive intellect makes explicit the *intellectum* and universal good, which is good *per se*; thus, the will desires it *simpliciter*. For that reason, the impressions of the senses and the sensible experiences pass to another ontological level, from the sensible one to the intellectual one.

The universal norms are naturally understood and formulated by the intellect and desired by the will; as a consequence, these superior faculties naturally order that the person inclines towards the *intellecta* and universal goods seeking them and avoiding the contrary, evil or defect of good (Stump 2008). That is to say, the whole person naturally seeks and persecutes the *intellecta* and universal goods avoiding the opposite. For instance, to preserve your life, to raise your children, to avoid killing yourself, to avoid killing your children (filicide) **5**, etcetera **6**. Therefore, the order essentially is a rational act. It is the superior faculty (intellect and will), which orders the natural universal inclination towards the *intellectum* and universal good (Dewan 2008), not in the opposite way. The sensible



experience does not make the practical intellect apprehends the object as universal good; therefore the intellect and will do not command the universal inclination to seek the object avoiding the contrary (Pizzorni 1962). The universal inclinations exclusively occur as a consequence of an intellectual process which orders that persons incline towards the universal goods. It can happen that a particular man chooses to act against an universal good, this is because persons are naturally free and responsible for their actions (McCluskey 2017). Even so, human beings always have to seek good under any aspect, *sub specie boni*; because if not, they would not pursue it neither voluntarily nor guiltily (Henle 2012). For example, someone who commits suicide to stop suffering or a particular man who kills his own daughter (filicide) to satisfy his hatred against her mother **7**.

Just as the practical intellect and the will the first thing that respectively apprehend and desire is the *intellectum* and universal good, (abstracted from the sensible experience) and with it the human reason formulates the first practical principle; analogously, it occurs with the rest of the *intellecta* and universal goods of natural law. The practical intellect intentionally apprehends that the object is good *per se*, thus it presents it to the will that desires it *simpliciter*; in consequence, the practical reason naturally formulates the universal precept of preserving the own life. As a result, the reason and the will naturally order that the whole person inclines towards the *intellectum* and universal good by pursuing it and avoiding the opposite. The same happens with the good of natural law of caring for and raising your own children. The intellect apprehends the notion as universal and good *per se*, thus, the intellect presents it to the will that naturally desires it (*voluntas ut natura*) **8**; in consequence, the reason naturally formulates the universal precept of caring and raising your own children. As a result, the reason and the will naturally order that the whole person inclines towards the *intellectum* and universal good by seeking it and avoiding the opposite. Aquinas' natural law (ethics, *ought*) is a natural consequence of the rational being (anthropology, *is*) (Sellés 2008).

In order to understand and formulate the universal precept of raising your own children avoiding the contrary, or preserving your life avoiding the contrary; the boy or girl must have felt some experiences; therefore he or she must have lived some years of life (Artigas 2003). Aquinas does not enter into details of age, nevertheless it is clearly stated in his texts that it is only from a certain period of life that you can properly speak of use of reason. The use of reason properly means having the capability to intellectualize (intellect) and to will (will) in act (Sanguinetti 2011). Although the intellect *per se* does not use any corporeal organ, nevertheless, it receives the phantasm from the sensible faculties that do use corporeal organs. According to Aquinas, it is impossible for our intellect, which is united to a body, to understand in act anything without using the images received by the bodily organs **9**. Therefore, the person cannot intellectualize, nor formulate judgments, nor will in act because of defect in the corporeal organs.

If children's organs (particularly the brain) are still evolving, the use of reason (intellect and will) will be hindered, too. The internal senses, because of the malfunction of the bodily organ, are not able to provide the phantasm for the active intellect. Consequently, it cannot present any intelligible species (*species impressa*) to the passive intellect, which as a result cannot express (*species expressa*) any *intellectum* and universal concept, with which the reason formulates the first theoretical and practical judgments. Therefore, to use the reason (use of reason) properly means to intellectualize and to will in act (De Finance 1997), which implies, being morally free and responsible of own actions (free will) **10**.



The natural inclinations that conform the natural law, tending to the universal goods and avoiding the opposite are exclusively the universal natural inclinations proper to man as man. Not the particular natural inclinations, that someone could feel, even if the inclinations subjectively look more or less good to us (Tonello 2009).

The nature of each thing is primarily the form, according to which each being (*ens*) belongs to a species (Pincemin 1997); thus, persons are constituted in their species by their form, a rational form **11**. Therefore, the human nature impels persons to act rationally, that is, to act according to the natural law; consequently, what is against the order of reason is against the nature of man as man. Aquinas' natural law presupposes rationality **12**; hence, non-rational animals cannot follow the natural law; they are just following their non-rational needs toward or against objects (Elders 1996: 179-186). The natural universal inclinations towards the *intellecta* and universal goods are a result of the judgment of the practical intellect, naturally desired by the will (*voluntas ut natura*) and rationally ordered; as a result persons naturally tend to seek the *intellectum* good avoiding the contrary **13**. For instance, the natural universal inclination to preserve your life, to raise your children, to know the truth; as well as the natural universal inclination to avoid the opposite, like committing suicide, committing filicide or living in ignorance (Dewan 1990).

Thomas Aquinas sometimes uses the expression "natural inclination" (*inclinatio naturalis*) to refer to non-universal or particular natural inclinations. The natural non-universal inclinations are countless and may tend towards particular good goods (such as caring for sick people), towards particular less good goods (such as drinking alcohol), or towards particular bad goods (like raping). Toward these goods, the will does not feel naturally attracted (*voluntas ut ratio*) **14**. Therefore, in Aquinas' texts, there are two completely different senses of *natural inclinations* (Brock 1988). However, some famous Thomistic scholars (Finnis 1988; Finnis-Grisez 1981) confuse the two senses (*voluntas ut natura* y *voluntas ut ratio*). They consider the universal natural inclinations of man as man toward *intellecta* goods *per se*, or natural law; just like non-universal inclinations toward non-universal and particular objects. Nevertheless, according to Aquinas, the particular natural inclinations are neither universal nor of man as man, hence do not conform the natural law (McInerny 1997).

Following this introduction, it is argued that Aquinas, with his integral vision of moral philosophy, which harmonically embraces ontology, anthropology and epistemology, seems to have satisfactorily addressed the *Is-ought problem*. This is because in his integral ethics it is possible (using Humean language) to derive universal norms (*ought, what ought to be*) from persons (*is, what is*) without falling into *Hume's law*, using two arguments.

1°) As the human intellect, in its theoretical aspect, apprehends the notion of *intellectum* and universal being (*ens*) and apprehends the notion of *intellectum* and universal truth, then naturally formulates the first theoretical principles (principle of non-contradiction, of identity, etcetera). Analogously, the human intellect, in its practical aspect, apprehends the notion of *intellectum* and universal good and formulates the natural law's precepts; or natural universal inclinations of man as human toward the universal goods. Aquinas' natural law does not start from the sensible experiences, and as a result, persons pursue or avoid the sensible objects. The process is radically the opposite; we could represent it (although in Aquinas' doctrine the person with all his faculties is substantially one being) (Goyette 2009) from top to bottom not from bottom to top. This means, the natural universal inclinations of man as human, or natural law, have been formulated and ordered after a judgment, from above, from the rational faculty; as a consequence the person



naturally inclines towards the universal goods avoiding the contrary. The person is free and responsible for his action; the person is praiseworthy or guilty for his actions (Pizzorni 2000). If the process were from bottom to up, meaning, if actions were directed by sensibility; persons would not be praiseworthy or guilty for their actions, since these actions would not be human as human, they would be like actions of non-rational animals (Brock 2015).

2º) The *intellectum* and universal being (*ens*) and the *intellectum* and universal good are real and ethically one in human beings. The *intellectum* and universal good is totally real and normative; although, as so many things in philosophy are real while abstract (Polo 2011). In Aquinas' doctrine, there is no dichotomical derivation from *is* to *ought* in the human being, because *is* (human being) and *ought* (natural law) are harmonically apprehended by the human intellect, both theoretical and practical at the same time. That means, any person for being human, naturally inclines to the *intellectum* and universal good. There is no dichotomy, but harmony, between *is* (*what is*) and *ought* (*what ought to be*); because every human being who understands that he is a person naturally understands that he must be, behave and act as a rational being. Hence, the natural law (ethics) is a natural consequence of the rational being (anthropology); this is because Aquinas defends the substantial unity and rationality of the human being (Mondin 1992).

In Thomistic ethics *ought* (*what ought to be*) that are derived from *is* (*what is*) are only and exclusively the universal natural inclinations of man as man or natural law. Any rational being (anthropology, *is*) naturally inclines to seek the *intellecta* and universal goods avoiding the contrary (ethics, *ought*). However, there are some individuals who choose not to obey this rational mandate or natural law. This is because, as said before, persons are essentially rational beings free and responsible for their actions (Palma 2009).

The natural particular inclinations towards particular goods are countless, such as taking care of old people, drinking alcohol, raping, and so on. Hence, as said before, they will never conform the natural law, since they are mere natural particular inclinations towards non-universal goods. Namely, the human reason apprehends these goods as what they are; particular and non-universal goods. Therefore, neither the intellect naturally apprehends these goods as goods *per se*, nor the will naturally desires (*voluntas ut ratio*) these goods as goods *per se* (Clavell-Pérez de Laborda 2009).

The first practical precept is to seek the *intellectum* and universal good avoiding the opposite, evil or defect of good; all other universal precepts are based on this first. The other precepts of natural law refer to pursue the other *intellecta* and universal goods; such as preserving your own life, caring for your own child or knowing the truth; avoiding the opposite, such as killing yourself, committing filicide or living in ignorance **15**.

Essentially, what Aquinas maintains is that our intellect apprehends the *intellecta* and universal goods intentionally, in an intentional way; therefore, not as a concrete concept but as an *intellectum* one (*verbum mentis*) (Sanguinetti 2011). Aquinas' natural law exclusively refers to the universal natural inclinations of man as man to seek the *intellecta* and universal goods avoiding the contrary. All *intellecta* concepts are abstracted from the senses by the reason; since there is nothing in the intellect that has not been in the senses before. Therefore, it can be said that according to Aquinas' ethics (using Humean language), from *is* (person) derives *ought* (natural law) without falling into *Hume's law* (Lichacz 2008).



3. Moore's Open Question and Aquinas' Human Intellect

This section will study Aquinas' possible response to *Moore's open-question argument*, which is a radical consequence of *Hume's law*, because it carries the naturalistic fallacy doctrine to the end (Brink 1989). Aquinas seems to have satisfactorily addressed this ethical problem, since in his doctrine the *intellecta* and universal notions being (*ens*), truth and good are intentionally apprehended by the human intellect both theoretical and practical. In consequence, the first theoretical and practical principles are naturally understood and formulated by the human intellect.

Moore's open question sagaciously questions the ultimate foundations of ethics **16**. Why is good good? Why is evil evil **17**? Why is suicide bad *per se*, or bad? Why is preserving one's life good *per se*, or good? Why is raising your own child good *per se*, or good? Why is killing your own child (filicide) bad *per se*, or bad? Is good good? Is evil evil **18**? Although Moore admits that, he does not know how to answer why some realities are good and others the opposite, evil; he maintains that this is still an *open question* for moral philosophy **19**. Moreover, anyone who tries to define good would fall into his *naturalistic fallacy* **20**. However, the answer may be that Thomistic ethics is fundamentally different from ethics that qualify an action as good by mere social consensus (*contractualism*) or just calculating its consequences (*consequentialism*) or just a pure duty (Kantian deontology). Good is both abstract, because it includes all the problematics about the foundations of moral philosophy, and at the same time it is real, as real as being (*ens*) (Melendo 2008). Good *per se* is good because the human intellect apprehends it as *intellectum* and universal good: as such. The human reason apprehends also being (*ens*) as being (*ens*) and truth as truth; because of that, these concepts are called *intellecta* and universal notions. As a consequence, from the *intellecta* and universal notions and their opposites, non-being (*non ens*), non-true or false, non-good or evil, the human intellect naturally formulates the first theoretical and practical principles.

The answer has been simplified as a syllogism.


Just as being (*ens*) is being because it is, and the human intellect apprehends the *intellectum* and universal being (*ens*) as what it is: real; and the human intellect apprehends the contrary as what it is: non-being (lack of being or *non ens*). Just as truth is truth because it is, and the human intellect understands the *intellectum* and universal truth as what it is: true; and the human intellect apprehends the contrary as what it is: false (defect of truth or non-true). Just as logic is logical because it is, and the human intellect apprehends logic as what it is: logical; and the human intellect apprehends the contrary as what it is: illogical (lack of logic or non-logical). Thus, good is good because it is, and the human intellect apprehends the *intellectum* and universal good as what it is: good; and the human intellect apprehends the contrary as what it is: evil (defect of good or non-good). For this reason, the first theoretical and practical principles are first principles; because the human intellect apprehends and understands the first theoretical principles (principle of non-contradiction, of identity, etcetera) and practical ones (to seek the *intellecta* and universal goods avoiding the contraries) as real, true, logical and good. Similarly, the human intellect understands the opposite of these principles as lack of reality, truth, logic and good. The first theoretical and practical principles cannot be demonstrated, because they are first principles of human knowledge **21**. Therefore, the answer will always be the same, the first principles are true because they are first principles of any knowledge **22** and deny or questioning them is an *petitio principia* **23**.



Thomas Aquinas affirms that the first thing that apprehends the intellect, abstracting from the sensible experience, is being (*ens*) as being (*ens*), not as a concrete notion but as an intentional one. The second thing that it understands is itself understanding being (*ens*) as theoretical truth, not as a particular but as an intentional concept. The third thing that it wants is being (*ens*) as practical truth, not as a particular but as an intentional notion. For that reason, firstly the intellect apprehends the notion of *intellectum* and universal being (*ens*); then that of *intellectum* and universal truth; finally, that of *intellectum* and universal good (Henle 2012). Therefore, when Moore is questioning whether good is good, he is also questioning if being is being and if truth is truth **24**. Because, it is the human intellect (theoretical and practical at the same time) that apprehends, in an intentional way, the *intellecta* and universal notions. Subsequently, the human intellect formulates the first theoretical and practical principles. Aquinas' natural law (ethics) is a natural consequence of the rational being (anthropology); for the reason that, he defends the substantial unity and rationality of the human being (Gilson 2002). Hence, in Thomistic ethics it seems that good is definable without falling into *Moore's open-question argument*.

Aquinas response to *Moore's naturalistic fallacy* is similar to *Hume's Is-ought thesis*. When the human reason apprehends the *intellectum* and universal good, the intellect presents it to the will, which desires it *simpliciter*. As a result, the intellect naturally formulates the practical principle and orders the whole person to seek the *intellectum* and universal good avoiding the opposite. Therefore, the natural universal inclinations or precepts of the natural law are naturally formulated and ordered from top to bottom, not from bottom to top -as sustains some Thomistic scholars- (Finnis 1980). In addition, when Aquinas writes about the natural law does not refer to the multitude of non-universal and particular natural inclinations toward the countless number of particular and concrete goods (Brock 2005). For example, the natural inclination to take care of old or ill people, the natural inclination to drink alcohol or the natural inclination to rape. Thomistic natural law exclusively refers to the universal natural inclinations of man as man toward the *intellecta* and universal goods; such as preserving one's life, not suicide, caring for your children, not committing filicide. The innumerable particular goods (taking care of old or ill people, drinking alcohol or raping) are not apprehended by the reason as universal goods. They are apprehended by the intellect as what they are: particular and non-universal goods; consequently the will does not naturally desire them (*voluntas ut ratio*) **25**. For this reason, they will never conform the natural law (Luño 1992). Therefore, it seems that Aquinas' ethics does not fall into *Moore's naturalistic fallacy*.

The human intellect, theoretical and practical at the same time, apprehends *ens*, *verum* and *bonum* not as mere concrete notions, but instead apprehends being, truth, good and its contraries intentionally, in an intentional way. As a consequence, the human intellect intentionally formulates the first theoretical and practical principles (Vanni 2007). That means, for a person to understand that murder is evil; he does not need to have assisted one or committed it. Simply the human intellect intentionally understanding what "person" and "own child" means, naturally knows what that entails: human nature, life, love, family, and so on. In the same way, the reason intentionally knowing what "murder" means, naturally understands what it entails. In consequence, the human intellect naturally formulates that to murder a person is evil and that it must be avoided; and that even worse would be to kill your son (Polo 2015). According to Aquinas, for the intellect to formulate the first theoretical and practical principles, the person should have lived a certain period (some years of life) of sensible and intellectual experience. For the reason that, the human intellect cannot



understand, nor formulate judgments, nor reasoning in act without the body (Bergamino 2002). Although the intellect *per se* does not use any bodily organ, it receives the phantasm from the sensible faculties that do use a corporal organ. Therefore, it seems that Thomistic ethics does not fall into *Moore's naturalistic fallacy*.

Regarding Moore radical scepticism, it can be said that ultimately, all knowledge and science relies on infallibility of human intellect in understanding the *intellecta* and universal concepts being, truth, and good, and in formulating the first theoretical and practical principles formed by the *intellecta* concepts and their contraries. This truth has been blurred over the centuries due to a misunderstanding epistemological scepticism (particularly all kind of rationalisms from Descartes) (Llano 2003). May be because the human intellect exclusively is infallible with respect to the *intellecta* and universal concepts and the first universal principles. However, with respect to the reasonings from the first principles and, especially, with respect to all other reasonings, the human intellect is fallible (Hoffmann-Michon 2017), very fallible.

Professor Moore questioning if the human intellect could apprehend (know) being (*ens*) and its contrary (*non ens*), or the capability to apprehend truth and its contrary (false) **26**, or the capability to apprehend good and its contrary (evil) **27**. He is not only questioning the capability to apprehend (know) the *intellecta* and universal notions, ultimately, he is questioning the capability of the human intellect to apprehend (know) anything. Actually, Moore seems to doubt about the principle of the principle, that is, the capability of the human intellect of understanding (Moore 2006: 130-132). In fact, he has doubts about everything because he wants to demonstrate everything by building an universe of absolute certainties (Llano 2003). This radical scepticism, as Moore experiences (Moore 2006: 169-170), is not an intellectual virtue but an intellectual defect **28** ; that if carried to the end, would finish in an absolute subjectivism**29**, eliminating the science and the language itself **30**, falling in chaos and mental confusion **31**.

CONCLUSION

This article tried to argue that Aquinas' ethical doctrine, which will harmonically embrace the whole person, could have already satisfactorily addressed both *Hume's law* and its radical consequent *Moore's open-question argument*. Regarding *Hume's law* Aquinas would argue that human beings (anthropology, *is*) naturally tend to seek the *intellecta* and universal goods (ethics, *ought*). Therefore in Thomistic ethics (using Humean language) from person (*is, what is*) derives the natural law (*ought, what ought to be*) without falling into *Hume's law*. Regarding *Moore's open question* and his *natural fallacy*. Aquinas would similarly argue that the natural law (ethics, *ought*) is a natural consequence of the rational being (anthropology, *is*); this is because Aquinas defends the substantial unity and rationality of the human being. The natural law does not refer to the multitude of non-universal and particular natural inclinations toward particular and concrete goods. Nonetheless, the natural law refers solely and exclusively to the natural universal inclinations towards the *intellecta* and universal goods, which are intentionally abstracted by the intellect from the senses and the sensible experience. Therefore, in Thomistic ethics it seems that good is definable without falling into *Moore's open question* or in his *naturalistic fallacy*.



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1. Cfr. D. HUME, *A treatise of human nature, vol. 3, part. 1, sect. 1*. “In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence”.
2. Cfr. S. Th. I-II, q. 5, a. 5, co. “Videre autem Deum per essentiam est supra naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis creaturae”. I have followed the original texts from *Corpus tomisticum* [on line] URL: <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/> [accessed: 10/03/2018].
3. Cfr. S. Th. I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2 “Ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine Deus significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura”. Critics to the ontological argument of Anselm of Canterbury.
4. Cfr. S.Th I-II, q. 94, a. 2, co. “Illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omni-bus quaecumque quis apprehendit. Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus, omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni. Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est [...] bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae”.
5. Aquinas talk about filicide that is, killing the son or daughter already born; not about aborting the fetus before birth, inside the womb. His teachings about abortion, fetus and human being are controversial. Cfr. S. Th. I, q. 76, a. 3, ad 3; S. Th. I, q. 118 a.2 ad 2; S. Th. II-II, q. 64, a. 8, ad 2.
6. Cfr. S. Th. I-II, q. 94, a. 2, co. “Primum principium in ratione practica est (...) bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae (...). Vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur (...).coniunctio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia (...).naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat (...), et ad hoc quod in societate vivat. Et secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae ad huiusmodi inclinationem spectant, utpote quod homo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet conversari, et cetera huiusmodi quae ad hoc spectant”.
7. Cfr. [on line] <http://www.therichest.com/rich-list/most-shocking/10-horrific-cases-of-parents-who-killed-their-children> [accessed 10/03/2018].
8. Cfr. S. Th. I-II, q. 10, a. 1, co “Principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum. Hoc autem est bonum in communi (*universal good*), in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit (*voluntas ut natura*)”. My brackets.
9. Cfr. S. Th. I, q. 84, a. 7, co.
10. Cfr. S. Th. I, q. 83, a. 1, co. Over the minimum age of criminal responsibility. Cfr. M.A. CORRIERO. *Judging children as children: a proposal for a juvenile justice system*, Philadelphia: TUP, 2006.
11. Cfr. S. Th. I-II, q. 94, a. 3, co.”Ad legem naturae pertinet omne illud ad quod homo inclinatur secundum suam naturam. Inclinatur autem unumquodque naturaliter ad operationem sibi convenientem secundum suam formam (...). Unde cum anima rationalis sit propria forma hominis, naturalis inclinatio inest cuilibet homini ad hoc quod agat secundum rationem”.
- 12.Cfr. S. Th. I-II, q. 94, a. 3, co. “Ad legem naturae pertinet omne illud ad quod homo inclinatur secundum suam naturam. Inclinatur autem unumquodque naturaliter ad operationem sibi convenientem secundum suam formam”.
13. Cfr. S. Th. I-II, q. 94, a. 5, co.
14. Cfr. S. Th. III, q. 18, a. 4, co. “Voluntas, per se loquendo, est ipsius finis; electio autem eorum quae sunt ad finem. Et sic simplex voluntas est idem quod *voluntas ut natura*, electio autem est idem quod *voluntas ut ratio*, et est proprius actus liberi arbitrii”. My italics.
15. Cfr. S. Th. I-II, q. 94, a. 2, co.



16. Cfr. G. E. MOORE, *Principia ethica*, Ch. I, § 10-11. “Let us consider what it is such philosophers say. And first it is to be noticed that they do not agree among themselves. They not only say that they are right as to what *good* is, but they endeavour to prove that other people who say that it is something else, are *wrong*”. My italics.

17. Cfr. G. E. MOORE, *Preface to Principia ethica*. “What is good in itself? (...) good and evil in themselves”.

18 Cfr. G. E. MOORE, *Principia ethica*, Ch. I, § 13. “When we think that A is good [...]. The original question [should be], ‘Is A good?’”. My brackets.

19. Cfr. G. E. MOORE, *Principia ethica*, Ch. II, § 27. “I myself am not prepared to dispute that health [either to preserve the own life, or not to commit filicide] is good. What I contend is that this must not be taken to be obvious; that it must be regarded as an open question”. My brackets.

20. Cfr. G. E. MOORE, *Principia ethica*, Ch. I, § 10. “Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not other, but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the naturalistic fallacy”.

21. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 4, c. 4 (BK1006a). “Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want of education, for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration)”.

22. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 11, c. 6 (BK1063b). “For those [...] is not easy to solve the difficulties to their satisfaction, unless they will posit something and no longer demand a reason for it; for it is only thus that all reasoning and all proof is accomplished; if they posit nothing, they destroy discussion and all reasoning. Therefore with such men there is no reasoning”.

23. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 4, c. 4 (BK1006a). “Begging the question”.

24. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 11, c. 6 (BK1062b). “Protagoras [...] said that man is the measure of all things, meaning simply that that which seems to each man also assuredly is. If this is so, *it follows that the same thing both is and is not, and is bad and good, and that the contents of all other opposite statements are true*”. My italics.

25. Cfr. S. Th. III, q. 18, a. 3, co. “Voluntas enim, (...) et est finis, et est eorum quae sunt ad finem, et alio modo fertur in utrumque. Nam in finem fertur simpliciter et absolute, sicut in id quod est secundum se bonum, in id autem quod est ad finem, fertur cum quadam comparatione, secundum quod habet bonitatem ex ordine ad aliud. Et ideo alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid secundum se volitum, ut sanitas, quod (...) vocatur *voluntas ut natura*, et alterius rationis est actus voluntatis secundum quod fertur in aliquid quod est volitum solum ex ordine ad alterum, sicut est sumptio medicinae (...) vocatur *voluntas ut ratio*. Haec autem diversitas actus non diversificat potentiam, quia uterque actus attenditur ad unam rationem communem obiecti, quod est bonum”. *Cursiva mía*.

26. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 4, c. 7 (BK1011b). “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, *is false*, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, *is true*”. My italics.

27. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 4, c. 4 (BK1008b). “Why does he not walk [...] over a precipice [committing suicide]? [...] *Evidently because he does not think that falling in is alike good and not good?* Evidently, then, he judges one thing to be better and another worse”. My italics and brackets.

28. Cfr. Sent. Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 15. “Sed istae dubitationes stultae sunt”.

29. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 4, c. 4 (BK1008b). “*If all are alike both wrong and right, one who is in this condition will not be able either to speak or to say anything intelligible*; for he says at the same time both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. And if he makes no judgement but ‘thinks’ and ‘does not think’, indifferently, what difference will there be between him and a vegetable?”. My italics.

30. In these sense, it is very interesting to read the critics that Wittgenstein does to Moore’s radical skepticism. Cfr. Wittgenstein 1969. *On Certainty*: 341-343, 456.

31. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 4, c. 4 (BK1006a). “It is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything [*there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration*] [...]. It is absurd to seek to give an account of our views to one who cannot give an account of anything, in so far as he cannot do so. For such a man, as such, is from the start



no better than a vegetable [...] will not be capable of reasoning, either with himself or with another”.
My italics.

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CHURCH AND POLITICAL SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT

The Church and the Society are two unquestionable, undeniable realities that intertwine in countless ways. Every society assumes the idea of community, and the whole human society is the entirety of all human communities. Universal ideals are being invoked through universal systems. What ideology exists within today's societies in the world? It is Secularization. This is the ideology that some philosophers call liberalism. Initially the reform was followed by the era of the Enlightenment. The basis of this philosophy is the idea of personality, human rights and liberty. The man has become a measure of all things and he thinks he is in power to say: I decide what I need and not God at all. These ideas are closely related to the ones of the Renaissance - the rebirth of paganism, the atheistic vision of the world. All the Olympians were gods. This is the sinful man who instituted and developed the idea of rights and freedom, bypassing the idea of moral responsibility before God.

Keywords: Church and Society; conscious; free; philosophy; Secularization; Christianity;

INTRODUCTION

People are equal before God, says the voice of sociologists, but in reality, cannot be equality. Inequality, superiority or privileges of some people, poverty or subordination of the others are normal, unmodified consequences of ruling the society that is considering a restoration of the right balance in the later life.

The man was born free, having, from the beginning, the power to obey or not God's will. The Creator has given to the compassionate beings that He created the opportunity to move voluntarily and freely, so that they can acquire the true moral values that they can preserve by their own will. But laziness and indifference towards the idea of guarding the good, alienation and neglect to the better is nothing more than heading to worse because, in fact, it is certain that evil is nothing but lack of good. That is what happens if one moves away from right side.

Sociologists, psychologists, researchers in the history of religions, the social policy of states consider work to be the means of man's realization, enrichment in plan, but unfortunately their aspirations do not go beyond the material threshold. They only emphasize the material importance that humanity has given it as a law after falling into sin, after man has forsaken God by disobedience and rebellion upon him. Together with the personal call to happiness, man has the social dimension as an essential component of his nature and his vocation. In fact, all men are called to the same purpose, God Himself; there is a certain resemblance between the communion of divine persons and the fraternity that men have to



establish between them in truth and in love; love for the neighbor is inseparable from the love for God.

The doctrine of sociology takes into account man's relationship with the society in which he lives, while the Church cannot be indifferent to this relationship and social realities. Christian spirituality is perfectly perceived in the way of life, experience, and work that we encounter in the effort and work of the Savior Jesus Christ. The social morality of Christian life is linked to the mission accomplished by Christ through which spiritual goods flow through the grace of God over the entire world through the church.

1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CHURCH, THE WORLD AND SOCIETY

In Eastern Orthodox Christianity, the relations between the church and the state are established on the basis of the principle of symphony¹. The exponent of the combined power of the Church and the state was Justinian himself. Novella 154 portrays Justinian above any law: "*God has subjugated the kingdom to the king himself, sending him to men as an inbred law*"². The church has penetrated into all life sectors. And the political power interfered in all matters of the Church's life. There has also been a harmonization of state and church life. As witness is the administrative territorial division of the Church, from the First Ecumenical Synod (Nicaea, 325)³.

The authority of the Church in the life of the city should not be perceived in the absolute sense but nuanced in the direction of the initial authority over its members, which at the same time made up the society. In the present, however, following the changes in the consciousness of the masses due to the French Revolution, the development of the positivist philosophy and the development of science, there is a hiatus between the Church and society. The relationship of the Church with the state has been established by the Savior himself, even during His earthly activity, by the justification of Caesar's request (Matt. 22:17). The answer given by Christ to the Pharisees on the question, "*Is it right to give Caesar the imperial tax?*" Emphasizes two things: the recognition of state authority, in the case of the imperial state and the reality of non-opposition between religious and civic duties. The autonomy of the Church towards the state, if it means the non-interference of the Church in purely political matters and non-intervention of the state in the internal affairs of the Church, does not mean at the same time the total indifference of the Church to the problems of contemporary society.

Recognizing each other's own identity, the two fundamental institutions, the Church and the State, have complementary purposes that address the same social body. The state is called upon to ensure its physical survival, while the church is called to mediate the becoming of the social body in the flock of God, preparing it for the afterlife. Although he was the keeper of the thesaurus of the teachings of the Savior in the close relationship with the Byzantine political power, Christianity (the religion of the Church) was neither "statized" (and thus secularized) as the liberal science, especially the Protestant, of the nineteenth- and not "paganized to the point of betraying the Evangelical message"⁴.

Divine worship is the very life of the Church and the center of the Orthodox cult is the Divine Liturgy, named by Saint Dionysius the Areopagite the Mystery of the Mysteries,

¹ Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria vieții bizantine*, Enciclopedică Română, București, 1974, p. 21.

² S.B. Dașkov, *Împărați bizantini*, Enciclopedică, București, 1999, p. 73.

³ Jean Meyendorff, *Biserica creștină ieri și azi*, Anastasia, București, 1996, p. 35.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 23.



because it crowns all that has been given through the other ministries and unites the most to every believer and all in the One and infinite God love perfecting communion with God.

The word *liturgy* comes from the Greek word (*leon ergon*), through which the Greeks understood every public work or every other thing done for the benefit of the state or the public. The Church intervenes by giving moral appreciation in economic and social matters when this is required by the fundamental rights of the person, the common good or the salvation of souls.

Man as a sociable and social being, is fully accomplished by incorporating himself into the church, by the birth of water and the Spirit (John 3: 5), a new birth given in the "bath of baptism" through "communion with Christ," bringing the Spirit in the human body, sharing the tremendous kindness that irradiates and shines, making it like God. Man has Christ as an opportunity to become God by grace. Through the "bath of baptism we cleanse ourselves from all sin (ancestral or personal), and through the mystery of the Holy Anointing Oil we become partakers of divine gifts, acquiring fellowship in the life of Christ"⁵.

God is the source of absolute love. Love, which is not imposed on humans by itself, does not rise in human beings, but in God, the source of absolute love that attracts those who love Him. Man cannot ascend to God without increasing in the assimilation of his love for men; he cannot complete himself in communion with God without making himself more gifted to others.

Therefore, the communion cannot be done, as in the case of knowledge, only through love. This is the only and viable way of accomplishing the communion, because there is nothing excepting love. *"The more people are united by love, the more they are more important, valuable to each other, and in the case of human beings, the more they are united, the more mysterious one is. That's why the mild approach stops the person who loves to roughly treat the loved one. The more they are united, the more they amaze each other and act more and nicer with each other."*⁶

Cohesion and social order, the normal development of community life is based on a complicated system of duties, and so what is emphasized always falls on duty, not on rights. Social debt is obedience to the laws of society.

Man is a workman in the eyes of a sociologist, he is a social being, and labor it is the one which emancipates, elevates, rewards and leads him to an ideal state, to an ideal society.

The founders of the liberal thinking of work (the *Empire* philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke) in the 19th century struggled to show that the normal natural state of man is an artificial product, slave of the existing social organizations. This opens up the possibility of a new interpretation that reconciles the main freedom of individuals with their current status of subjects: man is born free, but his natural state of freedom has been replaced by an artificial state of multiple addictions. In an effort to articulate this interpretation, original liberalism invented the idea of a natural state of man, supposed to exist before its social state, familiar today to a development through knowledge and labor.

According to this idea, before establishing the social organization, its hierarchical structure, legislation and the state, people were in a state of freedom and equality. If civil society was born on the basis of an initial agreement established between its first members, it must be concluded that the basis of community life is the consent of the people to associate

⁵ Nicolae Cabasila, *Despre viața în Hristos*, transl. by Pr. prof. dr., Ene Braniște și Pr. prof. dr. T. Bodogae, Edit. Arhiepiscopiei București, 1989pg. 149

⁶ Pr. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, *Studii de teologie dogmatică*, Edit. Mitropoliei Olteniei, 1991, p. 205



and be led. As John Locke insists, "*Political Societies have all begun through a Voluntary Union, and through the mutual understanding of the people acting freely in the choice of those who govern them, and in their power to work for the benefit of society*"⁷.

In this initial state, people were guided not by laws issued by a public authority (such an authority did not exist yet), but by the Law of Nature expressed in the voice of Reason. The Nature (not written or written only in the souls of men) says that each individual is destined to pursue his own safety, but also that, given the existing equality, each one must respect the safety of the others, so to refrain from harm or violate their rights.

The idea that people are originally in a natural state in which they are governed only by the laws of nature, an idea of a naturalistic outlook that emphasizes natural things rather than divine decisions, plays a very important role in the liberal conception of labor, because it opens the way to the rejection of the status quo (the state of things in society) defended by traditionalism. As soon as, besides the present social situation (of inequality and dependency), a rival situation arises, the original situation - natural state, equality and independence - gives rise to the possibility to distinguish between the state of affairs (what is) and the state of law (what must be): it can be said that the current social status is not the one in principle; that God did not necessarily want people to live in the state of inequality, subordination, and dependence - moreover, since initially made people equal and free, giving them only the Law of Nature as a guide - it is supposed that he they wanted them to stay that way. Paradoxically, appealing to the naturalist perspective does not put liberalism in conflict with religion, but, on the contrary, it brings the support of divine will to the aid of liberal aspirations. It can now be said that since God created free men, God did not agree that they would be subordinated to an absolute power.

As they evolve, societies face the phenomenon of increasing differentiation or individualization. Common consciousness begins to lose its importance, and so individual consciousness emerges, whereby men differ between themselves. The latter generates an organic solidarity, widespread in modern societies. Certainly, there are no companies operating only on the basis of a single type of solidarity (mechanical or organic), but they tend to one of them.

Durkheim distinguishes social man or ethnic man and the average man. The social man can only be the moral man, while the average man is the ordinary, the common man, the one who is subject of mistakes and faults.

After thousands of years of social existence, they still wonder what the social is. The scientific queries, when they became possible, were limited by the methodological requirements, they did not relate to social existence, they merely assumed it and cut out various "study objects"; some of them have been consecrated as "scientific disciplines"⁸.

The sociology of the 19th-20th centuries that launches the labor-induced innovation in the Leninist-Marxist conception is accomplished through collectivity, the goods being a common benefit, so everyone is obliged to work for the benefit of the society. In the communist slogans and in the sociology of the times, the state was "a generous being providing bread for everyone, a wedge for all arms, a capital for all the enterprises, credits for all projects, a balm for all the wounds, consolation for all sorrows, solutions for all problems, truths for all minds, fun for all kinds, wine for the elderly.

⁷ John Locke, *The Second Treatise of the Government*, Dahrendorf, Ralf, "Modern Social Conflict. Essay on the Freedom Policy", Humanitas, " Al. I. Cuza ", CEU Press, 1996, p. 102

⁸ Karl R. Popper, *Societatea deschisă și dușmanii ei*, Humanitas, București, 1993, p. 54



It used to provide all desires, satisfied all our curiosity, corrected all our errors, amended all our mistakes and absolved everyone the need for providence, caution, judgment, intelligence, experience, order, economy, temperance and diligence"⁹. But if the state only divides the citizens that it has already gathered from them and if, as it is obviously, it cannot take a little while in return, it means that the only possible sham that some people might be helped or 'save' would be the one that consists in supporting (financially) some on the basis of funds collected from others.

The conclusion of the exposed concepts leads us to the understanding of the natural moral law which is the foundation of the state and of the social order. The Orthodox Church is not regarded as an organization in the sense of a political or other organization; it is not only the organized life of religious believers, but it is above all the theandric body, the life of God in men, the theandric community, a sacramental community. In this life of communion in the Church, the one who enters is enlightened, is taught by Christ who works in him. The Church, in this sense of communion, deeply overcomes any form of social or other organization. The Church is the mystery of communion with and through the Holy Trinity, the body in which the icon of the Holy Trinity is realized.¹⁰

The Church's communion character consists not only in the historical and organizational form of the church community, but also in its character of the Lord's secret Body. This character must be taken into account in the answer to the question: what are the ontological and spiritual elements that make it possible for an identity between the Church and communion? At the heart of the idea of communion of the Church in Orthodoxy is its appropriation of the Mysterious Body of the Lord, the clerical church or the Eucharistic Church. These can be considered the premises or sources of the Church's communion idea¹¹.

The aspect of communion of the Church is also based on the fact that the man created in the image of God is a subject that manifests an intention for communion. Our entry into the life of triumphal communion is the work of Jesus Christ, which is a center where the intentions of communion have the ultimate intensity, and of the Holy Spirit who is the Spirit of communion. The communion in the Church reflects and validates how to be the work of the ultimate reality of the Holy Trinity. Trinitarian love is the model of love among Christians. God has a personal character and is interpersonal. Man only in communion and in relation to the other is accomplished and knows himself fully and knows the other while loving him at the same time¹². The Holy Spirit makes every medullar fulfill his own work, but so that it is at the same time a common work, a work of the Church for the Church. It is obvious that each member of the Church, working after his calling, brings his work to the whole Church, as in his turn he shares what all members of the Church do in one place. He gives in the community, but at the same time takes from this community. This report strengthens the life of communion, the life that is in the Church and the Church. Each of the adults of the Church fulfills in its body its special function that contributes to the good of all. The suffering or good of one has repercussions throughout the body, for the parts are intimately joined together.

When talking about the human community in Christianity, it must first be taken into account the specificity of the Christian faith resulting from the incarnation of Jesus Christ.

⁹ Frédéric Bastiat, "Statul", in *Viața românească*, anul LXXXIX, nr. 11-12/1994, p. 127.

¹⁰ Pr. Prof. Dumitru Stăniloae, *Sinteză ecclesiologică*, in *Studii Teologice*, Year VII (1955), nr. 5-6, p. 272-273.

¹¹ Pr. Dr. Dumitru Radu, *Îndrumări misionare*, ediție colectivă, I.B.M..B.O.R., București 1987, p. 380.

¹² Idem, *Autoritate și conciliaritate în practica actuală a Bisericii, convergențe și tensiuni*, in „Ortodoxia”, Year XLI, Nr. 2, (1989), p. 91.



For the act of the inauguration of Jesus Christ brought with it the dogmatic doctrine that structured the contents of the human community, but above all the fundamental ontological principle of the visible and spiritual unity of this community.

2. HUMAN PERSON AND SOCIETY

Scripture often affirms that God speaks to us through the greatness and beauty of nature: "The heavens say the glory of God, and the making of His hands tells strength. Day tells the day word and night announces science night. There are no words, no words whose voices are not heard. And throughout all the earth their word came out to the word of the world" (Ps. 18, 1-4).

Made up of body and soul, man stands at the midpoint of creation, uniting in himself matter and spirit, forming a connection between the two creations, spiritual and material, visible and invisible. According to St. John Chrysostom, man is composed of two substances - the visible and tangible and another rational, which relate to him both with the sky and with the earth; through his intelligent essence he communicates with the powers that are above him, and by his tangible nature he is bound up with earthly things. "The man, composed of a spiritual soul and a material body, constitutes the unique spiritual-material material psychosomatic in the world, as it was created by the free and creative will of God, a complete and new union of spirit and matter".¹³ This is the combination on which man's splendor and supremacy is based upon all visible beings of which man is distinguished by virtue of his nature and essence, being, according to the Psalmist, a little smaller than the angels, with glory and crowning honor.

The definition given by most of the dictionaries of the "person" ("individual of a human species, considered by all his physical and mental attributes, human being, ins"), but also to the "individual" ("person regarded as a distinct entity from other persons") does not cover from the Orthodox perspective any of the fundamental aspects of reality itself¹⁴.

To understand from the very beginning the distinction between the two terms must be said that unlike a person, a term that refers strictly to the meaning of man and God, the individual is a generic name, by which he can be understood a distinct unit of a species (animal or plant).

Etymologically, the word "individual" derives from the Latin equivalent in which is added the divide of the Greek word "atom" and means "indivisible", which cannot be divided. In the physical domain, the atom is considered a particle of matter that cannot be divided. In the biological field, the individual is a stand-alone unit, separated from other units that cannot be divided without ceasing to be what it is. It has life itself and is manifested in a unitary way. An individual is a quantitative notion, a number among other numbers, having no other characteristic than unity. Individuality presupposes inner unity and qualitative unity, being a qualitative unit. It shows us what distinguishes one person from another, the specific of each one, which belongs only to him and to anyone else. Every individual who comes into the world is unique, has a kind of own, no one else finds them. He is him. Human nature thus appears not only divided into a multitude of individuals viewed as numerical quantitative units, but also in an infinite variety of individualities, unique qualitative units. Individuality is a native, specific, psycho-physical structure. From the Christian point of view, this structure results from heredity, from the fact that God

¹³ Protos. Drd. Irineu Pop, *Chipul și asemănarea lui Dumnezeu – dat ontologic și misiune de realizat*, in Glasul Bisericii, anul XLVIII (1989), nr.2-3, p. 79

¹⁴ DEX, *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române*, Institutul de lingvistică „Iorgu Iordan”, 1998, p.782



creates each one with his own seal. Individuality and individuality are, however, terms that apply to animals, and unlike the animal, man is a person.

The term "person" derives from the Latin personality, which translates into a mask covering the face of artists in Antiquity when playing a role, and how the face has only masked man to understand a concrete human face, person-person, as they have translated from Latin. By the name "person" that is attributed only to man it is understood that he is a spiritual being. What makes man a person is not his body, but his spirit, which gives the psycho-physical person the character of person. When we say spirit, we understand a rational and free nature that knows itself and determines itself. But "person" means not only spirit, but also "hypostasis", that is, unity of self-standing, a whole that has its center of existence and life itself. Since "hypostasis" is the common name for all individual, rational or non-rational individual (individual hypostasis), the term "person" is used for rational, "spiritual" hypostases, and for "non-rational" individuals. Every person is a stand-alone unit (individual) and has its unique specificity among the other individuals (individuality) raised to the maximum possible degree.

The dialogue with people began God Himself when He created us creatures endowed with the capacity and duty to engage with Him and with us. Every need to communicate with each other, to talk to each other, to expect answers originates in these gifts that we have received from our Creator. The basis for the dialogue between us is the need for dialogue with Him. We cannot be without others because we cannot be without God.

In order to be able to enter into a full communion with you "I need to communicate certain meanings to you, and if you listen with understanding gain and I have a new understanding of them. I gain in depth, become transparent as a topic by penetrating your subject, or by opening your depths freely. You are my hope and my strength, you are strengthening, and I do, even by the fact that I know your hope and your strength. Your affiliation and mine to a common one makes you, when you cry out for my help, feel that something that belongs to me is in distress, and if I hit you, I shake and fuck myself something more essential than losing a good that is my exclusive ... No one can figure out how much he is worth for another, but he realizes how much another person is worth for him."¹⁵

The dialogue between person and person is under the power of God, as the One who takes care of our people and has made us so important to one another and capable of helping us and enriching our existence one by one. The human word as a means of openness and conscious and free communication is a way of strengthening and developing our nature by realizing its closeness to the infinite divine nature. The Word unites and opens people through communion. It enlarges a person's universe, opening up his or her horizon, partly apart from another person. The Word opens people to others in the light of the infinite love of One in whom there is supreme living and love.

The person is and must be the principle, subject and purpose of all social institutions. Certain societies, such as the family and the civic community, are needed. Other associations are useful both within the political community and internationally, respecting the principle of subsidiarity.

This principle indicates that a higher-level society must not intervene in the internal life of a lower-order society by depriving one of its competencies, but rather to support it if necessary.

The person is, thus, a way of existence that penetrates and makes the entire being personal. It is the subject and the bearer to whom it belongs and in which the being lives as

¹⁵ Pr. Prof. Dumitru Stăniloae, *Ascetica și mistica Bisericii Ortodoxe*, I.B.M.B.O.R., București, 2002, p. 363.



such.¹⁶ Descartes saw that the person is first of all a self-aware existence and affirmed "cogito ergo sum", that is, because I think, thinking that he understood the act of thinking as an act of the person directed at herself, so that act of self-consciousness.¹⁷

Many centuries before, the patriarch Callistus of Constantinople (14th century) exclaimed: "I love, therefore I am," showing that in communion through love, and not through Descartes' selfish individualism, every person must live its existence. The rhythm and pulse of existence comes from a mutual communication of existence through love. "The person finds sense and happiness only in the endless wealth of meanings and consequently in their infinite mutual experience and communication with other people and with the personal Word, the infinite source of all senses, the lovers of all persons in whom the meanings are embodied."¹⁸

The person, due to the inexhaustible character, proves to be an endless existence. It can never stop from its (spiritual) growth and can never cease in its communion (for others) in receiving and communicating new meanings, meanings and states of mind. He always lives infinitely, but in potency as a target to be achieved. The order and hierarchy of the community, the roles that each mortal must play, the social rank, the moral, legal rules that everybody has to respect are determined by the criterion of competence and labor. All citizens head to a good side: economic, social, moral.

The idea of a state of General Good implies that the state should not confine itself to establishing the rules of 'social play', leaving each participant alone to achieve the performance it is capable of, but to intervene directly to promote the interests of all 'players' (welfare, happiness, equality) according to their wishes, interests or needs.

3. MISSION OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE WORLD

The mission of the Church is to first preach the gospel about the man as a being created in God's image and likeness, called to be a shareholder of the Kingdom of God. In this framework, the mission of structures in the world is to take care of the human person understood as a member of society. Thus, priority for the mission of the Church is the conversion of man, and for the mission of structures in the world is the transformation of human society. These two roles do not contradict each other, but mutually cooperate in the realization of the Kingdom of Heaven.

The mission of the Church in the world is accomplished through the missionary effort of both the clergy and the laity, for the duty to confess Christ to the world has the Church in its entirety, for it is a reference to the whole community in the world. By nature, the Church is a missionary institution, because it itself originates in the mission of the Son and in the mission of the Holy Spirit, according to the plan of God the Father.

And this plan originates in the "source of love", that is, from the love of God the Father who, being the Beginning, from which the Son is born and from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son, freely creating us in the infinite and His merciful kindness, and calling us free to share with Him in His life and glory, He gladly poured out His divine goodness and did not cease to overthrow it, so that He, who is the Creator of all, in the latter, "everything in all" (I Co 15, 28), while at the same time realizing His glory and our happiness.

¹⁶ Paul Evdokimov, *Femeia și mântuirea lumii*, transl. by Gabriela Moldoveanu, Christiana, București, 1995, p. 49

¹⁷ Pr. prof. acad. dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, *Studii de teologie dogmatică*, Mitropoliei Olteniei, 1991, p. 134

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 69.



The Church - a community of faith lies on the organic unity between the Truth and the Gospel - faith: "And after hearing the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation, you believed in Him, and you were sealed with the Holy Spirit that was promised" (Ephesians 1, 13). In order to receive Christ from man, faith and repentance are demanded: "Repent and baptize each of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of sins, and receive the gift of the Holy Spirit" (Acts 2:28). Faith is the openness and grace of the divine, it is the means and the condition by which man draws near to God and works through His work in him¹⁹.

The mission, in biblical language, is related to the terms of vocation and salvation, and revolves around the verb to send. "Christ and the Church who testify Him through the preaching of the Gospel go beyond every particularity of race and nationality and therefore cannot be considered unknown anywhere and to anyone"²⁰.

The mission is a fundamental part of the being of the Church, for the preaching of the gospel of Christ to all nations and the call to "reconciliation through repentance and baptism"²¹. The pastoral mission of Church is not political, economic or social, but first of all the purpose it was set is religious, but without neglecting the political, economic and social implications of the mission, duties that can serve to build and strengthen the community of people according to the divine law.

4. THE SOCIAL MISSION OF THE CHURCH

What fundamentally distinguishes Christianity from other religions is that the notion of "neighbor" has a universal character, regardless nationality, social status, sex or religious belief. In this regard, the Apostle Paul tells us: "there is not here Jew or Greek, there is not here servant or freeman, there is not here male and female, for all you are one in Christ Jesus." (Gal. 3:28). "Learning by deeds is far more accurate and worthy of belief than word teaching. For one like this one, even silent and disobeying a word, can educate some by seeing others by hearing"²².

Every human community needs a legitimate authority to ensure order and contribute to the realization of the common good. This authority finds its foundation in human nature because it corresponds to the order established by God.

The authority is legitimately exercised when acting for the common good and to obtain it using morally permissible means. That is why political regimes must be determined by the free decision of citizens and must respect the principle of the "rule of law" in which the law is sovereign, and not the arbitrary will of the people. Unfair laws and measures contrary to moral order do not bind to consciousness.

The Church has always been concerned with the material but also the spiritual needs of the believers, viewed in the light of the religious objective it pursues. Commonly understood is the set of conditions of social life that allow groups and individuals to attain perfection.

¹⁹ Pr. prof. dr. Dumitru Radu, *Păstrarea dreptei credințe condiție a dobândirii mântuirii*, in BOR, No. 1-2, (1983), p. 51

²⁰ Pr. Dr. Gheorghe Petraru, *Dialogul interreligios în perspectiva teologiei Bisericii Ortodoxe* in: *Dialog Teologic*, Presa Buna, Iasi, 1999, p.11

²¹ Pr. Prof. Dr. Ioan Bria, , *Iisus Hristos*, Enciclopedică, București, 1992, p.254

²² Gh. D. Metallinos, *Parohia – Hristos în mijlocul nostru*, Deisis, Sibiu, 2004, p.75



Common good means: respecting and promoting the fundamental rights of the person; the development of the spiritual and temporal properties of people and society; peace and security of all.

Human communities have always included individuals who, due to genetic, material or social causes, have been unable to satisfy their needs by their own means. Along with the many means the Church has to call people to a dignified and honest life, from the earliest times, various moral and material support systems of those found in impasse, orphaned, sick, the poor, etc., who at one point need social protection so that they can be replayed to society shortly. The oldest religious societies were widows, virgins and deacons who were living to help others. The main institutions of social assistance organized by the Old Church supported the oldest families, the poor families, the orphaned or abandoned children and the elderly, by providing them with care, schooling and the appropriation of the church worship in order to socially reintegrate them.

Each person, depending on their place and role, is involved in promoting the common good, respecting the right laws and engaging in areas that require personal responsibility, such as taking care of their own family and engaging in their own work. Citizens should, as far as possible, take an active part in public life.

Society ensures social justice when respecting the dignity and rights of the individual, the very purpose of the same society. Society also pursues social justice, which is related to the common good and the exercise of authority, when it realizes the conditions that allow associations and individuals to obtain what they are entitled to.

There are unjust, economic and social inequalities that hit millions of human beings; they are in contradiction with the Gospel, contrary to righteousness, dignity, peace. But there are also differences between people caused by different factors that come into God's plan. In fact, he wants everyone to receive from others what he needs, and those who have special talents to share with others. These differences encourage and often force people to be magnificent, benevolent and share and encourage cultures to enrich each other.

Solidarity, which derives from the human and Christian fraternity, is expressed first of all in the fair distribution of goods, in the right pay for work and in the commitment to a more just social order. The virtue of solidarity also realizes the sharing of spiritual things of faith, more important than material things.

In Christianity, the love of the neighbor has a new reason: the love of God. The Savior shows that there is an indissoluble connection between God's love and the love of one's neighbor (Matthew 22: 37-39). Love of the neighbor appears as a manifestation of love for God and as an obvious proof of it. In this sense, St. John the Evangelist says, "If anyone says: I love God, and my brother hates him, he is a liar; for he who does not love his brother, whom he has seen, God whom he has not seen, cannot love Him. And this commandment we have from Him: who loves God to love his brother "(1 John 4: 20-21)²³. „Theocentrism is the fundamental characteristic of Christian love, God being love itself (1 John 4: 8), it is not isolated from people, but unanswered to spread their love over them, thus making people love Him. " ²⁴

Considering the great difficulties faced by today's Romanian society, the role of the Church is even more significant. The fulfillment of the Church's social mission to the world must involve the whole ecclesial community. In its involvement in social matters, dialogue

²³ Pr. Prof. Dumitru Stăniloae, „Să nu ucizi”, in: *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*, LXXXII, 1964, No. 3-4, pp. 203-205.

²⁴ Dimitrie Belu, *Despre iubire*, Timișoara, 1945, p. 50.



with civil society and other Churches is directly dependent on the quality of the formation of the consciences of believers, given the specific mission to the world and its realities. In this regard, the bishops need to reflect together and see if it is not the case, along with the biblical catechesis, along with liturgical catechesis, to be a social catechetical program. *Gaudium et spes* is the basic platform of such a social catechesis.

"Not only the communion and the unity of the members of each local community, but also the inter-communitarian, that the term society represents the Church's expression of the spiritual and essential organization of the life of its members and of the divine structure of its mission in the world."²⁵

In conclusion, through social concern as part of the mission of the primary Church, the communal consciousness, i.e. the ecclesial membership of the Church, is expressed, based on the equality and unity of all believers in Christ.²⁶

CONCLUSIONS

No matter how rationally evolved human society is, it does not manifest itself united because the feeling of unifying love is limited and isolated in family groups. The good seed of Christians, fraternity and love, is undoubtedly the common belief of the teaching of Christ that the true the Holy Gospels is today a model of the human being. The harmony and communion of Christian life is given by the moral virtues fulfilled by each member of the church in part with humility and obedience as the Savior says: " Greater love has no one than this: to lay down one's life for one's friends." (John 15,13). You won't be able to say, 'Here it is!' or 'It's over there!' For the Kingdom of God is already among you." (Luke 17:21) so God blesses those whose hearts are pure, for they will see God (Matthew 5, 5-9), thereby becoming the ones spreading the peace.

The Church, as the extension of the Body of Christ in the whole world, does not lead to it as a social reality, making itself felt in the world through duties and both the Church and the world are creations of God. The world is for the Church, the environment in which lives, the environment in which it accomplishes the commandments received from its Founder. The authority of the Church in the life of the city should not be perceived in the absolute sense but nuanced in the direction of the initial authority over its members, which at the same time constituted society.

But the church can and must be engaged in politics in ways and methods specific to its mission. Its role in the moral guidance is permanent, not limited to moral norms, and covering all spheres of social life, which politics is part of. The Church has the duty of creating the desire to clean the political act, the desire to cleanse it, not only on the surface, but in the profound reformation of the reorientation of priorities, in the minds and hearts, because regardless of the time preached, regardless of the historical-political conditions, the Church's discourse was delivered in aiming same direction – the love of the country, of the work of creating values, image of God.


²⁵ Christos Volugaris, *Teologia istorică a Bisericii*, Sf. Gheorghe-Vechi, București, 2001, p. 334.

²⁶ Pr. Dr. Constantin Preda, *Credința și viața Bisericii Primare. O analiză a Faptelor Apostolilor*, in: *Studii Teologice*, No. 1-2, 2002, p. 78.



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MASSES, TURBO-CAPITALISM AND POWER IN JEAN BAUDRILLARD'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ONTOTHEOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

If postmodern Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) could be defined as a theorist of power - to the extent that for some this is a contradiction by definition, although something very similar takes place in the case of Michel Foucault, he could be defined as a theorist of meta-power in the globalized era of turbo-capitalism. In his late texts (2005), which were published in 2010, the eminent French philosopher builds a provocative theory about power by using the classic concepts of domination and hegemony within the contemporary social, economic, political and ideological context of neoliberal globalization. In these papers, he analyzes in-depth the meta-power of hegemony in comparison with the power of domination. Actually, by signifying the critical passage of postwar capitalism from the phase of production to the phase of consumption, as Zygmunt Bauman does in his relevant work, Baudrillard formulates a meta-power theory as the equivalent of what he defines as turbo-capitalism. What is at stake is no longer the conventional issues of state sovereignty, Marx-inspired concept of alienation and Critical Theory-like negative dialectics but the crucial questions of hegemony, hostage and evilness. In short, Jean Baudrillard builds a new ontological and by extension disciplinary and theoretical field concerning global power, where the 'Empire of Good', or turbo-capitalism in his own terminology, is reborn in a totally catastrophic way (see simulation in the sense of a capitalist hypocrisy) either as an 'Axis of Evil' or as the 'problem of terror' (see simulacrum in the sense of a Lacanian stage of image within which turbo-capitalism represses, through a Freudian process of repelling, its unfamiliar self/i.e. uncanny, unheimlich). Despite the fact that Baudrillard has been sharply criticized for a kind of (apolitical) political pessimism, we strongly argue that, in a pure postmodern sense, Baudrillard illustrates power as a relational and absolutely dynamic, liquid and ambivalent space of antagonism, full of forces and counter-forces. In the final analysis, he approaches power as an empty space, as in the similar case of Claude Lefort, open-ended, contingent, without certainties, within an ontological, anthropological and historical context which is characterized of high risk and an abyssal post-foundationalism. In this article, we thoroughly explore this novel and innovative Baudrillardian theoretical frame of power analysis and its potentialities for a New Critical Theory in the 21st century.

Keywords: ontotheology; masses; power; turbo-capitalism; metaphysics; pataphysics:



1. METAPHYSICS, PATAPHYSICS AND THE SOCIAL AS TRANSPARENT EVIL

Jean Baudrillard is not probably a prophet of a pure theological style or a conventional fortune teller but without doubt his totally reflective thought from 1970s onwards until he passed away at the end of 2000s has a chiefly prophetic character. This is quite true, especially when we are looking for a novel and virtually radical social and political *ontotheology* which goes beyond the banalities of the mainstream politics and political thought as well. Having this concrete perspective as a basic point of theoretical and reflexive departure, in this article we perceive the famous French thinker Jean Baudrillard as an *anti-conventional* social and political philosopher who radically and thoroughly deals with the key-questions of *mass society*, (anti and/or meta)*power*, (turbo)*capitalism*, *consumerism* and by extension neoliberal *globalization* within the historical context of postwar Western societies¹.

From the very beginning of his seminal bibliography and in a clearly prophetic and sometimes nearly *messianic* (but without messianicity, in the sense of the relevant Derridean thesis)² and *eschatological* way as it is mentioned above, the prolific French (we dare say) *anti-philosopher* drew our attention on how a critical transition from *production* to *seduction* or, in a more sociologically conventional terminology, from *the political economy of commodities* to *the political economy of signs* took place throughout the postwar years in the contemporary Western societies. As it is well-known, Jean Baudrillard defined this absolutely new historical post-capitalist context using the almost *poetic* concepts of *hyperreal* and *hyperreality*³.

If we should specifically name a pioneer figure within the intellectual ranks of Continental Philosophy concerning the so-called “linguistic turn”⁴, undoubtedly this must be the French anti-philosopher Jean Baudrillard. The very crucial transition of contemporary Western societies from capitalist commodities’ period to a period of an explosive symbolic order of *empty signifiers*⁵, or whatever Jean Baudrillard termed as the *ecstasy of communication*⁶, meaning by this notion mainly the advent of *a new form of [capitalist] schizophrenia* or late capitalism itself as the pure realization of a collective schizophrenia⁷, has led to the complicated and tricky phenomenon of *turbo-capitalism*, where the traditional necessity of a revolutionary social and political *agent*, as primarily happens with the Marxist argumentation, gave its position to the controversial question of *masses* as a new paradoxical historical quasi-subject and subsequently to the relevant problem of the *end of the social*⁸.

¹ Douglas Kellner, “Theorizing Globalization”, In: Sociological Theory, No. 3, Vol. 20 (2002), pp. 285-305.

² Spiros Makris, “Politics, Ethics and Strangers in the 21st Century. Fifteen critical reflections on Jacques Derrida’s concept of hos(t)pitality”, In: Theoria & Praxis. International Journal of Interdisciplinary Thought, No. 1, Vol. 5 (2017), pp. 1-21.

³ Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988 (Edited by Mark Poster).

⁴ Michael Roberts, “Postmodernism and the linguistic turn”, In: Peter Lambert and Phillip Schofield (eds), Making History: An Introduction to the history and practices of a discipline, Routledge, Oxford and New York, 2004, p. 227.

⁵ Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s), Verso, London and New York, 1996, p. 36.

⁶ Jean Baudrillard, “The Ecstasy of Communication”, In: Hal Foster (ed.), The Anti-Aesthetic. Essays on Postmodern Culture, Bay Press, Port Townsend, Washington, 1987, pp. 126-134 (Translated by John Johnston).

⁷ Jean Baudrillard, “The Ecstasy of Communication”, In: Hal Foster (ed.), The Anti-Aesthetic. Essays on Postmodern Culture, Bay Press, Port Townsend, Washington, 1987, p. 132 (Translated by John Johnston).

⁸ Jean Baudrillard, In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 77 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).



Nevertheless and of course again in a paradoxical way, especially when we take seriously into consideration how completely paradoxical is the Baudrillardian thought as such, the end of the social in the era of masses and turbo-capitalism does not signify but the end of the human *emancipation* and/or *liberation* as the two dominant questions and/or stakes which obsessively stigmatized the historical phase of capitalist modernity not only according to the Marxists but even to the opposite philosophical terrain of radical liberalism⁹. This is how we made here the decision to both outline and classify him as the ideal personification of *anti-philosopher* within contemporary Western social and political thought. Drawing the socio-political center of gravity far beyond emancipation and liberation (and so *alienation*), actually Jean Baudrillard brings to the fore the ontotheological horizon of a new paradoxical nearly absurd metaphysics, i.e. *pataphysics*, where the social is seen as an *ecstatic* and/or explosive *reality* more real than the conventional and tangible materiality¹⁰. In this vein, it could be strongly argued that Jean Baudrillard seems like a sui generis neo-Platonic thinker in the sense that introduces a new genre of metaphysics beyond the well-known traditional one. Matthias Benzer points out that “Baudrillard plays on metaphysics without renouncing his distance from it”¹¹.

In Baudrillardian terms: “We are no longer a part of the drama of alienation; we live in the ecstasy of communication”¹². As a matter of fact, this is a new sort of drama (we dare argue here that this is the *postmodern drama* in itself) where humans are entrapped by themselves (and this is the main paradoxical ontotheological feature of the masses in the late capitalism and/or turbo-capitalism) in the political economy of the *empty* and/or *floating signifiers*. This is exactly the Baudrillardian definition of *parody*. Adopting a radical Nietzsche-like viewpoint, full of *absurdism*, *paradoxes*, *irony*, *parody*, *pastich* and *rhetorical poetics*, Jean Baudrillard draws our attention not to the typical institutional (i.e. surficial) aspects of politics (which in one way or another is the conventional wisdom of mainstream Political Science) but to the ontotheological and (in his own poetical jargon) pataphysical dimensions of *consumer society*¹³.

In affluent societies a constitutive transition takes place from exploitation and war (i.e. *domination*) to knowledge and power (i.e. *hegemony*). Nonetheless, this critical historical and chiefly socio-political transition does not mean less *violence*¹⁴. Paradoxically, and this is another one of the plenty Baudrillardian paradoxes, within this seemingly non-violent structure appears the phenomenon (or *spirit* in his own lexicon) of *terrorism* as the inner face of the whole post-capitalist system. He writes in his stunning poetic style the following: “More than violence, indeed, we should speak of virulence. This violence is viral: it operates by contagion, by chain reaction, and it gradually destroys all our immunities and

⁹ Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)*, Verso, London and New York, 1996, p. 1.

¹⁰ Jean Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art. Manifestos, Interviews, Essays, Semiotext(e)*, New York, 2005 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

¹¹ Matthias Benzer, “Metaphysics”, In: Richard G. Smith (ed.), *The Baudrillard Dictionary*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2005, p. 125.

¹² Jean Baudrillard, “The Ecstasy of Communication”, In: Hal Foster (ed.), *The Anti-Aesthetic. Essays on Postmodern Culture*, Bay Press, Port Townsend, Washington, 1987, p. 130 (Translated by John Johnston).

¹³ Jean Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society. Myths and Structures*, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1999.

¹⁴ Jean Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society. Myths and Structures*, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1999, p. 57.



our power to resist”¹⁵. In this case, Baudrillard’s pataphysical approach sounds like Hannah Arendt’s ontotheological, phenomenological and neo-republican theory about worldlessness and mass society in whatever she terms at the beginning as Totalitarianism and then as a post-Totalitarian era¹⁶.

By doing this, Jean Baudrillard throws the bright light on the critical role of *mass media* (as a poetical alliteration/parechysis of the masses) which substitute the traditional political institutions of *representation* by absorbing (like a monster; this paradoxical monster of masses or silent majorities) the social in the surface of a huge (TV-like) *screen* (that is to say *virtual reality*) which once more is ontologically, quasi-theologically and of course poetically termed with the nearly grisly concept of *transparency of evil*. Paraphrasing Baudrillard, it could be argued that media screen, as the realization of social emptiness, opens up a *hole* “in the mental universe”. It is well-known that this paradoxical hole is just the crucial point that violence, or *terror* in the Baudrillardian terminology, appears as a transparent evil in the virtual-driven era of turbo-capitalism¹⁷.

Transparency of evil must be considered as a strong metonymy of pataphysics. According to Baudrillard, pataphysics is a kind of metaphysical *emptiness*. Actually, transparency indicates first and foremost this paradoxical emptiness where everything exists as an imaginery (i.e. virtual) statement. “Pataphysics”, Jean Baudrillard writes “is the greatest temptation of the mind”¹⁸. Therefore, he argues, both exaggeration and ecstasy lead to the destruction and (in Derridean terminology) *de(con)struction* of reality. As far as the French anti-philosopher is concerned, pataphysics reveals a *gaseous* hyperreality, full of spiritual paroxysm, that looks almost like an *empty place*. We should bear in mind here that this is exactly the ontotheological way that Claude Lefort chooses to term the concept of power in the post-capitalist condition¹⁹. Above all, Jean Baudrillard points out, “there is only the pataphysic acid”²⁰.

In this respect, he adds with emphasis, pataphysics must be conceived as the “philosophy of the gaseous state”²¹. From this Baudrillardian viewpoint, everything is a tautology. It could be said that transparency, emptiness and tautology are just the poetical and rhetoric linguistic forms of an ontotheological existence without a real existent equivalent. Therefore, pataphysics seems like a “deadly narcissism, a mortal eccentricity”²². From this paradoxical ontotheological standpoint, world, capitalism, power and particularly

¹⁵ Jean Baudrillard, *The Spirit of Terrorism*, Verso, London and New York, 2012, p. 72 (Translated by Chris Turner).

¹⁶ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Schocken Books, New York, 2004; Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, Penguin Books, New York, 2006, p. 194 and Spiros Makris, “Aristotle in Hannah Arendt’s Republicanism. From homo faber to homo politicus”, In: *Annuaire International De Droits De L’ Homme*, 2015-2016, Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex, Paris: L.G.D.J. lextensoéditions, Volume IX (2017), pp. 535-563.

¹⁷ Jean Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil. Essays on Extreme Phenomena*, Verso, London and New York, 1993, p. 75 (Translated by James Benedict).

¹⁸ Jean Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art. Manifestos, Interviews, Essays, Semiotext(e)*, New York, 2005, p. 213 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

¹⁹ Claude Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 17.

²⁰ Jean Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art. Manifestos, Interviews, Essays, Semiotext(e)*, New York, 2005, p. 214 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

²¹ Jean Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art. Manifestos, Interviews, Essays, Semiotext(e)*, New York, 2005, p. 214 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

²² Jean Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art. Manifestos, Interviews, Essays, Semiotext(e)*, New York, 2005, p. 214 (Translated by Ames Hodges).



the masses are considered now by Jean Baudrillard as *kitsch* or *delirium*. “In Pataphysics”, he points out, “all phenomena are absolutely gaseous”²³. By inspiring the pataphysic paradox, Baudrillard brings to focus (through the ‘ecstasy of communication’ or in more specific terms via the total and terroristic hegemony of mass media) the important phenomenon of the *implosion* of the masses in the era of turbo-capitalism. “The pataphysics”, he poetically underlines, “is simply to burst”²⁴.

In accordance with Baudrillard, postmodern capitalist world has entered a new historical era where power is just the metonymy of a *collective suicide* or “the stage of cruelty”²⁵. More and more everything tends to be identified with this Heideggerian *nothingness* leading the silent masses until “the end of this world and of all possible worlds”²⁶. Without doubt, this is the main point that due to it lots of scholars accuse Jean Baudrillard for a cold and scary *pessimism*, a Nietzsche-like political *nihilism* or a nearly *apolitical* stance against the neocapitalist condition of structural poverty and inhumane exploitation²⁷. But as far as our interpretation is concerned, this is not the appropriate interpretation of Baudrillardian social and political thought. Baudrillard, such as his spiritual mentor Antonin Artaud, creates and uses pataphysic acid as the ontotheological and linguistic (i.e. poetical) vehicle of a sui generis *humor* that gives us the theoretical devices to de(con)struct (and thus destruct) the new signs, signifiers and also contents of hegemonic power in the era of globalized capitalism²⁸.

Hence, to sum up thus far, for the Baudrillardian masses to commit suicide means to demystify themselves. This both paradoxical and absurd self-catastrophic action of demystification is called by Baudrillard a *bloodless* process. However and despite the Nietzsche-like pessimistic character of this process, in the last analysis self-demystification could be considered as the regeneration of symbolic exchange in the deadly era of neocapitalist and/or neoliberal globalization²⁹. To put it in a nutshell, through self-demystification either individuals or especially the silent masses find out an ontotheological tactic to deal with and eventually grasp this totally new situation of post-capitalist implosion by using creatively and optimistically the humorous, parodic and finally sarcastic elements of self-assessment. Nonetheless this pataphysic method seems at first sight like a desperate

²³ Jean Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art. Manifestos, Interviews, Essays, Semiotext(e)*, New York, 2005, p. 214 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

²⁴ Jean Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art. Manifestos, Interviews, Essays, Semiotext(e)*, New York, 2005, p. 215 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

²⁵ Jean Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art. Manifestos, Interviews, Essays, Semiotext(e)*, New York, 2005, p. 215 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

²⁶ Jean Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art. Manifestos, Interviews, Essays, Semiotext(e)*, New York, 2005, p. 215 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

²⁷ Ronaldo Munck, *Marx @ 2000. Late marxist perspectives*, Zed Books, London & New York, 2000, p. 113; Paul Hegarty, “Jean Baudrillard”, In: Jon Simons (ed.), *Contemporary Critical Theorists. From Lacan to Said*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2004, p. 214; William Merrin, “Jean Baudrillard”, In: John Scott (ed.), *Fifty Key Sociologists. The Contemporary Theorists*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p. 17; Ian Buchanan, *Dictionary of Critical Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 48; Stuart Sim, *Fifty Key Postmodern Thinkers*, Routledge, London and New York, 2013, p. 31 and Razmig Keucheyan, *The Left Hemisphere. Mapping Critical Theory Today*, Verso, London and New York, 2013, p. 58.

²⁸ Jean Baudrillard, *The Agony of Power*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2010, p. 33 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

²⁹ Jean Baudrillard, *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1993 (Translated by Iain Hamilton Grant).



step towards the “path to schizophrenia”³⁰. Jean Baudrillard strongly argues that it is the only possible and perhaps efficient way to an earthly human salvation. From this perspective, if the paradoxical *theologia negativa* of pataphysics is the *self-psychoanalysis* of the masses in the era of turbo-capitalism (something like a redemptive *seduction*) then Baudrillard must be perceived also as a neo-Freudian ontotheological thinker³¹. In any case, both salvation and redemption as metonymies of self-seduction pave the way to a further analysis of Baudrillardian thought from the apocalyptic and messianic perspective of a negative theology in the *sui generis* poetical style of Franz Rosenzweig and Walter Benjamin³².

2. THE IMPLOSION OF THE MASSES, HEGEMONY AND THE PARADOX OF SELF-TERRORISM

As far as Jean Baudrillard is concerned, from now on politics do not concern either the phenomenon of political representation or the question of revolutionary agency but the pataphysic manner within which the masses are transformed, through the mass media channels and the ecstasy of communication process, into a *hyperreal space of perfect crime*, that is to say the paradoxical space of self-de(con)struction or self-implosion. In this radical, ontotheological and poetical, framework, the French anti-philosopher resolves efficiently the traditional dualistic problem of *good/evil* or *reality/illusion* by providing an absolutely novel metaphysics or *anti-metaphysics*, i.e. pataphysics, in which the reality is nothing but a form of *illusion*³³.

“Events, real events”, he emphatically points out, “will not even have time to take place. Everything will be preceded by its virtual realization. We are dealing with an attempt to construct an entirely positive world, expurgated of every illusion, of every sort of evil and negativity, exempt from death itself. This pure, absolute reality, this unconditional realization of the world—this is what I call the Perfect Crime (...) The situation is not simply contradictory or irrational—it is paradoxical. Beyond the end, beyond all finality, we enter a paradoxical state” where the excess of reality puts as a matter of fact an end to reality in itself; the excess of information puts an end to information and above all the excess of (especially human) communication puts an end to communication as such. Paradoxically, in this new ontotheological condition of turbo-capitalism and (a both powerful and powerless) hegemony, according to Jean Baudrillard, we do not suffer of a critical lack of reality but exactly from the opposite: we suffer of its critical self-fatal implosion³⁴.

Baudrillard, in his astonishing poetic prosa and in purely Nietzschean terms, further claims that:

“the world would be a perfect crime, that is, a crime without a criminal, without a victim and without a motive (...) the perfection of the crime lies in the fact that it has always-already been accomplished – *perfectum*. A misappropriation of the world as it is, before it even shows itself. It will never, therefore, be discovered. There will be no Last

³⁰ Jean Baudrillard, *The Conspiracy of Art. Manifestos, Interviews, Essays, Semiotext(e)*, New York, 2005, p. 216 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

³¹ Jean Baudrillard, *Seduction*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990 and Richard J. Lane, Jean Baudrillard, London and New York, Routledge, 2001, p. 16.

³² Franz Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005; Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, The Bodley Head, London, 2015 and Richard J. Lane, Jean Baudrillard, London and New York, Routledge, 2001, p. 105.

³³ Jonathan Smith, “Perfect Crime”, In: Richard G. Smith (ed.), *The Baudrillard Dictionary*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2005, pp. 152-155.

³⁴ Jean Baudrillard, *The Vital Illusion*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, pp. 65-67.



Judgment to punish or pardon it. There will be no end, because things have always-already happened. Neither resolution nor absolution, but inevitable unfolding of the consequences. Precession of the original crime which we might perhaps be said to find in the derisory form in the current precession of simulacra. After that, our destiny is the accomplishment of this crime, its inexorable unfolding, the continuity of the evil, the continuation of the nothing. We shall never experience the primal scene, but at every moment we experience its prolongation and its expiation. There is no end to this and the consequences are incalculable (...) This is the form the mystery takes”.

And by paraphrasing both Parmenides and Martin Heidegger, he concludes: “The great philosophical question used to be ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ Today, the real question is: ‘Why is there nothing than something?’”³⁵.

Therefore, it goes without saying, that the end of the social, as far as Jean Baudrillard is concerned, does not signify only *the loss of* [the traditional version of] *politics*, but in a sense the end of the well-known capitalist modernity in itself. In this regard, turbo-capitalism, as the fundamental ontotheological and social form of the so called *hyperpolitics*, leads straight to the paradoxical *chaos* and *abyss* of *self-terrorism*. To cut a long story short, the French anti-philosopher primarily argues that “the social itself has died before having given up its secret”³⁶. This is a very critical turning point in Baudrillardian ontotheological analysis having regard to the political modernity because actually he strongly declares the impossibility of *revolution* and *socialism* and mainly the definite end of *class struggle* and *proletariat*. All these ideas and agencies of modern capitalism now are replaced by the paradoxical and hyperreal (self-catastrophic) ‘monster’ of the (loudly silent) masses³⁷.

At the ontotheological epicenter of this new *hypersocial* human condition is located the chaotic and abyssal phenomenon of a hegemonic power that simply guides the masses at the self-catastrophic *moment* of implosion. Thus, if both hegemony and masses represent a new *duality* or a new *Manichaeism*, undoubtedly this is a quasi-ontotheological duality where the traditional one-dimensional scene of the global History is transformed into a long and huge pataphysic *continuum*, without concrete poles, having the parodic and sarcastic form of an implosive polarity. It is well-known that in pure Baudrillardian terms this new *postmodern* (or *post-capitalist*) *condition* is considered as an *abyss of meaning*³⁸ where the pessimistic and hopeless loss of any *eschatological faith* is replaced by a fatal polarity between masses and terrorism³⁹. “In their triangular affinity”, Baudrillard points out, “the masses, the media and terrorism describe the presently prevailing process of implosion (...) For us today”, he continues in a purely messianic and no doubt prophetic jargon both in the sense of a new *theologia negativa*, “implosion can only be violent and catastrophic because it comes from the *failure* of the system of explosion [that is the system of political

³⁵ Jean Baudrillard, *The Perfect Crime*, Verso, London and New York, 1996, pp. 1-2 (Translated by Chris Turner).

³⁶ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 94 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

³⁷ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, pp. 91-93 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

³⁸ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 40 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

³⁹ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 67 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).



modernity] and of organized expansion which has predominated in the West now for a few centuries’⁴⁰.

Following in this great and innovative reflexive tradition which ranges from Rosa Luxemburg to Jürgen Habermas footsteps⁴¹, Baudrillard sees in the paradoxical phenomenon of mass (self)terrorism not merely the end of the social but virtually the self-catastrophic end of modern capitalist *expansion* itself. In this specific respect, turbo-capitalism represents the critical ontotheological moment of the absolute colonization of *lifeworld* by the hegemonic system. Although at a first sight this new historical conjuncture looks like the ideal moment of the arrogant neoliberal triumph (i.e. the ‘Fukuyama syndrome’)⁴², actually, for the anti-philosopher Jean Baudrillard, that is to say for this sceptical and anti-conventional spirit, this moment in fact signifies the moment that global neocapitalism has conquered everything (violently or not) and because of this has reached its deep ontotheological limits⁴³.

As always, Baudrillard illustrates this new, we dare say, *posthuman condition* with an excellent almost poetic prosa:

“Our ‘modern’ civilizations”, he writes, “have existed on a base of expansion and explosion at all levels, under the sigh of universalized commerce, of economic and philosophical investments, under the sign of universal law and conquest. Undoubtedly, even they have known how to survive, for a time at least, on a *controlled explosion*, on a liberation of subdued and progressive energy, and this was the golden age of their culture. But, according to a process of boom and acceleration, this explosive process has become uncontrollable, it has acquired a fatal speed of amplitude, or rather it has reached the limits of the universal, it has saturated the field of possible expansion and, just as primitive societies were ravaged by explosion for not knowing how to curb the implosive process any longer, so our culture begins to be ravaged by implosion for not having known how to curb and equilibrate the explosive process”⁴⁴.

Hence, for Baudrillard, the phenomenon of global terrorism must be seen as the heyday of turbo-capitalism. In other words, even though it is obviously a tragic fact with catastrophic implications for the contemporary societies, at the same time, at the symbolic level, as the first mark of a process of symbolic exchange that has restarted⁴⁵, could be considered in Aristotelian terms as a *cathartic* event giving the global masses the chance for *self-reflection* and *self-awareness*. So, hegemonic power loses its traditional primacy and actually is transformed into the vehicle for a world that symbolically explodes from inside (i.e. implosion). As it is known quite well, the eminent French anti-philosopher did not face the thorny and controversial question of global terrorism as a typical socio-political problem in the postmodern era both of *globalization* and radicalization of religious *fundamentalism* but first and foremost as an ontotheological, existential and metaphysical question par

⁴⁰ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 73 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

⁴¹ Spiros Makris, “European Demos, Citizenship and Migrants in a Globalized World. Some Critical Reflections from a Habermasian Perspective”, In: Marco Caselli and Guia Gilardoni (eds), *Globalization, Supranational Dynamics and Local Experiences*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2018, pp. 87-107.

⁴² David M. Kotz, *The Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capitalism*, Harvard University Press, USA, 2015, p. 201.

⁴³ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, pp. 66-73 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

⁴⁴ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 74 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

⁴⁵ Jean Baudrillard, *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 1993 (Translated by Iain Hamilton Grant).



excellence, in the sense that he chiefly argues that the *spirit of terrorism* itself signifies the end of the social per se⁴⁶. Masses are exploding from within not so as the result of either *subordination* or *exploitation* or *alienation* (which is the typical Marxist approach) but because they reach, through the ecstasy of communication, to the paradoxical condition of absolute transparency of a tautological evil. When the world meaning is empty of any content, the medium itself (i.e. the masses) willingly goes towards self-de(con)struction and in the last analysis self-implosion.

From this point of view, mass terrorism could be perceived whether as the metonymy of the masses or the metonymy of a capitalist system of domination which by trying to hegemonize upon everything comes to this acid situation of self-catastrophe. Terrorism, for Baudrillard, looks like a pataphysic *virus* that contaminates everything. In a poetic manner, the French anti-philosopher illustrates terrorism either as a *double agent* of global capitalism or like its deadly *shadow*. There is no longer a clear and obvious demarcation line between terrorism and hegemonic system. “It is at the very heart of this culture which combats it (...) That system”, he clarifies with emphasis, “can face down any visible antagonism. But against the other kind, which is viral in structure (...) against that form of almost automatic reversion of its own power, the system can do nothing. And terrorism is the shock wave of this silent reversion”⁴⁷.

To put it simply, this radical development means that to the extent that violence contaminates everything seemingly there is no longer violence. Nonetheless, *transparency of evil* or the visibility of an invisible pataphysic virus is finally the failure of the hegemonic system itself which leads almost deterministically to the fatal moment of mass implosion. However, is it really a fatal outcome or Jean Baudrillard provides us just with an awful sociological view of the so-called turbo-capitalism? Without doubt, this is a significant question that is raised especially by those scholars who strongly criticize Jean Baudrillard for *political pessimism* and *apolitical stance* in general. As mentioned above, the mainstream academic critique against pataphysic argumentation about the ontotheological status of contemporary society and politics is that Baudrillard must be perceived as an entirely apolitical and furthermore pessimist thinker. If we accept this approach, it is probable to miss the critical point concerning Baudrillardian thought as a conceptual and theoretical whole. For this reason and in order to constructively deal with this problématique, it is worth arguing here that he must not be classified on the basis of the ordinary case of social and political nihilism. Choosing the method of pataphysics and by extension the onto-theological form of *simulacra*, Jean Baudrillard brings to the fore a new genre of nihilism in which the simulated transparency of the masses (and so of the evil) is invested in the implosive condition of *melancholia* (Baudrillard, 1994: 162)⁴⁸.

According to Jean Baudrillard, social and political melancholia is actually the paradoxical, implosive and cruel systemic (i.e. the hegemonic system against itself) displeasure in the dark and gloomy age of turbo-capitalism. Chiefly, it concerns the phenomenon that he terms as *the abyss of meaning*⁴⁹. “Melancholia”, Baudrillard stresses,

⁴⁶ Jean Baudrillard, *The Spirit of Terrorism*, Verso, London and New York, 2012 (Translated by Chris Turner).

⁴⁷ Jean Baudrillard, *The Spirit of Terrorism*, Verso, London and New York, 2012, p. 8 (Translated by Chris Turner).

⁴⁸ Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994, p. 162 (Translated by Sheila Faria Glaser).

⁴⁹ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 40 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).



“is the fundamental tonality (...) of current systems of simulation, of programming and information. Melancholia is the inherent quality of the mode of the disappearance of meaning, of the mode of the volatilization of meaning in operational systems (...) we are all melancholic. Melancholia is the brutal disaffection that characterizes our saturated systems”⁵⁰.

Hence, we must take seriously into consideration the fact that this Baudrillard-inspired human condition of melancholia is neither a pure romanticist feeling nor a simple pessimistic attitude. In effect, melancholia is the metonymy of neocapitalist implosion. In other words, it must be perceived as the point zero of the social itself, when the transparent masses, being emptied from any political representation and ideological meaning, via an infinite colonial-like expansion, in the sense of a capitalist system that accelerates without any ethical restrictions (i.e. turbo-capitalism), finally end in the pataphysic situation of an energetic *impasse*; an explosive *inertia*; which both are hypostasized in the marginal ontotheological and phenomenological event of a tragic (or cathartic in the optimistic case scenario) existential self-disappearance. It is worth noting here that paradoxically the moment in which the hegemonic system feels so strong, at the same moment, paraphrasing Cornelius Castoriadis expression: “it reminds us that we forever live at the edge of the Abyss”⁵¹. In this vein, turbo-capitalism step by step approaches the edge of chaos; that is to say little by little enters into the post-foundational specter of self-dissolution⁵².

Considered from this point of view, melancholia *à la* Baudrillard could be seen as the pataphysic, paradoxical and parodic (the three ‘P’s) realization of neo-capitalist *entropy* per se. In particular, melancholia of the masses denotes just this paradoxical situation of the powerful but saturated system of turbo-capitalism in the ontotheological moment of its implosive *self-aphanisis*. Psychoanalytically speaking, it must be considered as the disappearance of any kind of desire. In other words, for Baudrillard, it clearly brings to the fore the disappearance of the social subject itself. This is exactly the paradox of *pataphysic melancholia*. The most explosive moment of the masses represents at the same time the moment of their self-de(con)struction. Actually, this is the only ontotheological way to the social and political regeneration. The masses have to pay the price of a total entropy of the hegemonic system. So, it could be argued here that although masses, mass media and melancholia (the three ‘M’s) construct a kind of *hyperfinality*, that the hegemonic system of turbo-capitalism creates on its own; by its suicide; by terrorizing itself; Baudrillard steadily believes that this systemic nihilism, in the sense of a *social void*; as a *gigantic black hole*; in the final analysis tragically undermines the hegemonic power until its final implosion and breakdown⁵³.


This is exactly the precise meaning of this paradoxical, ontological, theological and in the last analysis symbolical situation that the eminent French anti-philosopher terms as *fatal strategies*, which is a combination or an intersection of ecstasy,

⁵⁰ Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994, p. 50 (Translated by Sheila Faria Glaser).

⁵¹ Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1997, p. 346 (Translated by David Ames Curtis).

⁵² Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994, p. 163 (Translated by Sheila Faria Glaser).

⁵³ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 36 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).



inertia and irony⁵⁴. At the epicenter of fatal strategies, Baudrillard poses *the principle of Evil*⁵⁵: a delirious world, i.e the masses in the era of turbo-capitalism and hegemonic power, which transforms, ironically, parodically and sarcastically, its *voluntary servitude* or *obedience* into a self-de(con)structive *disobedience*. Evil is just the critical ontotheological moment that silent masses (supposedly the absolute subject) become the absolute *object*. To put it differently, in the era of hyperreality, masses cease to be a social or a political *subject* in the conventional sense and become the fatality of the capitalist system itself⁵⁶.

With his own words, Baudrillard is entirely clear and apocalyptic (here also with the messianic and eschatological sense of the word) by disclosing the (hyper)real content of power and politics in the era of turbo-capitalism. “We confuse”, he writes, “the fatal with the resurgence of the repressed (desire as that which is inescapable), but the order of fatality is antithetical to that of repression. It is not desire that we cannot escape, but the ironic presence of the object, its indifference, and its indifferent interconnections, its challenge, its seduction, its violation of the symbolic order (therefore of the subject’s unconscious as well, if it had one). In short, it is the principle of Evil we cannot escape”⁵⁷. Actually, we cannot escape ourselves (that is to say our evil self). Everything now is transparent. In this respect, Jean Baudrillard introduces a Spinoza-like social and political ontotheology in which the masses, i.e. the Spinozian *multitude*, are the *pure objectivity* itself. In other words, the masses, or the *silent majorities*, as Baudrillard alternatively name them, are the real Hobessian *sovereign*: in other words an objectivity *irreconcilable, immanent* and *enigmatic*⁵⁸.

In this new global situation of today, as it is apparently illustrated by Jean Baudrillard, especially in his seminal book “In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities” (Baudrillard, 2007)⁵⁹, having as an almost fatal data the fact of the lack of any political representation or social agency, turbo-capitalism leads hegemonic power to the pataphysic human condition of an ontotheological and further symbolic lethargy. In Nietzsche’s lexicon, this could be perceived as the pure definition of tragic *irony*. To put it another way, this could be considered as a postmodern parody which neocapitalist modernity gives birth itself. In accordance with the eminent French anti-philosopher, silent majorities in the era of ecstasy of communication denote not just a typical capitalist contradiction (in Marxian terms) or a political dialectics (in Hegelian lexicon) but the ontotheological and rhetoric transparency of the hegemonic system itself⁶⁰.

This new capitalist system, full of simulacra and *simulations*, running straight to Nowhere as a gigantic collective turbo-consumer, is no longer characterized by the well-known traditional concrete ideological and/or ethical binary poles (e.g. left/right, right/wrong etc.). By contrast, it constitutes only an unstoppable cyclical polarity looking like the

⁵⁴ Jean Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 25 and p. 97 (Translated by Philippe Beitchman & W. G. J. Niesluchowski).

⁵⁵ Jean Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 219 (Translated by Philippe Beitchman & W. G. J. Niesluchowski).

⁵⁶ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 55 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

⁵⁷ Jean Baudrillard, *Selected Writings*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 199 (Edited by Mark Poster).

⁵⁸ Jean Baudrillard, *Selected Writings*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 199 (Edited by Mark Poster).

⁵⁹ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

⁶⁰ Jean Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil. Essays on Extreme Phenomena*, Verso, London and New York, 1993, p. 78 (Translated by James Benedict).



Nietzschean process of *eternal return*⁶¹. As far as Jean Baudrillard is concerned, and without doubt this must be considered as his fundamental thesis on both the nature and function of hegemonic power in the age of globalization, by creating the silent *masses*, the capitalist system creates virtually the preconditions of its implosion; its decadence; its collapse. Actually, from this viewpoint, the French anti-philosopher, as a Marx's specter that perpetually haunts us in the late modernity, implicitly argues, of course in his quite poetic and at the same time, theologically speaking, messianic and eschatological vocabulary, that postmodern capitalism, in the final analysis, creates its gravedigger: "The development of large-scale industry", Marx aphoristically points out, "pulls from under the feet of the bourgeoisie the very foundations on which they produce goods and appropriate them. Above all it produces its own gravediggers"⁶².

Therefore, melancholia, apathy and inertia of the silent masses must be seen as the very critical moments of this hegemonic system of power, that is to say turbo-capitalism and its fatal strategies, which more and more, within a cyclic process of fatal overextensions (as in the case of the colonization of the lifeworld by the system in Jürgen Habermas's approach), tends to an enormous implosion which will destroy its hegemony and perhaps the world itself (obviously, this is the ecological aspect of the Baudrillardian *theologia negativa* in the sense of the Coppola's 'Apocalypse Now')⁶³. By echoing to an extent the sound of conventional revolution, Baudrillard defines this new social and political condition as *involution*⁶⁴. In fact, the masses freeze the entire neocapitalist system. In the era of hyperreality, there are no longer social subjects or political agents. In contrast, there is only the object of the masses as a sui generis terroristic ghost (by reminding us once more the awful Marxian specter of communism) against the hegemonic power⁶⁵. Following in closely the writing style of the Baudrillardian ontotheological poetics footsteps, it could be said here that this development in the late modernity is not but the other Hamletian face of the inhumane neocapitalist system as it is reflected in the transparent mirror of both Good and Evil.

As we have seen above, the traditional metaphysics of the social paves the way to a radical, ontotheological and rhetoric, theory of imaginary, i.e. pataphysics, to remember only Cornelius Castoriadis's relevant notion. From now on, everything is possible and at the same time everything is quite impossible. Humor, fascination and seduction reveal (in the sense of an apocalyptic revelation without Messiah) the novel phenomenon of *hyperpolitics* as the *transpolitical of hyperconformity*⁶⁶. Nevertheless, paradoxically and against the conventional wisdom, for Baudrillard, hyperconformity signifies a new kind of *resistance* beyond the mainstream eschatological narratives of emancipation, liberation and alienation (i.e. *theologia positiva*). By doing this, the French anti-philosopher builds a sort of *theologia*

⁶¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Penguin Books, London and New York, 1969, p. 176 (Translated by R. J. Hollingdale).

⁶² Karl Marx, *Later Political Writings*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 12 (Edited and translated by Terrell Carver).

⁶³ Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994, p. 59 (Translated by Sheila Faria Glaser).

⁶⁴ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 67 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

⁶⁵ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 122 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

⁶⁶ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 62 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).



negativa according to which the crucial matter is no longer the class struggle but the inherently entropic nature of the turbo-capitalism itself.

Although there is a strong impression that Jean Baudrillard in his provocative essay “Forget Foucault” rejects Michel Foucault’s theory of power as an abyssal system of actions and reactions⁶⁷, in fact, it could be strongly argued that he leads this Foucauldian approach to its ontotheological and symbolic limits by turning both turbo-capitalism and *hegemony* into a thick space of networks and mass media within which the acceleration and proliferation of the gigantic social energy (i.e. meaning itself as a pure object) tends to negate and neutralize every form of hegemonic power. In this vein, as in the case of Foucault, Baudrillard could be reasonably characterized as a theoretician of *anti-(and/or meta)-power* in the era of globalization.

Hence, if we ought to sum up thus far this Baudrillardian pataphysic account of anti-meta-power, it could be said that this theoretical approach, just opposite to the modern Marxist or even liberal approaches of emancipation, liberation and alienation, in which either a revolutionary social agent or a liberating political agency is placed at the heart of social and political process, perceives human resistance as an entropic byproduct of the hegemonic system itself and vice versa⁶⁸. Therefore, against the strong seduction that causes people the ecstasy of communication and by extension the hyperconformity of turbo-capitalism, the seemingly silent masses, as the pure objectification of the implosion of the social, refuse both passively (involution) and actively (revolution) any total manipulation either from neocapitalist markets and the relevant marketing projects or from hegemonic powers or in the last analysis from any branch of the hegemonic system and its dominant signifiers.

For Jean Baudrillard, the masses connote the doubling logic of a hegemonic neocapitalist system which, as a transparent mirror of Evil, reflects itself by absorbing any kind of socio-political representation or agency. This abyssal polarity opens up a new ontotheological and symbolic space of reality, or the space of a new reality, more real than the real, i.e. hyperreal, where power as hyperpolitics or as a transpolitical spectral entity is simultaneously a kind of anti-meta-power. Both power and the masses, as a mythical Janus, poetically speaking, look as a double-faced Hamletian specter which enters into the scene of the History as a twofold actor either in order to hegemonize over the masses or (and this is the innovative and provocative part of Baudrillard’s anti-meta-power theory) to be put under question by the masses: in pure Shakespearean terms to be put ‘out of joint’. In this perspective, the masses are not a typical passive subject (i.e. object) but a pataphysic entity which has the ability to open up some *cracks* in the hegemonic capitalist system; to de(con)struct it; and by doing this either to cause some important reformations or even its breakdown. This is why, as aforementioned, Jean Baudrillard’s pessimism is not a mainstream theoretical approach but an entire anti-philosophical interpretation of the late modernity as a whole⁶⁹.

3. THE AGONY OF HEGEMONIC POWER OR THE ABYSSAL POWER OF HUMAN AGONY

This Baudrillardian ontotheology of anti-meta-power, which in conventional jargon could be seen as a radical theory of *civil disobedience* in the era of neoliberal globalization⁷⁰,

⁶⁷ Jean Baudrillard, *Forget Foucault*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007 (Translated by Nicole Dufresne).

⁶⁸ Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 102 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

⁶⁹ Paul Hegarty, *Jean Baudrillard. Live Theory*, Continuum, London, New York, 2004, p. 155.

⁷⁰ Hannah Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., New York, 1972, p. 49.



finally is summarized by the late Baudrillard in a couple of critical texts that the French anti-philosopher wrote about 2005 and which, in 2010, three years after he has passed away, they published under the semiologic and enlightening title “The Agony of Power”⁷¹. In a pataphysic sense, anti-power means, in the last analysis, the agony of power or, in other words, the abyssal power of human agony itself in the era of late neocapitalism. Paradoxically, although current global power or hegemony no longer denotes a world of dominators and dominated people (as in the previous case of *dominion*)⁷², hegemonic capitalist power becomes more and more ambiguous, unstable and agonizing in a very deadly way. According to Baudrillardian lesson, that must be taught carefully, this desperate hegemonic power does not need to be undermined from outside, i.e. revolution or explosion, a Lenin-like frontal attack against Versailles, because, ontologically, theologically and poetically speaking, it is an abyssal entropic form of a power/anti-power nature which is quite possible to be overturned from inside, i.e. involution and implosion⁷³.

According to Jean Baudrillard, the advent of hegemony instead of domination (see the Figure below) must be considered as “a triple jump, a three-part sacrifice” that both dramatically and in a redemptive manner (as God’s redeeming grace) overturn the traditional economic, political and philosophical illusions of Western modernity itself. It is worth reminding here that the French anti-philosopher perceives *virtuality* as a critical kind of ‘integral reality’ that dispels modern illusions forever. In this vein, Baudrillardian simulacra must be seen as a positive sense of illusion⁷⁴:

“1) Capital surpasses itself and turns against itself in the sacrifice of value (the economic illusion). 2) Power turns against itself in the sacrifice of representation (the democratic illusion). 3) The entire system turns against itself in the sacrifice of reality (the metaphysical illusion)”⁷⁵.

Domination as a model of power	Hegemony as a model of anti-meta-power
A master-slave relationship	No longer dominants and dominated, but a kind of an-nex-ation, i.e. nexus (=networks). Everybody is trapped in the network and submits to this hegemony
That is to say a dual relationship	Now, everyone is an accomplice. The end of We are both victims and accomplices
A symbolic model of power. It has an exterior character, i.e. representation	Hegemony is within us (internalisation)
Possibilities: explosion, revolution, alienation, dis-alianation	Hegemony uses complicity to lower individuals and their desires and so devaluing them even more. Nevertheless, we are no alienated in the conventional sense. Alienation is no longer the dominant problem (Marxism).


⁷¹ Jean Baudrillard, *The Agony of Power*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2010 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

⁷² Jean Baudrillard, *The Agony of Power*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2010, p. 33 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

⁷³ Richard G. Smith (ed.), *The Baudrillard Dictionary*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2005, p. 105.

⁷⁴ William Pawlett, “Illusion”, In: Richard G. Smith (ed.), *The Baudrillard Dictionary*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2005, p. 99.

⁷⁵ Jean Baudrillard, *The Agony of Power*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2010, p. 41 (Translated by Ames Hodges).



	However, we still suffer. We suffer from an irreversible vertigo. We are drawn to the black hole. This black hole is called by Baudrillard ‘integral reality’. It is both destructive and redeeming
Agonistic or active optimism (political engagement)	No hope for any socio-political resistance. Passive behaviour or pessimism (apolitical attitude) is coming to the fore as an implosive involution and/or inertia.
Domination phase	Hegemony is the next phase of domination. Actually, hegemony brings domination, and therefore alienation, to an end
Evil	Good (as an Evil which speaks about Itself)

Figure: From domination to hegemony in the era of turbo-capitalism⁷⁶

Within the Baudrillardian pataphysical poetics, this agony of power is described as a rough and tough process of both *cannibalization* and *carnivalization*; a quasi-ritual *orgy*, i.e. turbo-capitalism and hegemony, where every meaning, every representation, every socio-political agent or every symbol is liquidated *as if* a paradoxical kind, both destructive and constructive, of an ontotheological sacrifice in the suicidal Minotaur of power⁷⁷. Therefore, mockery, irony, masquerade, cynicism and parody are the main expressions of this neocapitalist social void where not only the capital and the power but the entire system turns against itself by sacrificing the Real per se. If this approach is an ironic return to the Platonic transcendence then this ‘perfect crime’, which is the disappearance of reality itself, could be conceived as “Baudrillard’s version of the death of god” not in the conventional subjective sense of Nietzsche but through “an objective and (...) autonomous process, the ‘destiny of the object’. There remains, one might say, the ‘real’ process through which the real has disappeared (...) What we used to call history and society have themselves become simulacra. This is why, for Baudrillard”, Andrew Wernick points out, “the old project of liberation and transformation, together with all critical efforts [he means apparently ‘Critical Theory’] to unmask the real, have become meaningless. Needed rather are ‘fatal strategies’ (...) which challenge the system to challenge itself”⁷⁸.

By liquidating (to note here only Zygmunt Bauman’s relevant problématique of liquidity) the traditional economic, democratic and metaphysical illusions, both turbo-capitalism and hegemonic power lead to the end of the social and the political which are redefined by Baudrillard as a shadow; as a hyperspace; or as a hegemonic form, i.e. the Real that represents itself as a Virtual. By refusing itself, power is at the same time a form of anti-meta-power. As it is well-known, Baudrillard presents this paradoxical transformation of reality into hyperreality in the late modernity of turbo-capitalism under the allegorical name of *white terror* (i.e. the Janus face of Good and Evil)⁷⁹. Hence, beyond Good and Evil, this

⁷⁶ Jean Baudrillard, *The Agony of Power*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2010, pp. 33-56 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

⁷⁷ Jean Baudrillard, *Carnival and Cannibal*, Seagull Books, London and New York, 2010 and Ross Abbinnett, “Carnival and Cannibal”, In: *Theory, Culture and Society*, No. 4, Vol. 28 (2011), pp. 145-156.

⁷⁸ Andrew Wernick, “Real”, In: Richard G. Smith (ed.), *The Baudrillard Dictionary*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2005, pp. 180-181.

⁷⁹ Jean Baudrillard, *The Agony of Power*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2010, p. 59 (Translated by Ames Hodges).



hyperreal world power is a Nietzsche-inspired negative ontotheology of social and political power (i.e. *ontologia* and *theologia negativa*) where the desire of hegemonic power, or, in other words, the so-called ‘will of power’ in the Nietzschean philosophy, leads messianically and eschatologically speaking to her agonizing self-destruction (i.e. the agony of power itself). In accordance with Baudrillard’s own poetical and deconstructive prose

“Negativity reemerges as irony, mocking and auto-liquidation internal to power. This is how the slave devours and cannibalizes the Master from the inside. As power absorbs the negative, it is devoured by what it absorbs. There is justice in reversibility. A catastrophic dialectic has replaced the ‘work of the negative’”⁸⁰.

White terrorism is that kind of terrorism which the state power produces itself in the era of turbo-capitalism, hegemony, transpolitics and transparency of evil. As far as Baudrillard is concerned, this form of hegemonic neocapitalism or turbo-capitalism is a kind of anti-meta-power or a kind of transpolitical capitalism which has been intoxicated by its *empty signifiers*⁸¹. This is the historical moment of the absolute emptiness of politics or the aestheticization of traditional political representation and symbolical exchange. So to the extent that politics is no longer a process of political struggle and adversary, it has been transformed into a game of transparent goodness, i.e. a goodness without Good. Put it simply, according to Baudrillard, insofar as Evil has given its position to transparent good, transpolitics finds in the hyperreal specter of white terrorism its absolute simulacrum. In the pataphysic era of turbo-capitalism and transpolitics, terrorism is the apotheosis (or deification) of hyperreality, virtual reality and above all liquidation of every symbolical representation. 9/11 and onwards, turbo-capitalism must be seen as a kind of self-terrorism. The aestheticization of terrorism via mass media and ‘TV reality’ paved the way for the advent of post-Totalitarian era. Terrorism becomes the kernel of transpolitics. Everything has been contaminated by the empty signifier of terrorism. ‘Every extension of hegemony’, Baudrillard writes in a prophetic, messianic and eschatological sense, ‘is also an extension of terror (...) All global culture is cannibalized by terror, by the discourse of terror’⁸².

To put it another way, it could be said that *metapolitics* itself is a kind of terrorism. Hegemony is just the virtual and aesthetical surface of this post-Totalitarian world. Terrorism means first and foremost the terrorization of people via mass media, televisions, social networks etc. Ontotheological speaking, the whole thing looks like a postmodern Apocalypse. For Jean Baudrillard, the transparency of evil in the post-Totalitarian world mainly signifies the passage from a master-slave model of power (i.e. domination) to a novel mode of subjection (i.e. hegemony) in which the peoples are accomplices with their self-destruction. Probably, this is not the typical category of Marxian alienation, but a *transpolitical liquidation* of any traditional political representation and symbolization where politics is defined as a *sui generis* passive and at the same time implosive action of *self-cannibalization*. Albert Camus defines this paradoxical situation as a true ontotheological event in which human comes to power in a state of *self-apotheosis* through a *metaphysical rebellion*⁸³.

⁸⁰ Jean Baudrillard, *The Agony of Power*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2010, p. 59 (Translated by Ames Hodges).

⁸¹ Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)*, Verso, London and New York, 1996, p.

⁸² Jean Baudrillard, *The Agony of Power*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2010, p. 94 and p. 96 respectively (Translated by Ames Hodges).

⁸³ Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, Penguin Books, London and New York, 2000, p. 29 (Translated by Anthony Bower).



This is the moment, in which the people, in a Machiavellian, Spinozian or Lefortean sense⁸⁴, is entering into the pataphysical spectrum of self-destruction (i.e. Spinoza's 'conatus' or, otherwise, these Freudian drives and/or instincts of eros and death)⁸⁵. It goes without saying that this is a paradoxical kind of power, both passive and active, both Good and Evil, entirely transparent, where the fatal strategy and/or condition of self-terrorism dominates. Both turbo-capitalism and transpolitics, as far as Jean Baudrillard is concerned, must be seen as the realized metonymy of the empty signifier of self-terrorism (i.e. white terrorism). The critical question that arises here is whether this is a typical Left-driven social analysis, or, as lots of Baudrillard's critics accuse him, it is the typical expression of radical conservatism, i.e. a sophisticated and elegant Nietzsche-inspired pessimism? In other words, what is at stake is whether the people can efficiently resist against itself. Hence, the significant issue of politics in the era of turbo-capitalism is not about of 'what is to be done' but 'who is going to do it'⁸⁶. From this viewpoint, transpolitics in the era of hegemony continues to remain a question of *agency*⁸⁷.

In this Baudrillardian grotesque-like transpolitical theory of anti-meta-power, even in an indirect way, the French anti-philosopher poses or, even better, raises the critical and sometimes thorny question of agency. To put it differently, Baudrillard brings to light the loss of political subject in the era of turbo-capitalism, transpolitics and transparency of symbolical exchange. Hence, politics is defined as *transpolitics* chiefly because lacks every characteristic of *activity* and by extension of *symbolical representation*. In fact, the citizens have been trapped into the broken mirror of simulacra and simulation. From a psychoanalytic point of view, the Lacanian 'mirror stage' (*stade du miroir*) has never led to the stage of political symbolization⁸⁸. The empty mirror of anti-meta-power indicates the *emptiness of agency* in the period of transpolitics. In this regard, it could be claimed that the late Baudrillard returns to a Marx-like philosophy of history concerning the way humans can change their lives actively instead of interpreting it: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to change it"⁸⁹. So, paraphrasing David Harvey, it could be said that the *enigma* of turbo-capitalism mainly becomes an enigma of socio-political agency in the era of self-terrorism⁹⁰. If there is even a small chance to reconstruct the mirror of politics, Jean Baudrillard, by showing us the *bizarre* consequences of our passivity in the hyperreality of transpolitics, suggests to analyze thoroughly and in-depth this peculiar phenomenon of the 'agony of power'. The agony of power is really the agony of the socio-political subject in the edge of abyss, i.e. the transparency of evil⁹¹. In this vein, if this *post-foundational* structure of transpolitics signifies the absolute ontotheological openness of

⁸⁴ Claude Lefort, *Machiavelli in the Making*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 2015, pp. 240-279.

⁸⁵ Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Dover Publications, Inc., United States, 2015.

⁸⁶ Spiros Makris, "Discourses of revolutionary subject in contemporary Marxism. Critical reflections through Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's oeuvre", In: *Theoria & Praxis. International Journal of Interdisciplinary Thought*, No. 1, Vol. 3, (2015), pp. 1-10.

⁸⁷ Zygmunt Bauman, *In Search of Politics*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 58.

⁸⁸ Jacques Lacan, *Écrits. The FIRST Complete Edition in English*, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York and London, 2006, p. 75.

⁸⁹ Karl Marx with Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology. Includes: Theses on Feuerbach and the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*, Prometheus Books, New York, 1998, p. 571.

⁹⁰ David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 215.

⁹¹ Jean Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil. Essays on Extreme Phenomena*, Verso, London and New York, 1993 (Translated by James Benedict).



politics towards a *liquid modernity*⁹², then, by the same token, it could be argued that this new ambivalent and contingent post-Totalitarian era gives us the opportunities to actively and consciously seek new forms of socio-political symbolization and representation away from the self-catastrophic parodic negativity of cannibalization, carnivalization and transparency of the political. Of course, this is not an easy way for us to efficiently deal with the problem of turbo-capitalism and of course this is not a naive proposal to pursue a new social utopia⁹³. By contrast, it is a proper way to reconsider the question of political action today or, in other words, to grasp how we must re-establish our public spaces, i.e our republics in the etymological meaning of *res publica* (public affairs)⁹⁴.

For Jean Baudrillard, the pataphysic phenomenon of cannibalization is when hegemonic power in the era of turbo-capitalism is turning against itself. In this case, power as an anti-meta-power moves beyond its ontotheological limits. Therefore, this hegemonic kind of anti-meta-power is by definition an unrestricted kind of power. This paradoxical development in late modernity, as happens also with the Baumanian approach, leads everything under a state of *liquidation*. From now on, there are no symbols, no representations, no tangible realities but only *empty or floating signifiers* of an unlimited carnivalization⁹⁵. The era of anti-meta-power brings to the fore the phenomenon of transpolitics. The prefix 'trans', in Baudrillardian thought, means the *transparency of power*. As power is empty of every symbolization and representation stays alone with itself. In fact, it tends to be a process of a *boundless aestheticization*. Paraphrased Walter Benjamin, it could be argued that anti-meta-power or transpolitics is the aestheticization of politics itself⁹⁶. Mass media, entertainment, consumerism and seduction transfer politics of domination into a hegemony of parody, simulation and simulacra. Transpolitics absorbs symbols and representations; breaks the mirrors of clear reference between things and concepts and leads citizenry in the pataphysic state of passivity, inertia, apathy and silence⁹⁷. As in the case of traditional fascism, in the era of turbo-capitalism, transpolitics turns into transparency of evil. Humans, without any mediation, appear themselves in the empty mirror of populism and demagogy. For Jean Baudrillard, silent citizens are absolutely accomplices in this new Apocalypse. Actually, Baudrillard, as an apocalyptic prophet, foretold the advent of contemporary populism and in this sense both the end of the social and politics. So, put it in a nutshell, cannibalization of politics means the end of politics through an aestheticization or a carnivalization of symbolic exchange. By taking seriously into consideration, Claude Lefort's theory of power as an empty space, it would be not an exaggeration to argue that Baudrillardian approach of turbo-capitalism and anti-meta-power could be conceived as an

⁹² Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 16; Oliver Marchart, *Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007, p. 154; Oliver Marchart, *Post-Foundational Theories of Democracy. Reclaiming Freedom, Equality, Solidarity*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2018 and Oliver Marchart, *Thinking Antagonism. Political Ontology After Laclau*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2018.


⁹³ Jean Baudrillard, *Utopia Deferred. Writings for Utopie (1967-1978)*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2006, pp. 31-32 and pp. 61-63.

⁹⁴ Dana R. Villa, 'Postmodernism and the Public Sphere', In: *American Political Science Review*, No. 3, Vol. 86 (1992), pp. 712-721.

⁹⁵ Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)*, Verso, London and New York, 1996, p. 36.

⁹⁶ Walter Benjamin, *Selected Writings. Volume 3, 1935-1938*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 2006, pp. 120-122 (Translated by Edmund Jephcott, Howard Eiland, and Others).

⁹⁷ Jean Baudrillard, *The Disappearance of Culture. Uncollected Interviews*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2017 (Edited by Richard G. Smith and David B. Clarke).



archetypic *post-foundational social ontotheology* about ‘the political’ in which hegemony, as power in a state of a virtual apotheosis, is trans-formed (see the prefix ‘trans’) into a pataphysic game of absolute risk and self-de(con)struction. In this regard, turbo-capitalism is conceived as a state of power risk and popular self-catastrophe. Therefore, the agony of hegemonic power paradoxically, ironically and eschatologically expresses the abyssal power of human agony in the age of silent masses and transpolitics. In Arendt’s own terms, both cannibalization and carnivalization of hegemonic power signal the ontotheological advent of post-Totalitarian world of *mass society* and *worldlessness*⁹⁸.

In his seminal book ‘Carnival and Cannibal’, Baudrillard analyzes further the phenomenon of transpolitics and the transparency of evil by putting the emphasis on the human *accountability*, i.e. human responsibility in the sense of an active and so thoughtfulness and prudent citizenship. Hence, if cannibalization means a humanity that cannibalizes itself or a humanity that has cannibalized the human condition as such, then this pataphysic human fatality (i.e. mortality) (of both cannibalization and carnivalization) can be changed only through a human society which could be break this *vicious circle* of turbo-capitalism by stopping to consume itself as a *zombie*. This is a difficult change because, as Baudrillard clearly shows, the individual has been entrapped into this peculiar hyper-power of hegemony which lacks every kind of legitimation, representation and symbolization. Actually, to the extent that this is a world empty of masters and slaves, dominators and the dominated or hegemonizers and the hegemonized, the liberation is not just a kind of revolution or emancipation. If there is an optimistic opportunity for us to be set free from the fatal conditions of cannibalization and carnivalization this is the case of either a reflexive individual or a collective subject which could be rearrange the broken mirror of politics in terms of *symbolical exchange* and *political representation*. From this viewpoint, this kind of ontotheological, symbolical and political change means that we ought to deconstruct this transparent or *ventriloquist* evil which appears or speaks instead of us without us and finally against us. From a pure Heideggerian perspective, this definitely means that we must rethink the phenomenological and existential implications of modernity itself. In other words, it means that we must take seriously into account the critical relationship between the social and technological aspects of our lives that give birth to a special kind of political community that is not a *power simulation* but a *polis* in the Aristotelian or Arendtian sense or, as Zygmunt Bauman writes, a polis in the meaning of *agora* in which people act, speak and judge in concert producing an entire culture of symbolical exchange, corpo-real communication, deliberation, legitimation and political representation⁹⁹.

In 1978, first in the French language and then in 1983 in the English speaking audience, Jean Baudrillard published his main socio-political *manifesto* with the very provocative title ‘In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities or the End of the Social’¹⁰⁰. It seems quite difficult almost impossible to grasp in-depth the so-called Baudrillardian ‘transpolitical world’¹⁰¹, without having previously to deal with this manifesto and its argumentation both on the end of the social and political in the era of hyperreality or turbo capitalism. As in the case of the Spinozian conatus, Baudrillard formulates a paradoxical (i.e. pataphysical) social

⁹⁸ John Kiess, Hannah Arendt and Theology, Bloomsbury, London and New York, 2016, p. 95.

⁹⁹ Bauman Zygmunt, ‘From agora to the marketplace, and whereto from here?’, In: Journal of Globalization Studies, No. 1, Vol. 2 (2011), pp. 3-14.

¹⁰⁰ Jean Baudrillard, In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities Or The End Of The Social, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007 (Translated by Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton and Andrew Berardini).

¹⁰¹ Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard. Live Theory, Continuum, London, New York, 2004, p. 91.



ontotheology or a theory of anti-meta-power in the postmodernity by using the *implosive energy* of the masses as an eschatological vehicle in order to bring to the fore the thorny question of agency in late capitalism. To put it in a nutshell, both the end of the social and the end of 'the political' signify first and foremost the tragic *loss of agency* in the era of transpolitics. Masses, in this transpolitical context, are characterized by the paradoxical strength of *inertia* and *apathy*. By and large, they look like a 'gigantic black hole', and this is undoubtedly one more example of Jean Baudrillard's idiosyncratic metaphorical and poetical expression¹⁰², that absorbs everything, especially the famous Western signifiers of State, History, Culture and above all Meaning itself¹⁰³. By cancelling every political representation, masses themselves represents the *social void* per se. As far as Jean Baudrillard is concerned, this is the human condition of simulation par excellence. In the era of transpolitics or, in other words, of turbo capitalism everything takes place *in vacuo*¹⁰⁴. Paraphrasing the prophetic and messianic French anti-philosopher, it can be argued, both as a tragic and redeeming conclusion, that transpolitical masses in the hegemonic era of turbo-capitalism (or the 'multitude' in the Spinozian jargon) are "a black hole that engulfs the social"¹⁰⁵.

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
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
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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF “SELF EXAMINATION OR SELF KNOWING” FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF RUMI AND SHANKARA

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ABSTRACT

The mystics always have a special interest in human beings. They think about both human being and his ideas, that is, in their thinking anthropology is of great importance from various dimensions especially epistemological, ethical and social. Therefore, the drawing and explanation of the features of the mystical man is a concern. They are for the sake of man and his greatness. Of course, it should be noted that their attitude towards humans is more than moral and moral dimension, and other aspects of anthropology, practical action, have a special place in his thought. This attitude towards man by him is the epistemic existential dimensions, as well as the nature of human truth, and in particular, the perfect man's attributes Includes. In this article, we use the views and opinions of these two great mystics and their interpretation based on their literary texts to study the role and effect of self-knowledge as a great and common way between the two mystics for connecting to the Absolute Truth. The present study is a descriptive comparative study and data are analyzed and analyzed using a content analysis method in a library method.

Keywords: self; self-knowledge; knowledge; love; human;

INTRODUCTION

Although the two great mystics of Islam and Hinduism (Rumi and Shankara) have separate origins and developed in a different cultural atmosphere and their teachings are in some ways different from each other, they have also been very similar. This affinity and similarity can be seen in their mysticism. Due to the similarities and similarities between the Hindu school and the Masnavi, the study of the issue of unity between man and God is of particular importance in both schools. . Vedanta is the most complete and most mundane Hindu school that represents the teachings of the Upanishads and is based on the theory of the unity of existence and the main points raised in it are attention to the ultimate and divine truth. Shankara, as one of the great scholars and commentators of this school of aspirations the monotheism expanded the Upanishads and established the beliefs of Brahmasotra and considered the basis of all the realities of the world as Brahman. (India's Philosophical Religions and Schools, 2-781). In his view, Brahman's knowledge is to discover the pure analogy of Atman and Brahman, and the infinite Brahman comes from the illusion of relativity, and to the fourfold, the awakening world, the dream world, for example, the deep



sleep world and his attitude to Atman. These determinations in the world of minerals are in the form of five determinations, namely, the corners of the food, the cornerstone, the cortex of the mind and the cortex and they create a hide that prevents everyone from seeing the inner light. This ignorance and ignorance in the great world appear as a force in the world and in the world of illusion and in the world of knowledge as ignorance and ignorance. (Ibid, 6-785). In Islamic mysticism, Rumi, in his works, addresses the issue of God and soul and importance an affiliate and a lover and lover alliance. Rumi has a special interest in man. He also contemplates the existence of man and his thoughts, that is, in the words of Rumi, anthropology is of great importance from various dimensions especially epistemological, ethical and social.

Therefore, the drawing and explanation of the features of the mystical man indicates the concern of Rumi To the human being and to the greatness of his being. Of course, it should be noted that Rumi's attitude towards man is more than the mystical and creative aspect, so that theoretical mysticism, practical action is a special place in his thought that this attitude toward man by him manifests the epistemic existential dimensions as well as the nature of human truth and, in particular, the perfect man's attributes has.

In Rumi's view, human being consists of two truths of the body and soul or soul, each of which has its own specific characteristics. The physical aspect of his resemblance and proximity to nature and the animal itself, while his spiritual dimension shows the high spiritual tendencies in him, suggests that man has moved from this land to this earthly and material world, And away from the original home, he pays special attention to the greatness of man in the creation of all its dimensions and makes him the essence. The abstract of the universe and the universe knows that other beings, as attributes and traits, are toward him (Sobhani, 1373-1893).

Shankara considers man as a creature that is superior to all creatures because the whole intellect is in man, as well as the human being who speaks and sees based on thoughts and tells the future and understands many things, and surrounded the environment and is superior to all realms of being. Human being is the only one that manifested in the complete manifestation of God in him. Additionally, man is an individual whose complete manifestation of God has come to pass. In addition, man is an organism whose constructive thought He is (Nasri, 1371-28), in the words "Whoever thinks he becomes the same is forever" (Reza Zadeh Shafagh-1367-417).

From the point of view of the Upanishads in man, a person called Atman, which is a manifestation of the universal soul or Brahman, that "the whole soul is the same individual and the same creation" (ibid., 379) is also the human being who aspires to his perfection and always must pay attention to his ambition And he does not neglect him because he neglects humanity's perfection. Atma is more than anything else for human beings. From child and property, and from everything else, should be considered more lovable (Nasri, 1371-9-28). Therefore, human beings have considered a human having two physical and immaterial realms, which have a spirit and a body, and consists of "Joe Atman" is himself the perm Atman of himself, the cosmic or general, which Jive Atman enjoys from the result of the act, and Perm Atman is an observer of actions, and they have two shades of certainty (31-kath: 6.4svet.up).

Also, for the understanding of Atman, the human body and its organs are brought as allegories (brhad.up.2.2-1-4), and the difference between the object and Atman is mentioned, that the body of life is the place of Atman, and Atman belongs to the object But after leaving it, it abandons (chand.up.1-1-2).



1. THE BASICS OF MYSTICISM IN RUMI'S VIEW

The basis of the attitude of Muslim mystics to the world is accepted by the Qur'anic teachings. God has repeatedly emphasized in the Holy Qur'an that you should study in the earth, learn the lessons of the ancestors (Anam/ 11) and learn about the quality of creation. (Spider, Verse: 20) God revealed His Signs and Verses in horizons of the world and souls, (Foselat/ 53), and the human being sees it as the other side. (Baqerah/ 115)

Rumi was aware of the fact that there is no distance between this world and the hereafter. This world is in that world and that world is also the environment in this world. We also, if we know how this world is, we will find that the world is in the hereafter, and there is not only hostility between the world and the hereafter, but also in terms of friendship and background and participation in the unity. (Soroush, 1371, p.100) Rumi, who knew the seven cities of love and who was familiar with the geography of the world of spirituality, sees no geographical boundaries between the world and the hereafter, and says:

The world is all over the world. It is about the mysticism of the world. It is a happy world (Dinani, 2004, p. 199).

Rumi's world is not the world of despair and grief that is at the forefront of Khayyami, which does not look beyond the senses of the world, nor the cold and impoverished climate of the monastery, who does not feel the world. (Zarrin Kob, 1382, p. 15), not a world full of persecution and violence, nor a small and sensible area of knowledge and experience, a wavy irritation that sweeps through its passion, freshness, meaning and life, and Life is a long road with a joyous song that humans sing and love throughout. (Ibid) Such a world "is merely to be experienced and felt, not to be described" (Abdul Hakim, 1375, p. 58). Therefore, it is only those who find that the context is they have put together a couch with Rumi in his life so that he can fly along with him in his world, and Rumi's speech is the only invitation from these people. (Portal, 1379, p. 56)

Rumi never misses the world and despises the universe, and does not deny the earth. In his view, what condemns the name of the world, or, to put it more correctly, the humble world is the same greed, and in not finding the truth. In this regard, the world is a concept that changes to the value of everyone and, from the one who has not gained the truth, this world is a ghost. (Goppinari, 2005, p. 274), as it says:


O mouth of your own infernal crust!

The other light of the world of the milk of the blood of the blood Pahlavi (Molavi, 1382.2-12-13). It turns out that the shameless world in terms of hair loss is a world that does not bring a man to social calm and does not provide him with a secure future and does not lead him to a vital life free from bruises and full of inner affluence.

The world is captured by the fork of greed, and unassigned to the eternal ecstasy, a zone that overcomes the spiritual calm of humans and reduces man from a high human condition, to the point where everyone thinks of his personal and personal interests. It is a place where greed is driven by the command and is an inspirational range, with conditions that create greed (Golpinani, 2005, p. 275).

2. THE BASICS OF MYSTICISM IN SHANKARA'S VIEW

Shankara (Sen'kara 880-820) is a thinker of existential unity, and Brahman, Atman, and the unity between them form the basis of his intellectual system. He expanded and promoted the uniqueness of the Upanishads, and organized the ideas and votes of the Prophet. The inviolable boundary of all the realities of the world is called Brahman, that is, the principle of neutrality which, in the dimension of transcendence and its literal aspect,



does not have any attribute, and can only be expressed in the essence of the universe, I believe that being is mere and beyond the subjective and objective determinations of Atman Atman and Brahman are two poles of reality in the great and minor universe, and according to Vedanta, "Brahman is real, the mortal world is the soul of the same Atman is not enough."

The universe has been added to Brahman. And if we remove all manifestations and limitations from the text of the facts and abstraction, what remains is the absolute reality that remains and radiates on itself. In their view, Brahman's knowledge of the secrecy of pure adherence Atman and Brahman, the reality of the world can be summed up in this brief equation, namely, "Atman is equal to Berahman." Therefore, the religion of Vedanta says Shankara is a religion of complete dishonesty and lack of plurality.

Shankara never accepted the principle of the plurality of ghosts, and according to him, Amman is not the result of the accumulation of all personal spirits, but an entirely unassailable and spiritual entity that is neither subject nor passive and is not confined to consciousness and integrity, but absolute observer and witness Like Brahman, and in terms like "you are the same", the phrase "you are the same" indicates that if you include the adjectives that come into the word "you" and depict it as something other than that " You "will mean" Atman "of the same" it ", ie" Brahman ", because these two facts are two mirror-shaped faces (Shayegan, 1389-84-783). According to Shankar, the soul and God are absolutely and similar. The soul is God and Allah the same being that they say this unity (Chatterjee and Data, 2005-632)

3. THE BASICS OF MYSTICISM IN SHANKARA'S VIEW

Self-knowledge in Islam and in the case of the Muslim mystics as the encyclopedia, Rumi emphasized the importance of this issue by referring to a well-known Saying from Imam Ali (AS), which stated: "Everyone who knows himself knows his Lord, undoubtedly" Has given Of course, we know that the evolution of the world is conditional on the evolution of the universe and reaching the worker is the culmination of human evolution, and this issue is not possible without self-knowledge. That's why no knowledge is as important as self-knowledge.

In this regard, Rumi says: "*A man is something great, everything is written in him, and he does not allow Cover and darkness that he reads that science in the veil and the darkness of these various occupations.*" (Rumi, 81: 81) In addition, self-knowledge, apart from its intrinsic value, is of special significance because of the lack of knowledge of theology and the knowledge of the god-fearing God (Faiz Kashani, 1410: 1/78). According to Rumi, he says: *For this, the Prophet created this description for anyone who knew himself, knows his Lord* (Mathnavi, 1388: 5/2114). With this citation, Rumi reminds us that the necessity of recognizing and the inner paths is that the true self of man is the manifestation of the divine right and that this will not be realized until the person chooses to do so (Rumi, 2001: 10). In his view, in the spirit of the nursery and behind you, in the human soul, there are emotions and emotions and mysterious powers that human beings are unaware of, but the effect and sign of the inner forces and forces of mankind are manifest in man's actions and behavior. Round (Hom., 1376: 1/194). In his prose book, the significance of this kind of noble science and knowledge is as follows: "Now also the scholars of the time split in hair and other things that they do not belong to, and they are surrounded by them in general, and what is important and He is the closest of all, he is an insider and does not know his own " (Rumi, 1380: 17). Also, in the Rumi universe, none of human science and education has the value and importance of self-knowledge.



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Its appearance is a mosquito flour to the wheel, its interior is a seven-wheel environment

Intact solar hidden in a particle, male lion in a bumper sheath

Sunny in one hidden particle, suddenly open that particle mouth

The scientific field is not hidden, it is hidden in three tastes of the world

(Masnavi 3579/5 and 4580/6, 1/2502, 37674/4: 1388)

If a man knows that right has manifested himself, he will seek his discovery because God created him for this reason.

Because the meaning of Great Lord was in manifestation and appearance

So the Caliph was the owner of the throne, so that his king was a mirror

Then he gave him an empty robe, and he asked for his darkness

(Mathnavi, 3307/6: 1388)

The most important thing that mankind gives to man is knowing the heart or soul in which he has chosen a god with all glory and abundance (the inquiry of 1387/6/3317). Therefore, in Rumi's thought, this fact is repeated every time, and it turns out that until a person recognizes his identity and identity, he will not be able to understand the true social life of religion and prosperity. Self-awareness is the most important human-centered issue of religion. (Ja'fari, 1366/c. 3/231). In addition, Rumi says that humans tend to feel so self-righteous that his interpretation of the rank of the great sultan who can be the essence of the creatures of the universe is a complex expression (Soroush 2006/1985).

4. THE POSITION OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SANKARA

Self-knowledge and knowledge of the soul are one of the main sources of God's knowledge and have always been considered in mystical systems. Of course, this is not the coordinates of Islamic mysticism, but in fact, in most of the mystical religious systems there can be traced back to it. Among Hindu thinkers, Ara Shankara is a thinker and a great commentator of the Vedanta, and since he is a moderated school of dualism. The connection



between the human soul with the original origin and the emphasis on its uniqueness is one of the fundamental determinations of the foundations of the mystical system. The most important factor in the unity of Atman and Brahman in the school is to learn the truth of the truth, and the existence of Brahman is the fact that we call it "self" or "pronoun", because every creature is self-conscious as "I am" So Brahman is the origin of the universe, which is exported from all beings, and is a joke of our existence, which we say to Atman, whoever knows the truth about the truth, has realized the truth of the truth, and everyone who knows the Brahman, that is, the inward insistence He has realized that "I am indeed a Brahman" (Shayegan, 1389-9 / 808)-

Therefore, the unity of Atman (soul) and Brahman in the school of Vedanta, which is regarded as one of the most important teachings, can in fact be translated as "the true self of man, it is God." Based on this, Brahman is the truth, and in Inside us, the sacrifices of the Vedas and the rituals that are performed with it are superfluous and even meaningless to reach the purpose of the way of karma or of the acts of men, but through the knowledge of oneself, and the true sacrifice is also to sacrifice all of you and to abandon "I".

COMPARE AND CONCLUSION

The mystical approach to self-knowledge is one of the most important issues that makes the mystics distinct from others, especially philosophers and theologians, although the ultimate goal is the mystic of the knowledge of the Lord, but from the point of view of the mystics, the only way, or at least the most correct way of knowing, is self-knowledge (Unity of existence, narrated by Ibn Arabi and Eckhart, 279) is a view we do not think about it, but it is the path to reaching that intuition, and this is said by the Prophet (s), that whoever knows himself, God Knows. Everything is from you and in you. There is nothing outside of you (Ibn Arabi, 1404: 101)

If we consider the most important goal in the mysticism of alliance and the connection of man to God, this matter has been reflected in the school of Islam and Shahnara and Masnavi Rumi. By comparing these two schools, we can look at similarities and differences in the issue. One of the similarities of these two schools is the attention to the problem of repentance, which corresponds to human excellence and the connection to the absolute truth. The importance of self-knowledge and the progression of anxiety to achieve the connection between the soul and God in this regard is very important in both schools, too. In addition, there are similarities between the two schools in terms of the existence of obstacles to connecting and joining the Lord, because in both schools, eliminating ignorance and relying not on the apparent knowledge or on Evydia, the avoidance of illusion or Maya and the avoidance of diseases Ethical, has been emphasized. However, similarities can be seen between the two schools. Among them, one can imagine love, which is not mentioned in the school of love as one of the sure ways to achieve the unity of Atman and Brahman. While in Rumi's view, ultimate divine love is to reach the level of unity and unity. This love is so passionate that it is incapable of describing it. Also, what separates human beings from one's own self and gives them the right to survive is love that eliminates itself in the presence of mankind, and removes God's Masnavi from the path of the right and leaves the way for the smooth seamstress makes the difficulty easy and tough. And in the light of evolution and transformation, man becomes empty to him and becomes self-destructive and, with his own power, possesses divine traits, survives to the truth and endures immortality.



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